Nuclear Affairs Research Articles

The Contribution of Latin America and the Caribbean to Multilateral Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament

This article addresses the developments and interconnections between regional and global-level negotiations to prohibit nuclear weapons. Ambassador Sergio Duarte, who has been one of the leading negotiators on nuclear weapons disarmament and nonproliferation since the 1960s and is the current president of the Pugwash movement, traces the history of Latin American and Caribbean efforts to forge stronger ties and foster regional cooperation. He goes back to the first quarter of the nineteenth century to show how those ties laid the ground for the conception of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the first Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in a populated area, and facilitated the region’s active role in nuclear affairs. He also dives into other successful arrangements, such as the creation of a binational agency (ABACC) that ensures control of nuclear materials in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to build confidence and increase cooperation in the nuclear field, and he describes the region’s key role in enabling the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY: CURRENT POLICY EMPHASIS

The article presents an analysis of the understanding of global nuclear security in terms of political accents. The relevance is explained by the processes that are currently taking place all over the world, taking into account the military operations in Ukraine. In addition, the global nuclear order is changing, the climate is changing, your oil price volatility, and the increasing problem of energy security. This speaks of the relevance and importance of turning to the study of issues of the future use of nuclear energy. The nuclear future requires significant efforts to strengthen international organizations and the regulatory framework that governs global nuclear affairs. It was noted that nuclear security requires global solutions, networks of national measures, international legal agreements and voluntary initiatives that form the basis of a comprehensive and effective global security architecture. Without a comprehensive and effective architecture, the progress made by countries is diminishing and it will be difficult for countries to sustain progress forward. Today, the country's approaches to nuclear security are very different, creating the danger that small links have been created to get rid of terrorists, looking for the easiest route to weapons-grade nuclear material. Only a general system that holds all states accountable to the same standards can ensure this. All countries must effectively exercise their sovereign security over their nuclear materials and facilities to prevent an act of catastrophic nuclear terrorism and thus preserve the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy.

The Unflinching Mr. Smith and the Nuclear Age*.

This article focuses on the U.S. diplomat and nuclear arms control negotiator Gerald (Gerry) Coat Smith in order to cast new light on the importance of diplomats in the context of the set of international activities currently labelled as “science diplomacy.” Smith, a lawyer by training, was a key negotiator in many international agreements on post‐WW2 atomic energy projects, from those on uranium prospecting and mining, to reactors technologies to later ones on non‐proliferation and disarmament. His career in science (nuclear) diplomacy also epitomized the shortcomings of efforts to align other countries’ posture on nuclear affairs to U.S. wishes. In particular, the unswerving diplomat increasingly understood that strong‐arm tactics to dissuade other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons would not limit proliferation. Not only did this inform later U.S. diplomacy approaches, but it lent itself to the ascendancy of the new notion of “soft power” as critical to the re‐definition of international affairs.

Siegfried Hecker on remembering history while planning the future of nuclear arms control

Sig Hecker is one of the world’s foremost nuclear security and policy experts and has for decades served as a go-to source for journalists writing about nuclear affairs. An emeritus fellow at Stanf...

Nuclear Humanitarianism

Abstract In recent years, humanitarianism has been portrayed as a revolutionary new force in the anti-nuclear movement. This article challenges this progressive understanding of humanitarianism’s role in nuclear affairs by exploring how the language and concept of humanitarianism have been deployed by two states that have been deeply involved in international nuclear law projects over the last 50 years: Australia and New Zealand. It argues that contrary to popular perceptions about the radical potential of humanitarianism in nuclear affairs, the phenomenon’s track record in Australia and New Zealand is chequered. Indeed, in certain key respects, humanitarianism has impeded anti-nuclear agendas in Australia and New Zealand: first, the ambiguity inherent in the language of humanitarianism has allowed it to be deployed to support the maintenance of nuclear weapons; and secondly, humanitarianism has generated outcomes that often support and reinforce the status quo legally and structurally. The article also offers some reflections on the relationship between humanitarianism and international law in the nuclear context. Specifically, it shows how the Australian and New Zealand case studies reveal contradictory approaches to, and understandings of, humanitarianism as law.

