Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Research Articles

NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUE IN THE NUCLEAR POLICY OF THE USA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ANALYSIS OF BASIC DOCUMENTS

The article is devoted to the study of the evolution of the nuclear policy of the United States of America in the field of non-proliferation in the XXI century. It is noted that the USA, as one of the first nuclear powers, pays considerable attention to this issue in order to maintain the stability of the non-proliferation regime and international security. Based on the methodology of content analysis and qualitative methodology, the principles, priorities, and primary methods of the strategy of the administration of the White House regarding countering nuclear proliferation are determined on the basis of the fundamental documents of the USA, speeches of officials, and researchers. Therefore, the purpose of the article is to study the basic elements of the US nuclear non-proliferation policy and assess how successful this policy is considered to be, in particular, based on the examples of Iran and North Korea. In order to achieve this goal, the study gradually reveals changes in the security environment in the context of the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons and means of delivery, and how this affects the policies of the US presidents’ administrations. Through the prism of such documents as the Nuclear Policy Review and the National Security Strategy of the United States, the main threats are defined, and therefore the priorities and concepts that form the general strategy of Washington to counter the proliferation of WMD. The article shows that in the XXI century, among the main threats to both the United States, its allies and partners, as well as the non-proliferation regime in general, attention is significantly focused on the problems associated with the existence and development of nuclear and missile programs of such states as Iran and North Korea. Therefore, the author analyses how official Washington elaborates a strategy towards the nuclear weapons proliferation problem, how the approaches of different administrations to counter these threats are changing, and which methods and approaches were used. In order to understand, how successful the strategy of individual administrations of US presidents was, the assessments of leading researchers and their arguments are studied. The conclusions summarize the results of the conducted research and reveal the author’s vision of the problem.

US POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE THEORY OF EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

The US policy towards North Korea is shaped by the nuclear non-proliferation policy and security guarantees provided to Japan and the Republic of Korea. These guarantees have a dual purpose. On the one hand, they are a tool to deter the DPRK from aggression against other countries in the region and, above all, US allies – Japan and South Korea. On the other hand, these guarantees are also an assurance of the latter's abandonment of the policy of acquiring a nuclear arsenal. The aim of the article is to analyze the foundations of Washington's policy towards Pyongyang and its influence on relations with allies through the prism of the theory of extended nuclear deterrence. It is stated that the effectiveness of deterrence consists of the conviction of the willingness to react with an adequate response. At the same time, the persuasiveness of extended deterrence is lower, as the protecting state must respond to threats from the ally that is to say outside its own national borders. There is controversy among scholars who reflect on the relevance of extended deterrence during the Cold War and in the modern security environment. It is noted that the emergence of new threats and an increasing number of conflicts, if any, change the nature of extended deterrence, but this does not diminish the importance of the "nuclear umbrella" of the United States for both the NPT and the security of the region. The author analyzes the reasons for the United States' security guarantees for South Korea and Japan. Particular attention is paid to the factor of North Korea's aggressive policy and its progress in the development of the nuclear missile program. With the reduction and withdrawal of US troops from Japan and South Korea, Pyongyang's destructive policies have exacerbated the American allies' sense of danger and provoked talks about developing their own nuclear programs. This scenario threatened the NPT regime and international stability, as well as US strategic interests in the region. Therefore, Washington is stepping up cooperation with its allies in the process of resolving the problem of North Korea's nuclear missile program and is officially reaffirming its unwavering security and defense commitments, which should restore trust between the parties and increase the role of extended deterrence in general.

An Ounce of Prevention—A Pound of Cure? The Reagan Administration's Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

Abstract The Israeli raid in June 1981 against the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq has been extensively analyzed by scholars, especially in the context of debate about the efficacy of preemptive strikes against hostile nuclear programs. Yet surprisingly, some important historical questions have been left unanswered: how did the raid affect the Reagan administration’s nuclear nonproliferation policy, and how was the raid perceived by relevant administration officials? How did the United States design its political strategy of response to the raid, and how did this strategy play out at the International Atomic Energy Agency? What does this episode tell us about Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy priorities? By exploring recently declassified documents from several archives around the world, this article addresses all of these questions and, in the process, debunks revisionist myths relating to the raid.

