Non-Proliferation Treaty Research Articles

Evaluating design intent in Iran’s ballistic-missile programme

‘This is a clear-eyed assessment of the Iran nuclear deal and how it was working smoothly before President Trump's reckless withdrawal. No single volume makes better use of the facts to refute the criticisms levied by the Trump administration against the deal, or differentiates more clearly between those of Iran's ballistic missiles which could be allowed in a negotiated arrangement and those which should be prohibited.’Angela Kane, Senior Fellow, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation; former UN High Rentative for Disarmament Affairs and UN Under-Secretary-General for Management ‘No one has contributed more to the public understanding of the complexities of nuclear proliferation and the attempts of various states to break out from the Non-Proliferation Treaty than Mark Fitzpatrick. Now he and his colleagues at the IISS have turned their focus to the withdrawal of the US from the JCPOA. Their new study is required reading for anyone concerned that this action could lead to yet another conflict in the Middle East or increase the risk of nuclear weapons spreading in the region.’IISSIn July 2015, eight parties – France, Germany and the United Kingdom, together with the European Union and China, Russia and the United States on the one side, and Iran on the other – adopted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran nuclear deal. Under the agreement, Iran accepted limits to its nuclear programme and stricter international monitoring in return for sanctions relief. Detractors, however, saw the deal as overly lenient towards Tehran. Donald Trump described the JCPOA as the ‘worst deal ever’, and announced in May 2018 that the US would cease waiving sanctions and withdraw from the agreement.This Adelphi book argues that the unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA was a grave error. Drawing on a deep understanding of the non-proliferation regime and their own technical expertise, the authors evaluate the principal criticisms of the JCPOA, some of which are unrelated to nuclear issues. The authors argue that the Procurement Channel – established by the JCPOA to give Iran a route to procure goods and services for its now-limited nuclear programme – has been an effective check on Iran's illicit procurement of nuclear-related goods. They also show that Iran's nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes are not intrinsically linked, for not all of its missiles were designed to be nuclear-capable. The fate of the JCPOA now hangs in the balance; its survival will ultimately depend on Iran.

The JCPOA Procurement Channel

‘This is a clear-eyed assessment of the Iran nuclear deal and how it was working smoothly before President Trump's reckless withdrawal. No single volume makes better use of the facts to refute the criticisms levied by the Trump administration against the deal, or differentiates more clearly between those of Iran's ballistic missiles which could be allowed in a negotiated arrangement and those which should be prohibited.’Angela Kane, Senior Fellow, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation; former UN High Rentative for Disarmament Affairs and UN Under-Secretary-General for Management ‘No one has contributed more to the public understanding of the complexities of nuclear proliferation and the attempts of various states to break out from the Non-Proliferation Treaty than Mark Fitzpatrick. Now he and his colleagues at the IISS have turned their focus to the withdrawal of the US from the JCPOA. Their new study is required reading for anyone concerned that this action could lead to yet another conflict in the Middle East or increase the risk of nuclear weapons spreading in the region.’IISSIn July 2015, eight parties – France, Germany and the United Kingdom, together with the European Union and China, Russia and the United States on the one side, and Iran on the other – adopted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran nuclear deal. Under the agreement, Iran accepted limits to its nuclear programme and stricter international monitoring in return for sanctions relief. Detractors, however, saw the deal as overly lenient towards Tehran. Donald Trump described the JCPOA as the ‘worst deal ever’, and announced in May 2018 that the US would cease waiving sanctions and withdraw from the agreement.This Adelphi book argues that the unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA was a grave error. Drawing on a deep understanding of the non-proliferation regime and their own technical expertise, the authors evaluate the principal criticisms of the JCPOA, some of which are unrelated to nuclear issues. The authors argue that the Procurement Channel – established by the JCPOA to give Iran a route to procure goods and services for its now-limited nuclear programme – has been an effective check on Iran's illicit procurement of nuclear-related goods. They also show that Iran's nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes are not intrinsically linked, for not all of its missiles were designed to be nuclear-capable. The fate of the JCPOA now hangs in the balance; its survival will ultimately depend on Iran.

