Notion Of Phronesis Research Articles

Aristotelian versus Platonic and Machiavellian interpretations of phronesis: A critical reflection on leadership and management education

AbstractGiven the high incidence of corporate scandals, we are faced with reconsidering management theory, principles and education. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we seek to show that it is necessary and possible to analyse current managerial and directive action in the light of Aristotle's ethical thought, specifically concerning phronesis (practical wisdom). The second aim is to highlight that the Platonic interpretation of phronesis as a matter of contemplative life contributes to an inadequate leadership style and ethical apathy. Furthermore, we claim that the Machiavellian interpretation of phronesis contributes to leadership based on manipulation and exclusion of morality in management. The third and final objective is to respond to these two interpretations by reviewing Aristotle's exceptional teachings on the relevance of phronesis as a special kind of wisdom in which good judgment, discernment and an adequate understanding of events for decision‐making converge. An essential claim of this paper is that Aristotle and his notion of phronesis, rather than Plato's or Machiavelli's, ought to inform contemporary debates in management scholarship and education. Aristotle's philosophical insights into practice, wisdom and more comprehensive ethics are highly relevant for public discourse in our contemporary societal context, especially for management education. Integrating phronesis into management and leadership education involves using case studies and experiential learning to teach practical wisdom and sound judgment.

A Phronetic Ethics of Securitization

Abstract Intervening in recent debates on normativity in securitization theory, I draw on Aristotle’s notion of phronesis and Morgenthau’s formulation of prudence to articulate an ethical theory that takes seriously the idea that securitization is a deeply intersubjective process. First, I critique Rita Floyd's extant “just securitization theory,” which develops universal moral criteria akin to those of just war theory. While insightful, I argue that both her approach to the study of securitization as an empirical phenomenon and to moral theory are flawed. Then, I develop a novel theory by articulating how securitizing actors ought to exercise phronesis as a mode of ethical reasoning rather than a set of rules to follow. Securitizing actors exercise phronesis when they continuously deliberate about the ends of their actions, consider potential long-term consequences, utilize both abstract knowledge and experience, engage in critical self-reflection, and practice restraint. Throughout the paper, I redeploy the “universal” just securitization concepts of just cause and proportionality as rhetorical devices to help stimulate phronetic judgement.

The Practical Wisdom of Phronesis in the Education of Purported Virtuous Character

AbstractIn the context of the recent revival of virtue ethics, the notion of character formation under the rational guidance of Aristotle's notion of phronesis, or practical wisdom, has been exalted as the principal aim of moral education. However, this is not unproblematic insofar as the promotion of Aristotelian phronesis seems to operate on rather different levels or to be ambivalent between the two rather different (and demonstrably separable) aims or goals of fostering reasonably sound deliberation and judgment concerning “right” or good (moral or other) agency or action and the allegedly optimal (empirical) psychological ordering of cognition and affect to the end of good or commendable human character. In this paper, David Carr argues that while the first of these aims is by and large educationally acceptable and defensible, the second is neither a desirable nor coherent educational goal.

EXPERIMENTAL VERIFICATION OF PEDAGOGICAL CONDITIONS EFFICIENCY FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FORMATION IN STUDENTS OF TECHNICAL SPECIALTIES DURING SOCIAL DISCIPLINES STUDYING

In todayʼs technogenic world, technology plays a special role, improving the quality of life and creating living environment for future generations. The question of the responsibility of technical specialists for the results of scientific and technological progress becomes extremely important. Higher technical education responds to public demand, defining responsibility as one of the key generic competencies of a specialist, a sign of their professional maturity. The article grounds the pedagogical conditions of formation of professional responsibility of students of technical specialties in the course of studying social disciplines. This is done on the basis of the notion of phronesis, i.e. the use of interdisciplinary connections of social disciplines for formation of ability to correlate own responsible behaviour with socially significant ideals; application of contextual learning; systematic monitoring of the process of formation of professional responsibility by means of information and communication technologies. The method of diagnostics of formation of professional responsibility of future specialists of technical profile is offered. The results of the experimental study of the effectiveness of the introduction into educational practice of the proposed pedagogical conditions for the formation of professional responsibility, which was conducted with students of Ternopil Ivan Puluj National Technical University (Ukraine) have been presented. The experimental study confirmed the effectiveness of pedagogical conditions for the formation of professional responsibility of students of technical specialties in the process of studying social disciplines and the feasibility of their introduction into vocational training in higher education institutions.

