Nuclear Arms Control Research Articles

Nuclear Arms Control in the Post Post-Cold War: Factors for Transformation and Exploration of Revitalization

Nuclear Arms Control in the Post Post-Cold War: Factors for Transformation and Exploration of Revitalization

Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND): a good faith, effective measure pursuant to Article VI NPT or empty gesturing?

It has been 50 years since the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which established the obligation upon all States Parties to work towards nuclear disarmament under Article VI. Yet, despite extensive reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles since the Cold War peaks, nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts are currently in disarray. After the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was terminated in 2019, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty remains as the only bilateral limitation on United States (US) and Russian nuclear forces in operation and is due to expire in February 2021. The US has justified its limited nuclear disarmament progress on the premise that the current international security environment is not conducive to further nuclear disarmament. Instead, the US has recently promoted a new initiative called Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND). The initiative aims to provide a platform for all States to engage in constructive dialogue to identify ways to improve the international security environment, which make nuclear deterrence necessary while addressing the hurdles that currently impede progress towards nuclear disarmament. Significantly, the US regards CEND as an ‘effective measure’ and an illustration of its commitment towards disarmament under Article VI. This article seeks to address the US claim that CEND represents a good faith, effective measure towards nuclear disarmament pursuant to Article VI. This will revisit existing doctrinal interpretative debates concerning the obligation under Article VI, particularly the requirements that negotiations and measures be adopted in good faith, and what constitutes an effective measure towards nuclear disarmament. The discussion will then determine whether the CEND initiative itself can be considered a good faith, effective measure towards nuclear disarmament, by considering its purpose, origins and implementation, and actions of the US.

The super weapon, the paper tiger and Godzilla: a trilateral dialogue on nuclear weapons

The United States, China, and Japan responded to the Cold War with three distinct orientations towards nuclear weapons. The US decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the product of a mentality that did not distinguish between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. A non-nuclear China refused to capitulate in the face of repeated US nuclear threats, but these were terrifying experiences that prompted China to develop its own nuclear weapons. Japan responded to being the only nation attacked with nuclear weapons by positioning itself as a leading advocate for nuclear disarmament while simultaneously and surreptitiously collaborating with its attacker to prevent Japan from being struck again. The pattern of interaction that developed between these three nations inhibits progress towards nuclear arms control and disarmament. Changing that pattern by facilitating a more equitable trilateral dialogue on nuclear weapons may remove this inhibition.

Stability amid Strategic Deregulation: Managing the End of Nuclear Arms Control

That nuclear arms control is on the way out is no news. The unraveling of its Cold War-era architecture started almost two decades ago, when US President George W. Bush welcomed Vladimir Putin to h...

Colloquium : Neutrino detectors as tools for nuclear security

For over 40 years, physicists have considered possible uses for neutrino detectors in nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, and fissile materials security. Neutrinos are an attractive fission signature because they readily pass through matter. The same property makes neutrinos challenging to detect in systems that would be practical for nuclear security applications. This colloquium presents a broad overview of several potential neutrino applications, including the near-field monitoring of known reactors, far-field monitoring of known or discovery of undeclared reactors, detection of reactor waste streams, and detection of nuclear explosions. We conclude that recent detector advances have made near-field monitoring feasible. Farther-field reactor detection and waste stream detection monitoring are possible in some cases with further research and development. Very long-range reactor monitoring and nuclear explosion detection do not appear feasible for the foreseeable future due to considerable physical and/or practical constraints.

African agency and global orders: the demanding case of nuclear arms control

How much agency do African states have to shape global orders? This study puts the global nuclear order under scrutiny to answer this question. It amounts to a demanding case. Arms control is something that global great powers take very seriously, and there is no weapons category that they take more seriously than nuclear weapons. My findings provide a nuanced picture. Although often outflanked and frustrated by nuclear weapon states, the nuclear order would look different without African actors exerting their agency. They successfully shaped background and foreground institutions constituting the global nuclear order by building advocacies for new institutions upon already existing ones, reaching out to state and non-state actors outside of Africa, and channelling communication through African states with authority in global fora. This study makes three contributions: First, it underlines the key finding of recent literature on African agency that African actors are more to be reckoned with than often assumed. Second, it provides novel evidence about the diplomatic mechanisms through which they come to make a difference. Third, it adds to our grasp of the constitution of global orders as well as the processes through which they come to be made, re-made and unmade more generally.

