Nuclear Project Research Articles

Socio-cultural risks of multimodal large generative models of "artificial intelligence" (GenAI)

The article is devoted to the study of the conditions for ensuring the information security of Russian citizens when using generative "artificial intelligence" technologies in the socio-cultural sphere. The relevance of the topic is due to the modern high rates of development of computer neural networks that generate multimedia content: texts, images, sounds and videos. The developers classify generative technologies as "artificial intelligence", position them as a "new nuclear project" capable of radically increasing the productivity of socio-cultural creativity, and receive significant government, corporate and investment financing. The object of the study is modern multimedia generative models, the subject of the study is the possibility of their use in the socio-cultural sphere of creativity and the associated risks of information security. The purpose of the study is to determine the conditions for ensuring the information security of Russian citizens when using multimodal generative technologies in the socio-cultural sphere. The research materials are scientific publications of recent years (2021–2024) in Russian journals of the HAC list (categories K1, K2) and international Scopus publications (quartiles Q1, Q2) devoted to research and critical analysis of the possibilities of multimodal generative models, associated risks and security tools. The philosophical methodology is applied: theoretical and cultural analysis, synthesis. The scientific novelty of the article is due to the application of a philosophical theoretical and cultural methodology for a critical comparison of the declarations of developers and the actual potential of applications of multimodal generative technologies. The result of the study is an assessment of how greatly exaggerated the risks predicted based on the positioning of the technologies in question as "artificial intelligence". The real risks are proposed to include: the incompatibility of development costs with the usefulness of the results; lowering the cultural level of professional and amateur creativity and worsening the tastes of the mass audience; use in "social engineering", fraud, mass disinformation, fake news, manipulation of public consciousness, "cancellation culture", destruction of traditional values and substitution of socio-cultural identity. The means of ensuring the safety of Russian citizens in the development and use of multimedia generative technologies in the socio-cultural sphere are recommended.

Use of Modeling as an Enabler for Cross-Topic Knowledge Management and Ontologies to Support Return of Experience and Replicability of Large Nuclear Projects

Abstract Nuclear projects often produce and consume a large amount of knowledge. Capitalization on this knowledge constitutes a significant way to increase efficiency on subsequent projects for any stakeholder. In this study, modeling is used as a main approach to support this capitalization. It constitutes, through graphical layout, a more reliable and robust way to transfer information. Moreover, the use of an interconnected set of models enables organizations to break the silos between the disciplines. The approach proposed is based on the operational implementation of existing “on-the-shelf” elements to benefit from previous implementations. The presented example illustrates how, on a nuclear project, engineering processes have been modeled from knowledge of previous projects. These components are all interconnected to constitute a self-supporting set of models as a body of knowledge. The use of models as a main base for knowledge management and transfer has been initiated due to (i) increased traceability of design decisions and impact analysis required by ever-increasing safety requirements from 1980s, 1990s, and Fukushima accident for new nuclear and (ii) gradual departures of design teams and lifetime extension of existing power plants requiring efficient ways to pass down knowledge to newcomers. Additionally, transfer of knowledge from document-centric to model-centric has enabled securitization of interfaces (between organizations, between systems) due to more numerous stakeholders and reduction of rework and site works.

“...We have begun preparing a work on the history of the nuclear project in the country”: on the contribution of the Institute of the History of Natural Science and Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences to the study of the history of the creation of domestic nuclear weapons

“...We have begun preparing a work on the history of the nuclear project in the country”: on the contribution of the Institute of the History of Natural Science and Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences to the study of the history of the creation of domestic nuclear weapons

Activities of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR Pavlo Yakovlevych Meshyk (1953)