Assessing the JCPOA

‘This is a clear-eyed assessment of the Iran nuclear deal and how it was working smoothly before President Trump's reckless withdrawal. No single volume makes better use of the facts to refute the criticisms levied by the Trump administration against the deal, or differentiates more clearly between those of Iran's ballistic missiles which could be allowed in a negotiated arrangement and those which should be prohibited.’Angela Kane, Senior Fellow, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation; former UN High Rentative for Disarmament Affairs and UN Under-Secretary-General for Management ‘No one has contributed more to the public understanding of the complexities of nuclear proliferation and the attempts of various states to break out from the Non-Proliferation Treaty than Mark Fitzpatrick. Now he and his colleagues at the IISS have turned their focus to the withdrawal of the US from the JCPOA. Their new study is required reading for anyone concerned that this action could lead to yet another conflict in the Middle East or increase the risk of nuclear weapons spreading in the region.’IISSIn July 2015, eight parties – France, Germany and the United Kingdom, together with the European Union and China, Russia and the United States on the one side, and Iran on the other – adopted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran nuclear deal. Under the agreement, Iran accepted limits to its nuclear programme and stricter international monitoring in return for sanctions relief. Detractors, however, saw the deal as overly lenient towards Tehran. Donald Trump described the JCPOA as the ‘worst deal ever’, and announced in May 2018 that the US would cease waiving sanctions and withdraw from the agreement.This Adelphi book argues that the unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA was a grave error. Drawing on a deep understanding of the non-proliferation regime and their own technical expertise, the authors evaluate the principal criticisms of the JCPOA, some of which are unrelated to nuclear issues. The authors argue that the Procurement Channel – established by the JCPOA to give Iran a route to procure goods and services for its now-limited nuclear programme – has been an effective check on Iran's illicit procurement of nuclear-related goods. They also show that Iran's nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes are not intrinsically linked, for not all of its missiles were designed to be nuclear-capable. The fate of the JCPOA now hangs in the balance; its survival will ultimately depend on Iran.

MULTILATERAL DISPUTES IN BILATERAL SETTINGS: INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE LAGS BEHIND THEORY

ON 5 October 2016, the International Court of Justice handed down its decision in the three parallel proceedings involving the Marshall Islands (as applicant) and India, Pakistan and the UK (as respondents): Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v India). The Marshall Islands claimed that the respondent states had failed to meet their obligation to negotiate the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in good faith, either under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (claim against the UK) and/or customary law (against all three respondents). All three respondents formulated objections to jurisdiction and admissibility. In all three cases, they objected that a “dispute” did not exist between them and the applicant. The Court, by a narrow majority (extremely narrow in the case against the UK: by the casting vote of the President), declined to exercise jurisdiction on the basis that no dispute existed between the parties.

Variations in AmLi source spectra and their estimation utilizing the 5 Ring Multiplicity Counter

Active-mode assay systems are widely used for the safeguards of uranium items to verify compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Systems such as the Active-Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) and the Uranium Neutron Coincidence Collar (UNCL) use americium-lithium (AmLi) neutron sources to induce fissions which are measured to determine the sample mass. These systems have historically relied on calibrations derived from well-defined standards. Recently, restricted access to standards or more difficult measurements have resulted in a reliance on modeling and simulation for the calibration of systems, which introduces potential simulation biases. The AmLi source energy spectra commonly used in the safeguards community do not accurately represent measurement results and the spectrum uncertainty can represent a large contribution to the total modeling uncertainty in active-mode systems.The 5-Ring Multiplicity Counter (5RMC) has been used to measure 17 AmLi sources. The measurements showed a significant spectral variation between different sources. Utilization of a spectrum that is specific to an individual source or a series of sources will give improved results over historical general spectra when modeling AmLi sources. Candidate AmLi neutron spectra were calculated in MCNP and SOURCES4C for a range of physical AmLi characteristics. The measurement and simulation data were used to fit reliable and accurate AmLi spectra for use in the simulation of active-mode systems. Spectra were created for average Gammatron C, Gammatron N, and MRC series sources, and for individual sources. The systematic uncertainty introduced by physical aspects of the AmLi source were characterized through simulations. The accuracy of spectra from the literature was compared.

Group Dynamics and Interplay in un Disarmament Forums: In Search of Consensus

The elimination of nuclear weapons has been an objective of the United Nations (un) since 1946. Although addressed through multiple forums, including the un General Assembly’s First Committee, Conference on Disarmament and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the possession and renunciation of nuclear weapons nevertheless remains a topic beset by multilateral stalemate and frustration over the entrenchment of positions between nuclear- and non-nuclear weapon states. Yet within these forums, disarmament politics are taking a new turn, with the emergence of new, cross-regional, cross-factional political groups working alongside more established blocs. Focusing on these group dynamics, this article argues that the emergence of new political groups, and their interplay with others, is critical to the effective functioning of disarmament negotiations. Through cooperative information exchange, encouraging policy entrepreneurship and by challenging the rigidity of entrenched bloc positioning, these new group dynamics may make an important contribution in the search for consensus within the un.