Citizen Scientist: Frank Von Hippel’s Adventures in Nuclear Arms Control Part 6. A Global Agenda and Beginning the Handoff to the Next Generation

ABSTRACT In this part, von Hippel discusses how his focus shifted in the first decade of the 21st century to a set of new concerns evoked by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the G.W. Bush administration’s retrograde policies with regard to nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. During this period, he co-founded the International Panel on Fissile Materials so that policy activists working in opposition to nuclear arms races and fissile material production in different countries could work together. He also focused on fostering another generation of activist scientists engaged with the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation agenda.

Вооружения и дипломатия

The United States’ withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019 threatens to dismantle the entire nuclear arms control system built over the last 50 years. It may lead to an uncontrolled multilateral arms race involving strategic, intermediate-range, tactical nuclear and non-nuclear offensive and defensive weapons. This dangerous turn of events is met with different attitude by different politicians and experts. One expanding school of thought postulates that the bipolar world of the Cold War era has given way to multipolarity, so bilateral nuclear weapons restrictions are no longer feasible. This assumption is supplemented by a hypothesis that it is impossible to control the newest weapons and military technologies using previous methods of negotiations and agreements, so those methods should also be abandoned. The focus should allegedly shift to various multilateral forums on creating an environment for nuclear disarmament and enhancing nuclear deterrence, transparency and predictability. Thus, the main premise is that the current arms control crisis is unavoidable and does not pose much danger: it is possible to do without formal nuclear arms reduction, limitation and non-proliferation agreements. However, scientific analysis demonstrates that the above assumptions about the advent of nuclear multipolarity and effects of new technologies are wrong. Firstly, despite deep reductions in nuclear weapons over the last 30 years, the proportion of those controlled by the two leading nuclear powers has barely declined at all, and the nuclear landscape remains largely bilateral. Secondly, the revolutionary impact of military technological progress is not something new, but is a logical phenomenon that has occurred regularly throughout history. Nonetheless, five decades of experience clearly demonstrated that arms control can be very successful, provided there is political will at the highest governments’ level to reach agreements on limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. Like in the past, in the foreseeable future, arms control measures are able to substantially reduce the threat posed by innovative weapons systems. No doubt, arms control agreements do have their limits. But overall, despite certain gaps and failures, the arms control process has scored a number of historical victories during the past 50 years, and it should remain at the core of international security, even if many problems cannot be resolved quickly or all at once. Only the continuation of nuclear arms control can create political and military conditions for eventual limitations of many innovative weapons systems and technologies, as well as for a phased shift to a multilateral format of nuclear disarmament.

Whiplash: Donald Trump and NATO

U.S. President Donald Trump has flip-flopped on NATO’s relevance, harangued allies about unfair burden-sharing, and threatened to condition U.S. support for other allies based on their level of defense spending. Trump’s erratic approaches to Russia, Ukraine, nuclear arms control, and the Middle East have further exacerbated allied anxieties. Militarily, the Trump administration has strengthened and extended U.S. commitments to NATO. Politically, the Alliance is in sad shape. The deeper challenge for Europe, however, is not U.S. abandonment, it is that the United States is drifting from being a European power to a power in Europe.

Strategic Stability: It Takes Two to Tango?

This article focuses upon the most recent trends in nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. It addresses the contemporary developments in three interconnected domains: first-strike, crisis and arms race stability. It traces the evolution of strategic stability studies, highlights the most fundamental contribution in the three above-mentioned study areas, and attempts to explain the change in contemporary nuclear deterrence. During the Cold War the superpowers developed international practices and unwritten rules of nuclear deterrence. Political practices emerged together with extensive studies of nuclear deterrence, which were based on a rational choice approach and game modelling. Contemporary international relations (IR) faces revival of nuclear deterrence studies. While some scholars are rediscovering the Cold War IR analysis models and adapting them to contemporary realities, others are looking for new analytical possibilities. This article focuses upon interlinkages between firststrike, crisis and arms race stability, and attempts to explain how changes in strategic environment can help better understanding the contemporary nuclear deterrence. It discusses whether and under what conditions nuclear parity, first-strike stability, arms control and crisis equilibrium can guarantee the strategic stability and military balance. It also addresses the qualitative or quantitative change in the conflict or crisis perception, and its implications on contemporary deterrence.

