Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference Research Articles

A nuclear babel: narratives around the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

ABSTRACTThe 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has been successful in starting new conversations about nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, many of those conversations are happening in silos with ban supporters and opponents talking past each other. Both sides of the debate often misrepresent one another, putting at risk cooperation within the global nuclear order and progress toward the 2020 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. To address these misperceptions, this article offers a bridge-building framework with steps for nuclear-weapon states, ban supporters, and regional and political coalitions. The framework is designed to be practical and to build trust following a heated and controversial debate around the ban treaty and its predecessor, the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons movement. The most important and timely of these efforts is for ban supporters and opponents to work together on risk reduction at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions with rising risks of misperception and inadvertent escalation.

The Theological Landscape of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: the Catholic Church, the World Council of Churches and the Bomb

AbstractCan religion bring something distinct, critical and useful to global politics? Or do the voices of religious actors mimic those of secular NGOs when given opportunities to speak truth to power in international diplomacy? This article examines these questions through the lens of nuclear disarmament, considering the role of the Catholic Church and the World Council of Churches at the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference at the United Nations headquarters in New York City. While faith communities have had a potent role in pushing for nuclear disarmament, the article argues that much more can be done by religious actors to argue that nuclear weapons are a stain on the moral conscience of people of faith.

Stuck on disarmament: the European Union and the 2015 NPT Review Conference

The quinquennial Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference represents a highly important event from the perspective of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Though not a party to the treaty itself, the EU has made a consistent effort since the 1990s to coordinate the positions of its member states and achieve higher visibility in the NPT review process. The aim of this article is to examine the role of the EU in the 2015 NPT Review Conference deliberations. Drawing on on-site observations, statements and in-depth research interviews, it argues that the recent institutional changes notwithstanding, the influence of the EU as a distinct actor in the NPT context remains very limited, and the EU's common position is in bigger disarray than ever before. This year's Review Conference demonstrated the widening rift between the member states, in particular in the area of nuclear disarmament and the related issues. The inability to maintain a coherent common position limits the EU ‘actorness’ and impedes its striving for relevance in the NPT forums. The dynamics outlined in this article further highlight the limits of the EU CFSP in security matters in which the national positions of individual member states are as divergent as in the case of nuclear disarmament.

The EU’s Performance in the 2015 NPT Review Conference: What Went Wrong

This article presents a performance analysis of the European Union (EU) during the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. Detailing what went wrong for the EU across three levels of performance analysis, the article goes on to present a number of key lessons for the EU approaching the next NPT review cycle. First, the EEAS should focus its energies onto specified ‘EU’ issues where there is greater convergence of Member States interests. Second, the EU must concentrate on its outreach with third countries prior to and during NPT review negotiations, particularly other NPT groups such as the NPDI. Third, portrayals of the EU as a ‘microcosm’ of the NPT raise expectations of the EU’s contribution to this forum and should not be overstated. Reconsideration of the EU’s raison d’être as a group within the NPT is therefore encouraged with a re-emphasis upon the EU’s regional bloc identity particularly warranted.

Is the NPT in Trouble? Setting the Stage for the 2015 Review Conference

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime once again faces a serious challenge in the run-up to the NPT Review Conference scheduled for April 27 to May 22, 2015. This can be attributed to the perceived delay in implementation of commitments made by the states parties at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Although the 2015 Review Conference is still half a year away, shaky U.S.–Russia relations, the armed conflict directly involving the Israelis and Palestinians, and the outcome of the U.S. mid-term elections will not be conducive to the review process. Both the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states should redouble their efforts to narrow their differences on key issues.

What Future for the NPT?

The next Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference will kick off on April 27, 2015. It will be the ninth RevCon since the entry of the NPT into force in 1970, and the fourth since the trea...

Steps toward increased nuclear transparency

While there is no doubt that some information on nuclear weapons must remain undisclosed, excessive nuclear secrecy hinders progress toward the twin goals of improved nuclear materials security and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide. With the March 2012 Nuclear Security Summit afoot and the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in sight, now is the time for nuclear weapons states to implement new transparency measures such as declaring additional information regarding the capabilities, size, and purpose of weapons stockpiles and fissile materials, and providing the means to verify a larger portion of those declarations. Increased transparency can reduce uncertainty, build trust, establish baselines for future reductions, and place political pressure on other states possessing nuclear weapons to take similar steps. Because they possess the vast majority of nuclear weapons and fissile material in the world, the United States and Russia should lead the way by creating a model for declarations, including non-deployed and nonstrategic weapons. Declarations of nuclear weapons and fissile materials could be verified bilaterally, through new multilateral agreements and a multilateral inspections agency or by expanding the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Some transparency actions can be taken immediately, either unilaterally or reciprocally. Increased transparency can provide short-term benefits for some states and establish a foundation for additional bilateral and multilateral nuclear arms reductions. Transparency can be embraced by non-nuclear weapons states and states with nuclear weapons outside of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty without undertaking new treaty obligations.