The article examines the insufficiently studied in historical and legal science issue of the activities of such a controversial political figure of the first post-Stalin months of 1953 as Pavlo Yakovlevych Meshyk. It is emphasised that he, having a university degree (which was rare for NKVD personnel in those years) and significant organisational skills, made a successful career in the central apparatus of the People’s Commissariat in the late 1930s. This was also due to the patronage of P. Meshyk by L. Beria. P. Meshyk was directly involved in Stalin’s repressions. In 1941, at the age of 30, he first became People’s Commissar for State Security of the Ukrainian SSR. In 1943, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General. From 1945 until March 1953, he worked on the implementation of the Soviet nuclear project. He was awarded the Order of Lenin (1949) for his active participation in the implementation of the nuclear programme, and later even received the Stalin Prize in Science and Technology (1951). In March 1953, he was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic, where he pursued a policy of strengthening the rule of law in the activities of the state security agencies and purging them of the most odious and incompetent employees. At the same time, a policy was implemented to rid the state security agencies of their dependence on the influence of the Communist Party. At the same time, P. Meshyk came into conflict with some party officials, including the then leader of the republic, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U, L. Melnikov. As a result, L. Melnikov was dismissed. P. Meshyk also took some measures to “root” the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, translated the ministry’s office work into Ukrainian, eased some of the Soviet government’s repressive policies towards the Ukrainian national liberation movement, actually restored the normal operation of Lviv State University, and improved contacts with Western Ukrainian intellectuals. These were positive aspects of the minister’s activities that can be assessed as attempts at reform. However, P. Meshyk stayed in the post of Minister of the Interior for only three months. In June 1953, he was arrested and later convicted on charges of treason and conspiracy to seize power, and in December of the same year, Meshyk was shot dead. He was partially rehabilitated in 2000.

THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX IN URAL HISTORIOGRAPHY

The article deals with the results and achievements of Ural scientists in studying the nuclear industry history. Public interest in detailed, scientifically based coverage of the construction, development and operation of enterprises in the nuclear weapons complex has always existed, but the development of this initiative was hampered by the special secrecy of archival materials on the activities of all enterprises and organizations related to the development and serial production of nuclear charges and ammunition. Only the socio-ideological changes caused by perestroika led to the declassification of archival funds, making them available for research. This situation has led to an increase in the number of publications on the nuclear project topic, including publications of Ural scientists.

Специфика кадрового комплектования советского акционерного общества «Висмут»: материалы переписки аппарата Первого главного управления при Совете министров СССР и парторганизаций Свердловского обкома ВКП(б) в 1949 г.

The publication introduces into scientific use correspondence of the deputy head of the First Main Directorate (PGU, executing agency of the Soviet nuclear project) under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Ya. Meshik with the party organizations of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the AUCP (B) on the issue of recruitment for work abroad. The analysis of references to the resolutions of the Council of Ministers known to researchers establishes that the Soviet Joint-Stock Company “Wismut” located in Germany recruited mining engineers and specialists in the field of geological exploration. Its subordinates were engaged in search and development of uranium deposits in the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany. A raw material base for extraction and processing of uranium-containing ores was formed for implementation of the Soviet nuclear weapons program in the second half of the 1940s. For reasons of state secrecy, researchers are still significantly limited in access to archival documents on the history of the nuclear project. Thus, introduction into scientific use of new historical sources related to the project implementation already seems sufficiently relevant and high-demand scientific task. In this case, it is a selection of five documents deposited in the materials of the Sverdlovsk City Committee of the AUCP (B) Documentation Center of Public Organizations of the Sverdlovsk Region associated with the mass recruitment of mining and exploration workers entrusted to the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the AUCP (B) in spring of 1949 in the interests of the nuclear project. At the direction of the Regional Committee (obkom), the Sverdlovsk City Committee selected a number of necessary specialists, and the First Main Directorate began their registration for work abroad. In the autumn of 1949, a request came from the PGU about expediency of such transfer for one of the selected specialists. Doubts were caused by minor flaws indicated in his generally positive characteristic. Responding to the request, the city committee withdrew its decision. The introduction of the identified documents collection into scientific use is due to two reasons. Firstly, at the grassroots stage, it fixes the recruitment system for the Soviet nuclear project, which has been little studied up to date. Secondly, on a hypothetical level, it can be considered an illustration of a mechanism of evasion from mobilization into the atomic project system, which frightened many specialists with its obscurity.