Contestation to the European Union on nuclear non-proliferation

ABSTRACT This article analyses the contestation of the European Union's (EU) nuclear non-proliferation policy. Contestation is as a social practice by which third actors express in discursive or practical terms their disapproval of certain norms and the actions that match them. In this way, norms are challenged, reinterpreted and transformed; and as a consequence, the validity of the norms is weakened or reinforced. There are reasons to believe that, as it is happening in other areas of EU foreign policy, the Union's role in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime is becoming increasingly controversial. The article argues that the contestation to the EU's nuclear non-proliferation policy is the result of its actions and positions in both in multilateral (i.e. The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference), and bilateral (i.e. EU-India relations) settings.

Market-based policies for nuclear nonproliferation

ABSTRACTAccess to weapon-useable fissile material—highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium—is the primary technical barrier to nuclear-weapon development. Nuclear-nonproliferation policy is largely concerned with the secure distribution and use of these materials and the technologies that produce them. To the extent that both materials and technologies are traded in markets, the problem may be viewed as one of influencing markets to give an acceptable set of allocative outcomes. While governments long ago rejected a laissez-faire approach to these markets, most current policy is based on prescribed or proscribed behavior rather than market incentives. “Market-based” nonproliferation policies would act through incentives in the markets for nuclear materials and technology rather than by prescribing outcomes or behavior. Possible polices of this sort include subsidized enrichment services, credits to impute value to spent nuclear fuel, and new markets for scarce nuclear materials. While market-based policies will not replace command-and-control policies entirely, they could lead to efficient regulation that suffices to guide the choices of most market participants, reserving special, more forceful measures for the few difficult cases.

From Opponent to Proponent: The Rational Evolution of China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy

China's performance regarding nuclear nonproliferation has experienced a tremendous change. From 1963 to the present, China dramatically moved from opponent of to proponent for nuclear nonproliferation. This literature only pays attention to this phenomenal change, without delineating the incremental stages in different phases that comprise the overall change. This article breaks down the overall change into four incremental shifts and specifically explains each of them. Close examination shows that these shifts were driven by different motives. The analysis leads to the conclusion that China's preferences in its nuclear nonproliferation decision making are driven by rational concerns.

Asia's Nuclear Conundrum

Asia's Nuclear Conundrum

Understanding the Nuclear Aspirations and Behaviour of North Korea and Iran

This article explores the drivers of North Korea and Iran’s nuclear aspirations and behaviour by employing the theoretical prisms of ‘security dilemma’, ‘regional security complex’ (RSC) and ‘social constructivism’. It argues that ideational values and interests are shaping Iranian and North Korean nuclear aspirations and behaviour. Conversely, the absence of positive inter-subjective understanding of the US and its allies regarding Iran and North Korea is influencing their nuclear non-proliferation policy towards these states. The nuclear ambitions and diplomacy of North Korea and Iran could be better understood by looking at the role of ideational, security and structuralism models that are influencing their threat perception in the respective security complexes. Thus, addressing the ideational factors and security dilemmas of the two states can help in resolving the twin threats to nuclear non-proliferation in the 21st century.

Proposal of a plutonium burner system based on HTGR with high proliferation resistance

An innovative plutonium burner concept based on high temperature gas cooled reactor (HTGR) technology, “Clean Burn”, is proposed by Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). That is expected to be as an effective and safe method to consume surplus plutonium accumulated in Japan. A similar concept proposed by General Atomics (GA), Deep Burn, cannot be introduced to Japan because of its adopting highly enriched plutonium, which shall infringe on a Japanese nuclear nonproliferation policy according to Japan–US reprocessing negotiation. The Clean Burn concept can avoid this problem by employing an inert matrix fuel (IMF) and a tightly coupled fuel reprocessing and fabrication plants. Both features make it impossible to extract plutonium alone out of the fabrication process and its outcomes. As a result, the Clean Burn can use surplus plutonium as a fuel without mixing it with uranium matrix. Thus, surplus plutonium alone will be incinerated effectively, while generation of plutonium from the uranium matrix is avoided. High neutronic performance, i.e., achievement of burn-up of about 500 GWd/t and consumption ratio of plutonium-239 reaching to about 95%, is also assessed. Furthermore, reactivity defect caused by the inert matrix is found to be negligible. It is concluded that the Clean Burn concept is a useful option to incinerate plutonium with high proliferation resistance.

