Norwegian Security Policy Research Articles

The dual ‘dual’ policy: Two conceptions of ‘deterrence and reassurance’ in Norwegian security policy and analyses

ABSTRACT This article argues that the conceptual basis for the Norwegian policy framed by ‘deterrence and reassurance’ towards the Soviet Union/Russia has consisted of two divergent ‘balancing acts’. One is ‘calibrated deterrence’, where reassurance is the means to ‘balance’ the deterrent effect. The other is a ‘balance’ between two theoretically conflicting means of achieving security: calibrated deterrence, versus reassurance understood as efforts and means to achieve common security. The argument implies that reassurance balancing deterrence has represented different things according to its use. Clarifying these distinct dyads improves our theoretical understanding of how states conduct their deterrent policies.

Depoliticising political violence: state-centric and individualised discourses in the Norwegian counterterrorism policy field

ABSTRACT Over the past decades, emerging focus has been on how teachers in Norway can foster citizenship in their classrooms to strengthen democracy. Yet, in conjunction with rising concerns of homegrown terrorism, a new curriculum in Norway draws on democratic education as a bulwark against terrorism. This paper explores the securitisation of the Norwegian educational domain. We analysed three counterterrorism policy documents to explicate the governance of security in school. Analyses of terrorism discourses show a depoliticised and individualised representation in the Norwegian security policy field. These discourses are accompanied by growing urgency where educators are expected to be vigilant towards presumed vulnerable students and report concerns to relevant authorities. This article provides new insight into what security expectations are placed on educators in Norway and their potential consequences for pedagogical practice.

Norway’s New(s) Wars—Syria in the Norwegian Mass Media

Through two case studies, this article will explore how Norwegian news media framed the Norwegian military presence in Syria. Earlier research by the author has shown how the legal aspects of NATO’s out-of-area operations have been ignored by mainstream media. In this study, emphasis will be put on self-censorship among Norwegian journalists, ignoring the fact that Norwegian special forces took part in military operations inside Syria from May 2017 to March 2018. The hypothesis based on Johan Galtung’s (2002) theory of peace journalism is that mainstream media refused to see the connection between Norway’s bombing of Libya and the escalation of the ‘civil war’ in Syria. According to legal experts, the Norwegian military presence in Syria was a violation of international law, as it supported rebel groups in armed confrontation with the Assad government, recognized by the Norwegian state through diplomatic relations. The hypothesis of the study—based on an explorative investigation of selected Norwegian news media—is that Norwegian politicians, silently supported by the media, have changed basic principles of Norwegian security policy without an open public debate. Before 1999, Norway was a loyal NATO member based on the notion that NATO was a ‘defense alliance’. After the change in NATO strategy to the new out-of-area policy, Norway has in practice become a ‘military tool’ in the geopolitical strategy of the US. This change of policy has, to a large extent, happened without critical investigation by mainstream media. The article presents two case studies of how Norwegian media dealt with the legal issues when Norway was asked to contribute in Syria, and how the Norwegian military presence was reported by Norwegian media in the periods December 2015 to January 2016, as well as May 2017 to March 2018.

Deterrence and Crisis Stability – The F-35 and Joint Strike Missile’s Effect on the Norwegian Security Policy Toward Russia

This article analyzes how the F-35 Lightning II and Joint Strike Missile (JSM) affect the Norwegian security policy toward Russia. It answers how the systems influence Norwegian deterrence and defense efforts and crisis stability in serious crises and draws conclusions on how an operational concept should look in order to best reconcile the requirements for deterrence and crisis stability. The F-35 and JSM improve Norwegian defense and deterrence by denial by contributing to situational awareness, NATO’s collective defense, joint operations, as well as operations in the air, maritime, and land domains. They also open for deterrence by punishment and may contribute to improving the crisis stability by raising the threshold for Russian aggression. However, the stabilizing effect depends on the ability to defend the F-35 bases, and an overly offensive posture may instead cause escalation and threaten the stability. The study outlines three relevant modes of operation for the F-35 during crises or war: defensive, tactically offensive, and strategically offensive. In a security crisis without NATO participation, deterrence and crisis stability may best be achieved by employing the F-35 and JSM in the defensive and, in certain circumstances, the tactically offensive mode. A war involving NATO may become a matter of national survival, and decision-makers should thus keep all options open and utilize the defensive, tactically offensive, and strategically offensive modes as required.

Norwegian Strategic Culture after World War II

This article details the changes in Norwegian strategic culture, comprising grand strategy and practice, following the end of the Cold War. Throughout the Cold War, Norwegian security and defence policy was characterized by broad, non-politicized consensus. Basic elements of this grand strategic perspective were the smallness of Norway, the people defence and allegiance to the UN. Doctrines focused on survival, with the army as the lead service. Close ties were maintained between the military and societal elites, and the military was seen just as much in societal terms, namely as an employer in scarcely populated areas, as it was in defensive terms. The changes in strategic culture over the past 10–15 years have been uneven, partly driven by internal and external changes in discourse, but over recent years probably as much by changes in practice. The first post-Cold War years witnessed the emergence of an alternative grand strategic representation, focusing on international operations rather than on invasion defence. Mindful of the impact on local communities of a reduced military presence, politicians long resisted any change, but after years of resistance the alternative grand strategy was embraced by the armed forces, leading to the creation of a rapid reaction force and increased emphasis on special task forces. International experience is now considered positive, even necessary, for a military career. Furthermore, whereas general conscription was gradually undermined because of the way in which it is practised, new civil–military ties were forged through the practice of providing military personnel training that was interchangeable with regular education. It now seems that military practice, as well as the specialized military discourse, has outpaced the broader Norwegian discourse on the use of military means. Nevertheless, the tension between global and local concerns remains unresolved.

