Normative Propositions Research Articles

Проблема практического дискурса: обоснование моральных норм

The paper provides analysis of the main problem of practical discourse — the issue of substantiation of moral standards — and addresses logical foundations of the so-called principle or law of D. Hume, according to which a logical transition from “is” to “should” is impossible, that is, from descriptive judgments to normative ones. The study shows that this law does not exclude all ethical theories, but only those that justify the norms of morality, deducing them from any realities of the external world: laws of nature, direction of evolution, objective course of history, etc. Hume only limits the methods of substantiating normative propositions, but does not exclude the very possibility of justifying them. The authors discuss various types and attempts to substantiate value judgments and propose to use a new concept of normative correctness. They also perform analysis of cognitive and non-cognitive concepts (I. Kant, C. Bayer, M. Singer, D. Rawls, P. Lorenzen, E. Tugendhad, Karl-Otto Apel, J. Habermas). The paper gives preference to the cognitive approach, and within its framework — the ethics of discourse developed by J. Habermas. The central point in the ethics of discourse is the principle of universalization, which is discussed in detail. The study shows that the principle of universalization and other provisions of the ethics of discourse seem to be well-founded, and the approach itself is the most promising of all other modern ethical undertakings. It also attests to the fact that the ethics of discourse is best suited to the spirit of genuine democracy. As the authors conclude, one way to persuade people to exercise free will and to apply the principle of universalization is through enlightenment, appealing to the mind, and demonstrating that a program to substantiate the ethics of discourse is the best in clarifying our everyday moral intuitions and defending democracy.

The Russian Stand on the Responsibility to Protect: Does Strategic Culture Matter?

Though Russia has approved the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P) in the UN platforms it has often been placed rightly in the ‘sceptics group’ of states that are not at ease with the premises and practices of R2P. What is the basis of the Russian discontent? This article suggests the relevance of strategic culture in explaining the Russian position on R2P. It is based on the assertion that, in addition to humanitarian and moral aspects, responding to mass atrocities within the doctrine of R2P takes place in a context of security considerations since, in severe cases, it involves, among others, a military component under a UN Security Council mandate. As such the use of force, approving or disapproving, it is all related to the realm of security even if the motive and objective may be humanitarian. In the security domain, this article argues that Russian strategic culture, in interaction with its national identity, historical experiences and prevailing narratives, forms a loose code of conduct and a context within which strategic decisions concerning the use of force in responding to a humanitarian crisis are made. It is, thus, concluded that Russian strategic culture by constraining decision-makers, defining appropriate behaviour and reflecting insecurities and aspirations explains Russia’s approach to R2P’s normative propositions, legal standing and implementation in practice.

A conceptual framework to untangle the concept of urban ecosystem services

Urban ecosystem service (UES) is becoming an influential concept to guide the planning, design, and management of urban landscapes towards urban sustainability. However, its use is hindered by definitional ambiguity, and the conceptual bases underpinning its application remain weak. This is exemplified by two different but equally valid interpretations of UES: “urban ecosystem services”, referring to ecosystem services from analogs of natural and semi-natural ecosystems within urban boundaries, and “urban ecosystem services”, a much broader term that includes the former group as well as urban services in a city. While we recognize that a single definition of UES is not possible nor necessary as its application is context-dependent, it is nevertheless useful to clarify the relationships between these interpretations to promote consistent use, and importantly, explore how a broader interpretation of UES might advance its applications in areas that have been neglected. We developed a conceptual framework that links UES to natural and human-derived capital to explain the relationships between the dual meanings of UES and proposed three normative propositions to guide its application: (1) integrate holistically multiple components of natural capital to provide UES, (2) reduce dependence on non-renewable abiotic resources and human-derived capital, and (3) enhance UES through technology. The framework we developed helps to resolve the current ambiguity in the meanings of UES, highlights the need to recognise neglected aspects of natural capital important for UES, and can be used to clarify relationships with related concepts conveying dependence of human well-being on nature.

One principle to rule them all? Anatomy of mutual trust in the law of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

In its case law on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the ECJ has put great emphasis on the “principle of mutual trust”. However, there is still relatively little analysis of the nature and content of the principle as it applies across the whole range of AFSJ law. This article aims to provide such an analysis. Taking a holistic approach, it examines the principle as established under Treaty provisions, legislation and case law relating to the AFSJ. It addresses its legal effects and unpacks its core normative propositions, also revisiting the issue of its relations with fundamental rights. The article concludes that, in essence, the principle is no more and no less than a bundle of interpretive doctrines. Its function is to enhance the effet utile of AFSJ legislation and to provide it with some doctrinal unity, without constraining the legislature’s wide discretion in determining the form or degree of “mutual trust” required of the Member States under every individual AFSJ instrument.

