Abstract

Investigations following the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident concluded that the nuclear plant control room design process did not give adequate attention to the human operators and their response under conditions of severe plant upsets or accidents. In an attempt to review existing nuclear control room design and prevent future accidents, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued several requirements. The response of most nuclear utilities to the requirements was confusion and uncertainty. This paper briefly reviews the evolution of NRC requirements since the TMI accident, and it describes a utility pilot study to demonstrate the usefulness of human factors methods in meeting these requirements. This utility pilot study suggests that those human engineering problems likely to affect the ability of control room operators to complete emergency procedures should be assigned the highest priority for mitigation.

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