The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in Jeopardy? Internal Divisions and the Impact of World Politics

The frustration of non-nuclear weapon states about the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament has reached boiling point: a vast majority of them have supported a resolution in the UN General Assembly that establishes a negotiation forum for concluding a prohibition of nuclear weapons in 2017. Rising tension among the nuclear powers and populist movements feeding nationalist emotions make it unlikely that the situation will change for the better in the near future. It is thus possible that the NPT might be eroded or, in the worst case scenario, simply collapse because of diminishing support.

THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO PAKISTANI AND IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: A STUDY IN PARADOX

This article explores the paradox in the reaction of the United States to the two different proliferation cases: Pakistan's proliferation and Iran's weaponization effort. The article tries to find answer to the following key question; why the United States, as one of the guardians of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) which would prefer to see a region that is entirely free of weapons of mass destruction, ultimately has accepted Pakistan's proliferation, while imposed considerable amount of pressure to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.The paper posits that number of factors explain such differences; first, and at the theoretical level, Pakistan was never considered an “irrational” and “messianic” state like Iran, but regarded as a country with a certain degree of cold-war type nuclear rationality. Second and at the applied level, while Pakistan was a US ally with not having a history of challenging the United States, Iran has been considered enemy and a threat toward the US interest.Third, while Pakistan's nuclear arsenal was viewed as a defensive mean against overwhelming strength of India, Iran's possible nuclear arsenal considered to be for offensive uses against the United States and Israel. The fourth factor pertains to the consequences of proliferation, which is what happens when Iran's neighboring countries may feel threatened by Iranian nuclear weapon and proceed to develop their own arsenal. Fifth factor deals with the possible Iran's temptation to give some nuclear material to a terror group in which made the United States serious in preventing Iran's weaponization. Last but not least, Israel was not involved to pressure and agitate against Pakistan, while it was applied a tremendous pressure against Iran to prevent it from achieving nuclear weapons.

Introduction: India's rise at 70

The 70th anniversary year of India's independence after two centuries of British colonial rule provides an excellent occasion to take the measure of a country that, today, is pivotal for both Asian and international stability. At 70, despite the persistent domestic challenges of poverty and inequality,1 India is widely considered a rising power,2 and is indisputably the world's largest democracy. In 2015, the Indian economy grew at a rate of 7.5 per cent, faster than that of China.3 As a nuclear-armed state, India enjoys recognition as a responsible nuclear power by key stakeholders in the non-proliferation regime, despite not being a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.4 And the past three presidents of the United States, a country once dismissive of India,5 have sought to engage New Delhi as a close economic or strategic partner, or both.6 To some, India is likely to become ‘the most important swing state’ in the international system.7

From the First Nuclear Explosion up to the Signing of Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons

Since the beginning of this nuclear era, one part of the international pacific community continually had tried, to reduce the risks posed by the existence of nuclear weapons proliferation. The environmental risks from explosions of nuclear tests in the atmosphere had increased the danger as a result of the competition of nuclear weapons triggered various initiatives from the very early design for international legal norms aiming to limit nuclear testing. This work paper tries to, describe, discuss and analyze historical data on political spirit before signing the NPT. More over this article considers and trying to give interpretations to the official political statements and declarations on unpredictable issue for the future, which it might have serious consequences for international security. The findings in this article are that competition of nations in having nukes and increasing their numbers and capabilities are one the main part in chain reaction factor that can bring proliferation in high alert and humankind in greater risk situation. DOI: 10.5901/ajis.2016.v5n3s1p331

North Korean Nuclear Issue: Regime Collapsism or Negotiation?

The North Korean nuclear issue has become one of international importance since North Korea’s withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and acquisition of nuclear capabilities. It threatens both the US and its Asian allies even as the DPRK regime reveals its intentions for more sophisticated nuclear tests. The international community has two rational options: 1) wait for collapse of the DPRK regime 2) and/or restart diplomatic negotiations to settle the North Korean nuclear issue. Currently, the Six Party Talks enacts tough economic sanctions on the DPRK while the world “waits and sees” how and when the DPRK’s regime will collapse. Given the failure of the international community in preventing the North Koreans from acquiring atomic weaponry, this article describes why diplomatic negotiation and reengagement with the DPRK’s existing regime, not a collapsism framework, is the most viable strategy to deal with the prevailing situation in the Korean Peninsula which, in turn, could ensure peace and stability in the East Asian region.