М.А. Длугач – забытый «генерал промышленности»

Moses Abramovich Dlugach is one of those wartime leaders who are called Generals of Industry: a metallurgical engineer, director of the largest machine-building enterprises, and a highranking party organizer. Despite the bright mark left by M.A. Dlugach in Leningrad (1940-42) and the Urals (1943), the available information about his career is very fragmentary, and some data are false. The purpose of the publication is to reconstruct the life and work path of the honored industry figure, evaluate his contribution to the cause of Victory, and show the features of the USSR industry management in the 1940s using the work of M.A. Dlugach as an example.. The publication is based on materials from the Central State Archive of Historical and Political Documents of St. Petersburg: personal files of leaders, memos on the organization of production and evacuation from Leningrad, and transcripts of speeches. For five years M.A. Dlugach worked his way up from a foundry technician to the sectoral secretary of the Leningrad City Communist Party Committee. With the outbreak of the war, a significant share of responsibility for organizing the production of new types of weapons fell on his shoulders. After the evacuation of the tank and artillery production of the Kirov Plant, carried out under his leadership, M.A. Dlugach headed the remaining dispersed in the city workshops of the enterprise, being the Kirov Plant Director from the end of 1941 to the beginning of 1943. In 1943, he headed the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant for about six months, and was later transferred to Chirchik. As the Director of the Chirchik plant Sredazkhimmash, he took part in the implementation of the Nuclear Project. Upon returning to Leningrad in 1948, he no longer held high positions, returning to the profession of a metallurgical engineer. At the peak of his career, M.A. Dlugach invariably found himself in the most important areas of work - he was responsible for the Leningrad mechanical engineering, for the production of tanks in the Urals and of heavy water for nuclear reactors. Contribution of M.A. Dlugach to maintaining the defense capability of the USSR should not be forgotten.

The Post-Revolutionary Israeli-Iranian Rivalry and Iran's Nuclear Program

There were big changes in the Middle East after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The rebels were against Israel. Tel Aviv had a good relationship with Tehran until 1979, but it was hostile towards its Arab neighbours because of a longstanding desire to rule the area. In times of change, Israel has grown afraid as Iran's power has grown. Israel is against Islam and Muslims. A lack of balance of power in the area and Iran's desire for nuclear weapons have made Iran and Israel compete with each other. A lot of Israelis think that Iran's nuclear project is a threat to their very survival and that it needs to be stopped. This piece talks about the bad feelings between Iran and Israel, the risks that could come from Iran having nuclear weapons, and different ways to get Iran to give up its nuclear programme. The piece is divided into four parts. The first part talks about the history of relations between Iran and Israel and why they are at odds with each other. The second part briefly explains how the division of power in the region led to a direct war between Tehran and Tel Aviv. The third part talks about Iran's nuclear project and the threats it makes against Israel. The last part talks about current plans for sanctions against Iran to get it to give up its nuclear weapons.

Staff Policy and Personnel Practices. Review of the Monograph “The Soviet Atomic Project: An Experience of Human Resourcing” by N. V. Melnikova

The monograph presents a comprehensive analysis of the staffing of the Soviet nuclear project: its principles, forms, methods, mechanisms, as well as organizational, managerial, educational, economic and social measures in the context of the Soviet economic system. The review highlights that in the book, for the first time, the author presents an analysis of previously unpublished materials and sources of a personal nature. This allows to cover various aspects – from the institutional frameworks for the formation of personnel to internal “atomic” social practices. The significance of the presented research lies in the fact that it shows the role of the human factor in the transformation of the USSR into a nuclear power.

