Notion Of Human Rights Research Articles

Social versus Political Rights

AbstractIn the past century, the notion of human rights has expanded significantly to include a variety of social rights. The introduction of this new category of human rights inspired a lively debate concerning the authenticity of such claims, focussing particularly on the ways in which social rights differ from political rights. This article examines the major points at issue in the debate. The important differences emphasized to date are those relating to costs, universality, and the correlativity of rights and duties. In each of these major areas of dispute, analysis indicates that the allegedly fundamental distinctions between social and political rights are in fact differences of degree, not of kind and, in fact, social rights conform both to the broad logic and the established practice of human rights.

Marx and Human Rights

Marx and Human Rights GEORGE G. BRENKERT 1. INTRODUCTION A GREATDEALis claimed on behalf of human rights in contemporary philosophy . Human rights, it is said, give a person a basis upon which to stand; they are the ground of human dignity; they constitute the essence of respect for persons.' Crucial to the significance of human rights is the claim that they hold not simply for modern, Western society but for all societies, modern as well as ancient, Western as well as Eastern. Thus, human rights can be used to evaluate the social life and practices of all humans throughout history. Whether Marx did or could accept such a notion of human rights has been of late a matter of considerable dispute. Some hold that Marx criticized inadequate or mistaken conceptions of rights, but still was committed to rights. G. A. Cohen, for instance, maintains that natural rights occupy a place of central importance in revolutionary Marxist belief.' Others, however , deny this. Accordingly, Steven Lukes claims that those Marxists who believe in human rights can only be "... revisionists who have discarded or abandoned those central tenets of the Marxist canon which are incompatible with such a belief.''s ~ See Joel Feinberg, "The Nature and Value of Rights," Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (Winter ~97o): 249-55. 2 G. A. Cohen, "Freedom, Justice and Capitalism," New Lrft Review, No. ~26 (March-April ~98i): ~~-12. In this paper I will concentrate simply on human rights (sometimes also referred to by others as moral rights, natural rights, or innate rights) and the question of their relativity or universality. I will thus not consider questions of distributive justice as such, nor will I consider questions of legal rights. The moral or human rights at issue here may be the basis for legal rights, may be linked with distributive justice, and may or may not be the same as the civil and political rights which individuals in modern society claim for themselves. Ziyad I. Husami also appears to attribute to Marx an acceptance of human rights inasmuch as he claims that Marx held a view of equal rights and justice which can be validly applied to any society. See Ziyad I. Husami, "Marx on Distributive Justice," Marx, Justice and History, edited by Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanoln (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 198o). 3 Steven Lukes, "Can a Marxist Believe in Human Rights?," Praxis International, ~ (January, ~98~): 344. [551 56 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 94:~ JANUARY ~98~ In the following, I shall also argue that Marx rejected the notion o human or natural rights. Those rights claimed to be human rights are, h~ held, relative to capitalist society.4 However, in contrast to other recent dis cussions, I believe it is possible to identify a basis for Marx's views on humai rights which explains the relativism Marx attributes to human rights, link.. his views on human rights with his characterization of bourgeois distributiw justice, and indicates the dialectical origin of human rights out of earlie~ forms of society. Though this account of Marx's understanding of huma~ rights enables us to evaluate more accurately than alternative recent discus sions other aspects of his views on human rights, e.g., their egoism, I shal not concentrate on this internal evaluation. Rather, I shall focus on Marx': argument that human rights, as such, do not exist. What have been callec human rights are simply those rights fundamental to capitalist society whict it has proclaimed to be universal. 9. THE CRUCIAL CHARACTERISTIC OF HUMAN RIGHTS Though Marx was aware of at least some of the major issues concerning th~ nature of rights which trouble philosophers today, he says very little abow these topics. Thus, for example, though Marx refers to a wide variety oi rights, e.g., "human rights," "the rights of man," "natural rights," "civi~ rights," "political rights," "legal rights," "abstract rights," "nominal rights,' "existing rights," etc., and occasionally suggests their interrelations, in gen. eral he rarely seeks to subordinate some either conceptually or logically tc others. 5 He mentions various interrelations between rights and duties, bu~ did not concern himself with the nature or acceptability of such correla. tions.~ Finally, even though in...

Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?

We should approach this topic with great fear and respect. It is not a merely “academic” issue. Human rights are trampled upon in the East as in the West, in the North as in the South of our planet. Granting the part of human greed and sheer evil in this universal transgression, could it not also be that Human Rights are not observed because in their present form they do not represent a universal symbol powerful enough to elicit understanding and agreement?

