Normative Uncertainty Research Articles

Ethical Reasoning During a Pandemic: Results of a Five Country European Study

Introduction: There has been no work that identifies the hidden or implicit normative assumptions on which participants base their views during the COVID-19 pandemic, and their reasoning and how they reach moral or ethical judgements. Our analysis focused on participants’ moral values, ethical reasoning and normative positions around the transmission of SARS-CoV-2.Methods: We analyzed data from 177 semi-structured interviews across five European countries (Germany, Ireland, Italy, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) conducted in April 2020.Results: Findings are structured in four themes: ethical contention in the context of normative uncertainty; patterns of ethical deliberation when contemplating restrictions and measures to reduce viral transmission; moral judgements regarding “good” and “bad” people; using existing structures of meaning for moral reasoning and ethical judgement.Discussion: Moral tools are an integral part of people’s reaction to and experience of a pandemic. ‘Moral preparedness’ for the next phases of this pandemic and for future pandemics will require an understanding of the moral values and normative concepts citizens use in their own decision-making. Three important elements of this preparedness are: conceptual clarity over what responsibility or respect mean in practice; better understanding of collective mindsets and how to encourage them; and a situated, rather than universalist, approach to the development of normative standards.

Minimax-Regret Climate Policy with Deep Uncertainty in Climate Modeling and Intergenerational Discounting

Integrated assessment models have become the primary tools for comparing climate policies that seek to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Policy comparisons have often been performed by considering a planner who seeks to make optimal trade-offs between the costs of carbon abatement and the economic damages from climate change. The planning problem has been formalized as one of optimal control, the objective being to minimize the total costs of abatement and damages over a time horizon. Studying climate policy as a control problem presumes that a planner knows enough to make optimization feasible, but physical and economic uncertainties abound. Earlier, Manski, Sanstad, and DeCanio proposed and studied use of the minimax-regret (MMR) decision criterion to account for deep uncertainty in climate modeling. Here we study choice of climate policy that minimizes maximum regret with deep uncertainty regarding both the correct climate model and the appropriate time discount rate to use in intergenerational assessment of policy consequences. The analysis specifies a range of discount rates to express both empirical and normative uncertainty about the appropriate rate. The findings regarding climate policy are novel and informative. The MMR analysis points to use of a relatively low discount rate of 0.02 for climate policy. The MMR decision rule keeps the maximum future temperature increase below 2C above the 1900-10 level for most of the parameter values used to weight costs and damages.

The Paris Agreement’s Article 6 Market Mechanisms and wto Law

Abstract The article analyses the market-based approaches in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement with respect to their potential interaction with international trade law. It focuses on the international dimension of Article 6 and the tensions associated with international trading of mitigation outcomes (under paragraphs 2–3 of the Article) and emission-reduction units generated through the sustainable development mechanism (paragraphs 4–7). We find that while there are significant normative tensions and legal uncertainties in the relationship between the regimes, international cooperation across the two law- and policy-making arenas could also help to develop new approaches to aligning wto trade law with international climate objectives.

Decision under normative uncertainty

AbstractWhile ordinary decision theory focuses on empirical uncertainty, real decision-makers also face normative uncertainty: uncertainty about value itself. From a purely formal perspective, normative uncertainty is comparable to (Harsanyian or Rawlsian) identity uncertainty in the ‘original position’, where one’s future values are unknown. A comprehensive decision theory must address twofold uncertainty – normative and empirical. We present a simple model of twofold uncertainty, and show that the most popular decision principle – maximizing expected value (‘Expectationalism’) – has different formulations, namelyEx-AnteExpectationalism,Ex-PostExpectationalism, and hybrid theories. These alternative theories recommend different decisions, reasoning modes, and attitudes to risk. But they converge under an interesting (necessary and sufficient) condition.

To offer or request? Disclosing variants of uncertain significance in prenatal testing.

The use of genomic testing in pregnancy is increasing, giving rise to questions over how the information that is generated should be offered and returned in clinical practice. While these tests provide important information for prenatal decision‐making, they can also generate information of uncertain significance. This paper critically examines three models for approaching the disclosure of variants of uncertain significance (VUS), which can arise from forms of genomic testing such as prenatal chromosomal microarray analysis (CMA). Contrary to prevailing arguments, we argue that respect for reproductive autonomy does not justify adopting a model on which an offer to disclose VUS is a routine part of genetic counselling. Instead, we contend that a commitment both to solidarity between healthcare providers and pregnant women and to the acceptance of a novel principle of caution under normative uncertainty means that we should instead adopt a model of VUS disclosure that imposes a strong presumption against offering to disclose VUS. The upshot of this is that it should be standard practice to only offer to disclose VUS when this is requested by the woman undergoing CMA. We defend our position against claims that arise from an alleged right to such information and that a presumption against an offer will lead to inequity.