Introduction: Global Order, Cooperation between the Superpowers, and Alliance Politics in the Making of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Introduction: Global Order, Cooperation between the Superpowers, and Alliance Politics in the Making of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

The Chinese Nuclear Test and 'Atoms for Peace' as a Measure for Preventing Nuclear Armament of Japan : the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy of the United States and the Introduction of Light Water Reactors into Japan, 1964-1968

The Chinese Nuclear Test and 'Atoms for Peace' as a Measure for Preventing Nuclear Armament of Japan : the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy of the United States and the Introduction of Light Water Reactors into Japan, 1964-1968

Nuclear Posture, Nonproliferation Policy, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

What is the relationship between nuclear postures and nonproliferation policies and the spread of nuclear weapons? At first blush, this might appear to be an obvious question. After all, states go to great lengths—extending nuclear security guarantees to nonnuclear weapon states, forward-deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of allies, sizing their own nuclear arsenals with the proliferation decisions of other states in mind, supporting international institutions in conducting inspections of nuclear facilities in nonnuclear weapon states, restricting the availability of sensitive nuclear technology, applying and enforcing sanctions against would-be proliferators, conducting military strikes against nuclear facilities, and promoting nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes, among many other steps—to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It would be strange to imagine that states pursue such actions unless they can expect a policy payoff in terms of peace or security. Yet, there is little systematic evidence to suggest that nuclear postures and policies have a meaningful impact on the spread of nuclear weapons. Correctly understanding the effects of nuclear posture and policy on both horizontal proliferation (the spread of nuclear weapons to new states) and vertical proliferation (increases in the size and sophistication of nuclear arsenals within existing nuclear states) is a subject of extreme real-world importance. United

Nonproliferation Policy of the Clinton Administration toward India: Shifting of Nuclear Goalposts?

This article examines the nuclear nonproliferation policy of the Clinton administration (1993–2001) toward India. It is argued that initially President Clinton was focused on a “capping, rollback, and eliminate” approach toward Indian nuclearization. But, after India conducted nuclear tests in 1998, there was a discernible change in Clinton's policy toward India, which has largely gone unrecognized. The Clinton administration considerably shifted the nuclear goalposts—from the cap, rollback, and eliminate Indian nuclear weapons—to merely the exercise of nuclear restraint by India. This, in turn, implied a tacit acceptance of the nuclear weapons possessed by India. The Clinton administration cleared the languishing nuclear debris and created space for the next administration to reset the anomalous nuclear relationship with India.

Mutual Interference between Universality and Individuality in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy: U.S–India Deal as a Turning Point

Mutual Interference between Universality and Individuality in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy: U.S–India Deal as a Turning Point

British nuclear non-proliferation policies towards Iran and the Middle East

The article argues that British non-proliferation policies towards the Middle East have had limited success because they are circumscribed by dependence on alliances and constrained by other factors such as Britain's historical legacy, its status as a nuclear weapons state and, especially through the European Union's engagement with the region, the communication of self-interest rather than credible pursuit of the declared objective of regional security-building. Despite promoting and implementing its own disarmament policies, Britain has been unable to overcome mistrust and perceptions of hypocrisy in the region in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. This is particularly evident in the dispute with Iran, which is examined in detail with the assistance of Adler's ‘double-damned dilemma’ model. The analysis argues that the Western coercive approach has facilitated the stalemate with Iran, because it has encouraged Iran's provocations and allowed it to respond with a strategy of denial. The analysis suggests that Britain and its allies adopt a defusing strategy which does not reduce the dispute to a proliferation problem, but treats Iran's behaviour as a quest for recognition. Britain has little influence on Iran, but might build on its relationship with Turkey to develop this approach in conjunction with its allies.