International humanitarian law and nuclear weapons: Irreconcilable differences

In 1996, the International Court of Justice issued an opinion that the use of nuclear weapons is “scarcely reconcilable” with international humanitarian law and concluded that nations have an obligation to pursue good-faith negotiations leading to disarmament. The 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference reaffirmed the need for all states to comply with international humanitarian law, which governs the use of nuclear as well as conventional weapons. When the rules of war are applied to nuclear weapons, it becomes clear that these weapons cannot comply with international law. The effects of nuclear weapons are inherently uncontrollable and do not meet international criteria for discrimination between military and civilian targets, for proportionality, and for necessity. Arguments made by the United States as to why some uses of nuclear weapons could be lawful do not stand up to scrutiny. Nuclear weapon states should make immediate changes to any missions, deployments, and targeting policies and practices that facilitate the use of nuclear weapons. Not only does international law preclude the use of nuclear weapons, but it also precludes threats to use nuclear weapons.

US state crimes related to nuclear weapons: Is there hope for change in the Obama administration?

Given the long history of US state crimes related to nuclear weapons and the aggressive unilateralism of the George W. Bush administration that compounded these crimes, the election of Barack Obama created a “hope” for “change” in American nuclear weapons policy. While it is too early to render any conclusive judgment, we offer a preliminary assessment of the Obama record with regard to nuclear weapons based on a number of significant policy statements made and official actions taken, including Obama's 2009 Prague speech, the signing of the new START agreement in April 2010, the administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the Washington DC Nuclear Security Summit, and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference of 2010. Although the new administration has taken some steps to reduce the likelihood of the use or threat to use nuclear weapons, we conclude that under President Obama the US continues to be in violation of the solemn legal obligation to disarm as imposed by the NPT treaty of 1968. We also briefly note some of the structural and cultural factors related to the American empire that hinders any president from changing American nuclear weapons policy.

Beyond the 2010 NPT Review Conference: What’s next for nuclear disarmament?

Although many have hailed the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference as a success, this author argues that some felt the final document hid the resistance of nuclear weapon states to making meaningful commitments to disarmament and the resulting reluctance of non-nuclear weapon states to agree on substantial measures toward non proliferation. At the intergovernmental level, the call for “political will” for nuclear disarmament is strong; but, the author writes, the elites discussing and deciding issues like arms control and disarmament have managed to disconnect them from broader issues of global order and domestic governance, thereby excluding the citizens directly affected by these issues. Achieving nuclear disarmament, the author writes, will require the engagement of people resolved to face the challenges of our time with a focus on justice, peace, and international security.

Previewing the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Despite groundbreaking disarmament pledges and substantial effort, the Obama administration's hopes for a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference may not be fully realised. Many developing countries are in no mood to grant new non-proliferation concessions, such as tightened rules on access to sensitive nuclear technologies, tougher inspection rules, or limits on withdrawing from the treaty. The non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain angered by the failure to move forward on many disarmament commitments pledged at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. Moreover, progress on disarmament measures under Obama has been slower than hoped, as he faces considerable scepticism in Washington about his strategy.

Perspectives on the Revival of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime in the Wake of President Barack Obama's Prague Speech

The election of Barack Obama as president of the United States promised a shift in the fortunes of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime after a near decade of intransigence and frustration. This article examines what has been achieved in the wake of Obama's speech in Prague in April 2009, where he articulated the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. Since the Prague speech, the effective norm of the NPT has been re-energised through a number of initiatives, including UN Security Council resolution 1887, the New START agreement and the agreed final document at the NPT review conference in May 2010. However a number of big challenges continue to face the NPT regime, including the nuclear programs of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the continued fallout from the US-India civil nuclear deal. The article concludes that the NPT continues to play a role in creating parameters within which powerful states face some constraints; and, crucially, that the Treaty maintains an international consensus that proliferation of nuclear weapons, even by democratic states, is a threat to global security. However, the NPT has not and will not replace power politics.