Is Normative Uncertainty Irrelevant if Your Descriptive Uncertainty Depends on It?

AbstractAccording to ‘Excluders’, descriptive uncertainty – but not normative uncertainty – matters to what we ought to do. Recently, several authors have argued that those wishing to treat normative uncertainty differently from descriptive uncertainty face adependence problembecause one's descriptive uncertainty can depend on one's normative uncertainty. The aim of this paper is to determine whether the phenomenon of dependence poses a decisive problem for Excluders. I argue that existing arguments fail to show this, and that, while stronger ones can be found, Excluders can escape them.

Digital Platforms and the New 19a Tool in the German Competition Act

In this article we present and critically evaluate the newly introduced section 19a of the German Competition Act. The provision applies to operators of two-sided platforms and networks that the Bundeskartellamt classifies as being of ‘paramount significance for competition across markets’. Using examples of previous abuse cases, we discuss which firms may eventually be the addressees of the new instrument. We analyse the list of prohibitable practices and point to normative uncertainties as regards the assessment of platform activities. We discuss the merits of the abridged judicial review. Finally, we consider the prospect of continuing fragmentation in the legal treatment of digital platforms in the internal market and assess the interaction with the Digital Markets Act as proposed by the European Commission.

Absolutely Right and Relatively Good: Consequentialists See Bioethical Disagreement in a Relativist Light

Background Contemporary societies are rife with moral disagreement, resulting in recalcitrant disputes on matters of public policy. In the context of ongoing bioethical controversies, are uncompromising attitudes rooted in beliefs about the nature of moral truth? Methods To answer this question, we conducted both exploratory and confirmatory studies, with both a convenience and a nationally representative sample (total N = 1501), investigating the link between people’s beliefs about moral truth (their metaethics) and their beliefs about moral value (their normative ethics). Results Across various bioethical issues (e.g., medically-assisted death, vaccine hesitancy, surrogacy, mandatory organ conscription, or genetically modified crops), consequentialist attitudes were associated with weaker beliefs in an objective moral truth. This association was not explained by domain-general reflectivity, theism, personality, normative uncertainty, or subjective knowledge. Conclusions We find a robust link between the way people characterize prescriptive disagreements and their sensibility to consequences. In addition, both societal consensus and personal conviction contribute to objectivist beliefs, but these effects appear to be asymmetric, i.e., stronger for opposition than for approval.

EURQ: A New Web Search‐based Uncertainty Index

Measuring economic uncertainty is extremely important for evaluating its role in economic activity. Nevertheless, measuring uncertainty is a difficult task since we do not know when economic agents perceive uncertainty and which type of uncertainty affects them. This paper introduces the economic uncertainty related queries (EURQ) index, computed for both the USA and Italy, which measures economic, political and normative uncertainty through large‐scale searches on the internet. We show that the EURQ index captures economic agents’ need for information in response to uncertainty shocks. Moreover, we show that this need for information is not just curiosity triggered by press coverage but rather captures individuals’ genuine interest, particularly in specific topics subject to uncertainty. Hence the EURQ index can be exploited fruitfully to measure the level of uncertainty perceived by economic agents and to assess the role of specific types of uncertainty in economic activity.

Ethics of Uncertainty As an Extension of Virtue Epistemology

Uncertainty can’t be understood without taking into account both properties of the problem situation and agent’s knowledge about it. The correspondence of knowledge and situation of decision-making is crucial for understanding the onto-epistemological nature of uncertainty. At the same time, this correspondence is the key topic in virtue epistemology, especially in its ‘non-classical’, regulatory, branch, related to works of R. Roberts and W.J. Wood. In this article, genetic consultation is chosen as an example of such a problematic situation since a doctor and a patient explicitly deal with the uncertainty of genetic risks. The problems of communication and joint decision-making in the context of medical-genetic consultation are comprehensively described in bioethics. At the same time, its social dimension is limited to the direct interaction of two individual agents, that allows us to use it as a model for constructing the ethics of uncertainty. In this article, four forms of uncertainty are identified: descriptive, normative and radical uncertainties, and translation uncertainty. Referring to the approaches of virtue epistemology, the author brings each of these forms into conformity with the proposed regulatory principle. The regulations assume that generating or disseminating knowledge under conditions of uncertainty require taking into account the incompleteness of the presented model of reality in its four aspects. A modelled fragment of reality could change in a predictable (descriptive uncertainty) or unexpected (radical uncertainty) way. The goals and values of a model’s user can not be hierarchically ordered, and may also change in the future (normative uncertainty). User’s interpretations of the model may be diverse, and can never be strictly defined by the intentions of the model’s author (indeterminancy of translation, or uncertainty whether success of co-reference is achieved).

