Normative Economic Theory Research Articles

Toward a New Normative (Economic) Theory of Politics

A normative theory neither grounded in nor constrained by a plausible positive science is not compelling. Thus, for example, a normative theory of the state which sees an end to class conflict (e.g. Plato's) is obviously not compelling to those who accept as valid a positive science of politics which claims permanence for class conflict (e.g. Aristotle's). 1 In this instance, the normative theory would appear utopian to one who accepts the explanatory argument. This paper argues that (orthodox) normative economic theories of politics (NETP) are in many respects utopian because they are inadequately constrained by a plausible science of politics. Part I outlines the basic components of NETP; Part II then contrasts the “positive science” implicitly underlying NETP with the main ingredients of a more compelling alternative and uses the latter to criticize NETP; Part III discusses some issues raised by the above and suggests directions for a new (and better) normative theory of politics.

A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for Implementation Analysis

THE principal rationale for public policy intervention lies in the inadequacies of market outcomes. Yet this rationale is really only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for policy formulation.1 Policy formulation properly requires that the realized inadequacies of market outcomes be compared with the potential inadequacies of nonmarket efforts to ameliorate them. The "anatomy" of market failure provides only limited help in prescribing therapies for government success.2 That markets may fail to produce either economically optimal or socially desirable outcomes has been elaborated in a well-known and voluminous

Airport Noise: Some Analytic and Policy Perspectives

formulation of an analytic framework for noise abatement. The concept of externalities can be a powerful analytic tool for guiding better resource allocation decisions in a wide variety of environmental pollution problems. However, in the case of airport noise, with which we are concerned in this paper, the existence of substantial private benefits linked to airport expansion and development indicate that recommendations which require the internalization of external costs directly to airport authorities and the airline industry may produce a set of consequences which are beyond the scope of airport noise control. If anything, the unrestricted application of normative economic theory to the problem of airport noise is likely not only to produce the wrong guidelines for public policy, but also to result in a magnification of the divergence between social costs and benefits and