The applicability of the Polluter Pays Principle in the field of nuclear energy in the EU

This article will examine whether the Polluter Pays Principle is formulated and applied in EU versus nuclear (Euratom) law and what consequences such application could have for the EU Member Countries, e.g., when deciding on new nuclear projects or life time extension of nuclear installations. The ECJ had already clearly accepted the Polluter Pays Principle’s function of internalization of all environmental costs. It is crystal clear that EU Institutions are required to apply the PPP, together with the Precautionary and the Proportionality Principles. The application of the PPP in the nuclear field has been emphasized in an EU Commission Recommendation of 24 October 2006. On the other hand, with Council Directive 2011/70/EURATOM of 19 July 2011, a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste was launched. In its Article 5(1) the duty to establish and maintain a national framework was formulated, but no mention is made of the application of the PPP, not in this Directive nor in the national reports and the EU follow up reports. The terminology used therein, ‘adequate financial resources’, falls short of an unambiguous adherence to the Polluter Pays Principle. The PPP should hold that ALL costs for decommissioning, waste conditioning and final disposal should be carried by the polluter. A cap on the nuclear waste costs as decided in Belgium seems to be in full contradiction with the earlier decisions of the ECJ and with the EU Commission’s Recommendation of 2006. Furthermore, the EU General Environmental Principles are made applicable to the nuclear energy sector by the ECJ in the Hinkley Point C case. As argued in the present article, the Polluter Pays Principle will be a heavy burden to bring the EU legal acquis in line with all the uncertainties on the costs of closing the cycle of nuclear energy production. Accepting a ‘cap’ on the nuclear waste costs leaves a blank cheque for later generations, which is not only against the Polluter Pays Principle, but is also completely in contradiction with the EU Green Deal regarding fair competition in the field of energy production and limiting the effect of subsidies for costs which have to be borne by the nuclear waste producers.

Ride the wind or go nuclear? A private investment analysis

This study presents a comprehensive investment analysis framework comparing onshore and offshore wind projects with traditional and modular nuclear projects. We assess investment potential excluding and including government financial support, akin to the system implemented in France. Results demonstrate that onshore wind projects rank as the most appealing investment option without government support, followed by offshore wind projects. In specific circumstances, modular nuclear projects prove more attractive based on specific metrics. Surprisingly, French government support tilts the scales, favoring offshore wind projects over onshore wind projects. To achieve investment parity with the most attractive wind project, modular nuclear power plants must receive a feed-in premium similar to that offered to offshore wind projects, leveraging their advantage of shorter construction times over wind projects.

A central facility concept for nuclear microreactor maintenance and fuel cycle management

Commercial deployment of nuclear microreactors presents an opportunity for the industry to rethink its approach to manufacturing, siting, operation and maintenance, and fuel cycle management as certain principles used in grid-scale nuclear projects are not applicable to a decentralized microreactor economy. The success of this nascent industry is dependent on its ability to reduce infrastructure, logistical, regulatory and lifecycle costs. A utility-like ‘Central Facility’ that consolidates the services required and responsibilities borne by vendors into one or a few centralized locations will be necessary to support the deployment of a fleet of microreactors. This paper discusses the requirements for a Central Facility, its implications on the cost structures of owners and suppliers of microreactors, and the impact of the facility for the broader microreactor industry. In addition, this paper discusses the pre-requisites for eligibility as well as the opportunities for a Central Facility host site. While there are many suitable locations for such a capability across the U.S., this paper considers a facility co-located with the Vogtle Nuclear Power Plant and Savannah River Sites to illustrate how a Central Facility can leverage the existing infrastructure and stimulate a local ecosystem.

