Non-trade Issues Research Articles

Governance in International Trade: Judicialisation and Positive Integration in the WTO

Positive integration among states, defined as the correction of negative externalities from liberalisation, is generally assumed to be very difficult to achieve on the European level, let alone on the international or global level. The political transaction costs of achieving positive integration legislation indeed seem daunting in an organisation such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), which operates under conditions of unanimity and has a membership of over 140 sovereign states. Yet, member states seem to have crossed the Rubicon: They have concluded a number of agreements that impose positive obligations to adopt new policy measures in fields traditionally restricted to the sovereign nation-state. There has been consistent political pressure to graft other, non-trade issues onto the WTO framework, i.e. to enlarge an organisation that formerly dealt exclusively with trade into a governance structure that also has regulatory competences in other areas of public policy. WTO member states have indeed introduced the obligation to protect intellectual property rights internationally, and they have concluded agreements on health, on technical barriers to trade, and on investment - each of these being fields of public policy for which more specialised agencies within the United Nations system would seem to have been the more natural locus for such agreements. Further, there have been - hitherto unsuccessful - calls to bring labour rights, environmental standards, or competition policy under the jurisdiction of the WTO. This raises the question: why and under which conditions is positive integration possible in the WTO? The present paper seeks to formulate theoretically embedded hypotheses that answer this question. I argue that judicialisation - the presence of binding third party enforcement - makes every single WTO commitment more credible. Because judicialisation facilitates enforcement, it exerts force on political actors in the legislative arm of the organisation to bring positive integration issues under the jurisdiction of the WTO. The aim of this paper is to explore the explanatory force of this general hypothesis in empirical cases of positive integration (intellectual property, health, technical barriers to trade, and investment) and to come to new theoretical and empirical insights about the sources of and conditions for international cooperation. This paper thus aims to contribute to interdisciplinary research on judicialisation in international trade governance and the impact of judicialisation on the emergence of global governing structures.

The WTO core agreement, non-trade issues and institutional integrity

WTO member countries understand the core agreement of the organization to consist of binding reciprocal market access achieved through multilateral negotiation, and supported by a system of trade policy rules and dispute settlement. Attempts to introduce social chapters into the WTO would compromise the core agreement. Specifically, authorizing the use of trade sanctions to pursue non-trade goals would diminish the value of the WTO to its members, and undermine the global trading system. WTO agreements and rules can be reconciled with environmental goals, the improvement of labor standards and the promotion of human rights through the development and strengthening of international institutions dedicated to these issues. Efforts by governments to promote new global institutions and international agreements would thereby remove political barriers to trade liberalization.

Global Governance and the WTO

The international trading system, embodied in the World Trade Organization (WTO), is rightly celebrated as one of the great successes of international cooperation. The success of that system, however, has not been matched in other important areas of international policymaking, including environmental, labor, human rights, and competition policy. In recent years, the trading system has come under stress because the impact of its success has been felt in these areas. The liberalization of trade and the establishment of multilateral trading rules, for example, have made it more difficult for nation-states to impose trade sanctions on states that fail to undertake certain environmental measures. Governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and individuals concerned about the impact of the trading system on these non-trade issues have challenged the WTO to address this concern. As of yet no consensus has emerged on the question of how to balance existing trade interests against these other interests. This Article proposes a strategy that would allow states to discuss trade and non-trade interests in a single forum. With a single place for the negotiation of a range of issues, states will be able to negotiate rules to govern the balance between trade and non-trade concerns. No such forum exists today. The best starting point for this effort is the WTO. The WTO has the advantage of being an established and successful organization that has proven itself capable of managing complex negotiations and administering the resulting agreements. It also has the advantage of a well functioning dispute resolution system. The primary problem with the WTO as the single home for these diverse issues is the fact that it is a trade organization, staffed by trade specialists, and prone to favoring trade interests over others. If it is to be an effective and accepted forum for non-trade issues, this trade bias must be eliminated. To overcome the trade bias of the institution, this Article advances a novel proposal to create autonomous, topical departments within the WTO. Each department would represent a single area, such as trade, environment, human rights, and so on. The departments would organize rounds of negotiation within their issue areas, leading to WTO obligations. In addition, to permit negotiation across issue areas, periodic would be convened in which trade concerns could be balanced against, for example, environmental concerns. The resulting agreements from the Mega-Rounds would also represent WTO obligations. The departmental structure would avoid the problems of a trade bias within the organization and retain the advantages of specialization. At the same time, the organization would have a mechanism to undertake the difficult but critical tasks of determining how trade and non-trade interests will interact.

