TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 391 Spying without Spies: Origins ofAmerica’s Secret Nuclear Surveillance Sys tem. By Charles A. Ziegler and David Jacobson. Westport, Conn., and London: Praeger, 1995. Pp. xi+242; notes, bibliography, in dex. $49.95. Now that the age of heroic inventors is long over, many people believe that technology has a life of its own. This book disproves that idea, for it clearly demonstrates that technological advances come neither from brilliant inventors nor from a mysterious and autono mous force, but out of committee meetings. The technology in question is the detection of nuclear explosions from afar, more specificallythe techniquesusedbythe UnitedStatesto detect the first Soviet atomic bomb, code-namedJoe-1. Interestingly, from the time of Hiroshima on, the press and the American public believed that detecting an atomic explosion, even in a remote part of the Soviet Union, would be a simple matter. After all, wouldn’t so powerful an explosion produce tremors in the earth that seismo graphs could register and create enough radioactive dust to set off Geiger counters around the world? In fact, as the authors make abun dantly clear, detecting an atomic explosion was an extraordinarily costly and complex undertaking, involving dozens ofairplanes flying around the clock, several highly specialized laboratories, and hun dreds of aviators, technicians, and scientists to staff them. Thanks to recently declassified documents in the National Ar chives and to diligent searching on the authors’ part, the technical and scientific complexities ofthe detection program are now becom ing clear. Sections of this book deal with the techniques of meteoro logical surveying, air filtration, radiochemistry, and seismology, as well as various attempts to detect high-altitude air pressure waves. Science and technology are not the main theme of the book, how ever, and they occupy only three of the eleven chapters. Rather, it is the rivalries among the army, the navy, the army air force, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Group or Agency that take center stage. Hidden behind a profusion of acro nyms (AFMSW-1, AFOAT-1, AFTAC) and code words (Fitzwilliam, Crossroads, Murray Hill Area, etc.), these organizations tried as hard to preempt each other in controlling a lucrative new activity as to detect a Soviet bomb. This is the story of the bureaucratic turfwars, the endless committee meetings, and the intricate review procedures that the detection program generated. This emphasis is a result of the sources, consisting of declassified memos, letters, and reports, most of them written as ammunition in the bureaucratic guerrilla wars. A reader interested in the results of the program will wonder how anything ever got done, with so many bureaucrats (in and out of uniform) squabbling, conniving, and keeping each other in the dark with elaborate and counterproductive security measures. In fact, the detection program almost did not happen. Although 392 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE the press, the public, and lower-level officials expected a Soviet bomb to explode imminently, the authors show that the most power ful and knowledgeable officials in the nuclear establishment—Gen eral Leslie Groves and J. Robert Oppenheimer, and later James B. Conant and Vannevar Bush—were quite certain that the United States could enjoy its nuclear monopoly for a decade or longer. They based their rosy assessment on the conviction that atomic bombs could only be made out of the high-grade uranium found in a single mine in the Belgian Congo, a rare substance for which the United States had cornered the market. They also believed that the Russians were technologically and culturally too backward to catch up with the United States or to develop methods to use low-grade uranium ores. As a result, they allowed the armed services to develop their detection methods at a leisurely pace without guidance from above or a sense of urgency. When the Soviets exploded Joe-1 barely four years after Hiroshima, “Top Washington officials . . . wire shocked and surprised” (p. 212). This is a fine, well-researched book that will delight historians of American bureaucracy and the military. Historians of technology will find several interesting sections in it, but they will wish for more. Daniel R. Headrick Dr. Headrick, professor of history and...
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