Normative Reasons Research Articles

Redefining action: facts and beliefs in the social world

This article presents a definition of action that links empirical facts with normative reasons to form an explanation of rational agency with predictive capabilities. This idea is developed along the lines of pragmatism which holds that a set of beliefs is a matter of linguistic evaluation from a particular community. This notion is related to the idea of facts as empirical information that is cognitively apprehended. Such information is regarded as an input which is later contrasted to expected (liable) behavioral responses from the agent. The deviation of such observed behavior with respect to the expected one represents an evaluative output that is understood as the definition of reasonably expected behavior. Action is, thus, understood as the outcome of such an evaluative process.

Eudaimonism and the Ground of Normative Reasons

ABSTRACTThis essay develops an argument against eudaimonism in support of John Hare's earlier critique of eudaimonism. In contrast to Hare, who mounts a Kantian‐Scotist objection to what he calls a single‐source view of motivation in eudaimonism, my critique of eudaimonism focuses on the ground of normative reasons in eudaimonism while also taking a page from Scotus's ethics. I argue that the main issue with eudaimonism is with the ultimate end and manner of our willing, which fails to correspond to the right ordering of love based on the nature of goodness in the object.

An initiative to develop capability-adjusted life years in Sweden (CALY-SWE): Selecting capabilities with a Delphi panel and developing the questionnaire.

Capability-adjusted life years Sweden (CALY-SWE) are a new Swedish questionnaire-based measure for quality of life based on the capability approach. CALY-SWE are targeted towards use in cost-effectiveness evaluations of social welfare consequences. Here, we first motivate the measure both from a theoretical and from a Swedish policy-making perspective. Then, we outline the core principles of the measure, namely the relation to the capability approach, embedded equity considerations inspired by the fair-innings approach, and the bases for which capabilities should be considered. The aims were to 1) the most vital capabilities for individuals in Sweden, 2) to define a sufficient level of each identified capability to lead a flourishing life, and to 3) develop a complete questionnaire for the measurement of the identified capabilities. For the selection of capabilities, we used a Delphi process with Swedish civil society representants. To inform the questionnaire development, we conducted a web survey in three versions, with each Swedish 500 participants, to assess the distribution of capabilities that resulted from the Delphi process in the Swedish population. Each version was formulated with different strictness so that less strict wordings of a capability level would apply to a larger share of participants. All versions also included questions on inequality aversion regarding financial, educational, and health capabilities. The Delphi process resulted in the following six capabilities: Financial situation & housing, health, social relations, occupations, security, and political & civil rights. We formulated the final phrasing for the questionnaire based on normative reasons and the distribution of capabilities in the population while taking into account inequality aversion. We developed a capability-based model for cost effectiveness economic evaluations of broader social consequences, specific to the Swedish context.

Beyond the modern shapes of the equality principle. Notes for a transition

Equality as an historic process of human emancipation, transcends the strictly legal/formal plane. Furthermore, it is enhanced by the “historic” willingness to democratise society and improve people’s lives. This is the materialistic dimension of the principle of equality, this ethical and historical “willingness” based on the production and development of social justice as a criterion and principle for action. Human rights and democracy, with their fighting practices and traditions, cannot be understood today without the idea of equality as a necessary principle. Human rights have always been linked to processes of reaction against inequalities. They have been and remain a reaction to any kind of oppression and/or domination, because human rights, which are rights and are human, are always actions that refer to human beings in need. The fact that they were formally conceived under the umbrella of normative reasoning does not presuppose that they should be conceived exclusively as individual rights, which demand fulfilment in the future, or even as horizons of possibility (idealistic vision), but as ways of life that make human existence – dignified existence – feasible for all people. The idea of equality is, therefore, not possible without this material judgement of existence.