Staffing and Recruiting in the USSR Nuclear Project

This review considers a monograph by N. V. Melnikova dedicated to the reconstruction of the most significant aspects of staffing in the atomic project in the context of the Soviet economic system. Despite the abundance of publications discussing the history of the creation of nuclear weapons in the USSR, this topic has not yet received adequate coverage, and the monograph under review fills this gap with a wide range of problems examined. More specifically, it addresses the issues of who determined the personnel policy in the nuclear project, what its specificity was, how staffing and recruiting occurred in practice, and due to which factors it was possible to quickly create a powerful and qualified team of the nuclear weapons complex and encourage people to work intensively and responsibly. The research makes a significant contribution to the historiography of the atomic project. However, its value is not limited to this. Some generalizations and conclusions in the monograph make it possible to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the “socialist economic system” and to clarify how it was possible to succeed in solving tasks significant for the country.

The Nuclear Anthropocene of the Soviet north: Cold War vernacular collecting and mining uranium, and its legacies

This paper explores the production of vernacular geological knowledge about uranium during the Cold War. In particular, it investigates uranium gathering practices in Siberia as a form of geopower exercised where Soviet citizens were encouraged to participate in geological exploration of the ‘bowels of the Earth’ for national benefits. This paper further discusses a novel theorization of the early Soviet understanding of the Anthropocene concept in its relation to the notion of nuclearity as formulated by Soviet scholar Vladimir Vernadsky (1863–1945). Finally, the Soviet nuclear project's legacies are analyzed through indigenous experiences of living near the uranium mine in Siberia. The material used for this research comprised a selected set of youth magazine articles and guidelines issued in the 1930s–1950s by Soviet geological agencies with the aim of promoting vernacular geological practices among Soviet citizens, as well as archival materials and field data collected from geologists and indigenous people in Transbaikalia, eastern Siberia, in 2021. This paper shows that Soviet citizens were a crucial part of the nuclear ideology and, at the same time, were treated as the means of nuclear production because of their ability to search for and extract uranium. It further shows how nuclear discourse in the Soviet Union and modern Russia has been shaped by Vernadsky's ideas about the role of nuclear power in the transformation of society.

Iranian National Security: Repercussions of Negotiations with the Great Powers

Negotiations constitute the first step on which countries rely to settle their differences peacefully, especially as they realize that the alternative to negotiations will have exorbitant and disastrous consequences.
 There is no doubt that the negotiation process is a series of activities that need a comprehensive program to define the goals and means of achieving the required results, anticipating what the negotiation process mechanism will interpret, which is known as the negotiation strategy.
 The Iranian negotiations with the great powers do not deviate from this framework, as each party seeks to implement several strategies to achieve the greatest possible gains. These negotiations received wide attention because of their significant impact on security stability in the region in general and the Arabian Gulf region in particular.
 The Western and Iranian negotiating parties regarding the Iranian nuclear project used both strategies of common interest and conflict at the same time. While the Iranians seek to achieve the goal of producing nuclear energy with minimal losses, the Western powers seek to stop the Iranian nuclear program and subject Iranian policy to their will.

TRANSFORMATION OF VALUES OF THE HIGH TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS FROM A VUCA TO A BANI ENVIRONMENT MODEL

The article is dedicated to the study of impact of a BANI-world conditions to implementation of the high technology industrial projects and in particular of the nuclear industry projects. The purpose of the article is to analyze tendencies of changes of different factors related to the high technology nuclear project implementation against the changing conditions of the environment. The object is the project management methodologies in the BANI environment. The subject is theoretical analysis of the values differentiation in between the VUCA and BANI worlds, key aspects of BANI impacting implementation of the nuclear projects. Tasks to be solved: to analyze the transformation from the VUCA model to the BANI model, to present values and their differentiation as the basis for survival in the new world order, to develop a method for assessing project risks in the BANI environment. Methods: practical empirical analysis of nuclear project risks in comparison with BANI-model forecasts, applied research, project risk management methodology, probability theory. The following results were obtained: the differences between the values of s VUCA and BANI are determined, an understanding of the general changes that have arisen due to the functionality of the environment is provided, the project management methodology applicable in the BANI environment is analyzed, a qualitative and quantitative risk analysis based on BANI projections is implemented on the example of a nuclear project in Ukraine, and the grounds for determining the most influential BANI forecast are proposed. The main results of the research are identification and analysis of values and their differentiation in the process of transformation from the VUCA to the BANI world, proposals for the project management approach which could cover the needs of the nuclear project and the consequences of this transformation. To estimate risks, it was proposed to use qualitative and quantitative methods of risk assessment. The case study of one of the nuclear projects in Ukraine, and a mixed classic-Agile methodology for the management of the nuclear project was performed. Conclusions: risk management of the nuclear projects has to be carried out based on the impact of the BANI-projections to identified risks.