Treze passos para o juízo final: a nova era do desarmamento nuclear dos Estados Unidos e da Rússia

Este artigo procura explicar por que os líderes dos EUA e da Rússia não implementaram total e efetivamente o plano de ação de treze pontos práticos para o desarmamento nuclear, estabelecido na Conferência de Revisão do Tratado de Não-Proliferação Nuclear em 2000. As decisões relacionadas aos treze pontos, tomadas pelos membros dos Executivos das duas maiores potências nucleares, são vistas como resultado da conciliação de imperativos internos e externos por esses indivíduos, que enfrentam oportunidades e dilemas estratégicos distintos simultaneamente nos âmbitos doméstico e internacional. São consideradas as escolhas políticas de membros dos Executivos nacionais e estrangeiros, Legislativos e principais grupos de interesse desses países, bem como a distribuição de poder sobre a formulação da decisão nacional, estabelecida pelas instituições políticas domésticas. As hipóteses apontam que os membros dos Executivos desses países - apoiados por grande parte dos membros dos Legislativos e dos principais grupos de interesse envolvidos, como as Forças Armadas - procuraram garantir autonomia para definir a estrutura e a composição de forças estratégicas e táticas, modernizar arsenais atômicos e operar uma força capaz de lidar com contingências que envolvam não apenas potências nucleares tradicionais, mas principalmente novos Estados detentores de armas de destruição em massa e organizações terroristas.

Taking a Stand Against Nuclear Proliferation: The Pediatrician's Role

Nuclear weapons pose a grave threat to the health of children. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which for almost 40 years has limited the spread of nuclear weapons, is in danger of unraveling. At the 2000 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, 180 countries, including the United States, agreed on 13 practical steps to implement Article VI of the treaty, which calls for nuclear disarmament. However, the United States has acted in contravention of several of those disarmament steps, with announced plans to develop new nuclear weapons and to maintain a large nuclear arsenal for decades to come. Pediatricians, working individually and through organizations such as the American Academy of Pediatrics and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, can educate the public and elected officials regarding the devastating and irremediable effects of nuclear weapons on children and the need for policies that comply with and strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, rather than undermining it. For the children of the world, our goal must be a nuclear weapons convention (similar to the chemical and biological weapons conventions) that would prohibit these weapons globally.

Is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Shaking at its Foundations? Stock Taking After the 2005 NPT Review Conference

This commentary considers the state of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime including the latest review, Non-Proliferation Review Conference, of the State Parties as discussed at the Wilton Park Conference in December 2005.

Lessons from the unsuccessful 2005 nuclear non-proliferation treaty review conference

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is probably the most important treaty for the control of nuclear weapons. A Review Conference was held in May 2005 but the member states failed to agree on any decisions or recommendations. Possible causes for this failure reside in the unsupportive geopolitical climate surrounding the conference, design limitations of the Treaty, and the obstructionist actions of particular states. However, valuable contributions were made at the conference by some states and by civil society representatives. Fortunately there are still many ways for states and civil society to make future conferences more successful in eliminating the threat to human security from nuclear weapons.

The 1975-76 Debate Over Ratification of the NPT in Japan

THIS PAPER HAS four purposes: to trace the course of the debate which surrounded the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ratification drive of 1975-76 in Japan; to examine by close review the actual Japanese decision-making process revealed in the unfolding interaction between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japanese government; to fill an information gap as to why Japan did not ratify the NPT in 1975 when even the EURATOM associated states of Europe including West Germany deposited articles of ratification for the May NPT Review Conference; and to discuss why, in 1976, six years after signing the NPT, Japan finally ratified it. The principal forum for the debate over the NPT was the Diet. The sessions which began on December 27, 1974, and ended on May 24, 1976, were particularly important. While not all the debates over this issue took place in the Diet-in fact very few did-the schedule around which the Diet was organized did establish the pace. The composition of the Diet over most of this period was particularly important to the fate of the NPT. In the lower house (House of Representatives), the ruling LDP had 279 members, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) 117, the Japan Communist Party (JCP) 39, the Komeito 30, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) 20, one independent, and five vacancies. A margin of 72 seats existed between the LDP and all opposition parties combined. Fairly comfortable, indeed. In the Upper House (House of Councillors), the situation differed considerably. The strength of the LDP stood at 128 while the JSP had