Notion Of Necessity Research Articles

“Some Do it Out of Necessity, Others Because They Like Money and Others Because They Find it Easy”: Motivations for the Involvement of Women in Drug Trafficking in Peru

ABSTRACT Latin American feminist scholars have constructed valuable analyses on how structural inequalities, feminization of poverty, and patriarchy are the main reasons women get involved in drug trafficking. As the primary material and emotional providers of their families, and to fulfill their gendered responsibilities as reproducers of care, it has been shown that women participate in illegal activities mainly out of economic “necessity.” Nonetheless, this approach may create a homogeneous and passive imaginary of women involved in drug trafficking that is linked to Marianista femininity. The paper contributes to Southern Criminology in the task of constructing localized knowledge from the South. It aims to acknowledge women’s diversity to pursue a more nuanced perspective of women’s motivations and start to contextualize and analyze the concept of “necessity.” The paper analyses 22 interviews of women sentenced for drug trafficking in Peru and proposes six motivations for their involvement: (1) Strengthening autonomy and independence, (2) Pursuit of material-hedonistic fulfillment, (3) Desire for recognition and power, (4) Trust-based involvement, (5) Involvement driven by addiction, and (6) Involvement as unwitting participants due to deception. It concludes that the notion of necessity is influenced by class and territory, shaping women’s motivations and involvement in drug trafficking. Additionally, their motivations are not solely driven by economic needs but also by psychological and affective ones.

Net zero and the unexplored politics of residual emissions

In this perspective article, we call for more engagement with the unexplored politics of residual emissions. Residual emissions are those emissions that remain at the point of net zero, despite abatement efforts. Unlike carbon dioxide removal, which has been the focus of a lively research and policy debate, the notion of residual emissions remains relatively unexplored so far. With the mainstreaming of net zero as the long-term goal of climate policy, the politics of residual emissions are set to become a key point of contestation. Claims about residual emissions tend to revolve around notions of necessity and possibility, i.e. emissions that derive from activities deemed socially necessary yet impossible to fully abate. In this perspective article, we highlight how such claims are socially constructed and ultimately contingent on values, norms and interests. We call upon researchers to help render visible the geographically and historically contingent claims to necessity and possibility that underpin projected residual emissions. We see this as an important means to repoliticize debates about the limits and possibilities of emissions abatement, and suggest entry points for such research efforts.

Negation, Truth and Falsity

The present article includes thematically connected questions on negation in the areas of the philosophy of logic, philosophical logic and metaphysics. It highlights a central problem negation poses to a certain area of philosophy. The purpose of the article is also to analyze negation in the areas of the philosophy of logic, philosophical logic and metaphysics. It highlights a central problem negation poses to a certain area of philosophy. It includes historical references, puts the problems discussed into context, and ties together a number of the main themes and problems. The investigation discusses the problem of logical revisionism and whether there is any room for genuine disagreement, and hence shared meaning, between the classicist and deviant’s respective uses of ‘not’. If there is not, revision is impossible. We argue that revision is indeed possible and provide an account of negation as contradictoriness according to which a number of alleged negations are declared genuine. Among them are the negations of FDE (First-Degree Entailment) and a wide family of other relevant logics, LP (Priest’s dialetheic “Logic of Paradox”), Kleene weak and strong 3-valued logics with either “exclusion” or “choice” negation, and intuitionistic logic. We also discuss the problem of furnishing intuitionistic logic with an empirical negation for adequately expressing claims of the form ‘A is undecided at present’ or ‘A may never be decided’ the latter of which has been argued to be intuitionistically inconsistent. We reveal the importance of various notions of consequence-as-s-preservation where s may be falsity (versus untruth), indeterminacy or some other semantic (or “algebraic”) value, in formulating rationality constraints on speech acts and propositional attitudes such as rejection, denial and dubitability. The article provides an account of the nature of truth values regarded as objects. It is argued that only truth exists as the maximal truthmaker. The consequences this has for semantics representationally construed are considered and it is argued that every logic, from classical to non-classical, is gappy. Moreover, a truthmaker theory is developed whereby only positive truths, an account of which is also developed therein, have truthmakers. We investigate the definability of negation as “absolute” impossibility, i.e. where the notion of necessity or possibility in question corresponds to the global modality.

Problems for the Argument from Logic: a Response to the Lord of Non-Contradiction

James Anderson and Greg Welty have resurrected an argument for God’s existence (Anderson and Welty 2011), which we will call the argument from logic. We present three lines of response against the argument, involving the notion of necessity involved, the notion of intentionality involved, and then we pose a dilemma for divine conceptualism. We conclude that the argument faces substantial problems.