Confronting Normative Uncertainty: Deciding Cases When You Don’t Know How to Decide

The intellectually honest and humble judge faces a very serious problem about which little has been said. It is this: how to decide what she ought to do when, despite knowing all the relevant facts, laws, and theories of adjudication about how she ought to decide, she remains uncertain. Drawing from emerging debates in moral theory, I call this problem the problem of “normative uncertainty.” In this Article, I explain the problem, distinguish it from related debates in the legal literature, and show that the obvious solution—engage in some legal reasoning to figure it out—is a nonstarter. Judges ought not simply muddle through, following whichever theory of adjudication they find most plausible. Sometimes, like in Brown v. Board of Education or Google v. Oracle, they ought not follow their preferred theory but do what another theory suggests instead. Developing a full solution will be difficult. To show why, I sketch a solution and apply it to Brown I. I do not defend it. Instead, I use it to illustrate why developing a solution to normative uncertainty is considerably more difficult than developing solutions to other kinds of uncertainty. I then apply it to Google to show how, even without a solution, recognizing the problem changes how we evaluate judging. Specifically, we can consistently maintain both that a court erred legally, and that a court acted rationally given its uncertainty. Importantly, these two critiques are against different benchmarks—jurisprudence and practical rationality—and so going forward, we need to be clear which critique we are making.

Digital Platforms and the New 19a Tool in the German Competition Act

In this article we present and critically evaluate the newly introduced section 19a of the German Competition Act. The provision applies to operators of two-sided platforms and networks that the Bundeskartellamt classifies as being of ‘paramount significance for competition across markets’. Using examples of previous abuse cases, we discuss which firms may eventually be the addressees of the new instrument. We analyse the list of prohibitable practices and point to normative uncertainties as regards the assessment of platform activities. We discuss the merits of the abridged judicial review. Finally, we consider the pro-spect of continuing fragmentation in the legal treatment of digital platforms in the internal market and assess the interaction with the Digital Markets Act as proposed by the European Commission.

Vive la Différence? Structural Diversity as a Challenge for Metanormative Theories

Decision-making under normative uncertainty requires an agent to aggregate the assessments of options given by rival normative theories into a single assessment that tells her what to do in light o...

The Evidentialist's Wager

Suppose that an altruistic agent who is uncertain between evidential and causal decision theory finds herself in a situation where these theories give conflicting verdicts. We argue that even if she has significantly higher credence in CDT, she should nevertheless act in accordance with EDT. First, we claim that the appropriate response to normative uncertainty is to hedge one's bets. That is, if the stakes are much higher on one theory than another, and the credences you assign to each of these theories are not very different, then it is appropriate to choose the option that performs best on the high-stakes theory. Second, we show that, given the assumption of altruism, the existence of correlated decision makers will increase the stakes for EDT but leave the stakes for CDT unaffected. Together these two claims imply that whenever there are sufficiently many correlated agents, the appropriate response is to act in accordance with EDT.

Risk and Fear: Restricting Science under Uncertainty

AbstractThe catastrophic risks posed by new technologies such as killer robots and geoengineering have triggered calls for halting new research. Arguments for restricting research typically have a slippery‐slope structure: Researching A will lead to deployment; we have decisive moral reasons against deployment; therefore, we should not research A. However, scientific uncertainty makes it difficult to prove or disprove the conclusion of slippery‐slope arguments. This article accepts this indeterminacy and asks whether and when it would be permissible to restrict research under empirical and normative uncertainty. The argument starts from the ethical framework for the regulation of scientific research with human subjects and offers modifications to adapt it to the purpose of restricting new technologies. Two main questions arise in the process: whether it is permissible to impose restrictions at the research stage to prevent harms that will arise from the use of a technology and whether it is permissible to restrict research preemptively on the grounds of public fear and anxiety, before there is sufficient evidence establishing the risk of harm. I answer both questions in the affirmative and defend this position against objections.