Foreword

A burgeoning literature addresses the links between the World Trade Organization and ostensibly “nontrade” issues, including corruption and bribery, health care (such as tobacco control), human rights generally or labor rights in particular, diverse environmental concerns, issues of “culture,” and even the fight against terrorism. Current WTO scholarship, at least that published in the United States, seems to be obsessed with exploring the outer boundaries of the trade regime. In the face of a vast array of potential recipes for linkage to particular nontrade issues, as well as cautionary tales against such linkage, what is to be gained from revisiting these questions?

Institutional Linkage: Transcending “Trade and …”

“Trade and … ” linkages arise when nontrade issues are linked to trade. Thus, if the United States declines to trade with Myanmar until it complies with certain human rights or democracy standards, this is a “trade and … ” linkage. All “trade and … ” linkages are constructed, in the sense that the decision to link trade to other issues is always a political decision and is not otherwise determined by the nature of things. Governments link trade concessions to the satisfaction of other, nontrade policy interests, either politically or legally, whenever they find such linkage useful to the achievement of their goals.

Post-Seattle Environment: Developing Countries at the Crossroads

The recent failure of the Seattle ministerial conference has raised several questions on the future of the global trading environ ment and the role of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in it. A large segment of the global population desires a moratorium on the newer issues to be brought under the WTO while the developed world is all for strengthening and widening the WTO's activities. The developing countries (DCs), in particular, have expressed wide-ranging apprehensions regarding the function ing of the WTO. It is in this context that the present article examines the factors contributing to the Seattle failure and its consequences. It suggests a three-forked strategy for the DCs in the course of the forthcoming ministerial conference and thereafter. The strategy includes exposing weaknesses and drawbacks of the Uruguay round agreements; highlighting protec tionist behaviour of the developed world and continuing with their fight against the non-trade related issues. Unite or perish will be the ultimate mantra for the DCs' success in the global negotiations.

Public administration implications of the north american free trade agreement

The emerging North American trade bloc presents both challenges and opportunities for Mexico, Canada, and the United States. Free trade among disparate partners is a complex undertaking. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will bring important benefits to all three countries, but it will also raise many important issues. The sharp differences in wage rates, worker productivity, and education levels among the partners has fueled fears of job losses on both sides of the border. Disparity among NAFTA nations on labor practices, health and occupational safety laws and regulations are also sources of conflict. Effective dispute resolution mechanisms must exist for both the trade and non-trade issues. Practical guidance, in this regard, can come from the experience of the Canadian Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) and the European Economic Community (EEC; European Union since 1993). New political and administration mechanisms will be required to deal with each of these challenging issues.

NAFTA as the Center of an Integration Process: The Nontrade Issues

NAFTA as the Center of an Integration Process: The Nontrade Issues

Trade Diversification in Black Africa

Third-World governments have frequently professed the virtues of trade diversification, and they have voiced a number of legitimate concerns about what can happen if this is not achieved. First, the greater the geographical concentration of their export trade, the more vulnerable are they to fluctuations arising from changes in the level of imports, devaluations, or other developments in their principal markets.1 When, for instance, exports were directed predominantly towards the relatively slow-growing European Economic Community in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the exporting countries might have been better off if their outlets had been more diversified. Second, various pressures may be exerted to induce smaller countries to purchase most of their needed imports from the larger trading partner that has bought most of their exports.2 Those with geographically concentrated exports are particularly vulnerable in tariff disputes, or what J. A. Conybeare has termed ‘trade wars’.3 Finally, countries which are particularly dependent on individual export markets are vulnerable to ‘linkage’ pressures – attempts by their powerful partners to utilise economic leverage to force concessions on non-trade issues, often political in nature.4

A Positive Approach to the International Economic Order. Part II: Non-Trade Issues and Clockwork Debt

Journal Article A Positive Approach to the International Economic Order. Part II: Non-Trade Issues and Clockwork Debt Get access A Positive Approach to the International Economic Order. Part II: Non-Trade Issues. By Alasdair MacBean and V. N. Balasubramanyan. London: British-North American Committee. 1980. 100 pp. Pb:£2.25. $5.00.Clockwork Debt. By Pierre Dhonte. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 1980. 124 pp. £9.75. Graham Bird Graham Bird 1University of Surrey Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 57, Issue 1, Winter 1981, Page 129, https://doi.org/10.2307/2619380 Published: 01 January 1980