Social Origins of Nuclear Policy: A Niebuhrian Dilemma of the U.S. Policies toward North Korea

IntroductionInternational efforts to stop North Korea's nuclear program are still looking for a way out. Nearly two decades have passed since the North first alarmed the world with its nuclear reprocessing facilities in 1992, but the multiple international negoDepartment tiations ever since have yet to find an effective deterrent. More perplexing than the unfruitful negotiations per se is the indeterminacy that the international community has shown throughout the process. An obvious example is the drifting policies of the U.S., the leader of the world anti-proliferation community. Throughout the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, the U.S. policies wildly swung between containment and engagement. The ambiguity continues even today as we see the Obama government switching policy positions off and on.1Why isn't there a consistent solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis? Why are the international (the U.S. in particular) responses to the North's nuclear challenge drifting?Keeping in mind a normative origin of the policy inconsistency, this research delves into the contextual backgrounds of the uneven nuclear non-proliferation policies. Due to the controversial nature of the issues involving the nuclear crisis like sovereignty and national security, the nonproliferation efforts are supposed to call for a choice of only relatively better policy each time without any absolute solution. Borrowing Reinhold Niebuhr's insights, the North Korean nuclear crisis is a typical case of where a definitive behavioral principle is hard to utilize.2 Consequently an objective analysis of policy conditions is rarely available, which in turn makes a rational or institutional choice by political elites out of the question. Instead, the public perception of the issues at the bottom of the society takes its place as the matter of consequence.Ironically a social normative cause of the U.S. policy inconsistency looms large from the solid international norm for nuclear nonproliferation. Despite the solid consensus on the principle of blocking the spread of nuclear weapons at all costs, a few technical differences that rose in the middle of negotiating how to implement the norm have directed the course of negotiation. It is an irony that the methods employed to apply a principle ruled over the principle. As a response, this research asserts that some of the suggested policy means, even if they are efficient in practice, raise several fundamental social concerns that are not compatible with the norm of nuclear nonproliferation. The North Korean crisis involves two or more ideas that stand at odds with each other. The normative conflicts generate the policy indeterminacy.This research reflects on Reinhold Niebuhr's thoughts about international politics-relative justice, in essence-as the reference of normative ambiguity arising from the process of negotiation with North Korea. His ideas are helpful to identify the social context where a durable policy is hard to obtain. The North Korean nuclear challenge, seen from Niebuhr's perspective, is a typical case of lacking an absolute justice to apply. The North's nuclear adventure, though not as acceptable as the U.S. behavior to discourage it, is still excusable from its claim of national defense. To buy how much of the North's defensive concerns, this research suggests, is the determinant of the direction and level of the U.S. reaction to the nuclear challenge, while a consensus has yet to be made in American society. In addition, the U.S. policies are supposed to fluctuate given the fact that several conflicts exist within the U.S. government that involve ideational debates deep in the American society.In this paper, Niebuhr's relative justice is employed to critically review the U.S. nuclear policies toward North Korea angles in the following order. First, the literature review introduces relevant studies and points out that a normative consideration is still necessary. …

The Yellow Cake Road: Malcolm Fraser, the Ranger Enquiry and Australia's Role in the US International Fuel Cycle Project

The 1975–1983 Fraser Government failed to develop an enrichment industry in Australia but did see the initiation of uranium sales following the adoption of the Ranger Enquiry. Both of these developments were shaped by US nuclear commercial and non‐proliferation policies during the Ford and Carter Administrations, which aimed to restrict the spread of enrichment technology. Fraser would come to realise that it was not a question of private ownership of the nuclear fuel cycle, but of accepting a role for Australia in the international fuel cycle as a supplier of cheap yellowcake.