Wisdom of the experts: Using survey responses to address positive and normative uncertainties in climate-economic models

The social cost of carbon (SCC) and the climate-economic models underlying this prominent US climate policy instrument are heavily affected by modeler opinion and therefore may not reflect the views of most climate economists. To test whether differences exist, we recalibrate key uncertain model parameters using formal expert elicitation: a multi-question online survey of individuals who have published scholarship on the economics of climate change, with 165 to 216 respondents, depending on the question. Survey questions on the magnitude of climate impacts and appropriate discount rates revealed that prevailing views differ from prominent IAMs, including DICE. We calibrate the DICE damage functions and discount rates to reflect the mean and median survey responses, respectively, recognizing these two parameters’ differing sources of uncertainty (positive versus normative). We find a 16-fold higher SCC than the base DICE-2013R assumptions, with a range of 11- to 24-fold under alternative modeling assumptions (using the DICE-2016R2 model version and calibrating damages to median rather than mean responses). Our findings support a 7- to 13-fold SCC increase for different respondent subgroups even when we exclude the potential for catastrophic climate impact shocks. Our results reveal a significant disparity between IAMs and the broader community of scholars publishing in this field.

Governing climate risks in the face of normative uncertainties

AbstractGoverning risks is not only a technical matter, but also a matter of ethical and societal considerations. In this article, we argue that in addition to scientific and technical uncertainties, we need to also address normative uncertainties of risk decisions. We define normative uncertainties as situations where there are different partially morally defensible ‐‐ but incompatible ‐‐ options or courses of action, or ones in which there is no fully morally defensible option. We conceptualize normative uncertainties, distinguishing between the four categories of evolutionary, theoretical, conceptual, and epistemic normative uncertainties. We will show different instances of normative uncertainties in climate adaptation strategies. We finally present two methods for identifying and dealing with normative uncertainties, namely, the Wide Reflective Equilibrium and adaptive planning. Situations of normative uncertainties have always been and will continue to be present in risk decisions and they have often been dealt with in an implicit manner. In this article, we make them explicit, which could lead to better morally informed and justified decisions about climate risks.This article is categorized under: Climate, Nature, and Ethics > Ethics and Climate Change.

Normative Uncertainty without Theories

ABSTRACT How should an agent act under normative uncertainty? We might extend the orthodox theory of rational choice to the case of uncertainty between competing normative theories. But this requires that the values assigned by different normative theories be comparable. This paper defends a strategy for avoiding the need for intertheoretic value comparisons: instead of comparing competing moral theories, I argue that values can be represented in terms of a de dicto specification of value. I provide a decision theory for de dicto values that generalises expected utility theory, and I compare the proposal with alternative strategies for avoiding the problem of intertheoretic comparisons.

Expected Value under Normative Uncertainty

Maximising expected value is the classic doctrine in choice theory under empirical uncertainty, and a prominent proposal in the emerging literature on normative uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about the standard of evaluation. But how should Expectationalism be stated in general, when we can face both uncertainties simultaneously, as is common in life? Surprisingly, different possibilities arise, ranging from Ex-Ante to Ex-Post Expectationalism, with several hybrid versions. The difference lies in the perspective from which expectations are taken, or equivalently the amount of uncertainty packed into the prospect evaluated. Expectationalism thus faces the classic dilemma between ex-ante and ex-post approaches, familiar elsewhere in ethics and aggregation theory under uncertainty. We analyse the spectrum of expectational theories, showing that they reach diverging evaluations, use different modes of reasoning, take different attitudes to normative risk as well as empirical risk, but converge under an interesting (necessary and sufficient) condition.

The Breakdown of Anti-Racist Norms: A Natural Experiment on Normative Uncertainty after Terrorist Attacks

Terrorist attacks can have profound consequences for the erosion of social norms, yet the causes of this erosion are not well understood. We argue that these attacks create substantial uncertainty about whether norms of civic conversation still hold. Observing breaches of these norms then leads people to express their own anti-immigrant attitudes more readily, as compared to a context where these norms are unambiguous. To test our theory, we examine (i) the impact of terrorist attacks on the level of hate speech against refugees in online discussions, and (ii) how the effect of terrorist attacks depends on the uncertainty about social norms of prejudice expression. To this end, we report on the results of a unique combination of a natural and a lab-in-the-field experiment. We exploit the occurrence of two consecutive Islamist terrorist attacks in Germany, the Wurzburg and Ansbach attacks, in July 2016. Hateful comments towards refugees in an experimental online forum, but not towards other minority groups (i.e., gender rights), increased as a result of the attacks. The experiment compares the effect of the terrorist attacks in contexts where a descriptive norm against the use of hate speech is emphasized, i.e., participants observe only neutral or positive comments towards a minority group, to contexts in which the norm is ambiguous because participants observe anti-minority comments. Observing anti-immigrant comments had a considerable impact on our participants’ own comments after the attacks, while observing anti-gender-rights comments did not. We end by discussing implications of the findings for the literature on social norms, sociological methods and policy.