The modem lawyer operates within a conception of law as a body of rules. To confront the law of contract, of torts, or of property, is to familiarize oneself with an intricate set of rules. Such familiarity is not yet legal scholarship, much less legal practice. For in order to use the rules as lawyers use them, the rules must be contemplated and considered, and the relationship between the different rules must be understood. Because the intellectual processes involved in handling the rules exhibit a high degree of sophistication, those intellectual processes may themselves become the subject matter of philosophical argument. Thus we may regard jurisprudential theories as embodying differing understandings of the processes of handling legal rules; and we may conceive of legal theory as the attempt to grasp the moral significance of rules as a foundation for social order. This essay shall offer some thoughts on the relationship between the rule of law, considered as a moral ideal, and the notion of rules as the principal means by which legal order is manifested. 1. Positivism, Idealism and Common Law When juristic thinking emerged from the early modern age and entered the 18th century, the notion of rule through law came increasingly to be associated with the idea of government through rules. Yet the same intellectual conditions which had brought about the evolution (in Hume's words) from a government of will to a government of law, also encouraged an interpretation of those developments along lines which were fundamentally alien to the legal conceptions and practices from which those ideas had emerged. Two traditions of thought would come to dominate speculative debate about the nature of law as a social institution: moral idealism, which continued to locate the foundations of law's authority in the system of natural rights; and an empirically-minded version of liberalism, which would ultimately develop into an austere form of legal positivism, and which would emphasize law as an instrument of deliberate social engineering. The effect of this debate was to change fundamental features of common law scholarship, both through the development of doctrinal legal science and, at the same time, through a changing conception of juristic speculation as a body of questions about doctrinal science. It is idealism, rather than positivism, which might be thought of as more closely describing the forms of reasoning and scholarship which embody traditional * Reader in Jurisprudence, University College London. Email: s.coyle@ucl.ac.uk. ? The Author 2006. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org This content downloaded from 157.55.39.209 on Sat, 14 May 2016 06:21:20 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 258 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies VOL. 26 common law practice. For idealism, with its emphasis on moral values and rights, seems to offer the best explanation of the characteristic fluidity of common law 'rules'. Yet insofar as the emergence of doctrinal legal science constituted a genuinely new way of thinking about the law, developments in speculative jurisprudence had rather less impact on the ordinary business of judicial argument and procedure which made up the bulk of the lawyer's intellectual engagement with the law than did the upsurge in parliamentary intervention into traditional common law areas, or the development of ideas concerning freedom of contract. A form of common law scholarship therefore continued to survive, which differs in essential respects from both positivism and idealism: a form of scholarship for which precedent and custom, rather than rights or rules, supplies the ground of authority and justification. Positivism and idealism can be regarded as attempts to theorize and regiment these traditional conceptions in ways which made them intelligible and justifiable to contemporary audiences whose understandings of social life rendered doubtful the idea that rule through law can be achieved on the basis of customs and shared practices. Both positivism and idealism, in different ways, describe a legal order constituted by a body of rules. For the positivist, political stability and social order represent a political achievement attainable only through articulated legal rules: in a world characterized by apparently unbridgeable diversity between individual conceptions of moral worth and political value, customary practices provide a doubtful focus for collective interpretations, and a system of deliberately created, authoritative rules comes to be seen as the unique means of bringing about harmony and certainty in the interpersonal relationships on which social order
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