Toward a Critique of the Ineffectual: Heidegger’s Reading of Aristotle and the Construction of an Action Without Ends

ABSTRACT The paper demonstrates how Heidegger constructed his notion of an action without ends, or the ineffectual, through his early readings of Aristotle. Heidegger initially aligns the ineffectual with the notion of phronesis in Nicomachean Ethics, and later develops it further in Division 2 of Being and Time. The paper examines some of the implications of the conception of an action without ends. It shows that in fact the notion is absent from Aristotle and it is inconsistent. Finally, the paper briefly explores the profound influence that the ineffectual has had on what came to be called in the United States ‘continental philosophy’.

Organisational effectiveness for ethical tourism action: a phronetic perspective

This paper explores how small tourism firms driven by an ethical approach to tourism narrate their organisational effectiveness. The study frames the ethical approach articulated in the first-person accounts of these firms’ owner-managers using Aristotle’s notion of phronesis, that is the process of identifying “good” actions consistent with living well and with an ethical telos. The research consists of a narrative approach via unstructured interviews with owner-managers of small Italian tour operators, members of the Italian Association of Responsible Tourism (AITR) and, as such, driven by an ethical approach to tourism. Data analysis combines features of structural and linguistic narrative analysis. The research findings disclose an organisational effectiveness largely rooted in a personal intuitive disposition gained by practical first-hand experience, personal knowledge, and a moral concern for the achievement of public wellbeing. Moreover, the findings challenge a business-centred approach to organisational effectiveness and question the dominant pro-growth, profit-oriented neoliberal discourses. These considerations can be used for setting the ground in tourism studies for a novel theoretical framework revolving around the ancient Aristotelian tradition of prioritising public wellbeing and happiness over capital accumulation, that further contributes to question market-driven capitalism and neoliberal globalisation.

Can Self-Love be cultivated through Phronesis?

Nowadays, the notion of phronesis has acquired multiple translations, while the concept of self-love – multiple understandings. Since each translation and interpretation highlights an aspect over another, this study aims to philosophically outline the Aristotelian phronesis on the basis of its etymological development, seeking to determine whether self-love can be cultivated through phronesis on an experiential level or not. Thus, the analysis is of a qualitative nature, establishing the pre-Aristotelian and Aristotelian understandings of phronesis as intertwined with virtue and good life, an intertwinement which is, in essence, fundamental to philosophical practice, revealing its intimate connection with phronesis on both conceptual and experiential levels. Finally, it is concluded that a philosophical practice is in itself an art of phronesis and a virtuous activity, since it involves a conscientious self-understanding leading to eudaimonia, aiming to pursue what is good for oneself, the other and the humanity in general, on which basis the right stance of self-love is fostered and cultivated, for one should love what is noble, that is wisdom, and aspire to it.

Aristotle and Ricœur on Practical Reason

This paper analyzes the Aristotelian notion of phronesis, such as it appears in Book VI of the Nichomachean Ethics, detailing what sort of model to grasp practical reason it entails: a practical wisdom. Setting it against the backdrop of a reflection on the prevalent uses and meanings of reason today, and the consequence these views have for a depiction of selfhood and human action, the paper shows how, amid the contemporary revival of Aristotelian practical philosophy, Paul Ricœur updates this phronetic model in Oneself as Another. The paper discusses the implications of such a thick account of selfhood and human action, such as it being a potential key to overcome some difficulties caused by Kantian moral philosophy, while it also calls, with and beyond Ricœur, for a refinement of the phronetic model by taking into account not only its thick intersubjective grounding but also the limits to rationality and the need to take the plurality of life forms that can count as being examples of a ‘life worth living’ (a good life).