Keynes Goes Nuclear: Thomas Schelling and the Macroeconomic Origins of Strategic Stability

Among the most important ideas in Cold War nuclear strategy and arms control was that of “stability”—the notion that by protecting weapons for use in retaliation, the superpowers would be less likely to fight a thermonuclear war. Conventional wisdom among strategists and historians of strategy has long held that stability was inherent to the logic of rational nuclear deterrence. This essay shows the conventional wisdom to be mistaken. It examines the technical practice of Thomas Schelling, who introduced the stability idea in a classic 1958 paper. Celebrated as a game theorist, Schelling was actually trained as a Keynesian macroeconomic modeler during the second half of the 1940s. In 1958, he used Keynesian techniques to frame deterrence as a stable system of dynamic adjustment, akin to the stable macroeconomic system he had modeled as a young economist. Among Schelling's fellow strategists, stability quickly became popular as a rationalization for their preferred nuclear deployment policies.

The third nuclear age

Since the end of the Cold War, the bipolar competition and cooperation between the United States and Russia have sustained global strategic stability in the second nuclear age. However, destabilizing technologies in the hands of the United States, Russia, and China will markedly change the strategic landscape in the near future. This article asserts that a technology-enabled, multipolar competition will usher in the third nuclear age, which may be identified by three trends: (1) a new arms race with revolutionary weapons that challenge the existing deterrence paradigm; (2) an entanglement of nuclear and non-nuclear force and doctrinal development in the multipolar competition; and (3) a state-driven model of innovation. The article then concludes that new thinking on deterrence geometry, global governance of nuclear nonproliferation and arms control, and nuclear strategy will be needed to maintain strategic stability in the third nuclear age.

The Deep Crisis of Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament: The State of Play and the Challenges

ABSTRACTAfter the golden age of arms control, Russia and the United States are no longer engaged in arms control negotiations. The landmark Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was officially terminated on 2 August 2019, and the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expires in February 2021. The continued political alienation between Russia and the West, combined with new military-technological developments, will undermine strategic stability. A new arms race is looming with severe implications for global nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and regional stability. Neither superpower seems to have a strategy for developing arms control and disarmament. On the contrary, both sides are pursuing costly programs to replace and modernize their Cold War strategic arsenals. A more ambitious approach is necessary for further reductions in nuclear arsenals and the extension of long-standing arms control commitments. The collapse of the INF Treaty could have been prevented by reciprocal inspections to verify treaty compliance. The United States and Russia can agree to extend New START to 2026 and to undertake a wider and structured discussion about what they could do to enhance strategic stability. Such a model must take into account third-country actors, missile defense, precision-guided conventional strike systems, and future actions in outer space and cyberspace. NATO and Russia need to launch a substantive dialogue on how to reduce the risk of hazardous military activities and to prevent military escalation caused by accidents and miscalculations. Other nuclear-armed states and their different types of delivery systems must be part of the disarmament process.

Dispensing With the Indispensable Nation?

Abstract Since entering office, US president Trump has reversed key multilateral achievements of his predecessors, initiating a new US retreat from multilateral cooperation. For other governments wishing to preserve and deepen existing global agreements, this has posed the question of whether and how multilateral cooperation can work without the leadership and support of the dominant global power. International relations scholars have already debated the possibility of “nonhegemonic cooperation” in earlier periods marked by US unilateralism. This article draws on these previous analyses to evaluate the current prospects and limits of a “multilateralism minus one” in three key global policy areas: nuclear arms control, climate change, and trade.

Jon Wolfsthal on the link between nuclear strategy and the nuclear modernization budget

ABSTRACTIn this interview with Bulletin editor-in-chief John Mecklin, nuclear arms control and nonproliferation expert Jon Wolfsthal provides his wide-ranging views on the current nuclear situation, how the new Congress might deal with US plans for a $1 trillion-plus modernization of its nuclear arsenal, and ways the inordinate cost of that modernization program might be reduced.

The Treaty is Out of the Bottle: The Power and Logic of Nuclear Disarmament

ABSTRACT The nuclear genie is out of the bottle, manifesting as nuclear proliferation. Efforts to contain it have generated another genie whose agenda is to establish a verifiable nuclear disarmament regime. Despite several achievements and remarkable stability, the limits of the nuclear arms control and non-proliferation regime have become evident. In the mid-1990s, therefore, civil society, in cooperation with governments and international organizations, launched a concerted effort to promote nuclear abolition. Immediate results included the 1996 International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons and the 1997 Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (Model NWC). Two decades later the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Ban Treaty) creates a legal framework and provides a platform to develop a negotiating process and norm-building instruments for a nuclear-weapon-free world. Drawing on international legal theory and international relations theory (and their critiques of each other), this article examines the normative value, logic and power of nuclear disarmament. Taking the existing regime as a reference point, we compare the elements and implications of the Ban Treaty and Model NWC, and draw conclusions across various dimensions, including elements of the treaties and their approaches to elimination, verification, compliance and organization.