Project and Process Approaches in Science. Overview of Large Scientific and Technical Projects

The analysis of the management of large scientific and technical projects is carried out. The nuclear and space projects of the USSR, the nuclear project of the USA (Manhattan project), international and Russian megascience projects, federal scientific and technical programs (FNTP) and complex scientific and technical programs and projects (KNTP) are considered. The issues of problem formulation (substantiation of the relevance of the work), allocation of resources for projects, project implementation management are analyzed. From the examples considered, megaprojects include projects that were implemented in the USSR and the USA, some international projects of the mega-science class, and individual KNTP projects. Russian mega science projects, and most of the KNP from the point of view of management should be attributed to the class of large rather than megaprojects. It is shown that federal targeted programs, federal scientific and technical programs are rather not project-based, but process-based (they represent a set of small-scale projects that are not aimed at a common practical result), therefore they should be considered in the appropriate management logic.

Model‐based architecting evaluation method for the delivery of complex nuclear projects

AbstractFacing the organizational and technological complexity of nuclear infrastructures (NI), the public reluctance in nuclear technology and the increasing restrictive regulatory environment, improving the conceptualization and evaluation of NI architecture is crucial for the successful completion of NI projects. Indeed, many technical engineering difficulties or delays in delivery can be avoided by deepening the design and evaluation of NI architectures. In a context where model‐based systems engineering (MBSE) is becoming more and more relevant, it is interesting to integrate evaluation into this process. Although the architecture evaluation (AE) process is rather well defined in the literature and linked to system analysis practices, it is quite difficult to deploy and pilot within complex NI projects. This article proposes a model‐based method, EVAluation for Critical Infrastructure Model Based System Engineering (EVA‐CIME), to facilitate the deployment of AE processes on a project. The components of this method are described and illustrated in a study of a NI design. The benefits and limitations of EVA‐CIME in its state of development are discussed and lead to the conclusion that the method should be extended to foster an AE culture within the company itself.

The role of intelligence in the creation of the first samples of Soviet nuclear weapons

The successful completion of the Soviet nuclear project was due to the combination of internal and external factors. Of course, the privileges and guarantees provided by the government for the scientific research and production of nuclear weapons, as well as the arduous efforts made by scientists to overcome various difficulties, have played an important role. But equally important is the use of foreign experience, mainly known through intelligence. Intelligence activities helped the Soviet Union absorb and utilize foreign experience. Neither the emphasis on the decisive role of intelligence, nor the denial of its importance contributes to a systematic and scientific understanding of its purpose and role. The Soviet Union was able to complete all nuclear research independently, but this would require more resources and time.

A Shortcut to Autonomy or a Path to Dependency? Foreign Assistance and Brazil’s Search for Nuclear Autonomy

ABSTRACT How did foreign assistance influence Brazil’s path to attaining nuclear autonomy? To answer this question, a technopolitics hypothesis centred on the role played by national scientific and technological strategies will be discussed, focusing on two case studies: the history of the Thorium Group (1965-71) and the 1975 Brazil-West Germany nuclear agreement. In both instances, Brazilian policy-makers relied on imported technologies as shortcuts to implement nuclear projects without designing a coordinated plan that involved national scientific programmes and research centres. The Brazilian case highlights the limits of initiatives aimed at attaining nuclear autonomy that revolve only around foreign assistance without complementary investment in national scientific initiatives.