Antologia de um currículo: notas esquizoanalíticas para cartografar narrativas seriadas

Abstract Inspired by the lines of force of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s philosophies of difference, this article explores some schizoanalytical notes for the cartography of a curriculum of a cultural artifact. From the contributions of post-critical theories and their connections with the field of cultural studies, we understand serialized narratives as a curriculum. The text operates, in its stylistics, through an (auto)-fictional elaboration, bringing takes narrated by the Mapmaker, a character who presents some methodological notes of our cartographic investigation from fragments of his memories. The argument explored is that the constitutive lines of the curriculum of serialized narratives have presented a multiplicity that makes it understandable as an “anthological curriculum,” allowing us to visualize its control regions, derived from the state apparatus, and its contagion zones, typical of war machines. In this sense, the “anthological curriculum” is produced in the clash between the hard, flexible, and escape lines that compose it. Our conclusion is that the different ways in which we become ourselves and the different subject positions we assume throughout life are at stake in this artifact. Thus, we believe that the serialized narrative curriculum, by triggering lines of escape, opens spaces for other exits, providing less normative reasoning for subjects crossed by gender and sexuality dissidences.

Textualism and the Indian Canons of Statutory Construction

When interpreting statutes enacted for the benefit or regulation of Indians or construing treaties signed with Indian nations, courts are supposed to apply any of five specific canons of construction relating to Indian Affairs. Through examining the modern line of Supreme Court cases involving statutory or treaty interpretation relating to Indian nations, this Article demonstrates that the Court has generally been faithful in applying canons relating to treaty interpretation or abrogation. The Court has also respected the canon requiring unequivocal expression of congressional intent before finding an abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity. However, there are two other canons that the Court almost never applies. One, the tribal sovereignty canon, requires clear intent to interfere with tribal sovereign rights; the other, the Indian ambiguity canon, requires statutes to be construed liberally with ambiguities resolved to the benefit of Indians. After reviewing the possible reasons why textualist jurists might be opposed to the use of substantive canons, this Article makes two arguments to remedy any reluctance to using the tribal sovereignty and Indian ambiguity canons. First, these canons have constitutional roots, and as such, even textualists on the Court should not be reluctant to use them. Second, the more established canon concerning abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity should also extend to statutes interfering with tribal sovereign rights. There are no normative reasons to treat abrogation of sovereign immunity differently than other statutory interference with tribal sovereignty.

Logik beim dogmatischen Setzen mit schwach inferenziellem Anspruch. Nicht-Monotonie und Geltungsränge in der juristischen Ordnungsbildung

How logic can cope with the law, and vice versa, strongly depends on how one imagines the structure of legal reasoning. Of course, one can analyze relationships between (supposed) statements of legal code in the conditional, prescriptive form deontic logic is acquainted with; they will behave as standard deontic sentences do. But that captures neither the set of sentences that actually guides legal decisions nor the way lawyers actually deal with it. Especially in the German doctrinal tradition, the actually decisive set contains further sentences that establish integrity and order; the work of lawyers is mainly to construct, compatibilize and apply such sentences. The big question is then, how well these sentences and their relationships can be digested in logical terms. The paper connects findings from the debate about the construction of legal systems with Wolfgang Spohn’s decision theory based on defeasible normative reasoning. Indeterminacy and overcomplexity will always rule out full formalizations of legal reasoning. But since doctrinal thinking strives for consistency and rule-based, deductive rationality, jurisprudence can draw on formal theory to reflect on its own standards of analysis.

A Higher-Order Approach to Diachronic Continence

We often form intentions to resist anticipated future temptations. But when confronted with the temptations our resolutions were designed to withstand, we tend to revise our previous evaluative judgments and conclude that we should now succumb—only to then revert to our initial evaluations, once temptation has subsided. Some evaluative judgments made under the sway of temptation are mistaken. But not all of them are. When the belief that one should now succumb is a proper response to relevant considerations that have newly emerged, can acting in line with one’s previous intention nonetheless be practically rational? To answer this question, I draw on recent debates on the nature of higher-order evidence and on what rationally responding to such evidence involves. I propose that agents facing temptation often have evidence of “deliberative unreliability”, which they ought to heed even when it is “misleading” (that is, even when their evaluative judgments are in fact proper responses to the relevant considerations then available). Because evidence of deliberative unreliability can “dispossess” agents of normative reasons for evaluative judgments and actions that they would otherwise have, being continent despite judging that one should now succumb can often be more rational than giving in.