Ethics of responsibility: Fallibilism, futurity and phronesis

In this article, I deal with the issue of a possible ethics of responsibility (ER) from a philosophical perspective in general, and bioethics in particular. My aim is to explore whether an ER is able to incorporate or integrate some, if not most, of the valid (and valuable) aspects of utilitarianism and deontology, without succumbing to most of the glaring shortcomings of these two famous frameworks. If such an enterprise could be successful, I would venture to infer that the ER could indeed be highly relevant for the time in which we live. I develop three central ideas of the framework of the ethics of responsibility. These three ideas are, firstly, that an appropriate framework for moral decision-making requires us to make room for the possibility of failure; secondly, we must see the implications of Jonas’ emphasis on the need for an ethics of futurity for taking cognisance of the consequences of acts, and, thirdly, that although consequences of actions may be important, as utilitarianism has always insisted, consequences are not enough. Moral actions are also of necessity guided by rules and principles when making moral decisions. It is particularly in this respect that I shall, at the end, draw on the insights of Aristotle in respect of his notion of phronesis. The crux of my argument is to be found in what Aristotle identifies as the essence of moral knowledge. Moral knowledge respects and often builds upon the norms and action guides that pervade social life. However, merely drawing on deep-seated norms and conventions is not enough. These norms and conventions require application in a host of practical situations. Exactly how they are to be applied, is far from self-evident. That is something that we learn in the practice of daily life by the deliberation that essentially characterises phronesis or prudence (practical wisdom).

La phrônésis ricoeuriana: una rilettura di futilità e proporzionalità nei casi di fine vita

La dilemmaticità dell’esperienza della malattia, le implicazioni etiche e morali determinate dal progresso della bioingegneria medica e la complessità dei percorsi di cura hanno determinato il progressivo incremento di conflitti di natura morale all’interno delle strutture ospedaliere, dei centri di cura e degli hospice. Tali cambiamenti hanno pertanto condotto filosofi, bioeticisti e teologi morali ad interrogarsi circa la modalità con cui l’etica, diventando parte integrante della prassi clinica, può trovare un’applicabilità nella gestione, decostruzione e risoluzione dei conflitti morali nascenti all’interno del settore sanitario. Paul Ricoeur ha individuato nella phrônésis aristotelica l’approccio d’indagine imprescindibile per l’analisi contestuale del reale: quello prudenziale. Pertanto, nella sua petite éthique, la “saggezza pratica” – la prudence, così tradotta dalla nozione latina di “prudentia” – rappresenta il punto di partenza dell’espressione del giudizio medico, nonché dell’applicabilità della norma morale nella particolarità del reale. Il presente lavoro è stato concepito nell’obiettivo di indagare il ruolo pragmatico della nozione ricoeuriana di phrônésis in quella sfera “regionale”, così come presentata dall’autore, che è l’etica medica. L’analisi circa l’apporto della “prudenza” nelle dinamiche conflittuali del settore sanitario risulterà inoltre fondamentale nel rilevare l’interconnessione tra la nozione di phrônésis e i due concetti cardine del fine vita, ovverosia, la futilità e la proporzionalità.

THEORY OF JUDGMENT AND PHRONESIS IN PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HANNAH ARENDT

One of the crucial issues of modern universalistic theories of practical philosophy is the theoretical justification of normative principles and moral judgments that enables their universal validity. The problems these theories face are caused by separating rational theorizing from contexts of real life. That is the separation of theoretical justification and practice. The common for modern practical philosophy opposition between universalism and contextualism is reinterpreted today, new theories of post-metaphysical universalism appear that provide the developments of the last universalistic project of discourse ethics in the context of a critical theory of the “third generation”. The purpose of this article is to present the ethical philosophy of Hannah Arendt as the original conception where the Kantian theory of judgment and the Aristotelian notion of phronesis are brought together in order to clarify the nature of ethical and moral statements. This problem, as the article highlights, lies in the understanding of subsumption of particular under universal. Universal judgments according to Arendt are justified in the Kantian theory of “enlarged mentality” as the human capacity to interact in communication and activity. The sensitivity to situations is reflected in the Aristotelian notion of phronesis. As Arendt’s justification of normative and ethical judgments is analyzed, the hermeneutic character of her theory is revealed, which is appropriate for the theory of J. Habermas and modern followers of critical theory. The article provides additional insight into the concept of “public space” as the realm which enables the overlapping of theory and practice. As proved the “public space” in the practical philosophy of Hannah Arendt becomes the realm of mutual ethical and moral thinking where judgments are oriented to the level of the human condition in general. The paper concludes by arguing that Arendt’s conception may overcome the opposition between universalism and contextualism, which is relevant in current ethical discourse.

