Non-nuclear Weapon Research Articles

Nuclear weapons and the humanitarian approach

The traditional arms control approach is slow in dismantling nuclear arsenals. It is also a state-centered approach, and does not enthuse public opinion as it is rather technical and complex. The recent interest in the so-called humanitarian approach of nuclear disarmament can be explained by a growing frustration with traditional arms control. The humanitarian approach points to the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons for individual human beings, and recommends forbidding nuclear weapons. The step-by-step approach is replaced by a principled approach, which holds that nuclear weapons are too destructive to be used, just like chemical and biological weapons. A ban on nuclear weapons will turn the tables. The burden of proof will shift from the non-nuclear weapon states to the nuclear weapon states. Those nuclear weapon states that are not eager to eliminate their nuclear weapons will come under growing pressure from worldwide public opinion as well as their own public opinion. It is this stigmatizing effect of nuclear weapons as inhumane and therefore unusable that may bring all states to pursue Global Zero.

The nuclear security discourse: Proliferation vs disarmament concerns

The phrase ‘proliferation concern’ tags its subject – circumstances, a government, a policy, a capability – as a threat to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is applied as a discursive tool in the increasingly powerful nuclear security discourse, reinforced by successive US presidents to frame an understanding of nuclear relations in the language of US interests and national security. This article investigates the evolution of this discourse and what the phrase ‘proliferation concern’ means in nuclear arms control parlance and practice from the point of view of non-nuclear weapon states, especially the emerging powers. Emerging powers (like Brazil, Turkey and South Africa) struggle with the hype around nuclear security that is used to restrict rights to civilian nuclear technology while endlessly postponing nuclear disarmament. For these states, the discourse brings about ‘disarmament concerns’. The article uses the South African case study to illustrate the problematic nature of this discourse.

The EU's multilateralist combat against the proliferation of WMD in the NPT: mirroring the Grand Bargain

In 2003, the European Union (EU) launched its Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in which it sought the strengthening of an effective multilateral non-proliferation regime, with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as its cornerstone. Focusing upon the implementation of that strategy 10 years on, this paper considers the EU's navigation of the NPT negotiation environment and the structural conditions at play between the Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapon States and the Grand Bargain enshrined between them. It shows that the EU's “multilateralist combat” within the NPT has met with limited success due to the EU's lack of bargaining power – the EU has neither the will nor the capacity to make the bargaining concessions necessary to achieve its goals in this forum. Further challenging claims that the EU may offer a “benchmark” for the NPT community; this paper suggests that the EU is more a mirror of the imbalance of the Grand Bargain than a solution in how to resolve it.

Waiting for Kant: devaluing and delegitimizing nuclear weapons

Expectations of significant progress towards a nuclear weapons-free world continue to shape global nuclear politics. Progress towards nuclear disarmament will require diminishing the value of nuclear weapons to the point where it becomes politically, strategically and socially acceptable for nuclear-armed states to relinquish permanently their nuclear arsenals. Key to this are the concepts and processes of �devaluing� and �delegitimizing� nuclear weapons that have steadily coalesced in global nuclear discourse since the mid-1990s. This article builds on current research by developing three images of nuclear disarmament under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): �surface� devaluing, �deep� devaluing, and delegitimizing nuclear weapons. The first represents codification by the nuclear-weapon states of the transformation of the Cold War environment through reductions in the size and role of nuclear arsenals that leaves the logic of nuclear deterrence and nuclear prestige largely unchanged. Deep devaluing is framed as a reconceptualization of the political, strategic and military logics that underpin nuclear-weapons policies and practices. Delegitimizing represents a more radical normative project to transform collective meanings assigned to nuclear weapons. The analysis examines conceptions of devaluing nuclear weapons from the perspective of non-nuclear weapon states and the relationship between devaluing nuclear weapons and the idea of a spectrum of nuclear deterrence. It concludes by highlighting the tension between surface and deep devaluing, the emergence of a delegitimizing agenda, and the political implications for the current NPT review cycle set to culminate in the next quinquennial Review Conference in 2015.