Verbotsgrade und „kontra-normative“, hypothetische Welten. Zu Wolfgang Spohns Rangtheorie, übertragen auf rechtliche Normensysteme

That wrongdoing can be understood as scalar rather than bivalent, is a kind of truism in modern criminal law theory. But how exactly the strength and stringency of legal prohibitions and corresponding obligations can be conceptualized, is a complicated and intriguing topic. So, Wolfgang Spohn’s elegant, fresh start with a normative ranking theoretic conception of a prohibition order should be warmly welcomed by legal theorists for scrutinized discussion. Anyhow caution is warranted when “counter-normative”, similar worlds-thought experiments are introduced which promise an easy way out of the bramble bush of comparing and weighing different wrongdoings and offences in our actual (factual and normative) world. Furthermore, Spohn’s fact-regarding normative reasoning is too much rooted in modern decision theory, that it can be regarded as completely “theory-neutral” between different understandings of legal norms within deontological and consequentialist theories.

The multimodal construction of corporate performance: An analysis of earnings videos

Financial communication is conducted through various genres, among which are earnings videos. The videos discursively disclose corporate performance two/four times yearly (once every three/six months), using multimodal features to convey specific social meaning about corporate performance. These features constitute discursive strategies, which may generate and maintain investor interest in corporations. A multimodal analysis of language and image features is conducted on earnings videos in English, French and Spanish of corporations in the global finance industry. The analysis posits five discursive strategies. The information in the videos (1) emphasizes corporate contribution, (2) displays their beneficial activities, and is (3) anchored to spatio-temporal location. The information (4) is humanized and (5) acknowledges the risks faced. The strategies are realized using language and image features. These features complement one another because language and image co-construct meaning about corporate performance. The discursive strategies should be understood in relation to the corporate context, which reveals institutional isomorphism. The choice of strategies is probably influenced by a mix of coercive, mimetic and normative reasons. Disclosure in earnings videos is linked to government and stock exchange regulations, models of existing texts and conventionalized practices, and comprehension for investors. The study of financial communication may enrich discursive competence and provide a systematic way to decipher and deploy multimodal features.

Committing to interdependence: Implications from game theory for human–robot trust

AbstractHuman–robot interaction (HRI) and game theory have developed distinct theories of trust for over three decades in relative isolation from one another. HRI has focused on the underlying dimensions, layers, correlates, and antecedents of trust models, while game theory has concentrated on the psychology and strategies behind singular trust decisions. Both fields have grappled to understand over-trust and trust calibration, as well as how to measure trust expectations, risk, and vulnerability. This article presents initial steps in closing the gap between these fields. By using insights and experimental findings from interdependence theory and social psychology, this work starts by analyzing a large game theory competition data set to demonstrate that the strongest predictors for a wide variety of human–human trust interactions are the interdependence-derived variables for commitment and trust that we have developed. It then presents a second study with human subject results for more realistic trust scenarios, involving both human–human and human–machine trust. In both the competition data and our experimental data, we demonstrate that the interdependence metrics better capture social “overtrust” than either rational or normative psychological reasoning, as proposed by game theory. This work further explores how interdependence theory – with its focus on commitment, coercion, and cooperation – addresses many of the proposed underlying constructs and antecedents within human–robot trust, shedding new light on key similarities and differences that arise when robots replace humans in trust interactions.

