Review: The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons

Abstract

THE TRADITION OF NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS T.V. Paul Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009. 336pp, US$29.95 PaPer ISBN 978-0804761321In the none-too-long history of nuclear weapons, two facts are striking: first, unlike any other weapon, this one was used only twice, shortly after it became operative, and then not for more than six decades. Second, despite the weapon's apparent non -usability, not only have nuclear talks completely failed, but some nations are still trying to join the nuclear club. The reasons for this are complicated and it is easier to explain why nuclear weapons were not used after August 1945: the horror of the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of such magnitude, and the longterm damage from a nuclear attack be so extensive, that over the last 64 years no one has dared to use such a weapon of mass destruction.T.V. Paul accepts these reasons for the non-use of nuclear weapons but argues that there are still questions to be answered. We can understand why the nuclear powers did not use nuclear weapons against each other. Such was the power of deterrence. But why did nuclear powers not use these weapons when they became entangled in bloody conflicts with nonnuclear states? The example of the US in Vietnam is the most notable case. In an attempt to address this problem, and despite the fact that he is a political scientist, Paul rejects the purely paradigm driven an answer (3). The reasons for non-use defy a single explanation, because nuclear weapons were never formally banned in the way that chemical and biological weapons were. Explaining the informal norm of non-use calls for a nuanced approach that takes into account a number of factors that go beyond a single grand theory.One of the explanations that Paul cites is the horrendous impact of nuclear weapons. This is the logic of consequences. With the passing years, non-use also became a matter of tradition. These two forces - the logic of consequences and the tradition of non-use - fixed the nuclear non-use policy even when there seemed to be some logic that called for a nuclear attack. Tradition, continues Paul, was based to great extent on reputation. This is a twofold argument. On the one hand, the non-use of nuclear weapons preserved peace through deterrence and justified the nuclear monopoly of the US and USSR, even these countries campaigned for nuclear nonproliferation. On the other hand, using nuclear weapons would show the use in an excessively bad light in international public opinion (3).Paul bases his case not on primary research but secondary sources. This raises a question of principle: why did he use one source and not another? For example, in discussing the actions of the administration, Paul relies on books that emphasize Truman's idealistic approach to foreign policy and nuclear affairs. His wanted nuclear and took steps to achieve it. Truman became an advocate of international control, he writes, as a result of the devastation of Hiroshima/Nagasaki and the arguments presented by influential scientists and of other peace activists, while his advisors came out with plans for eventual nuclear disarmament (41). …