Is organizational commitment-job satisfaction relationship necessary for organizational commitment-citizenship behavior relationships? A Meta-Analytical Necessary Condition Analysis

Meta-analyses on the relationships of organisational commitment (OC), job satisfaction (JS) and organisational citizenship behaviour (OCB) have been used to assess necessity of one another by evaluating their causality through the notion of sufficiency. This study applies necessity condition analysis (NCA) on r values collected from a systematic review of the relationship between OC, JS, and OCB and tests their relations under the notion of necessity. Two meta-analyses were performed on 140 error adjusted effects reported from 70 studies which fulfilled study’s selection and inclusion criteria. Meta-analytical results provided positive and significant OC–JS (ř = 0.546) and OC–OCB (ř = 0.374) relationships. NCA scatterplot, statistics, and bottleneck analysis confirmed the necessity of OC–JS relationship for medium and high level of the desired OC–OCB relation. This study fulfilled the literature gap on the mutual relationship of OC, JS, and OCB by focusing on the notion of necessity rather than the traditional employed notion of sufficiency through a novel method that is testing necessity hypotheses through meta-analyses. For researchers, this method provides a novel approach to analyse meta-analytical data, while enabling practitioners for identifying and focusing on necessary relationships rather than diverging their energies and resources on factors that partially affect the outcomes.

From KLM-style conditionals to defeasible modalities, and back

We investigate an aspect of defeasibility that has somewhat been overlooked by the non-monotonic reasoning community, namely that of defeasible modes of reasoning. These aim to formalise defeasibility of the traditional notion of necessity in modal logic, in particular of its different readings as action, knowledge and others in specific contexts, rather than defeasibility of conditional forms. Building on an extension of the preferential approach to modal logics, we introduce new modal osperators with which to formalise the notion of defeasible necessity and distinct possibility, and that can be used to represent expected effects, refutable knowledge, and so on. We show how KLM-style conditionals can smoothly be integrated with our richer language. We also propose a tableau calculus which is sound and complete with respect to our modal preferential semantics, and of which the computational complexity remains in the same class as that of the underlying classical modal logic.

Modal Objectivity1

AbstractIt is widely agreed that the intelligibility of modal metaphysics has been vindicated. Quine's arguments to the contrary supposedly confused analyticity with metaphysical necessity, and rigid with non‐rigid designators.2 But even if modal metaphysics is intelligible, it could be misconceived. It could be that metaphysical necessity is not absolute necessity – the strictest real (non‐epistemic, non‐deontic) notion of necessity – and that no proposition of traditional metaphysical interest is necessary in every real sense. If there were nothing otherwise “uniquely metaphysically significant” about metaphysical necessity, then paradigmatic metaphysical necessities would be necessary in one sense of “necessary”, not necessary in another, and that would be it. The question of whether they were necessary simpliciter would be like the question of whether the Parallel Postulate is true simpliciter – understood as a pure mathematical conjecture, rather than as a hypothesis about physical spacetime. In a sense, the latter question has no objective answer. In this article, I argue that paradigmatic questions of modal metaphysics are like the Parallel Postulate question. I then discuss the deflationary ramifications of this argument. I conclude with an alternative conception of the space of possibility. According to this conception, there is no objective boundary between possibility and impossibility. Along the way, I sketch an analogy between modal metaphysics and set theory.

High-Society Framing: The Brooklyn Eagle and the Popularity of Twilight Sleep in Brooklyn

ABSTRACTTwilight Sleep (TS) is an obstetric intervention during which a laboring woman enters a semiconscious state via injection. TS received enthusiastic support in Brooklyn, NY, in The Brooklyn Eagle (TBE) newspaper between 1914 and 1918. The purpose of this article is to analyze the framing of TS in TBE as the most popular obstetric intervention among wealthy, White socialites in Brooklyn during the period. The coverage in TBE prompted a nearly universally positive perception of TS among the newspaper’s wider readership. After extensive historiographical research and rhetorical analysis of newspaper coverage of TS in TBE, we discovered a form of framing we call “high-society framing,” rooted in both wealth and notoriety. We discuss four possible effects of high-society framing: The first is the ability of high-society framing to attract or repel the public regarding a health care issue, and the second is the impact of high-society framing on public perception of medical interventions, procedures, or pharmaceuticals. A third possible effect of high-society framing is that it can alter notions of necessity, and a fourth is that high-society framing can elicit a tacit acceptance of medical interventions, procedures, and pharmaceuticals, thus obfuscating risk. Finally, we argue that high-society framing has implications for the discussion of health care in present-day mediated discourses.