South Korea’s Search for Nuclear Sovereignty

South Korea’s Search for Nuclear Sovereignty Toby Dalton (bio) and Alexandra Francis (bio) keywords south korea, united states, nuclear sovereignty, nuclear policy [End Page 115] EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This article argues that the narrow technical disagreements stalling the renegotiation of the U.S.–South Korea nuclear cooperation agreement mask a far larger and more complicated set of issues and interests that challenge both the future of bilateral nuclear cooperation and the nonproliferation regime. main argument An oft-stated South Korean objective in bilateral nuclear negotiations with the United States is to achieve “peaceful nuclear sovereignty.” This complex term, reflecting South Korea’s desire to decrease U.S. leverage over its nuclear affairs, has multiple connotations, including energy security, industry competitiveness, legitimate rights, status, and autonomy. There are tensions among these competing objectives, which, coupled with the inherent limitations on nuclear independence resulting from international nuclear trade regimes, make the concept of peaceful nuclear sovereignty a chimera. Other states—Iran, Brazil, and Turkey, for instance—are driven by similar sentiments, meaning that Washington must take care to resolve its differences with Seoul in a way that balances nonproliferation and nuclear energy interests. policy implications • The wellspring of South Korea’s likely disappointment is the unattainability of peaceful nuclear sovereignty itself. Negotiating among the bureaucratic and public interests that embody these complex aspirations in Seoul will be a greater challenge for the Park Geun-hye administration than the talks with Washington. • How the United States and South Korea resolve the enrichment and reprocessing issue will set a precedent for how states should address other non–nuclear weapons states interested in pursuing sensitive nuclear technologies and thus holds implications beyond the Korean Peninsula. • There is common ground between Seoul and Washington on the need to strengthen global standards for nuclear security and safety, which provides a basis for resolving their differences through deeper collaboration coupled with enhanced monitoring. [End Page 116] Since 2010, negotiators from the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have sought to bridge an impasse holding up the conclusion of a bilateral nuclear cooperation pact. The outdated agreement governing this issue, concluded in the 1970s when South Korea was a nuclear neophyte, was to expire in 2014; the sides agreed on a temporary extension to 2016, giving negotiators more time to work. Seoul and Washington concur on the need to make the new agreement consistent with South Korea’s stature as an advanced nuclear energy state. But South Korea also seeks to win U.S. permission to conduct advanced, proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, such as reprocessing spent fuel, which Washington has refused on nonproliferation grounds. Although this disagreement might seem narrow and technical, the impasse masks a far larger and more complicated set of issues that implicate not just the future of U.S.-ROK nuclear cooperation but also the viability of the nonproliferation regime to continue to satisfy the interests of states such as South Korea. For the United States, nuclear negotiations with South Korea primarily are focused on facilitating commercial nuclear trade and sustaining nonproliferation standards. The latter, however, conflict with South Korea’s nuclear ambitions in two ways. First, Seoul’s desire to conduct the enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear materials—activities that can also be used to make fuel for nuclear weapons—contradicts U.S. policy to discourage the spread and use of these technologies. Second, Seoul’s continued adherence to a 1992 joint declaration between North and South Korea, under which both sides agreed not to possess enrichment and reprocessing facilities, represents a central element of U.S. policy toward the denuclearization of North Korea. Although North Korea long ago broke that agreement, South Korean enrichment and reprocessing activities could confound efforts to roll back North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. For these reasons, Washington opposes Seoul’s request to enrich or reprocess U.S.-obligated nuclear material. But Seoul is not just negotiating for enhanced terms of nuclear trade or permission to conduct enrichment and reprocessing. For South Korea, the negotiations have a strong political impetus, as they symbolize both its global aspirations and complicated relationship with the United States. The deeper motivation behind its negotiating stance, as captured in terminology used...

Nuclear non-proliferation trends in the Asia-Pacific: the dilemmas of regime stasis, strategic flux and market expansion

Despite the recent surge in both governmental and academic advocacy of nuclear disarmament, including initiatives of the Obama administration and the Australian and Japanese governments, the spectre of further nuclear proliferation arguably remains a key challenge for international security. This article suggests that this is particularly the case in Asia due to three major dynamics: (1) the stasis of the international non-proliferation regime embodied in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; (2) the state of flux in the global and regional strategic nuclear environment; and (3) increasing regional demand for nuclear energy. This article argues that developments in each of these realms of nuclear affairs hold the potential to increase proliferation pressures in the region.