Russia and the US in the Cold War arms race

Frank von Hippel’s invaluable firsthand account (Physics Today, September 2013, page 41)—about the influence of nongovernment organizations (NGOs) on defusing the Cold War arms race—deservedly reflects the leadership and influence that he and others contributed. With regard to supportive and complementary activities involving other American and European NGOs, his focused chronicle is unavoidably incomplete. A supplement to the backstage narrative can be found in reference 11. A. DeVolpi, Nuclear Insights: The Cold War Legacy, Amazon.com, 2009. 9780977773428, especially its first volume.When the original Federation of American Scientists (FAS) chapter at the University of Chicago migrated in the 1950s to Argonne National Laboratory, additional experienced physicists and nuclear engineers joined the group, which continued its public-interest activities. The chapter provided indispensable technical credibility to various NGOs, ultimately including the multifaceted arms-control collaborations of volunteer professionals. Because of the intimidating Cold War cultural atmosphere for untenured scientists, that conscientious support often resulted in personal and occupational sacrifice in professional employment, promotion, prospective funding, and security clearances.Active and retired national laboratory scientists who worked on nuclear weapons and reactors also provided unsanctioned professional contributions through voluntary technical consultation and advice, partly reflected in von Hippel’s reference 9.In addition, there were contributions by specialists from other disciplines and by eminent political figures, professional organizations, segments of the media, venturesome academics, and benevolent funding sources. Peace movements in the West, along with Soviet refuseniks and high-level apparatchiks, were important standard-bearers, often arrayed against entrenched defense establishments and national-defense hardliners who relied on worst-case analysis and political intractability. The Natural Resources Defense Council, under the leadership of Thomas Cochran and Christopher Paine, was an American NGO that indeed had a sustained groundbreaking role, along with the FAS.Amplification of unofficial American collaboration with the Committee of Soviet Scientists came about as European NGOs gradually expanded their own multilateral activities related to aspects of both nuclear and nonnuclear weapons during the Cold War confrontation and its post-Soviet aftermath.These remarks augment von Hippel’s article and do not detract from his widely recognized leadership.REFERENCESection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCE <<CITING ARTICLES1. A. DeVolpi, Nuclear Insights: The Cold War Legacy, Amazon.com, 2009. 9780977773428, Google Scholar© 2014 American Institute of Physics.

Nuclear Posture, Nonproliferation Policy, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

What is the relationship between nuclear postures and nonproliferation policies and the spread of nuclear weapons? At first blush, this might appear to be an obvious question. After all, states go to great lengths—extending nuclear security guarantees to nonnuclear weapon states, forward-deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of allies, sizing their own nuclear arsenals with the proliferation decisions of other states in mind, supporting international institutions in conducting inspections of nuclear facilities in nonnuclear weapon states, restricting the availability of sensitive nuclear technology, applying and enforcing sanctions against would-be proliferators, conducting military strikes against nuclear facilities, and promoting nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes, among many other steps—to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It would be strange to imagine that states pursue such actions unless they can expect a policy payoff in terms of peace or security. Yet, there is little systematic evidence to suggest that nuclear postures and policies have a meaningful impact on the spread of nuclear weapons. Correctly understanding the effects of nuclear posture and policy on both horizontal proliferation (the spread of nuclear weapons to new states) and vertical proliferation (increases in the size and sophistication of nuclear arsenals within existing nuclear states) is a subject of extreme real-world importance. United

Technical Negotiations in a Political Environment

Despite a political environment fraught with core policy differences, between 1979 and 1983, six governments and two international safeguards directorates—the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Euratom Safeguards Directorate—negotiated an agreement to preserve the core verification principles behind the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). At first, even agreement to talk was in doubt. Other governments questioned US motives; they wondered whether US motives in promoting the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation had been to evaluate or to prevent non-nuclear weapon states from deploying uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies. In addition, Germany and Japan disagreed with the United States on whether NPT safeguards were to address undeclared materials or activities. Notwithstanding this environment, the participants reached agreement first to negotiate, and then on specific technical measures, even when the approach implied a policy consensus where none existed. At the conclusion, agreement was reached on specific technical measures for safeguards at gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants, and all participating states, including two nuclear weapon states, made diplomatic commitments to adopt this approach for current and future centrifuge plants. This article examines the factors that facilitated agreement and considers what lessons can be learned for future efforts to solve complex technical issues in a politically charged environment and in the absence of complete agreement even on the objectives to be realized.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AS A BELIEF SYSTEM

How does the current situation in the disarmament and nonproliferation area present itself from a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) perspective and address the visible disconnect that we see in the d...

Conventional Prompt Global Strike: A Fresh Perspective

Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) is the proposed capability to deliver a precision nonnuclear weapon against a target anywhere in the world in less than an hour. Despite years of study and debate, the need for a better understanding of the issues related to this capability remains. Recent political, arms control, and fiscal developments warrant a fresh look at conventional prompt global strike. Analyzed here are potential contributions of CPGS to U.S. national security objectives, weapon-system options for the CPGS role, arms control limits that apply to certain options, and some possible drawbacks of CPGS capabilities. Overall, a number of CPGS options could enhance U.S. and allied security within the existing arms control framework and without creating significant risks.

Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: How Can the World Resolve the Disharmony Between the UNSC and UNGA?