Branding India: Constructing a reputation for responsibility in the nuclear order

Nation-branding professionals have the same goal as diplomats and politicians – the goal of endowing the nation with specific qualities in the minds of the target audience, so that it is identified with those qualities. In other words, they are constructing an identity for the country. Insights from the commercial practice of nation branding can illuminate the process of identity construction by states. As an illustration, the paper investigates the case of India’s branding/self-presentation as a responsible holder of nuclear weapons. In 1998, India declared itself a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS). Since India has not been granted NWS status under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, this breach of international norms triggered condemnation. Today, however, India is being incorporated into the governance mechanisms of the nuclear order, to the extent that it is considered a de facto NWS. The paper identifies four strategies – differentiation, standardization, total branding, and crisis management – from a review of the nation-branding literature, and relates them to India’s foreign policy strategies in the nuclear issue area in the last two decades. This paper is an initial attempt to build a bridge between the International Relations and place-branding literatures.

The establishment of the London Club and nuclear-export controls

Relations between the United States and Russia today are beset by rivalry in almost every sphere, and mutual suspicion reigns. Both parties have shunned arms-reduction talks and are pursuing nuclear modernisation programmes; a new nuclear arms race looms. Yet the two leading nuclear powers have shared interests in checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies, as did the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War.This Adelphi book reaches back to episodes of US–Soviet cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation to identify factors that permitted successful joint action, even in circumstances of profound geopolitical rivalry. It includes essays on the collaboration that prevented South Africa from conducting a nuclear-weapon test in 1977; Cold-War-era discussions on peaceful nuclear explosions and the developments that led from the Limited Test-Ban Treaty to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT); negotiating and sustaining the NPT; the establishment of the London Club and nuclear-export controls; bolstering IAEA safeguards; and negotiating the draft Radiological Weapons Convention. From these case studies, the editors identify seven lessons for contemporary policymakers and three immediate challenges that can only be overcome through bilateral cooperation.

Lessons for the future

Relations between the United States and Russia today are beset by rivalry in almost every sphere, and mutual suspicion reigns. Both parties have shunned arms-reduction talks and are pursuing nuclear modernisation programmes; a new nuclear arms race looms. Yet the two leading nuclear powers have shared interests in checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies, as did the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War.This Adelphi book reaches back to episodes of US–Soviet cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation to identify factors that permitted successful joint action, even in circumstances of profound geopolitical rivalry. It includes essays on the collaboration that prevented South Africa from conducting a nuclear-weapon test in 1977; Cold-War-era discussions on peaceful nuclear explosions and the developments that led from the Limited Test-Ban Treaty to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT); negotiating and sustaining the NPT; the establishment of the London Club and nuclear-export controls; bolstering IAEA safeguards; and negotiating the draft Radiological Weapons Convention. From these case studies, the editors identify seven lessons for contemporary policymakers and three immediate challenges that can only be overcome through bilateral cooperation.

Negotiating the draft Radiological Weapons Convention

Relations between the United States and Russia today are beset by rivalry in almost every sphere, and mutual suspicion reigns. Both parties have shunned arms-reduction talks and are pursuing nuclear modernisation programmes; a new nuclear arms race looms. Yet the two leading nuclear powers have shared interests in checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies, as did the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War.This Adelphi book reaches back to episodes of US–Soviet cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation to identify factors that permitted successful joint action, even in circumstances of profound geopolitical rivalry. It includes essays on the collaboration that prevented South Africa from conducting a nuclear-weapon test in 1977; Cold-War-era discussions on peaceful nuclear explosions and the developments that led from the Limited Test-Ban Treaty to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT); negotiating and sustaining the NPT; the establishment of the London Club and nuclear-export controls; bolstering IAEA safeguards; and negotiating the draft Radiological Weapons Convention. From these case studies, the editors identify seven lessons for contemporary policymakers and three immediate challenges that can only be overcome through bilateral cooperation.

Negotiating and sustaining the Non-Proliferation Treaty: challenges and lessons for US–Russia cooperation

Relations between the United States and Russia today are beset by rivalry in almost every sphere, and mutual suspicion reigns. Both parties have shunned arms-reduction talks and are pursuing nuclear modernisation programmes; a new nuclear arms race looms. Yet the two leading nuclear powers have shared interests in checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies, as did the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War.This Adelphi book reaches back to episodes of US–Soviet cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation to identify factors that permitted successful joint action, even in circumstances of profound geopolitical rivalry. It includes essays on the collaboration that prevented South Africa from conducting a nuclear-weapon test in 1977; Cold-War-era discussions on peaceful nuclear explosions and the developments that led from the Limited Test-Ban Treaty to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT); negotiating and sustaining the NPT; the establishment of the London Club and nuclear-export controls; bolstering IAEA safeguards; and negotiating the draft Radiological Weapons Convention. From these case studies, the editors identify seven lessons for contemporary policymakers and three immediate challenges that can only be overcome through bilateral cooperation.