Entangled histories: Climate science and nuclear weapons research

Climate science and nuclear weapons testing have a long and surprisingly intimate relationship. The global networks that monitored the Fukushima radiation plume and forecasted its movement are the direct descendants of systems and computer models developed to trace fallout from weapons tests. Tracing radioactive carbon as it cycles through the atmosphere, the oceans, and the biosphere has been crucial to understanding anthropogenic climate change. The earliest global climate models relied on numerical methods very similar to those developed by nuclear weapons designers for solving the fluid dynamics equations needed to analyze shock waves produced in nuclear explosions. The climatic consequences of nuclear war also represent a major historical intersection between climate science and nuclear affairs. Without the work done by nuclear weapons designers and testers, scientists would know much less than they now do about the atmosphere. In particular, this research has contributed enormously to knowledge about both carbon dioxide, which raises Earth’s temperature, and aerosols, which lower it. Without climate models, scientists and political leaders would not have understood the full extent of nuclear weapons’ power to annihilate not only human beings, but other species as well. In the post-Cold War era, US national laboratories built to create the most fearsome arsenal in history are now using their powerful supercomputers, their expertise in modeling, and their skills in managing very large data sets to address the threat of catastrophic climate change.

Policy or Posturing

On 6 April 2010 the long-awaited nuclear posture review report was released, fulfilling a promise from as the White House blog proclaimed.1 A year earlier, in Prague, President Barack Obama had pledged that the United States would take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. On the 40th anniversary of the entry into force of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in March 2010, Obama pledged that the forthcoming review would move beyond outdated Cold War thinking and reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in US strategy.2 The administration clearly saw the review as a key element of the positive narrative regarding US nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament policy that it wanted to convey prior to the Washington nuclear security summit in April and the nonproliferation treaty review conference in New York in May. Now that these major multilateral events have successfully been held and the anniversary of the review's release has passed, it is worth considering its real impact on the international strategic environment. Did the review represent a genuine reform of US nuclear policy or was it more of a public relations exercise designed to position the US favourably in the context of a major meeting of the nonproliferation treaty parties? This article will consider the review from an international perspective, and in particular how its content responds to the obligations of states party to the treaty and the decisions of its quinquennial review conferences. The review, as an authoritative policy statement of the world's leading nuclear power, was addressed to a foreign as much as a domestic audience. The nature and timing of the review was intended to influence states active in international nuclear affairs in a manner coincident with US policy objectives. Issued a month before the opening of the May 2010 review conference of the nonproliferation treaty, and after a decade of difficulties for this core international security treaty, the nuclear posture review was undoubtedly going to have an impact on the perceptions of participating states as well as on the atmosphere of the conference itself.Despite the timing of its release and its deployment as a public diplomacy vehicle in the lead-up to the US -hosted nuclear security summit and treaty review conference, the nuclear review was nevertheless very much a home-grown product. It had domestic roots as a congressionally mandated review of all aspects of US nuclear weapons policy and posture, as well as the related infrastructure of the nuclear weapons complex. An early decision was taken to issue the review solely in an unclassified form, thus ensuring full transparency of the results to the public, both domestic and foreign. The Obama administration was not going to repeat the mistake of the previous administration, which conducted a classified nuclear posture review in 2001 and saw excerpts of it leaked, including controversial text on nuclear deterrence and preemption that provoked international consternation. The 2010 review was designed to be viewed as a progressive statement on US nuclear weapons policy that would complement the administration's foreign policy aims of strengthening the treaty and enlisting international support in shoring up the global nonproliferation regime. At the same time, it was also meant to send a reassuring message to US allies and partners who rely on extended deterrence that American commitments are as solid as ever. Finally, it was intended to placate various domestic constituencies with vested interests in the continuation of nuclear forces and the associated nuclear weapons complex. Given the inherent tensions, if not downright incompatibility, among these various aims, it is not surprising that in the end the review delivered a rather mixed message to the international audience.The salient issues of the review from an international perspective were the definition of the role for nuclear weapons in US strategy; the nature of the security assurances the US was prepared to give to non-nuclear weapons states; what action the US would take on outstanding nuclear disarmament commitments; what would be done to strengthen nonproliferation and nuclear security; and how the US would approach relations with other nuclear weapons-possessing states. …