The foundational efficiency of love: reconciling with Aquinas

AbstractAnabaptist theologians who vie for the most convincing theory of divine non-violence in the contemporary ‘atonement debate’ quite often fail to appreciate the contributions of medieval scholars such as St Thomas Aquinas. Of course, that failure does have a rationale. Aquinas does, indeed, support various systematic expressions of a satisfaction theory of atonement. In doing so, he insists upon God's violent solution to the problem of sin and also employs language fraught with quid pro quo, mercantile and penal images. Aquinas does attempt to ‘correct’ Anselm and rearticulate the satisfaction theory of atonement; however, his expression of that motif still hinges upon the divine demand for remuneration, balanced accounts or an economic transaction in order to repair the damage done by sin. God's desire for this redemptive reparation results in the necessity of the violent death of an innocent man. Consequently, although Aquinas expresses the notion of necessity differently than Anselm, his theory also necessitates, at best, divine complicity with violence and, at worst, divine insistence on violence. Anabaptist theologians who remain true to the tradition's pacifist roots rightfully cry ‘foul’ in response to Aquinas’ theory. If Jesus of Nazareth fully reveals the character of God as indicated in John 14:7 with the words, ‘if you have seen me, you have seen the Father’, theories of atonement which depict God as condoning or requiring violence do not harmonise with the life and teachings of the man Christians call the Prince of Peace, especially if that violence pertains to the redemption of a loving God's good creation. As a result, those who oppose the implicit divine violence embedded in Aquinas’ satisfaction theory of atonement may opt to disengage with him, to expel him completely from the conversation. Yet I suggest that non-violent atonement theologians pause and rethink their indictment of the angelic doctor. Satisfaction remains the prevalent theme surrounding Aquinas’ atonement motif, but it is not by any means the only image he brings to bear on the topic. In fact, throughout his ruminations on the passion of Christ, St Thomas focuses explicitly on the unfathomable, extravagant and immeasurable divine love as the primary motivation for God's desire and subsequent actions to redeem and restore a sinful humanity. I suggest that, given Aquinas’ emphasis on divine love, Anabaptist theologians may well discover a satisfying interlocutor for further theological conversation which carries significant implications for the life of the church. Indeed, scholastic savants such as Thomas Aquinas still do warrant a place at the communal table.

Time and Necessity in Avicenna’s Theory of Demonstration*

Avicenna’s (d. 1037) theory of demonstration is largely inspired by Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics but also, at the same time, characterized by significant flashes of originality. One of the areas where Avicenna’s innovative contribution is most evident is his interpretation of the notion of necessity in the context of demonstrative arguments. The paper investigates two issues. First, the relationship between the notion of substantial necessity and that of descriptional necessity and their relevance for Avicenna’s theory of scientific discourse. Second, the question whether Barbara LXL qualifies as a genuine demonstrative argument, i.e., whether its combination of modalized premises provides sufficiently strong epistemic grounds for certitude to come about in the conclusion of a syllogism.

Terrible Engines:

Abstract This article describes the emergence across several genres—poetry, fiction, and the recently coined “conceptual writing”—of a “speculative” subgenre that forgoes conventional literary content in favor of executing highly complex literary forms characterized by a preoccupation with number, the use of word sets, and a high degree of recursion in syntax and narrative structure. To this degree, these works are intent to expose the mathematical properties of language above aspiring to conventional realism and spontaneous expression. Nonetheless, through the frame of the philosophy of Quentin Meillassoux, a form of realism can be discerned in these writings, if only of a highly “speculative” sort that wishes to limn the “unkthinkable” in which a unique form of contingency (as opposed to the classical notion of necessity) in a primary feature in the apparent coherence and orderliness of our present state of the universe.

The notion of necessity in the German philosophy of the Enlightenment

The notion of necessity in the German philosophy of the Enlightenment

Plato on Necessity and Disorder

In the Timaeus, Plato makes a distinction between reason and necessity. This distinction is often accounted for as a distinction between two types of causation: purpose oriented causation and mechanistic causation. While reason is associated with the soul and taken to bring about its effects with the good and the beautiful as the end, necessity is understood in terms of a set of natural laws pertaining to material things. In this paper I shall suggest that there are reasons to reconsider the latter part of this account and argue for a non-mechanistic understanding of necessity. I will first outline how the notion of necessity is introduced in the dialogue. Next I will show how a mechanistic account of necessity fails to capture Plato’s purpose of treating it as a causal factor; and, finally, I will argue that this purpose is better understood as an attempt, on Plato’s part, to account for the causal origin of disorder and irrationality, an origin articulated in terms of a pre-cosmic situation and the notoriously difficult notion of the third kind.

