Normative Ethical Theory Research Articles

Before Virtue: Assessing Contemporary Virtue Ethics by Jonathan J. Sanford

Reviewed by: Before Virtue: Assessing Contemporary Virtue Ethics by Jonathan J. Sanford Anthony T. Flood Before Virtue: Assessing Contemporary Virtue Ethics by Jonathan J. Sanford (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2015), x + 280 pp. For Thomists and other Aristotelians working within the analytic tradition, the rise of contemporary virtue ethics (CVE) in current philosophical discussion seems like occasion for rejoicing. A rejection of deontology and consequentialism in the name of virtue by top members of the field leaves one thinking: "What is not to like?" But then, when we read the literature, something seems amiss, even to the point where we wonder if CVE is a coherent approach and if it has anything in common with what Aristotle and Aquinas mean by "ethics." Jonathan Sanford has clearly pondered these same questions and given Before Virtue to us as a result. [End Page 953] Sanford has performed a great service in offering a painstaking analysis of CVE and a sober assessment of its status as a viable normative ethical theory. This is no small task. To what CVE even refers is the source of much discussion. Seeking to include the wide array of thinkers and cover their viewpoints that make up the movement, Sanford offers the following characterization: "A contemporary virtue ethicist is an academic philosopher who subscribes to some of the principles shared by some virtue ethicists and who self-identifies with this movement" (89). Due to the wide extension of this description, he treats the multitude of thinkers self-identifying according to this characterization. In terms of Sanford's analysis of CVE, at no point does he reject the movement out of hand or fail to see the positive contributions many of its authors have made to contemporary discussion. Nonetheless, he makes a compelling case that it is a movement in disarray, in large part due to its rejection of key Aristotelian principles. Aristotle performs the central role in Sanford's case for three reasons: (1) the function G. E. M. Anscombe assigns to him in her analyses; (2) Aristotle serving as a common denominator in subsequent CVE literature; and (3) Sanford's contending that the framework of Aristotle's ethics is superior to the alternatives. Sanford's assessment of the CVE movement begins with Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy." In this article, Anscombe diagnoses the shortcomings of modern moral philosophy and suggests that it ought to be scrapped in favor of an ethics revolving around the Aristotelian virtue of phronesis and its place in the good life. Since subsequent virtue ethicists credit this article as the origin of CVE, Sanford thinks it legitimate to use Anscombe's principles as the standard of evaluation of the CVE movement. Against this measure, he thinks CVE ultimately fails to distinguish itself from the common framework of contemporary moral philosophy. The movement "has in many respects betrayed the recommendations of its mother" (183). Key to the fabric of what Anscombe thinks a suitable moral theory are both an affirmation of ethical absolutes and an adequate philosophical psychology. She points to Aristotle for addressing both considerations. Sanford posits three questions, the answers to which would constitute an adequate psychology: (1) What is human nature? (2) What is the purpose of human life? (3) And by what means can we judge progress made toward achieving the goal of human life? The raising of and providing answers to these questions constitutes the heart of the book. Attempting to employ the notion of virtue as the basis of an ethical theory without addressing these questions is likely either to fail or to be rife with confusion. As I read Sanford, CVE is plagued by attempt after attempt to treat virtue as [End Page 954] removed from the broader context in which it is intelligible. Before virtue, we must address foundational questions of moral philosophy and understand virtue as nested within this context. The book could stand on its own as a worthwhile critique of an important contemporary ethical movement; however, Sanford goes further by offering a second part, which I found to be the most compelling aspect of the work. He offers an overview of Aristotle and Aquinas that, while providing...

The role of normative marketing ethics

This essay highlights the importance of normative thinking in marketing ethics and proposes avenues for future research. It begins with contrasting positive and normative ethics. Then, a brief discussion of the literature in the field is included. Arguments offered by those who tend to avoid normative analysis are examined. Four types of normative ethical theories are presented: consequentialism, duty-based ethics, contract-based morality, and virtue ethics. The essay concludes with seven future research directions for normative marketing ethics and customer-brand relationships.