South Korea’s Nuclear Non-proliferation Policies and the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

South Korea’s Nuclear Non-proliferation Policies and the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

FINDING A BALANCE BETWEEN ASSURANCES AND ABOLITION

This article analyzes South Korean views of the April 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and explores the review's impact on South Korean domestic political debates on policy toward North Korea and the credibility and value of the US-South Korean alliance. Despite specific concerns raised by individual specialists in South Korea, the contents of the NPR have not sparked significant public debate there and have enjoyed acceptance by the current government in Seoul—perhaps unsurprising, given the strength of the US-South Korean alliance. The article also explores the impact of the NPR on US-South Korean nonproliferation cooperation in the context of the upcoming negotiations between Washington and Seoul on a nuclear cooperation agreement and in the context of South Korea's decision to host the Nuclear Security Summit in 2012, a meeting that among other benefits will provide the two countries a unique opportunity to strengthen their collaboration on nuclear security issues and global nonproliferation policy.

Author's Response: The Subject—Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, not Nuclear Choices, Proliferation, or Nonproliferation Policy

[ 152 ] asia policy Author’s Response: The Subject—Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, not Nuclear Choices, Proliferation, or Nonproliferation Policy Muthiah Alagappa My thanks to the reviewers for contributing to this roundtable. I would like to preface my response with two general points. First, the two books under review differ substantially in purpose and scope. Nuclear Logics seeks “to help understand why states seek or renounce nuclear weapons” (p. ix), focusing on non-nuclear East Asian and Middle Eastern states that seek or do not seek nuclear weapons. The Long Shadow, on the other hand, seeks “to develop a deep understanding in comparative perspective of the purposes and roles assigned to nuclear weapons in the security thinking and practice of relevant states and to explore their implications for regional security, stability, and conflict resolution” in a dramatically altered international security and nuclear environment with a focus on Asia (p. 22). The Asian security region is defined broadly to include Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia; the United States; Russia; Australia; and tentatively the Middle East. Inquiry in The Long Shadow is not limited to states that may or may not seek nuclear weapons. Importantly, the book investigates the nuclear roles and strategies of all states that possess nuclear weapons and of those non–nuclear weapons states that are allied with nuclear weapons states, as well as the acquisition prospects and the possible roles in which nonstate actors may employ nuclear weapons. Although informed by certain concepts and theories, The Long Shadow does not seek to test particular hypotheses or advance a causal explanation. The book is by design an empirical study to develop a firm foundation for subsequent conceptual and theoretical work. Second, The Long Shadow is not about nonproliferation or disarmament. Although the findings of the study have implications for both issues and I do tease out some of these in my concluding chapters, a primary purpose of the study is to provide an alternative perspective to the nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament discourses that have tended to dominate discussion of nuclear weapons in the United States. There is little doubt that WMD proliferation continues to be a crucial security concern, and some believe that muthiah alagappa is Distinguished Senior at the East-West Center. He can be reached at . note u The author would like to thank Mark Borthwick, Charles Morrison, and James Wirtz for their comments on an earlier version of this response. [ 153 ] book review roundtable • nuclear logics & the long shadow nuclear disarmament should be an urgent goal of humanity. These are not the only lenses through which to view nuclear weapons, however. A substantial number of states of all stripes continue to attach value to the security roles of their nuclear arsenals. The management and control of nuclear weapons requires that we understand the roles such weapons perform or are deemed to perform. The ethics of responsibility requires us to address the roles and implications of nuclear weapons in all their dimensions. Thus, a security perspective that attaches importance to but does not prejudge the salience of nuclear weapons in national security strategies intentionally girds inquiry in The Long Shadow. Taking seriously the security rationales advanced by nuclear weapons states, including the United States, does not imply uncritical acceptance of the party line. It is thus unfortunate that concern with proliferation has dominated the reviews. An excessive focus on proliferation and a failure to recognize the substantial differences in the purpose and scope of the books under review have prevented reviewers (except for Christopher Ford) from direct and substantial engagement with the main propositions advanced in The Long Shadow. In fact, if a reader were only to rely on the reviews, he or she would be misinformed of the purpose and the key propositions advanced in the book. In light of the above I will limit my response to a few specific points: the logic of zero; the United States and nuclear disarmament; nuclear weapons, security, and stability; and the supposedly “underwhelming” and “contradictory” nature of my proposal for a new nuclear order. Logic of Zero Deepti Choubey contends that the January 2007 op-ed essay by the “four horsemen”—George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William...