The Uses of the Work of the International Law Commission on State Responsibility in International Investment Arbitration

The Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts (‘ARSIWA’) constitute an experiment in international law-making. Unlike other successful projects of the International Law Commission (‘ILC’), such as its work on the law of treaties and diplomatic and consular relations, the ARSIWA have not yet led to the adoption of a multilateral treaty. Yet, their text is cited commonly as the authoritative statement of the law on state responsibility with investment tribunals being by far their most frequent users. This well-recorded paradox calls for a reflection on the ways in which investment tribunals make use of the ARSIWA. This paper examines the methods which investment tribunals explicitly or implicitly employ when using the ARSIWA in order to determine the content of rules of general international law on state responsibility. Specifically, it identifies common patterns in the ways in which investment tribunals justify their reliance on the ARSIWA and deal with their ambiguities. The paper then proceeds to critically assess these findings from two perspectives: the overarching aims of the law of state responsibility and the doctrine of sources of international law. The paper synthesises these empirical and doctrinal insights into a proposal for a common framework for the use of ARSIWA. Such framework is based on a distinction between the ascertainment of the legal status of a normative proposition and the determination of the content of a normative proposition whose status is undisputed.

Clarifying dual-processing for marketing researchers

Few would argue that the dual-processing model of cognition is one of the most influential psychology frameworks of our time. But despite its simplicity and elegance, it often leaves novices and experts alike confused. The purpose of this paper is to highlight and resolve four factors contributing to this confusion. This research contributes by (1) clarifying the dual-processing model by proposing a framework that defines key terms and their relationships, (2) offering two terms (Default and Search) that can be used to organise cognitive processes, (3) explaining how different cognitive processes operate, and (4) offering normative propositions for future marketing researchers interested in the dual-processing model.

A critically modern ecological economics for the Anthropocene

Ecological economics recognizes economic activity as a biophysical process mediated by social systems and ultimately subject to the constraints of a finite earth system. The Anthropocene discourse appears as validation of the central concerns of ecological economics yet throws into relief its limits as a normative transdiscipline oriented toward social transformation. We review ecological economics in light of two overarching challenges: first, negotiating between biophysical reality and plural constructed social realities, so as to create legitimate grounds for a sustainability transition; second, accounting for multi-level, multi-scale social and political action, which demands a means for arbitrating among competing normative propositions. We argue that attempts to address these challenges within ecological economics have been inconsistent and relatively scarce, reflecting an unresolved tension regarding modern and postmodern social theory. We demonstrate that a critically modern ecological economics could draw on aligned social movements and build on deliberative theory as a foundation for social and political change fit for navigating the Anthropocene.

Una fundamentación universalita de los derechos humanos

El artículo pretende establecer el contexto teórico general para propiciar una discusión en torno a la apremiante tarea de fundamentar los derechos humanos desde un criterio universalista. Se intentará proveer a los derechos humanos de una justificación teórica universal más allá de la que contiene su simple enunciación como derechos universales. Se recurre a la filosofía normativa kantiana, que es un paradigma del análisis de los enunciados con contenido normativo, para acometer el propósito de dotar a los derechos humanos de una fundamentación propiamente normativa, es decir, en su contenido intrínseco como normas. Una fundamentación en sentido universalista es aquella que tiene su fuerza vinculante en el contenido de la norma en sí misma, en su estructura lógica.

THE LOCAL CONSTRUCTION OF RELIGIOUS BLASPHEMY IN EAST JAVA

The blasphemy case of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, known as Ahok, who is a Christian and was Jakarta’s non-Muslim governor, has sparked different reactions among Muslim groups in Indonesia. Reactions of Muslim groups of different persuasion in East Java will be highlighted in this article. Two theological constructions emerged out of this case, namely textual-normative and moderate-substantive construc¬tions. This article aims to identify theological construction and social actions as normative propositions and actions of Muslim groups in East Java. To comprehend the concepts and responses through the article, several leaders of the Muslim roups such as FPI (Front Pembela Islam), HTI (Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia), FUI (Forum Umat Islam), MMI (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia), Al-Irsyad, FS-LDK (Forum Studi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus), NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah were interviewed. The article finds that moderate and rational theological concept of blasphemy is coined by major Muslim groups especially NU and Muhammadiyah which prioritize greater national interest, whereas other Muslim roups, especially those with literal interpretation, promote political identity vis-a-vis other religious groups.