Ubuntu and the modern society

The incompatibility school of thought maintains that ubuntu is incompatible with modern society’s politico-juridical order and neoliberal economic system that promotes individualism and unequal distribution of wealth in the context of economic marginalisation and severe impoverishment of the black African majority. Furthermore, the postcolonial state tends to undermine the common good of society. The pro-ubuntu camp maintains that ubuntu is relevant as a normative ethical concept and as the underlying moral framework of reconciliatory politics of South Africa’s rainbow nation. I will show that the limitation of ubuntu due to its application in the framework of liberal constitutional democracy and neoliberal “global institutional order” that serve the interests of global capital and at the same time undermine the economic interests of impoverished black Africans requires ubuntu normative ethical theory to establish an understanding of a rearrangement of the “global institutional order” in a way which fits ubuntu. This work is novel as I appropriate Metz’s understanding of ubuntu as a normative ethical theory to show the importance and the nature of the realignment of the “global institutional order” to ubuntu in a way which promotes the common good of the global community of human beings.

Indigenous representation in the ‘moral museum’: perspectives from classical ethical theory

ABSTRACTMuseums operate in a complex social, political and cultural sphere, and must therefore negotiate ethical quandaries in many of their activities. Engagement with indigenous peoples and cultures reflects one such quandary for museums, institutions closely tied to processes of colonialism. Ideas about the nature of ‘museum ethics’, expressed in both scholarly literature and professional codes and standards, can deliver conflicting values and guidelines for museum behaviour, making practical ethical decision-making a difficult process. Engagement with the fundamental theories and methodologies of the classical ethical tradition may help simplify this process, by clarifying ambiguous terminologies and providing a flexible framework for analysis. This paper applies theories in meta-ethics and normative ethics to the First Peoples exhibition at the Melbourne Museum in Victoria, Australia, to inform conclusions about the ethical implications inherent in interactions with indigenous cultural heritage in museums.

Utilitarianism, Deontology and Virtue Ethics

The concepts behind three of the principal normative ethical theories (utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics) are evident in a real-life scenario. This case study involves videotapes recorded from inside Grootvlei Prison, Bloemfontein, South Africa in 2002. Prisoners captured sensational footage of warders selling alcohol, drugs, loaded firearms and juveniles for sex to inmates. It was footage every journalist would want to broadcast and it was for sale to the highest bidder. The country’s three flagship current affairs programs, broadcast on three different channels, were each approached to buy the footage. Each of the television channels operates under different business models: one is the public broadcaster; another a free-to-air private channel; the third is a pay channel and part of a multinational listed company. Upon analysis it is clear that each executive producer/company espoused different ethical philosophies, yet each decision was ultimately ethical. The reasoning and philosophies of three ethical theories are highlighted in business decision-making, commercial judgments as well as journalistic choices.

Narratives and Practices of Voluntary Simplicity in the Czech Post-Socialist Context

Voluntary simplicity is usually seen as an alternative social movement that is responding to the current social and environmental crisis within affluent societies. Many scholars draw on Inglehart's concept of post-materialism and consider voluntary simplicity to be a way of limiting one's consumption in order to free oneself and seek satisfaction in the non-material aspects of life. These scholars assume that the values associated with simplicity emerge out of over-saturation with consumption. This article discusses the results of research conducted among Czech households who voluntarily reduce consumption and who do so in a post-socialist context, without having first lived in affluence. Theoretically and methodologically, the article builds on the work of Hana LibrovĂĄ [1994, 2003; LibrovĂĄ et al. 2016] and is rooted in three main concepts: the concepts of post-materialism [Inglehart 1977], 'new luxury' [Enzensberger 1996], and the normative ethical theories of motivation [PelikĂĄn and LibrovĂĄ 2015]. The findings of the study call into question Inglehart's structural assumption that non-consumption lifestyles like voluntary simplicity only develop in affluent societies and suggest that the Czech socialist past created conditions suitable for the emergence of a non-ideological and primarily self-oriented version of voluntary simplicity. The roots of simple lifestyles may also lie in people's dissatisfaction with the promise of modernity, a promise suggesting that it is possible to attain and lead the good life through material abundance. Prior experience with an affluent lifestyle did not play a role in the decision of participants in this study to live a nonconsumption lifestyle. This study in a post-socialist country therefore has the potential to provide a deeper understanding of the motivations for choosing voluntary simplicity.