Review: The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons

THE TRADITION OF NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS T.V. Paul Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009. 336pp, US$29.95 PaPer ISBN 978-0804761321In the none-too-long history of nuclear weapons, two facts are striking: first, unlike any other weapon, this one was used only twice, shortly after it became operative, and then not for more than six decades. Second, despite the weapon's apparent non -usability, not only have nuclear talks completely failed, but some nations are still trying to join the nuclear club. The reasons for this are complicated and it is easier to explain why nuclear weapons were not used after August 1945: the horror of the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of such magnitude, and the longterm damage from a nuclear attack be so extensive, that over the last 64 years no one has dared to use such a weapon of mass destruction.T.V. Paul accepts these reasons for the non-use of nuclear weapons but argues that there are still questions to be answered. We can understand why the nuclear powers did not use nuclear weapons against each other. Such was the power of deterrence. But why did nuclear powers not use these weapons when they became entangled in bloody conflicts with nonnuclear states? The example of the US in Vietnam is the most notable case. In an attempt to address this problem, and despite the fact that he is a political scientist, Paul rejects the purely paradigm driven an answer (3). The reasons for non-use defy a single explanation, because nuclear weapons were never formally banned in the way that chemical and biological weapons were. Explaining the informal norm of non-use calls for a nuanced approach that takes into account a number of factors that go beyond a single grand theory.One of the explanations that Paul cites is the horrendous impact of nuclear weapons. This is the logic of consequences. With the passing years, non-use also became a matter of tradition. These two forces - the logic of consequences and the tradition of non-use - fixed the nuclear non-use policy even when there seemed to be some logic that called for a nuclear attack. Tradition, continues Paul, was based to great extent on reputation. This is a twofold argument. On the one hand, the non-use of nuclear weapons preserved peace through deterrence and justified the nuclear monopoly of the US and USSR, even these countries campaigned for nuclear nonproliferation. On the other hand, using nuclear weapons would show the use in an excessively bad light in international public opinion (3).Paul bases his case not on primary research but secondary sources. This raises a question of principle: why did he use one source and not another? For example, in discussing the actions of the administration, Paul relies on books that emphasize Truman's idealistic approach to foreign policy and nuclear affairs. His wanted nuclear and took steps to achieve it. Truman became an advocate of international control, he writes, as a result of the devastation of Hiroshima/Nagasaki and the arguments presented by influential scientists and of other peace activists, while his advisors came out with plans for eventual nuclear disarmament (41). …

From the familiar to the extraordinary: local residents’ perceptions of risk when living with nuclear power in the UK

Nearly two decades since the last nuclear power station was built and began operating in the UK, nuclear energy is firmly back on the political agenda domestically and elsewhere in the world. Yet since the 1980s, little research has investigated perceptions of nuclear power in the UK, particularly those of communities living in very close proximity to such facilities. Using biographical narrative interviews (n = 61), we explore how local residents living close to two nuclear power stations in the UK (Bradwell, Essex and Oldbury, South Gloucestershire) have come to view their local facility. We reveal how the power station is constructed through processes of familiarisation and/or the normalisation/normification of risk as part of everyday life; how this ordinariness is juxtaposed with moments of extraordinariness in which, due to direct and mediated events, the power station is reframed as a risk issue; and how risk awareness is associated with moments of anxiety which ebb and flow through our interviewees’ lives. We conclude that biographical experiences dynamically unfolding through space and time can be interrupted by risk events (mediated and direct, real and symbolic, nuclear and non-nuclear) to disrupt the usually taken-for-granted ordinariness of a power station’s presence in a particular locality. Our findings suggest that those involved in debate about new nuclear build must be sensitive to the heterogeneity of the extraordinary in nuclear affairs and the importance of socio-cultural histories of place.

The nuclear affairs of PTEN

PTEN encodes a major tumor-suppressor protein that is a dual-specificity phosphatase. Inactivation of PTEN has been shown to be involved in heritable and sporadic cancers. Mutation or deletion of PTEN, historically the most commonly identified mechanisms of inactivation of tumor suppressors, is found only in the minority of sporadic non-cultured primary cancers, which indicates that there might be other, novel mechanisms of inactivation. Despite the absence of a classic nuclear localization signal, PTEN enters the nucleus by several mechanisms, including simple diffusion, active shuttling, cytoplasmic-localization-signal-dependent export and monoubiquitylation-dependent import. Cytoplasmic PTEN has a well-known role as a negative regulator of the PI3K/AKT pathway; however, it is becoming clear that cytosolic PTEN is not the same as nuclear PTEN. Nuclear PTEN plays a role in chromosome stability, DNA repair, cell cycle arrest and cellular stability. The balance between these functions is an important factor in determining whether a cell remains benign or becomes neoplastic.

Nuclear energy from Dwight Eisenhower to Mohamed El Baradei

At the start of the nuclear age, nuclear power was seen as a terrifying instrument of death. Nowadays, radiation sources, using either radioactive material or radiation generators, are widely used throughout the world in medicine, research, agriculture, industry, hydrology and education. The Nobel Peace Prize 2005 was awarded jointly to Mohamed El Baradei and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Nuclear Law has not yet the importance it needs to have. We are now in the beginning of a new age where the relaunch of nuclear generation must be seen as a positive event. However, nuclear and radiological terrorism and the increase in the number of countries with nuclear weapons is a growing global security concern. This paper outlines the most important events in nuclear affairs from 1945 to nowadays.