Myths of Established Security Policy

Since 2017, the Study Group “European Security and Peace” of the Federation of German Scientists (VDW) has been working on the central interrelationships and challenges of European and global security. In doing so, it continues the VDW‘s tradition in the field of cooperative security and peace policy, in which science played a particular role. At the beginning of the VDW‘s foundation, questions of nuclear disarmament and arms control were at the forefront, which is reflected in particular in the “Göttingen Declaration of 1957 on Nuclear Armament” as well as in its participation in the international Pugwash movement. In the meantime, new security risks, complex conflict dynamics and crisis constellations have emerged alongside nuclear armament, from digitalisation to climate change. This development is accelerated by technical-scientific progress and its ambivalence as well as by economic and social processes of globalization. Under the changing conditions of the 21st century, the (apparent) stability of the previous world order is dissolving; the challenges for peace and security in and around Europe are increasing. The opportunities for a cooperative world order are dwindling. Nationalist power politics is fuelling a chaotic dynamic that increases the danger of a new uncontrollable arms race, weakens established forms and institutions for dealing with conflicts and clouds the prospect of a sustainable European peace order. Following in the tradition of the VDW, the study group aims at contributing to a better understanding of the complex conflict dynamics through analyses, statements and events and to draw constructive conclusions for an appropriate peace policy. As its first project, the study group has analytically examined some “myths of established security policy”. Here, the ambiguous term “myth” refers to beliefs that have solidified into dogmas. They promote political decisions that are based on premises that need to be problematized. It is the task of science to critically question, interpret and examine the plausibility of assumptions underlying political decisions. It is evident that even highly problematic decisions can result from faulty assumptions. Widespread myths can block the path to appropriate social discourse and good politics. The goal the study group has set itself is to address some of these certainties as myths and to deconstruct them in order to break them up and thus correct them. Specific recommendations for action, however, take second place. The draft papers were discussed extensively and in part controversially in the study group. However, the responsibility for the deliberately pointed texts lies solely with the authors. The first delivery contains individual papers on the following topics: the cooperative world order (Lothar Brock), Russia and the European peace order (Sabine Jaberg), the effectiveness of robust military interventions in the Global South (Hans-Georg Ehrhart), the inadequate equipment of the German Federal Armed Forces (Michael Brzoska), the current relevance of arms control (Michael Staack) and the threat to security posed by climate change (Jürgen Scheffran). Further papers are in preparation. With the publication of the “Myth Papers” and related comments, a scientific discussion is to be initiated which – so the authors of the papers and the editors of the Friedens-Warte hope – will lead to critical reflection, but also to new ideas for a better, scientifically informed peace and security policy.

After New START: US Modernization, Moscow, and Nuclear Arms Control

ABSTRACTThe United States has planned an ambitious strategic nuclear modernization program, as has Russia. Within this context, what are the expectations for New START and its extension to 2026 or beyond? This study analyzes possible scenarios for US strategic nuclear modernization within New START limitations, acknowledging that wild cards include the fate of the INF treaty, threats posed by missile defenses and postmodern counter-defense weapons, and other uncertainties.

Determinants of the Nuclear Policy Options in the Obama Administration: An Interview with Jon Wolfsthal

ABSTRACT Jon Wolfsthal is renowned for his policy achievements and his well-informed articles on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation issues. He served as special assistant to former US President Barack Obama and as senior director for arms control and nonproliferation at the National Security Council from 2014 to 2017. He was special adviser to Vice President Joe Biden for nuclear security and nonproliferation and a director for nonproliferation on the National Security Council from 2009 to 2012. During his time in the Obama White House, Wolfsthal was a key figure in formulating and implementing Obama administration nuclear policies. This interview enables both experts and the general public to become more acquainted with major determinants of the policy options that the Obama administration pursued as it sought to advance the President’s “Prague agenda”. The following text actually combines two interviews, conducted on 30 July 2017 and 1 March 2018 and edited for this journal.

Limitations on ballistic missile defense—Past and possibly future

ABSTRACT The ABM Treaty is unlikely to be revived any time soon. But it is possible that restraints on US deployment of ballistic missile defenses could make them seem less threatening to the effectiveness of Russia’s and China’s nuclear deterrents and set the stage for discussions about ways to preserve and even advance nuclear arms control. The proposed restraints are on systems designed to intercept warheads outside the atmosphere. Such systems are of little value in any case because they can be easily deceived by decoys and other countermeasures.