Is it the end or just the beginning of ubuntu? Response to Matolino and Kwindingwi in view of Metz’s rebuttal

In this article we offer a critical review of Matolino and Kwindingwi’s article “The end of ubuntu” in which they put forward their view, based on conditions in contemporary South Africa, that the philosophy of ubuntu is dead. In the main, we intend to uphold what we believe is the more plausible argument, as suggested by the title of Metz’s paper, “Just the beginning of ubuntu”. We argue that Matolino and Kwindingwi’s arrival at the conclusion that ubuntu is over is influenced by their point of departure, which appears to be established on the dubious pre-philosophic assumption that ubuntu, as a normative ethical theory, is a “narrative of return”. We further question their assertion that contemporary conditions in South Africa are the basis on which ubuntu moral theory should be dismantled. Matolino and Kwindingwi argue for the demise of ubuntu without supporting their position with convincing, logical reasons. We argue that ubuntu, insofar as it is a moral theory, is competitive and will ultimately prove to be a desirable ethic which could contribute positively towards developing moral character in the contemporary sociopolitical environment in parts of Africa. This article intends to explore the methodology and logic of the debate. However, in the pursuit of pure academic critique, we reject Metz’s allegation that the criticism by Matolino and Kwindingwi is ad hominem.

A comparative study of Ibn Miskawayh’s and Michael Slote’s Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics is one of the normative ethical theories that, unlike deontological theory or utilitarianism, emphasizes on virtuousness. Ibn Miskawayh’s virtue ethics is influenced by Aristotle, and Michael Slot is influenced by Hume's views. A comparison between these two theories reveals the similarities and differences of their different readings of virtue. The role of Happiness in virtue ethics is one of the differences. In explaining virtue ethics Ibn Miskawayh emphasizes happiness while Slote rejects it. While rationalism has a fundamental place in the theory of Ibn Miskawayh, there is no such a place for it in the emotivist view of Slot. Altogether, Ibn Miskawayh’s theory is more coherent and logical due to its emphasis on happiness and rationality. Slote's emphasis on emotivism is one of the weak points of his theory which has false consequences.

Discovering the Neural Nature of Moral Cognition? Empirical, Theoretical, and Practical Challenges in Bioethical Research with Electroencephalography (EEG).

In this article we critically review the neural mechanisms of moral cognition that have recently been studied via electroencephalography (EEG). Such studies promise to shed new light on traditional moral questions by helping us to understand how effective moral cognition is embodied in the brain. It has been argued that conflicting normative ethical theories require different cognitive features and can, accordingly, in a broadly conceived naturalistic attempt, be associated with different brain processes that are rooted in different brain networks and regions. This potentially morally relevant brain activity has been empirically investigated through EEG-based studies on moral cognition. From neuroscientific evidence gathered in these studies, a variety of normative conclusions have been drawn and bioethical applications have been suggested. We discuss methodological and theoretical merits and demerits of the attempt to use EEG techniques in a morally significant way, point to legal challenges and policy implications, indicate the potential to reveal biomarkers of psychopathological conditions, and consider issues that might inform future bioethical work.

Scanlon’s contractualism: A review essay

The purpose of this essay is to give a succinct summary of contractualism, an influential moral theory of American philosopher Thomas Scanlon. Scanlon introduced contractualism in his essay ?Contractualism and Utilitarianism? from 1982 and developed it in his book What We Owe to Each Other from 1998. The essay begins by situating Scanlon?s contractualism in the tradition of contract theories of morality. It then examines its peculiarities as a metaethical and a normative ethical theory. Finally, it discusses the most important objections to contractualism, ending with recommended secondary literature for subsequent researchers.

