Nuclear Counterproliferation Research Articles

Cyber-weapons in nuclear counter-proliferation

ABSTRACT Under what conditions are cyber-weapons effective in nuclear counter-proliferation? With continued interest in nuclear proliferation professed by Iran, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia, a discussion of the effectiveness of counter-proliferation measures remains relevant. Cyber-attacks as military option in a state-on-state conflict still requires additional corroborating evidence to make conclusions about its long-term effectiveness. This work analyses the general applicability of cyber-weapons and their usefulness in nuclear counter-proliferation. Through a comparative case study of Operation Orchard, Stuxnet, and recent “Left-of-Launch” operations against North Korea, the essay finds that cyber-operations are not particularly effective against nuclear programmes that are in the later stages of their development. They can disrupt and delay a nuclear programme temporarily, if the attack remains clandestine, but cannot halt nuclear proliferation all together. However, effectiveness increases if they are used in combination with conventional weapons. The article addresses a topic of interest to national-level decision-makers: whether cyber-operations can and should play a role in nuclear counter-proliferation.

Desarmar al ‘bárbaro’: Occidente y la cruzada contra la proliferación nuclear en Oriente Medio

El Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear (TNP) en vigor desde 1970 legitimó la tesis de Occidente de que hay estados más racionales y estables que otros para poseer un arsenal nuclear. Aunque las diferencias entre estados existen, una división binaria entre un mundo civilizado y racional y otro bárbaro e irracional no contribuye a explicar la diversidad de fenómenos en la arena internacional, antes bien, obtura esa posibilidad. La Guerra contra el Terrorismo, declarada por Estados Unidos en 2001, exacerbó su postura estratégica etnocéntrica y le permitió implementar políticas y acciones de contraproliferación nuclear desproporcionadas en países como Irak, Libia e Irán. A partir del análisis sobre etnocentrismo y seguridad del teórico británico de las Relaciones Internacionales, Ken Booth, el presente artículo explica las contradicciones de la narrativa dicotómica occidental en referencia a la proliferación nuclear en Oriente Medio, sintetizada en tres postulados: primero, la disuasión nuclear no es posible debido a la inestabilidad política de los actores; segundo, los países de Oriente Medio carecen de capacidades técnicas para la posesión de armas nucleares y tercero, el gasto militar nuclear contraviene al desarrollo de estos países.

Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment

Abstract Why has U.S. grand strategy persisted since the end of the Cold War? Despite shocks such as the 2008 global financial crisis and the costs of the war in Iraq—circumstances that ought to have stimulated at least a revision—the United States remains committed to a grand strategy of “primacy.” It strives for military preponderance, dominance in key regions, the containment and reassurance of allies, nuclear counterproliferation, and the economic “Open Door.” The habitual ideas of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, or the “Blob,” make U.S. grand strategy hard to change. The United States' military and economic capabilities enable the U.S. government to pursue primacy, but the embedded assumptions of the Blob make primacy the seemingly natural choice. Thanks to the Blob's constraining power, alternative grand strategies based on restraint and retrenchment are hardly entertained, and debate is narrowed mostly into questions of execution and implementation. Two cases—the presidency of Bill Clinton and the first year of the presidency of Donald Trump—demonstrate this argument. In each case, candidates promising change were elected in fluid conditions that we would expect to stimulate a reevaluation of the United States' commitments. In each case, the Blob asserted itself successfully, at least on the grand strategic fundamentals. Change in grand strategy is possible, but it would require shocks large enough to shake the assumptions of the status quo and a president willing to be an agent of change and prepared to absorb the political costs of overhauling Washington's traditional design.

Cyber Operations as Nuclear Counterproliferation Measures

Focusing on recent malware that allegedly targeted Iran’s nuclear programme, this article discusses the legality of inter-state cyber operations as measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons approaching the problem from the perspective of the law of State responsibility, in particular the circumstances precluding wrongfulness. After examining the role that cyber attacks and cyber exploitation can play in preventing nuclear proliferation, the article explores whether cyber operations can be justified as countermeasures in response to a possible breach by Iran of its non-proliferation obligations. It then discusses whether counterproliferation cyber operations amounting to a use of force are submitted to a more lenient legal regime than other more traditional forms of the use of force in international relations. Finally, the article explores the legality of counterproliferation cyber operations from the perspective of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and in particular of the resolutions adopted against Iran by the Security Council. The article concludes that the legality of counterproliferation cyber operations must be assessed in the light of the general primary and secondary rules of international law: neither the means used (cyber instead of kinetic) nor the aim pursued (the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons) justify a special legal regime.

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Games, Risks, and Analytics: Several Illustrative Cases Involving National Security and Management Situations

This paper presents and compares four models of games and risk analyses designed to support strategic and policy decisions, three focusing on national security issues and one on project management. They share a common core of probability, linked decisions among the parties involved, and risks to a principal decision maker. Their structure is based on systems and decision analysis. Their level of complexity depends on the strategies, the environment, and assumptions of variation over time of probabilities, preferences, and options. They are part of the field of analytics and some of its real-life applications. The first model is based on a one-move game, in which the United States faces risks of terrorist attacks by several possible groups using various types of weapons. The result is a probabilistic ranking, at a given time, of the threat posed by these weapons. The second model is a dynamic simulation of counterterrorism scenarios in an alternate game between a government and a terrorist group. The objective is to compare the stabilizing effects of different short- and long-term government strategies. The third model is a dynamic evaluation of nuclear counterproliferation strategies involving an analysis of the weapon development program of a particular country with evolving intent and capabilities and of the effectiveness of different U.S. strategies to prevent or delay its success. The fourth model is a principal–agent representation of the development of an engineered system, in which an agent in charge of part of the project may consider meeting a deadline by cutting corners if he falls behind schedule, generally increasing the system failure probability. The goal is to support the decisions of the manager in setting constraints and incentives. This paper shows how a set of similar game and risk analysis models at different levels of complexity can provide valuable insights to decision makers, both in national security and management situations, and help them avoid mistakes such as excessive focus on the short term and underestimation of dependencies. It compares their capabilities, including the number of moves, dynamics of the underlying situation, possible changes of context, actors' preferences and strategic options, and risk characterization.

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Nuclear Counterproliferation in the Middle East

Nuclear Counterproliferation in the Middle East