Global Governance, Sustainability and the Earth System: Critical Reflections on the Role of Global Law

AbstractThis article begins by questioning the capacity of the concept of sustainable development to stabilize social reproduction and foster global justice. Based on interdisciplinary perspectives on global governance, it discusses the way in which global law fails to cope with the resonance of advanced capitalism in the world society and ecological systems. Our analysis focuses on the regulatory and institutional features of three interwoven functional regulatory regimes (global finance, energy, and environmental protection), which demonstrate structural governance dysfunction at the expense of ecological integrity and justice in the global realm. The article further examines the capacity of global law to foster a ‘compositive’ and ‘compensatory’ contribution to global justice and the stability of the Earth system through global constitutionalism. In this context, it concludes that Neil Walker's global law approach provides a fertile analytical framework for describing the patterns of interaction between different species of global law but proves to be particularly ‘slippery’ in its normative propositions regarding the gap between global law and justice. Drawing from the Earth system approach, we argue in favour of a global material constitutionalism, recognizant of ecosystemic boundaries and socio-environmental impacts of the global socio-economic metabolism. We consider that the gap between global law and global justice is best addressed by devising more deliberative patterns of transnational governance, as well as ecosystem and human rights approaches, in order to accommodate the fair and equitable internalization of material limits across global regulatory regimes that act as functionally differentiated economic constitutions of advanced capitalism.

Determining discount rates for the evaluation of natural assets in land-use planning: An application of the Equivalency Principle

One of the most pressing issues when making decisions over long-term environmental problems is deciding on an appropriate discount rate. This can be a highly technical discussion. While some argue in favour of market rates, which usually tend to be high, others support the use of near-zero rates to ensure that both current and future generations are properly accounted for. This paper presents an alternative approach to determining the discount rate for environmental assets in the case of land-use planning - the Equivalency Principle (EP) - based on the normative proposition that the social value of protected natural land should be at least the same as the market price of an adjacent land with similar environmental characteristics that has been granted permission for development. The paper first provides a theoretical overview of the approach, followed by an application of the EP at the land plot level across 11 European countries. Based on the EP, pure rates of social time preference that would equate natural and development land values within each administrative unit have been calculated. The findings show that the application of the EP usually results in discount rates that are lower-than-market rates and that are geographically differentiated. This implies discount rates that account for preferences of the society where the land or natural resource is located, with results ranging between 0% and 11%, with an average rate of 1% across study sites.

The Role of Standards of Review in Labour Law

Employment rights may be expressed as (i) rules or (ii) standards of review. The insight that it is not credible that all labour laws are directed towards the correction of general labour market failures is taken as a point of entry to engage in further research into standards. This paper probes their special role in addressing the internal vulnerabilities to which employees are exposed in their individual and specific employment relationship. The principal argument is made that unlike fixed rules, standards of review of managerial behaviour police employment-relationship specific failures, rather than the labour market generally. The central claim made in this paper is designed as a rejoinder to the powerful descriptive and normative propositions that labour laws ought only to be concerned with ensuring the maintenance of a properly functioning and efficient labour market, and that any labour laws that go beyond this market-correcting role are misconceived and unwarranted.

Expressivism and Cognitive Propositions

AbstractExpressivists about normative thought and discourse traditionally deny that there are nondeflationary normative propositions. However, it has recently been suggested that expressivists might avoid a number of problems by providing a theory of normative propositions compatible with expressivism. This paper explores the prospects for developing an expressivist theory of propositions within the framework of cognitive act theories of propositions. First, I argue that the only extant expressivist theory of cognitive propositions—Michael Ridge's ‘ecumenical expressivist’ theory—fails to explain identity conditions for normative propositions. Second, I argue that this failure motivates a general constraint—the ‘unity requirement’—that any expressivist theory of propositions must provide a unified nonrepresentational explanation of that in virtue of which propositional attitudes have the content that they have. Third, I argue that conceptual role accounts of content provide a promising framework in which to develop an expressivist theory of cognitive propositions.

The Role of Standards of Review in Labour Law

Employment rights may be expressed as (i) rules or (ii) standards of review. The insight that it is not credible that all labour laws are directed towards the correction of general labour market failures is taken as a point of entry to engage in further research into standards. This paper probes their special role in addressing the internal vulnerabilities to which employees are exposed in their individual and specific employment relationship. The principal argument is made that unlike fixed rules, standards of review of managerial behaviour police employment-relationship specific failures, rather than the labour market generally. The central claim made in this paper is designed as a rejoinder to the powerful descriptive and normative propositions that labour laws ought only to be concerned with ensuring the maintenance of a properly functioning and efficient labour market, and that any labour laws that go beyond this market-correcting role are misconceived and unwarranted.

