Nuclear Plant Control Room Research Articles

HFACS-based FAHP implementation to identify critical factors influencing human error occurrence in nuclear plant control room

HFACS-based FAHP implementation to identify critical factors influencing human error occurrence in nuclear plant control room

Why alarm fatigue is a pivotal issue that affects the acoustical design of healthcare facilities

The U.S. FDA and Joint Commission designated “alarm fatigue” the “#1 priority in healthcare technology” in 2011–2012, acknowledging that this acoustical problem results in hundreds of patient deaths and thousands of injuries. The healthcare facilities industry has been slow to recognize that “alarm fatigue” is partly a facility design issue: i.e., a cacophony of recurrent noises from myriad uncorrelated medical devices, set at maximum loudness, occurring in hard-walled, reverberant spaces (such as patient rooms, ORs, and ICUs) produce elevated stress, sleep impairment, disorientation, and dangerously irrational, potentially deadly behavior. “Alarm fatigue” has been addressed as a human factors problem elsewhere: e.g., nuclear plant control rooms (after Three-Mile Island) and aircraft cockpits. In healthcare, it is imperative to engage architects, designers, acoustical engineers facility engineering staffs, and clinicians, who represent the “first line of defense” as the medical device industry requires 5–10 years to implement solutions. The presenter co-led a delegation of 12 distinguished members of the acoustics profession to the national summit on “alarm fatigue,” Washington DC, 2011 and has co-authored peer-reviewed medical journal articles and a forthcoming FGI white paper on the subject. This presentation focuses on solutions, challenges, and the research roadmap needed to address “alarm fatigue.”

A Computerized Diagnostic System for Nuclear Plant Control Rooms Based on Statistical Quality Control

In engineering science, statistical quality control techniques have traditionally been applied to control manufacturing processes. An application to commercial nuclear power plant maintenance and control is presented that can greatly improve safety. As a demonstration of such an approach to plant maintenance and control, a specific system is analyzed: the reactor coolant pumps of the St. Lucie Unit 2 nuclear power plant located in Florida. A 30-day history of the four pumps prior to a plant shutdown caused by pump failure and a related fire within the containment was analyzed. Statistical quality control charts of recorded variables were constructed for each pump, which were shown to go out of statistical control many days before the plant trip. The analysis shows that statistical process control methods can be applied as an early warning system capable of identifying significant equipment problems well in advance of traditional control room alarm indicators.

Comparison of US and UK Practices and Philosophies for Nuclear Plant Control Room Design

The American and British nuclear power programmes have in the past taken divergent routes, with the Americans choosing pressurized water reactors, whilst the British have opted for gas cooling. Although the technology and plant design for these two systems encompasses many fundamental differences, some of which have ramifications for the controllers, the basic task of monitoring and controlling a reactor holds many similarities in both countries. It is therefore instructive to compare and contrast the approaches which have been taken to human factors in nuclear power plant control room design on both sides of the Atlantic.

The Integration of Human Factors Methodology into Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Reviews

Investigations following the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident concluded that the nuclear plant control room design process did not give adequate attention to the human operators and their response under conditions of severe plant upsets or accidents. In an attempt to review existing nuclear control room design and prevent future accidents, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued several requirements. The response of most nuclear utilities to the requirements was confusion and uncertainty. This paper briefly reviews the evolution of NRC requirements since the TMI accident, and it describes a utility pilot study to demonstrate the usefulness of human factors methods in meeting these requirements. This utility pilot study suggests that those human engineering problems likely to affect the ability of control room operators to complete emergency procedures should be assigned the highest priority for mitigation.

Human Factors in Control Room Design a Matter of Decision and Implementation

TMI-2 focused attention on Human Engineering deficiencies in all nuclear plant control rooms while overlooking the evolution of their design and the principles of good system design. Reasons for the less than desirable features of the control rooms are explained. Standardization and modularization of board structure and board-mounted components are proposed to help achieve improvement in the designs. Mockups and more extensive use of C.R.T.' s are urged. A method of Usage or task analysis is presented and the importance of operator participation is emphasized.