Grounding Twenty-first-Century Public Relations Praxis in Aristotelian Ethos

ABSTRACTBy grounding public relations praxis in Aristotelian ethos, practitioners can function as liaison officers with balanced perspectives, capable of co-creating meaning with both client organizations and their publics between whom experts are hired to facilitate mutually beneficial relationships. This approach locates persuasion at the nexus of speaker ethos in the public relations process. It allows practitioners to balance their commitment to the ethics of their profession with loyalty to clients, while empowering audiences (organizations and their publics) to function as the final arbiters of any courses of action proposed to them. Moreover, because the approach enables practitioners, based on their credible ethos, to participate in organizational decision-making, it has the potential to transfer their ethical worldview to client organizations. Ultimately, the central theoretical contribution of this essay is an alternative approach to public relations praxis founded on an analysis of Aristotle’s notion of phronesis, arête, and eunoia.

Reflexiones sobre las políticas educativas

El artículo caracteriza los sistemas educativos, su estructura y los actores que intervienen en ellos, como marco de las políticas educativas, y precisa la relación entre políticas y reformas educativas. Enseguida discute dos formas de entender las políticas, y plantea que para el gobierno son la forma adecuada de decidir sobre temas de interés público en una sociedad democrática, en contraste con ideas basadas en concepciones liberales, o las que postulan una planeación autoritaria. Precisa la relación entre políticas y programas de gobierno. Discute la relación entre investigación y toma de decisiones, y desarrolla cuatro versiones de posturas intermedias entre el positivismo de Comte y la dialéctica de inspiración marxista: la postura de Gadamer, con la noción de phrónesis; la ingeniería social fragmentaria de Popper; las ideas del analista de políticas como artesano, de Majone, y las de Cronbach sobre el papel del evaluador en las decisiones. Revisa reformas fáciles o difíciles, y comenta la dificultad de que reformas diseñadas en la cúspide del sistema lleguen al aula. Para terminar, comenta ideas de Pablo Latapí sobre las políticas educativas y la influencia de la investigación en ellas.

Engagement and practical wisdom in clinical practice: a phenomenological study.

In order to understand the lived experiences of physicians in clinical practice, we interviewed eleven expert, respected clinicians using a phenomenological interpretative methodology. We identified the essence of clinical practice as engagement. Engagement accounts for the daily routine of clinical work, as well as the necessity for the clinician to sometimes trespass common boundaries or limits. Personally engaged in the clinical situation, the clinician is able to create a space/time bubble within which the clinical encounter can unfold. Engagement provides an account of clinical practice as a unitary lived experience. This stands in stark contrast to the prevailing notion, referred to as a dual discourse, that describes medicine as the addition of humanism to science. Drawing on Aristotle's notion of phronesis and Sartre's definition of the situation, we illustrate how this novel perspective entwines clinical practice, the person of the clinician, and the clinician's situation.

Finding resilience through practical wisdom

Delivering resilience will require innovative systems-thinking skills of practical wisdom that go beyond technique. Aristotle's notion of phronesis as practical wisdom, which was largely lost until contemporary thinking about virtue ethics, provides a basis for a modern interpretation. Resilience, risk, vulnerability, robustness and sustainability need to be set not just in the dominant paradigm of scientific/technical rationality but also within a reflective practice that nurtures practical wisdom and questions ‘why’ before ‘how’. Practical rigour, as part of practical wisdom, is the meeting of a need by setting clear objectives involving many values (some in ‘wicked’ conflict) and reaching those objectives in a demonstrably justifiable way. Seven elements in practical rigour are described. Two keys to delivering resilience are: (a) to allow professionals to publicly admit that we do not know when we genuinely do not know; (b) to integrate people, purpose and (old) process through collective practical wisdom emerging from collaboration and learning together.

Being ‘rational’ and being ‘human’: How National Health Service rationing decisions are constructed as rational by resource allocation panels

The English National Health Service Constitution states that patients have the right to expect all decisions about access to medicines and treatments to be made 'rationally'. Rationality in health care can be framed as instrumental, institutional or practical. In this article, we present a case example from an ethnographic study of the work of 'Individual Funding Request' panels to explore how rationality is enacted and accounted for in deliberations about the rationing of health care in the National Health Service. Our rhetorical analysis highlights how an embodied, practical rationality emerges as a significant aspect of rationality in practice, but at the same time has a problematic status in formal accounts of decision-making. We suggest that being both 'human' and 'rational' is a 'delicate balance' and creates a dilemma for Individual Funding Request panels. Aristotle's notion of phronesis provides a useful lens for theorising our observation of panel deliberations, and we argue for greater attention to the value of narrative ethics in helping us understand the challenges faced by resource allocators.