The origins of US–Soviet non-proliferation cooperation

Relations between the United States and Russia today are beset by rivalry in almost every sphere, and mutual suspicion reigns. Both parties have shunned arms-reduction talks and are pursuing nuclear modernisation programmes; a new nuclear arms race looms. Yet the two leading nuclear powers have shared interests in checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies, as did the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War.This Adelphi book reaches back to episodes of US–Soviet cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation to identify factors that permitted successful joint action, even in circumstances of profound geopolitical rivalry. It includes essays on the collaboration that prevented South Africa from conducting a nuclear-weapon test in 1977; Cold-War-era discussions on peaceful nuclear explosions and the developments that led from the Limited Test-Ban Treaty to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT); negotiating and sustaining the NPT; the establishment of the London Club and nuclear-export controls; bolstering IAEA safeguards; and negotiating the draft Radiological Weapons Convention. From these case studies, the editors identify seven lessons for contemporary policymakers and three immediate challenges that can only be overcome through bilateral cooperation.

IAEA safeguards: patterns of interaction and their applicability beyond the Cold War

Relations between the United States and Russia today are beset by rivalry in almost every sphere, and mutual suspicion reigns. Both parties have shunned arms-reduction talks and are pursuing nuclear modernisation programmes; a new nuclear arms race looms. Yet the two leading nuclear powers have shared interests in checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies, as did the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War.This Adelphi book reaches back to episodes of US–Soviet cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation to identify factors that permitted successful joint action, even in circumstances of profound geopolitical rivalry. It includes essays on the collaboration that prevented South Africa from conducting a nuclear-weapon test in 1977; Cold-War-era discussions on peaceful nuclear explosions and the developments that led from the Limited Test-Ban Treaty to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT); negotiating and sustaining the NPT; the establishment of the London Club and nuclear-export controls; bolstering IAEA safeguards; and negotiating the draft Radiological Weapons Convention. From these case studies, the editors identify seven lessons for contemporary policymakers and three immediate challenges that can only be overcome through bilateral cooperation.

The 1977 South Africa nuclear crisis

Relations between the United States and Russia today are beset by rivalry in almost every sphere, and mutual suspicion reigns. Both parties have shunned arms-reduction talks and are pursuing nuclear modernisation programmes; a new nuclear arms race looms. Yet the two leading nuclear powers have shared interests in checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies, as did the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War.This Adelphi book reaches back to episodes of US–Soviet cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation to identify factors that permitted successful joint action, even in circumstances of profound geopolitical rivalry. It includes essays on the collaboration that prevented South Africa from conducting a nuclear-weapon test in 1977; Cold-War-era discussions on peaceful nuclear explosions and the developments that led from the Limited Test-Ban Treaty to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT); negotiating and sustaining the NPT; the establishment of the London Club and nuclear-export controls; bolstering IAEA safeguards; and negotiating the draft Radiological Weapons Convention. From these case studies, the editors identify seven lessons for contemporary policymakers and three immediate challenges that can only be overcome through bilateral cooperation.

Peaceful nuclear explosions: from the Limited Test-Ban Treaty to the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Relations between the United States and Russia today are beset by rivalry in almost every sphere, and mutual suspicion reigns. Both parties have shunned arms-reduction talks and are pursuing nuclear modernisation programmes; a new nuclear arms race looms. Yet the two leading nuclear powers have shared interests in checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies, as did the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War.This Adelphi book reaches back to episodes of US–Soviet cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation to identify factors that permitted successful joint action, even in circumstances of profound geopolitical rivalry. It includes essays on the collaboration that prevented South Africa from conducting a nuclear-weapon test in 1977; Cold-War-era discussions on peaceful nuclear explosions and the developments that led from the Limited Test-Ban Treaty to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT); negotiating and sustaining the NPT; the establishment of the London Club and nuclear-export controls; bolstering IAEA safeguards; and negotiating the draft Radiological Weapons Convention. From these case studies, the editors identify seven lessons for contemporary policymakers and three immediate challenges that can only be overcome through bilateral cooperation.