The Moral Supply Chain, Phronêsis, and Management Education

In recent years there has been an increased interest in the research dedicated to the ethics and morality of supply chains. The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) dominates literature on supply chain ethics in management education. The objective of this paper is to develop some propositions to complement and look more broadly and differently at these management concepts. Supplementing these concepts with the fundamental questions on the meaning of ‘what a moral supply chain is’ and ‘what moral supply chain ought to be,’ we develop some descriptive and normative propositions for management education on the ethics of supply chains. Against a descriptive viewpoint, we propose that judgments on the morality of supply chains should be viewed from multiple perspectives, often conflicting. Against a normative viewpoint, we propose some reflections on how to apply Aristotelian practical wisdom in management education on supply chain ethics.

The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic

In this paper, I argue that there is accepted propositional technological knowledge which appears to exhibit the same patterns of change as questions, theories, and methods in the natural, social, and formal sciences. I show that technological theories attempting to describe the construction and operation of artifacts as well as to prescribe their correct mode of operation are not merely used, but also often accepted by epistemic agents. Since technology often involves methods different from those found in science and produces normative propositions, many of which remain tacit, one may be tempted to think that changes in technological knowledge should be somehow exempt from the laws of scientific change. Indeed, it seems tacitly accepted in the scientonomic community that, while scientific communities clearly accept theories, technological communities merely use them. As a result, scientonomy currently deals with natural, social, and formal sciences, and the status of technological knowledge within the scientonomic ontology remains unclear. To help elucidate the topic, I propose that the historical cases of sorting algorithms, telescopes, crop rotation, and colorectal cancer surgeries confirm that technological theories and methods are often an integral part of an epistemic agent’s mosaic and seem to exhibit the same scientonomic patterns of change typical of accepted theories therein. Thus, I suggest that propositional technological knowledge can be part of a mosaic.
 
 Suggested Modifications
 [Sciento-2018-0011]: Accept the three-fold distinction between explicit, explicable-implicit, and inexplicable with the following definitions:
 
 Explicit ≡ propositional knowledge that has been openly formulated by the agent.
 Explicable-Implicit ≡ propositional knowledge that hasn’t been openly formulated by the agent.
 Inexplicable ≡ non-propositional knowledge, i.e. knowledge that cannot, even in principle, be formulated as a set of propositions.
 
 Also accept the following definition of implicit:
 
 Implicit ≡ not explicit.
 
 [Sciento-2018-0012]: Accept that propositional technological knowledge – i.e. technological questions, theories, and methods – can be part of a mosaic.
 Also accept the following questions as legitimate topics of scientonomic inquiry: 
 
 History of Technological Mosaics: What technological theories were accepted and what technological methods were employed by different epistemic agents at different time periods?
 The Status of Inexplicable Knowledge: Is there such a thing as inexplicable knowledge?
 Typology of Technological Knowledge: What types of technological knowledge are there?

The Status of Questions in the Ontology of Scientific Change

The currently accepted scientonomic ontology includes two classes of epistemic elements – theories and methods. However, the ontology underlying the Encyclopedia of Scientonomy includes questions/topics as a basic element of its semantic structure. Ideally there should be no discrepancy between the accepted ontology of theoretical scientonomy and that of the Encyclopedia. I argue that questions constitute a distinct class of epistemic elements as they are not reducible to other elements that undergo scientific change – theories or methods. I discuss and reject two attempts at reducing questions to either descriptive or normative theories. According to the descriptive-epistemic account, scientific questions can be logically reduced to descriptive propositions, while according to the normative-epistemic account, they can be reduced to normative propositions. I show that these interpretations are incapable of capturing the propositional content expressed by questions; any possible reduction is carried at the expense of losing the essential characteristic of questions. Further, I find that the attempts to reduce questions to theories introduce an infinite regress, where a theory is an attempt to answer a question, which is itself a theory which answers another question, ad infintum. Instead, I propose to incorporate the question-answer semantic structure from erotetic logic in which questions constitute a distinct class of elements irreducible to propositions. An acceptance of questions into scientonomic ontology as a separate class of epistemic elements suggests a new avenue of research into the mechanism of question acceptance and rejection, i.e. how epistemic communities come to accept certain questions as legitimate and others as illegitimate.
 Suggested Modifications
 [Sciento-2018-0001]: Accept the following definition of question:
 
 Question ≡ a topic of inquiry.
 