Alternative Semantics for Normative Reasoning with an Application to Regret and Responsibility

We provide a fine-grained analysis of notions of regret and responsibility (such as agent-regret and individual responsibility) in terms of a language of multimodal logic. This language undergoes a detailed semantic analysis via two sorts of models: (i) relating models, which are equipped with a relation of propositional pertinence, and (ii) synonymy models, which are equipped with a relation of propositional synonymy. We specify a class of strictly relating models and show that each synonymy model can be transformed into an equivalent strictly relating model. Moreover, we define an axiomatic system that captures the notion of validity in the class of all strictly relating models.

IDENTIFYING THE ‘PEOPLE’ IN ‘WHAT WILL PEOPLE SAY’: INCORPORATING SOCIAL IDENTITY WITHIN LAW AND NORMS DISCOURSE

identity has an immediate and profound impact on how the two motivations for adhering to social influences operate in real world. First, individuals not only are likely to believe but ‘need to’ believe members from within their identity group are ‘right’ (and those outside to their group ‘wrong’) for self-esteem maintenance. Expressive powers of law, therefore, will vary considerably depending on how it portrays behaviors of those within my group. Second, whose positive opinion we crave for is deeply rooted in our social identity. This has direct consequence on how individual respond to a law when offenders are likely to be part of one’s identity (such as men responding to the #metoo movement or white Americans responding to All Lives Matter). The discussion also helps identify the limits of reputational tools like shaming for enforcing laws. Finally, the article highlights an important epistemological lacuna in the law and norms discourse by incorporating social identity within it. Individuals, when influenced by those they identify with, have both informational and normative reasons to adhere to these influences. The article argues that while either of the two motivations can ex-post rationalize the phenomenon, neither capture the true motivations underlying adherence through identification. The motivational dichotomy is not as evident as the discourse presumes and there is a need to revisit the framework we use to understand social influences.

Supporting business owners with psychiatric disabilities: An exploratory analysis of challenges and supports.

Self-employed individuals with psychiatric disabilities may face unique challenges to running small businesses. This study aims to identify business-related challenges and examine whether supports designed to alleviate those challenges are associated with positive business milestones and self-employment satisfaction. Data were collected via a survey of 60 participants with a history of psychiatric disability who were operating a U.S.-based small business. This exploratory study used descriptive statistics to look at the relationship between business challenges, business development supports, business milestones, and satisfaction with self-employment. Although most participants reported experiencing business challenges and using supports, relatively few supports were helpful in the context of specific challenges. The number of challenges was positively correlated with the amount of supports used. Respondents used interpersonal or informal supports more often than help from organizations or institutions and tended to find these more helpful. The satisfaction of owning a business was generally high and positively correlated with the age of the business. Satisfaction was not necessarily tied to normative reasons such as business gross or percent of income. In this study, self-employed individuals with a psychiatric disability appear to prefer-or have greater access to-informal or interpersonal support, compared to institutional support. This may indicate that these owners have different needs for support, or that they do not use mainstream institutional resources that facilitate sustainability and growth, and therefore targeted efforts to provide formal support may be needed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Believable Normative Error Theory

AbstractNormative error theory is thought by some to be unbelievable because they suppose the incompatibility of believing a proposition at the same time as believing that one has no normative reason to believe it—which believing in normative error theory would seem to involve. In this article, I argue that normative holism is believable and that a normative holist will believe that the truth of a proposition does not invariably generate a normative reason to believe it. I outline five different scenarios in which this is believably the case. I then show how each example can be used to generate a counterexample to the incompatibility claim. I conclude that believing a proposition is compatible with believing there is no reason to believe it and that as such normative error theory has not yet been shown to be unbelievable.