Zolin and Pizzi: Defining Necessity from Noncontingency

The point of the present paper is to draw attention to some interesting similarities, as well as differences, between the approaches to the logic of noncontingency of Evgeni Zolin and of Claudio Pizzi. Though neither of them refers to the work of the other, each is concerned with the definability of a (normally behaving, though not in general truth-implying) notion of necessity in terms of noncontingency, standard boolean connectives and additional but non-modal expressive resources. The notion of definability involved is different in the two cases (‘external’ for Zolin, ‘internal’ for Pizzi), as are the additional resources: infinitary conjunction in the case of Zolin, and for Pizzi, first, propositional quantification, and then, later, most ingeniously, the use of a propositional constant. As well as surveying and comparing of the work of these authors, the discussion includes some some novelties, such as the confirmation of a conjecture of Zolin’s (Theorem 2.7).

Causal Necessity in Aristotle

Like many realists about causation and causal powers, Aristotle uses the language of necessity when discussing causation, and he appears to think that by invoking necessity, he is clarifying the manner in which causes bring about or determine their effects. In so doing, he would appear to run afoul of Humean criticisms of the notion of a necessary connection between cause and effect. The claim that causes necessitate their effects may be understood— or attacked— in several ways, however, and so whether the view or its criticism is tenable depends on how we understand the necessitation claim. In fact, Aristotelian efficient causation may be said to involve two distinct necessary connections: one is a relation between causes considered as potential, while the other relates them considered as active. That is, the claims that (1) what has the power to heat necessarily heats what has the power to be heated, and that (2) a particular flame which is actually under a pot necessarily heats it, both of which appear to be true for Aristotle, involve distinct notions of necessity. The latter kind of necessity is based on the facts, as Aristotle sees them, about change, whereas the former is based in the nature of properties. Though different, both kinds of necessity are instances of what contemporary philosophers would call metaphysical necessity, and together they also amount to a theory of causal determination.

How many notions of necessity?

Evans distinguishes between superficial necessity and deep necessity in his analysis of the contingent a priori. The distinction between these two notions of necessity is formalized by Davies and Humberstone through the addition of the operator Fixedly to Actuality Modal Logic (AML, S5A), where deep necessity is represented by the combination Fixedly Actually. Wehmeier’s Subjunctive Modal Logic (SML) provides an extension of the expressive capacity of ordinary modal predicate logic alternative to AML. I add Fixedly to SML and show that in the system SML with Fixedly the distinction between deep and superficial necessity disappears. I conclude that the existence of the distinction between deep and superficial necessity, as well as the existence of the contingent a priori, cannot be asserted independently of the choice of background logic.

Proper Names, Contingency A Priori and Necessity A Posteriori

After a brief review of the notions of necessity and a priority, this paper scrutinizes Kripke's arguments for supposedly contingent a priori propositions and necessary a posteriori propositions involving proper names, and reaches a negative conclusion, i.e. there are no such propositions, or at least the propositions Kripke gives as examples are not such propositions. All of us, including Kripke himself, still have to face the old question raised by Hume, i.e. how can we justify the necessity and universality of general statements on the basis of sensory or empirical evidence?

Cohen's Ambiguities

Cohen's Ambiguities

Extending possibilistic logic over Gödel logic

In this paper we present several fuzzy logics trying to capture different notions of necessity (in the sense of possibility theory) for Gödel logic formulas. Based on different characterizations of necessity measures on fuzzy sets, a group of logics with Kripke style semantics is built over a restricted language, namely, a two-level language composed of non-modal and modal formulas, the latter, moreover, not allowing for nested applications of the modal operator N. Completeness and some computational complexity results are shown.

First‐Person Authority and Self‐Knowledge as an Achievement

Abstract: There is much that I admire in Richard Moran's account of how first‐person authority may be consistent with self‐knowledge as an achievement. In this paper, I examine his attempt to characterize the goal of psychoanalytic treatment, which is surely that the patient should go beyond the mere theoretical acceptance of the analyst's interpretation, and requires instead a more intimate, first‐personal, awareness by the patient of their psychological condition.I object, however, that the way in which Moran distinguishes between the deliberative and the theoretical attitudes is ultimately inconsistent with a satisfactory account of psychoanalytic practice; mainly because, despite Moran's claims to the contrary, such a distinction is still inspired by a Cartesian picture of the self. I argue that, in the light of his distinction, Moran may emphasize that an agent's psychological dispositions should be permeable to her decisions and projects, but is forced to reject the idea that permeability could go the other way too. I explore Bernard Williams' notion of acknowledgment and Simone Weil's distinction between two notions of necessity, in order to articulate a notion of receptive passivity which may help us to characterize this second direction of permeability. I finally outline why receptive passivity (and, thereby, the double direction of permeability) is crucial in order to identify the goal of psychoanalytic treatment and, derivatively, to understand how a certain kind of awareness may have a significant therapeutic effect.