Environmental Security in East Asia: The Case of Radioactive Waste Management

This article examines the issue of radioactive waste in Northeast Asia from a regional environmental security complex perspective. First, the study tries to determine if it is proper to examine the issue from a "regional" and "security" perspective. It then discusses the radioactive waste management systems of the countries in Northeast Asia, and assesses the status of the regional radioactive waste security complex based upon two cases of radioactive waste dumping, as well as the prospects for regional cooperation. The article concludes that the emergence of proposals on the safe management of radioactive wastes and efforts to promote cooperation on nuclear affairs implies that common interests do exist and that mutual gains can be realized among Northeast Asian countries from regional cooperation. However, numerous obstacles must be overcome before an effective regional institution can be established.

Indian Diplomacy

Nehru was the symbol and the maker of Indian diplomacy after 1947 and the key spokesman on foreign affairs for the Indian Congress Party before 1947. His mental outlook and approach yielded a mixed legacy in foreign affairs. (1) His move towards the USSR produced policy-development. (2) His contradictory impulses institutionalised ambivalence in the Indian decision process concerning nuclear affairs, military policy and Pakistan policy. (3) His China policy produced policy-failure. Finally (4) his attitude towards India's smaller South Asian neighbours and Southeast Asian states produced policy-neglect. After Nehru, Indian diplomacy became power-oriented and interventionist; and the level of action shifted from the primacy of the global plane to that of regional and domestic planes. Indian diplomatic theory and practice in the Nehru and the post-Nehru eras reveal the presence of six competing approaches or sub-cultures. The debate between their assumptions and implications has not been settled in Indian thinking. Hence Indian diplomatic theory and practice are still evolving. Nehru's foreign affairs record deserves critical scrutiny in part to correct the mythology about his diplomacy and in part to get a true measure of his bitter-sweet legacy.

A Dilemma of Nuclear Regulation in Canada: Political Control and Public Confidence

The federal government has been involved in both the commercial and regulatory aspects of nuclear energy for nearly forty years. These conflicting mandates have had the effect of compromising the government's dealings in a matter of fundamental importance. Canada's involvement in an international marketing arrangement for uranium and Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.'s marketing problems point to the need for new legislation to govern nuclear affairs. It is argued that in drafting such legislation, primary consideration must be given to placing the regulatory board out of the reach of Cabinet, so as to prevent it from becoming merely another arm of executive government. This will help to ameliorate the credibility problem which has beset federal nuclear regulation.

Australia and Nuclear Affairs

IT WAS NATURAL FOR AUSTRALIA, an exposed nation with limited diplomatic, human and material resources, to receive with special concern the first Chinese nuclear test. But the Chinese action only served to highlight rather than inspire Australian pre-occupation with how to accommodate foreign and defense policy to the nuclear age. An examination of the implications of and debate over nuclear affairs, in fact, serves to illuminate the dilemmas of Australian external policy generally, and the nexus between external policy and politics.* It is useful to notice the Liberal-Country Party Government's traditional attitude toward nuclear war and arms as described by Prime Minister Menzies in I957. He visualized small chance for global war but considerable chance for recurring limited conflicts, especially in South-East Asia; for these conventionally armed Australian forces would be sufficient. In any event, the use of nuclear weapons in such outbreaks could only invite escalation. Secondly, Menzies stressed the enormous drain of money and resources that would be imposed if small Australia tried to create her own nuclear arsenal. Finally, he warned against any tendency toward the proliferation of nuclear arms. The British and especially American nuclear storehouses were sufficient for deterrence and, if necessary, for retaliation.' Since I957, the Government's projections about Asian developments have proved accurate. There have been many bitter conflicts in the area, between China and India, in Laos, in Viet Nam, and between Indonesia and Malaysia. Australia gave arms to India and participated in developing her air force. She placed fighters in Thailand during the i962 crisis. She has about ioo military instructors in South Viet Nam and has recently decided to send a battalion of combat troops. She has had a battalion in Malaya since i955, and in i964 stationed units of all services in and around Malaysian Borneo. By the close of i964, Australians had met and inflicted casualties on Indonesian infiltrators in Malaya and the Malacca Straits. But so far all these difficulties have been localized, and where there has been fighting, it has been by conventional means.