In the Name of What? Defusing the Rights-Culture Debate by Revisiting the Universals of Both Rights and Culture

This article unravels the perceived dichotomy between universal human and women's rights and apparently misogynist cultural claims and practices. It does so by mainly focusing on the ‘universal’ side of the dichotomy. In pursuing this argument, it first describes how recent feminist work has gone beyond a critique and transformation of the content of universals and suggested the transformation of both the status and structure of universals. At the same time, feminists find it useful to retain universals, not because they are in fact universal, but rather because of the political utility of their universalising thrust. This radical feminist critique of Western universal ideals is further fleshed out with the help of Aristotle's notion of phronesis. Thereafter, the culture side of the perceived dichotomy is briefly considered and it is suggested that cultural claims often function much like universalist claims, only on a smaller scale, and that the same conditions apply to their invocation in any specific concrete situation that should apply in the case of Western universals, as indicated in the first part of the article. The theoretical considerations are throughout demonstrated using mostly South African examples.

English

A review of the relevant literature recognised several characteristics that permeate discussions on spirituality. This paper’s premise is that these characteristics inform an individual’s choice of values – they form a type of regulative ideal. The process developed explains the link between these values and virtue and therefore ethical behaviour in the workplace. The values frameworks developed recently in the spirituality literature specify those things a spiritual person perceives as worth having, getting or doing. This paper contends that these values, particular to spiritual persons, contribute to the flourishing of individuals and therefore lead to the acquisition of virtue. Spiritual persons are likely to be ethical persons. Such individuals are likely to be of significant benefit to their organisations. A process is offered to explain the link between these values, virtue and ethical behaviour in the workplace. Central to this process is the notion of phronesis (practical wisdom) in the perception, selection and implementation of spiritual values in the workplace. Practical wisdom or phronesis is the reward for striving for virtue. It is the ability to know what is good to do here and now. It enables a person to have rational control of their feelings: to “have those feelings at the right times on the right grounds towards the right people for the right motive and in the right way” (Aristotle, Trans. 1941, NE Bk 2 chap 6; 1106b16). This paper contends that spiritual values, particular to spiritual persons and enhanced through phronesis, contribute to the flourishing of individuals and therefore lead to the acquisition of virtue. Phronesis is essential if espoused organisational values are to become a reality in the life of the organisation.

Sabiduría práctica: en la intención de una vida buena con y para los otros

El objeto de este texto será examinar la noción ricoeuriana de phrónesis, desde la perspectiva de una ética individual, con el fin de mostrar que es mucho más que una simple mediación en los conflictos morales. Se indagará por el lugar y el papel de la phrónesis en cada nivel (teleológico, deontológico y prudencial) de lo que Ricoeur denomina su «Pequeña ética». En el recorrido por este componente se expone la dialéctica entre el deseo y la norma, de la misma manera que la relación entre ipseidad y alteridad y su relación con la phrónesis.

‘Marketplace Masculinities’ Within the International Public Arena of Global Media: Towards a Christian Spiritual Approach to Male Embodiment and ‘Genital Ensoulment’

Abstract Under the pressure of deconstruction, criticism within the gender discourse, and the fading away of the traditional patriarchal male role functions, male identity is in a crisis. Due to the impact of the mass media, masculinities are currently mostly determined by the healthiness, body-image and achievement ethics of a market-driven economy (marketplace masculinities). It becomes closely associated with the instant need-satisfaction of a consumerist society. As a public issue, maleness is moulded by power, six-pack fitness, wealth, success, money and phallus. Plastic instant masculinity is shaped by the ancient old symbol of phallus, the post-modern Zeus: Rambo, and the leisure idol of playboy. This article considers the extent to which the Christian spiritual notion of phronesis within inhabitational theology can reframe masculinities, and argues that from a spiritual perspective males can grow into compassionate men. The article concludes that patriarchal headship should be transformed and replaced by the theological public of servant-hood and the trans-cultural notion of an eschatological identity.