Who Loves Mosquitoes? Care Ethics, Theory of Obligation and Endangered Species

The focus of this paper is on normative ethical theories and endangered species. To be exact, I examine two theories: the theory of obligation and care ethics, and ask which is better-suited in the case of endangered species. I argue that the aretic, feminist-inspired ethics of care is well-suited in the case of companion animals, but ill-suited in the case of endangered species, especially in the case of “unlovable” species. My argument presupposes that (1) we now live an era where human disturbances to planetary ecosystems are triggering a sixth mass species extinction, and (2) widespread interventions will be needed to save many species from extinction.

How Friedman’s View on Individual Freedom Relates to Stakeholder Theory and Social Contract Theory

Friedman’s view on corporate social responsibility (CSR) is often accused of being incoherent and of setting rather low ethical standards for managers. This paper outlines Friedman’s ethical expectations for corporate executives against the backdrop of the strong emphasis he puts on individual freedom. Doing so reveals that the ethical standards he imposes on managers can be strictly deduced from individual freedom and that these standards involve both deontological norms and the fulfillment of particular stakeholder expectations. These insights illustrate the necessity to reconsider how Friedman’s approach relates to other important normative theories of business ethics. Contrasting Friedman’s approach with stakeholder theory and integrative social contract theory—when considering the importance he assigns to individual freedom—shows how and why these approaches differ. Still, the comparison also highlights striking similarities. This paper contributes to a better understanding of Friedman’s position—which is still one of the most influential approaches in business ethics research—because it enables a differentiated look at its strengths and weaknesses.

Four Roles of Ethical Theory in Clinical Ethics Consultation

When clinical ethics committee members discuss a complex ethical dilemma, what use do they have for normative ethical theories? Members without training in ethical theory may still contribute to a pointed and nuanced analysis. Nonetheless, the knowledge and use of ethical theories can play four important roles: aiding in the initial awareness and identification of the moral challenges, assisting in the analysis and argumentation, contributing to a sound process and dialogue, and inspiring an attitude of reflexivity. These four roles of ethical theory in clinical ethics consultation are described and their significance highlighted, while an example case is used as an illustration throughout.

Comments on In Praise of Desire

Professors Arpaly and Schroeder offer a new theory of the role of desire in belief and action, a theory that they present with an abundance of helpful examples. Their focus is intrinsic desires, which they define as desires for things, actions, or states of affairs for their own sake. These desires, and not deliberation or recognition of reasons, they argue, are what ultimately rationalize (explain or justify), beliefs and actions. Their book is rich and complex, but I will focus solely on the relationship between intrinsic desires and virtue, and their conception of these desires and of Reason and Appetite. Arpaly and Schroder begin by stating that, ‘‘in the long-standing philosophical dispute between Reason and Appetite,’’ they side with Appetite. Appetite is a power to set ends and prioritize them, Reason to grasp the world in conceptual terms (3). To have a good will, or virtue, or the capacity to act in a praiseworthy manner, ‘‘is just a matter of [intrinsically] desiring the right things’’ (2). This, in turn, means desiring what is actually good or right regardless of what one believes is good or right. In turn, desiring what is actually good or right requires conceptualizing ‘‘the right or the good in the right way,’’ that is, as held by ‘‘the true normative ethical theory, whatever that might be’’ (15). These claims raise my first question. If the intrinsic desire for the good or right entails conceptualizing it in the right way, then in what sense are the authors siding with Appetite against Reason? Whereas Reason alone is not enough for a good will,

Inference of trustworthiness from intuitive moral judgments.

