One of the oddest things about cultural relativism is its almost perverse obsession with the specific content of moral systems as opposed to general form. The anthropologists I talk to who have done fieldwork in exotic societies and are committed social relativists or social constructivists will never tire of pointing out to me how the content of moral rules is quite different in their societies from ours and how this proves the essential soundness of relativistic premisses. I then ask them if they know of any society that does not have moral rules, and an elaborate moral surrounding them. They do not. I ask them if their societies have rules about, for example, the fair distribution of resources. They do. Those rules are different from our rules, but they have them. I ask if they have rules about the legitimate use of violence. They do. Again those are different from our rules, but they have them. I ask if they have a theory of blame - of the attribution of responsibility for breaking the rules. They do, different again, but they have it. I ask if they have a system of rewards for keeping the rules and punishments for breaking them. They do. I ask if they have standards for assessing personal worth, and a system of moral for evaluating it. Well, yes, they do. There are good people and bad people and ways of distinguishing them - but of course the standards are not ours. Of course not. I ask if children, at different stages of lives, show a different understanding of the nature of the rules. Well, yes, they do. I ask if this is taken into consideration by the adults in assigning responsibility to children. Well, yes, it is - but not in the same way as we do it. No, certainly not. I then ask them why they think people might be so stupid as to apply completely non-applicable moral rules to themselves? Surely they will only apply relevant ones? Rules against embezzlement are useless in a society without money, but rules against the unfair use of property there will surely be and sure enough there are. And does this not depend on some notion of fairness that is independent of the actual content of the rules? Similarly, does not the praise-blame system depend on some notion of responsibility independent of what is actually praised or blamed? And if there is some concept of treachery (and there always is), then does this not depend on some notion of loyalty regardless of the boundaries of the unit (that is, those to whom treachery is a crime)? I could add to the list of queries, but you have the idea by now and can add to it yourselves. I usually succeed in driving my colleague away rather than driving my point home. There is a profoundly curious reluctance to conduct the debate at this level. The anthropologist wants to keep it at the level of specific rules to illustrate the vast differences between moral systems: I want to move quickly to general features of moral systems to illustrate how they are all fundamentally about the same things, even if the casuistry differentiates them. But my colleague suspects that I am going to spring a trap about universals and then grab him with some nonsense about innate moral propensities or the like, and he either backs off, accusing my universal framework of moral discourse argument of vagueness or something such or, if he has done Philosophy 101 at some point in his career, will trump my ace with accusations of the naturalistic fallacy. I do not let him get away with that one since I did Philosophy 201 and rapidly point out that I am not saying anything about prescriptions following logically from descriptions at afl. I am simply saying that we know of no societies where there is not a recognizable framework of moral discourse, and that the contents of this are pretty much the same everywhere, even if the actual prescriptions differ a lot - which one would expect, since people are not totally out to lunch and so will usually make specific rules relative to actual situations. …