IN DEALING with the Greek Philosophers we tend to take the notion of predication for granted: we tend to assume that we have the right to use the term 'predicate' without question, in discussing the theories put forward by e.g. Plato and Aristotle. An example of this tendency is the common assertion that Plato held that the Forms were self-predicable. While this assertion may be in some sense true, it does assume that the notion of predication may be taken for granted. This assumption is, perhaps, partly due to a further assumption that the notion of predication is a logical or even grammatical notion, and that Plato and Aristotle must therefore have seen its importance and employed it accordingly. I wish to question that assumption in Aristotle's case. I have already questioned it in connection with Plato,' saying that Plato was continually trying to account for what we should call predication in terms of notions akin to that of identity. It is tempting to assume that because Aristotle had the term 'predicate' at his disposal, he must have known all about the notion. It is moreover, a feasible suggestion that in Aristotle 'xzcTryopeZv' is a technical term the origins of which are obvious. The use of the phrase '=T-nyopeZv -r xcx rtVo4' stems from legal contexts; it thus comes to mean 'to maintain or assert something of something' and it perhaps retains something of an accusatorial aura. But while the use of the phrase implies that Aristotle knew in sonme sense something about what it is to assert something of another thing, it does not inmply that he could ipsofacto provide the correct theory about it. What is true is that the trend of Aristotle's metaphysical thought led him towards a view of predication which involved treating it as something much more than a mere grammatical notion. My fundamental reasons for doubting whether Plato and Aristotle really understood predication is that they were, as Speusippus was not, realists, in the sense that they embraced a realist theory of meaning. They believed, that is, that the meanings of words are real entities existing independently of the mind. In Plato's case this is obvious enough from the very fact of the Theory of Forms, and from the fact that Plato frequently speaks of the problem of predication as that of how one thing
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