Canada-U.S. Relations: The Rules of the Game

CANADA-U.S. RELATIONS:. THE RULES OF THE GAME Allan E. Gotlieb J. here is a widely shared impression that things have changed in the relationship between Canada and the United States. Changes within each country have added to differences which already existed between them. Issues on which we differ may be more numerous now, and some of these may be fundamental in a narrow way, but this is, after all, more or less par for the course for a relationship that is the most complex and richest of any bilateral relationship in world affairs. The point is that we should not be embarrassed by this, or anxious, or alarmed. We are, after all, different countries. What we should do is make sure that the rules of the game for managing the relationship have kept up with the changes that have taken place. The starting point of our assessment should be the recognition of what we have in common. Two pluralistic, immigrant societies which have a common and immutable commitment to democratic methods and a shared notion of human rights; economies based on the dominant creative role of the private sector; and a generally shared cultural milieu and idiom. Traditionally , the United States and Canada share roughly similar world views: We are on the same side of events on the large questions of international peace and security, basically because of our concern for democratic and other political values. We also share the consciousness of a friendly and intensive relationship, built up over the years, with its great complex of economic and human interchange, its dependencies, and its heavy responsibility for the cooperative management of the shared frontier, a concept that now goes beyond the land to include the air and the wind and the ocean's resources, and their impact on our lives. Allan E. Gotlieb is the Canadian Ambassador to the United States. The text of this article originated in the form of remarks made by Ambassador Gotlieb in April 1982 as a speaker in the annual Christian A. Herter Lecture Series at SAIS. 177 178 SAIS REVIEW So where are the differences? There are the traditional differences, and the newer, emerging ones. Traditionally, the most obvious differences are those ofrespective size, power, and responsibility in world affairs. The United States is a superpower with a global foreign policy based both on overall global responsibilities and on specific national interests in almost every corner of the globe. Canada is a regional power without a region. So said Dean Acheson. Providence made arrangements whereby the United States is Canada 's region. So Canada inevitably reaches outward with a global foreign policy. It had no other choice. This explains, in part, Canada's strong commitment to multilateralism, Atlanticism, the Pacific Community as well, and bilateral ties that correspond to our historic and linguistic ties, and our need to develop links in this hemisphere. It explains our active role in designing the architecture of the United Nations, nato, the modern Commonwealth, and fa Francophonie. Canada is a large power; to call us a "middle power" is inaccurate. But most of our interests in promoting thejudicious resolution of global issues— peace, security, a morejust world order, a stable and open trading environment —are shared with our allies and other countries. True, we have specific trade and investment interests and important bilateral relationships in every part of the globe, which we are trying to advance as a matter of national interest. But basically, in geopolitical terms, Canada's international interests are shared. Canadian approaches have fewer roots in specific national objectives in terms of defense, ideology, or—and this is the telling distinction— responsibility. Perhaps that is the best way to define a superpower and its role—global responsibility—something that goes beyond weapons systems and armed might, but bears upon the singular responsibilities of leadership. For example, international turbulence does not always affect specifically Canadian interests to the extent that it does those of the United States. Globally, the United States is conscious of needing to defend its massive international presence. Politically, the United States is engaged in a deeply preoccupying strategic face-off with the U.S.S.R. Canada, of course...

Assessing Bill C-36: The Myth of Inalienable Human Rights

The concept of human rights circumvents an exact definition and despite its universal acceptance there is a lack of agreement on how it should be approached.2 Human rights may be defined as inalienable rights which are acquired purely by virtue alone. In comparison, some scholars view human rights in a “strict legal sense” as such rights are created by contract or statute and are therefore, “removable or alterable.”3 The dominant notion of human rights accepts the theory of “natural rights” as political, legal, economic and egalitarian rights which are both morally and legally justifiable.4 More importantly, it is argued that these abstract principles only become relevant as they are codified in detailed legislation, otherwise, “they remain incomplete and ineffective in affording [...]

Human Rights: The Church Speaking to Politics

In the language and literature of politics there are few concepts at once as important and as confused as the idea of human rights.The testimony to its importance is convincing. Countless men have died in the name of human rights. Entire societies have been formed with some vision of human rights as the central social creed, while other societies have been thoroughly disrupted by internal elements pursuing such rights. And today the politics of many nations and much of the politics among nations is carried on in verbal categories of human rights.But if the significance of the notion of human rights is evident, the fact of disagreement about its meaning is no less clear.