Moral judgments play a critical role in motivating and enforcing human cooperation, and research on the proximate mechanisms of moral judgments highlights the importance of intuitive, automatic processes in forming such judgments. Intuitive moral judgments often share characteristics with deontological theories in normative ethics, which argue that certain acts (such as killing) are absolutely wrong, regardless of their consequences. Why do moral intuitions typically follow deontological prescriptions, as opposed to those of other ethical theories? Here, we test a functional explanation for this phenomenon by investigating whether agents who express deontological moral judgments are more valued as social partners. Across 5 studies, we show that people who make characteristically deontological judgments are preferred as social partners, perceived as more moral and trustworthy, and are trusted more in economic games. These findings provide empirical support for a partner choice account of moral intuitions whereby typically deontological judgments confer an adaptive function by increasing a person's likelihood of being chosen as a cooperation partner. Therefore, deontological moral intuitions may represent an evolutionarily prescribed prior that was selected for through partner choice mechanisms. (PsycINFO Database Record

Prosocial Leadership: Research investigating the identity and development of prosocial leaders.

This paper begins by reviewing the relevant literature pertaining to topic of research, prosocial leadership. This literature includes: normative ethical theory which underpins many ethical leaders...

Rightness = Right-Maker: Reduction or Reductio?

Abstract I have recently argued that if the causal theory of reference is true, then, on pain of absurdity, no normative ethical theory is true. In this journal, Michael Byron has objected to my reductio by appealing to Frank Jackson’s moral reductionism. The present essay defends my reductio while also casting doubt upon Jackson’s moral reductionism.

Early Confucianism is a System for Social-Functional Influence and Probably Does Not Represent a Normative Ethical Theory

To the question “What normative ethical theory does early Confucianism best represent?” researchers in the history of early Confucian philosophy respond with more than half a dozen different answers. They include sentimentalism, amoralism, pragmatism, Kantianism, Aristotelian virtue theory, care ethics, and role ethics. The lack of consensus is concerning, as three considerations make clear. First, fully trained, often leading, scholars advocate each of the theories. Second, nearly all participants in the debate believe that the central feature of early Confucianism is its moral thought. However, these normative ethical theories are logically inconsistent with one another, the third point. The entailment is unavoidable: the majority of scholars of early Confucian normative ethics must be incorrect about their attributions of a normative theory to early Confucianism. It would appear, then, that we need a new dao 道 or pathway for the study of early Confucian moral thought. One alternative is to adopt an immersively interdisciplinary research methodology that pivots on the recognition that early Confucianism is a social-functional system the governing purpose of which is to influence cultural leaders.

A Person-Centered Approach to Moral Judgment

Both normative theories of ethics in philosophy and contemporary models of moral judgment in psychology have focused almost exclusively on the permissibility of acts, in particular whether acts should be judged on the basis of their material outcomes (consequentialist ethics) or on the basis of rules, duties, and obligations (deontological ethics). However, a longstanding third perspective on morality, virtue ethics, may offer a richer descriptive account of a wide range of lay moral judgments. Building on this ethical tradition, we offer a person-centered account of moral judgment, which focuses on individuals as the unit of analysis for moral evaluations rather than on acts. Because social perceivers are fundamentally motivated to acquire information about the moral character of others, features of an act that seem most informative of character often hold more weight than either the consequences of the act or whether a moral rule has been broken. This approach, we argue, can account for numerous empirical findings that are either not predicted by current theories of moral psychology or are simply categorized as biases or irrational quirks in the way individuals make moral judgments.

Right-Making, Reference, and Reduction

Abstract The causal theory of reference (CTR) provides a well-articulated and widely-accepted account of the reference relation. On CTR the reference of a term is fixed by whatever property causally regulates the competent use of that term. CTR poses a metaethical challenge to realists by demanding an account of the properties that regulate the competent use of normative predicates. CTR might pose a challenge to ethical theorists as well. Long (2012) argues that CTR entails the falsity of any normative ethical theory. First-order theory attempts to specify what purely descriptive property is a fundamental right-making property (FRM). Long contends that the notion that the FRM causally regulates competent use of the predicate ‘right’ leads to a reductio. The failure of this argument is nevertheless instructive concerning a point at which ethics and metaethics overlap.