 [Sciento-2018-0002]: Accept the ontology of epistemic elements with theories, methods, and questions as distinct epistemic elements. Reject the previously accepted ontology of epistemic elements.
 [Sciento-2018-0003]: Provided that modification [Sciento-2018-0002] is accepted, accept that the epistemic stance that can be taken by an epistemic agent towards a question is question acceptance (the opposite is unacceptance), defined as follows: 
 
 Question Acceptance ≡ a question is said to be accepted if it is taken as a legitimate topic of inquiry.
 
 [Sciento-2018-0004]: Provided that modifications [Sciento-2018-0002] and [Sciento-2018-0003] are accepted, accept the following question as legitimate topics of scientonomic inquiry: 
 
 Mechanism of Question Acceptance: How do questions become accepted as legitimate? What is the mechanism of question acceptance? 
 Indicators of Question Acceptance: What are the historical indicators of theory acceptance? How can observational scientonomists establish that such-and-such a question was accepted as a legitimate topic of inquiry by a certain epistemic agent at a certain time?

¿PROFUNDIZACIÓN O CAÍDA DEL REALISMO JURÍDICO COMO TEORÍA DESCRIPTIVA DE NORMAS?

Algunas versiones del realismo jurídico pretenden compatibilizar la pretensión de que el derecho es un conjunto de normas con un fuerte compromiso con el empirismo. De conformidad con este último, el derecho no está constituido por entidades abstractas de ningún tipo sino por hechos empíricamente constatables. En vistas a llevar a cabo esta compatibilización, en varios trabajos Riccardo Guastini ha defendido una concepción de las proposiciones normativas, i.e. aserciones existenciales sobre normas jurídicas, como enunciados teóricos acerca del derecho vigente, necesariamente referentes a ciertos hechos. Se concibe así al derecho vigente como el conjunto de textos que son resultado de interpretaciones estables, consolidadas y dominantes que los jueces han llevado a cabo en sus decisiones en el ordenamiento de que se trate. Partiendo de esta versión del realismo jurídico, este trabajo procura sembrar algunas dudas. Primero, sobre este modo de concebir a las proposiciones normativas. Segundo, sobre el modo en que, en consecuencia, queda configurada la teoría del derecho. Tercero, y más en general, sobre la pretensión de compatibilizar la visión del derecho como conjunto de normas con la tesis empirista.

Anarchy, pacifism and realism: building a path to a non-violent international law

ABSTRACTIn anarcho-pacifist thought it is argued that a consistent pacifism could only accord with anarchism, as the establishment and enforcement of any sovereign legal order necessitates the use of violence that is anathema to pacifist ethics. Yet little work has been done to think about how this relation between pacifism and anarchism might be of value in thinking about international relations and international law, where anarchical conditions are broadly recognised as prevailing. I will suggest that a more realistic proposal for promoting peace in international relations may be found in the normative propositions of Gerhart Niemeyer’s Law Without Force and the ‘weak pacifism’ offered by Danilo Zolo, both of which depict anarchy as a condition in which a non-violent international law might be realised. The tentative argument will be advanced that perhaps it is the anarchical condition of international politics that might allow the development of a pacifist international law in the future. While such a transformation of international law cannot be instituted through a concrete programme for reform it provides a point of reference for the imagination of new forms of international justice that avoid the provision of legal/moral justifications for war.

Battered Women and the Requirement of Imminence in Self-Defence

Should the South African courts abolish the traditional imminence standard, something must be used to stand in its place. The identification of the various alternatives which have been suggested to replace imminence - most notably the establishment of the "reasonable woman standard" as advanced in the case of S v Engelbrecht 2005 (92) SACR 41 (W) - has moved the law of self-defence into the realm of subjectivity. The end result not only undermines self-defence as a justification defence, but is also unworkable for a number of reasons. For instance, utilising expert testimony to explain how the battered woman’s syndrome affects individual perception would leave a judge with no meaningful way to determine if that abused woman’s belief in the imminence of danger was reasonable, even if viewed from her distorted perspective. It is suggested that no reference need be made to the "reasonable battered woman", since South African courts already do this to a limited extent by taking a number of factors into account in determining if the abused woman acted reasonably. By rethinking certain factors in the situation as a set of relatively innocuous normative propositions, the abused woman’s actions can be judged in accordance with standard propositions in the law of self-defence.