Norway and a major international crisis: Suez ‐ the very difficult case

This article reviews Norway's policy during the Suez crisis in 1956, how the policy was formed and how it can be explained. Emphasis is put on the decision‐making process and on the role of the powerful Norwegian Shipowners’ Association. It also discusses Norway's most important interests and considerations in policy formation, and how they were balanced. Norway's Suez policy is seen in connection with the close relations with Israel, which could be viewed as in conflict with the protection of Norway's NATO membership and vital economic interests, represented by the powerful shipowners. In the end, Norway's Suez policy is put in the context of the change in Norwegian foreign and security policy in general, a shift in emphasis from being Britain's close ally and friend to being under the protective umbrella of the US, the new superpower.

The evolution of Norwegian security policy: Alliance with the West and reassurance in the East

The evolution of Norwegian security policy: Alliance with the West and reassurance in the East

Norwegian Security Policy for the 1980s

The key strategic position of Norway in Northern Europe is elaborated in the first part of this article. Norwegian alignment in NATO is based on the proposition that Norwegian (or Scandinavian) means are inadequate to defend the country from attack from a major power. It has become an objective of Norwegian defence policy to block as effectively as possible any option of limited war against North Norway by raising the force requirements for the adversary to a level at which the risks of escalation would appear forbidding. The Norwegian security calculus is predicated on the notion that South Norway has forward defence in the Baltic, Northern Germany and Denmark. Therefore, the defence effort has been concentrated in the north. Public support for Norway's policy of alignment has been rather stable over the last decade. The issue of reinforcement is dealt with in detail, as are the re-emerging nuclear weapons issues. Finally, the evolution of the Norwegian defence effort is analysed. It is concluded that those aspects of alliance policy which relate to nuclear weapons are likely to cause discussion and dissension in the years ahead. The Norwegian Government is likely to support changes in the posture and doctrine of NATO which reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and, particularly, the pressures for early use. The unilateral constraints with respect to the stationing of foreign troops will be maintained.

Norwegian Security Policy for the 1980s

The key strategic position of Norway in Northern Europe is elaborated in the first part of this article. Norwegian alignment in NATO is based on the proposition that Norwegian (or Scandinavian) means are inadequate to defend the country from attack from a major power. It has become an objective of Norwegian defence policy to block as effectively as possible any option of limited war against North Norway by raising the force requirements for the adversary to a level at which the risks of escalation would appear forbidding. The Norwegian security calculus is predicated on the notion that South Norway has forward defence in the Baltic, Northern Germany and Den mark. Therefore, the defence effort has been concentrated in the north. Public support for Norway's policy of alignment has been rather stable over the last decade. The issue of reinforcement is dealt with in detail, as are the re-emerging nuclear weapons issues. Finally, the evolution of the Norwegian defence effort is analysed. It is concluded that those aspects of alliance policy which relate to nuclear weapons are likely to cause discussion and dissension in the years ahead. The Norwegian Govern ment is likely to support changes in the posture and doctrine of NATO which reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and, particularly, the pressures for early use. The unilateral constraints with respect to the stationing of foreign troops will be maintained.

Norway and the Bear: Soviet Coercive Diplomacy and Norwegian Security Policy

Norway and the Bear: Soviet Coercive Diplomacy and Norwegian Security Policy

New Territories and New Problems in Norwegian Foreign and Security Policy

In proportion to the country's size, population and economy, Norway has a greater stake in the exploration and exploitation of new territories than almost any other nation. The natural resources on the continental shelf may be so large that they will dominate Norway's economy in the future. Opposite pressures of international demand for rapid development of Norwegian oil resources and the national desire to limit growth and prevent its upsetting effects upon the economy, illustrate some of the new problems the country now faces in its foreign relations. Continental shelf wealth – together with the fact that shelf activities may be carried out in the strategically important Barents Sea area – also raises some specific security issues.

New Territories and New Problems in Norwegian Foreign and Security Policy

In proportion to the country's size, population and economy, Norway has a greater stake in the exploration and exploitation of new territories than almost any other nation. The natural resources on the continental shelf may be so large that they will dominate Norway's economy in the future. Opposite pressures of international demand for rapid development of Norwegian oil resources and the national desire to limit growth and prevent its upsetting effects upon the economy, illustrate some of the new problems the country now faces in its foreign relations. Continental shelf wealth - together with the fact that shelf activities may be carried out in the strategically important Barents Sea area - also raises some specific security issues.

Norwegian Security Policy: Options and Constraints

The structure and assumptions of Norwegian security policy in the context of the evolving political order in Europe and the codification of superpower relations are outlined. Attitudes towards the future evolution of NATO, and the competing perspectives which were brought to bear on security policy issues in the EC referendum campaign and its aftermath, are examined. The Norwegian security predicament is influenced directly by the naval competition of the superpowers. Norwegian defence policy is examined from the point of view of missions and force posture. Finally, the author discusses the role of arms control in Norwegian security policy.

Norwegian Security Policy: Options and Constraints

The structure and assumptions of Norwegian security policy in the context of the evolving political order in Europe and the codification of superpower relations are outlined. Attitudes towards the future evolution of NATO, and the competing pers pectives which were brought to bear on security policy issues in the EC referendum campaign and its aftermath, are examined. The Norwegian security predicament is influenced directly by the naval competition of the superpowers. Norwegian defence policy is examined from the point of view of missions and force posture. Finally, the author discusses the role of arms control in Norwegian security policy.

Norwegian Security Policy

Norwegian Security Policy