Chisholm’s Paradox Revisited: Puzzles regarding Contrary-to-Duty Obligations and a Dynamic Solution

A contrary-to-duty obligation (CTD obligation) is a type of conditional obligation that tells us what to do when a primary duty is violated. Chisholm’s Paradox is one of the most famous deontic puzzles about CTD obligations. It is widely believed that Chisholm’s Paradox does not arise for ordering semantics, today’s orthodox semantics for modals and conditionals. In this paper, I propose a new puzzle, the CTD Trilemma, to show that ordering semantics still has difficulties in adequately representing natural reasoning with CTD obligations. I argue that to solve the CTD Trilemma a formal account must attend to two different functions played by ought-statements in our normative reasoning and discourse: ought-statements as normative rules and normative judgments. To formally capture this distinction I develop a new dynamic account of ought-statements and normative reasoning inspired by Frank Veltman’s update semantics for default reasoning. Finally, I show how my update semantics for normative reasoning provides a simple and elegant solution to the CTD Trilemma and explains seemingly inconsistent data about inferences using ought-statements in normative reasoning.

Skepticism about reasons for emotions

ABSTRACT According to a popular view, emotions are perceptual experiences of some kind. A common objection to this view is that, by contrast with perception, emotions are subject to normative reasons. In response, perceptualists have typically maintained that the fact that emotions can be justified does not prevent them from being perception-like in some fundamental way. Given the problems that this move might raise, a neglected alternative strategy is to deny that there are normative reasons for emotions in the first place. The aim of this paper is to offer the first sustained discussion of arguments for skepticism about normative reasons for emotions. I argue that none of the obvious ways to argue against reasons for emotions casts genuine doubt on them, and thus that unless another argument is given an appeal to reasons for emotions continues to constitute a legitimate strategy to assess various theories of emotion.

A methodological analysis of national models of integration: time to think without the models?

ABSTRACT National models of integration are widely used to understand the relationship between nationalism and integration-immigration policies. In this methodological article, we highlight two key concerns. First, national models of integration emerged out of inductive and normative case studies. The analytical value of models which are based on inductive and normative reasoning is not directly generalisable beyond very similar cases. Second, and despite their inductive limitations, the generalisation and application of national models beyond these analytical limits have produced tautological and essentialist outcomes – fitting empirical data into the models and overlooking other possible correlations between nationalism and integration policies. Amid recent scholarly attempts at amending the national models, the question remains whether national models are truly useful tools for the comparative studies of the relationships between nationalism and integration-immigration policies. We argue that comparative examinations require a more robust theoretical and methodological approach that can be used across periods and contexts without becoming tautological and essentialist.

The pursuit of inclusion: Conditions for civil society inclusion in peace processes in communal conflicts in Kenya

Why are some peace processes in communal conflicts more inclusive of civil society actors than others? Inclusion of civil society actors, such as churches and religious leaders, women’s organizations, or youth groups, is seen as important for normative reasons, and studies also suggest that civil society inclusion can improve the prospects for durable peace. Yet, we have a very limited understanding of why we observe inclusion in some communal conflicts but not others. We address this gap by theorizing about various forms of civil society inclusion in local peace processes, and examining to what extent involvement by different types of third-party actors—governments, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—may contribute to inclusion. Empirically, we draw on a combination of cross-case and in-depth data covering peace negotiations in communal conflicts in Kenya. The findings show that civil society was less frequently included as facilitators when the government was involved as a third party, while inclusion in the form of direct participation of civil society in negotiations, or via involvement in the implementation phase, was equally common across different types of third-party actors. Our study thus provides important new insights regarding how inclusion plays out in communal conflicts.

The power to believe for reasons

ABSTRACT An influential view of believing for reasons holds that the reasons for which we believe are causes of our believing. This view has well-known difficulties accounting for the problem of deviant causal chains. I diagnose these difficulties and argue that the problem arises for the causal view because it uses an impoverished set of resources. I offer a novel causal account of believing for reasons that avoids the problem of causal deviance by appealing to teleological resources such as abilities and aims. Believing for reasons is the exercise of an ability characterized in terms of its causal powers and its teleological function: that of sensitivity to normative epistemic reasons. This theory is a kind of ‘believer-centered’ account of believing for reasons, and I contrast it with other prominent believer-centered accounts in the literature. I argue that other believer-centered accounts either cannot solve the problem of causal deviance or they cannot explain how a common sort of rational failure is possible.