Global momentum towards a "Nuclear-Weapon-Free World" (NWFW) has been growing since the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, in the international community, it is still difficult to discern a unified voice about how to approach a NWFW, utilising international law. This is possibly because of ongoing disagreement between nuclear weapon States (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon States (NNWS), particularly the non-aligned countries. The issue revolves around the understanding of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), especially art 6 of that treaty which sets out the contracting parties' nuclear disarmament obligations. Reflecting the discord between the NWS and NNWS, this article sheds light on the gap between the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)'s perceptions of, and actions taken towards, the realisation of a NWFW. The article calls for the minimisation of disharmony by reinvestigating the roles of the United Nations system and the NPT in establishing a NWFW, and through observing the UNGA's current position.

Review: Getting to Zero The Path to Nuclear Disarmament

GETTING TO ZERO Path to Nuclear Disarmament Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Judith Reppy, eds. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011. 404pp. US$27.95 (PaPer)When a friend noticed me reading this book, he tartly observed, The Americans will never give up their nuclear This received wisdom, no matter how uninformed, may well be the summation of the global debate now taking shape on the elimination of nuclear weapons. But it might not be. For as we have learned through history, what at one time seems utterly impossible (abolishing slavery?) becomes not only possible but achievable when enough people demand changes in political decision-making.US President Barack Obama set off the present debate with his nowfamous speech in Prague in 2009 (for which he won the Nobel peace prize) when he proclaimed America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear speech was foreshadowed by a series of op-ed pieces by four highly experienced practitioners in the American political establishment - Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn, and William Perry - who have endorsed the value of a nuclearweapons-free world. There is now no doubt that the nuclear disarmament debate has not only been legitimized but has already shifted from whether to pursue a world without nuclear weapons to defining the structure ofthat secure world and the means through which it can be built.Immense contradictions persist. nine nuclear weapons states (the US, Russia, the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea), which together possess 20,000 nuclear weapons, most of them many times more powerful than the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, are all in the duplicitous state of professing elimination while modernizing their arsenals. US, the lynchpin of the nuclear club, insists on maintaining global military dominance, a policy that seems guaranteed to ensure its rivals will not give up their nuclear strength. Thus the political debate goes around in circles.Enter an intellectual assessment of the case for actually achieving a nuclear-weapons-free world. Catherine McArdle Kelleher, senior fellow at the Watson Institute, Brown University, who worked in the Clinton administration, and Judith Reppy, professor emerita at Cornell University, have assembled an engaging series of essays, mostly by fellow academics, but also including Alexei Arbatov, who at one time was responsible for Russia's defence budget and arms control treaties, and Randy Rydell, a highly placed official in the UN department of disarmament affairs.The book surveys all of the reasons why it is absolutely necessary to rid the world of nuclear weapons and all of the reasons why the nuclear states, particularly France and Israel, shun serious discussion of negotiating such an eventuality. It is framed by David Holloway, an arms-control specialist and historian at Stanford University, in an opening chapter on the political space that Obama opened up and in a closing piece pointing out the obstacles to genuine progress. reduction of nuclear weapons to zero, he says, goes hand-in-hand with controlled and guaranteed access to nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes and international arrangements to prevent states from breaking out of a non-nuclear weapons regime. …

Global Plutonium Production Capabilities with Civilian Research Reactors

This article deals with the plutonium production capabilities in civilian research reactors and the resulting proliferation risks. A complete record of all civilian research reactors located in Non-Nuclear Weapon States and de-facto Nuclear Weapon States is compiled and systematized according to their type. A discussion of the various production paths and scenarios for plutonium with those reactors follows. In order to derive an assessment with a broad coverage, partly diverse fleet of reactors, two designs representative of light water and heavy water moderated reactors (which account for 82 percent of the total installed capacity in Non-Nuclear Weapon States and de-facto Nuclear Weapon States) were chosen and included in burn-up calculations with the Monte Carlo code KENO V.a and Origen-S, both incorporated in the modular system Scale-6. The effective production rates in fuel elements as well as by irradiation of targets are then applied to calculate the capabilities of plutonium production of each considered research reactor. The results provide an overview of the proliferation relevance of the global research reactor fleet and its regional distribution.

Steps toward increased nuclear transparency

While there is no doubt that some information on nuclear weapons must remain undisclosed, excessive nuclear secrecy hinders progress toward the twin goals of improved nuclear materials security and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide. With the March 2012 Nuclear Security Summit afoot and the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in sight, now is the time for nuclear weapons states to implement new transparency measures such as declaring additional information regarding the capabilities, size, and purpose of weapons stockpiles and fissile materials, and providing the means to verify a larger portion of those declarations. Increased transparency can reduce uncertainty, build trust, establish baselines for future reductions, and place political pressure on other states possessing nuclear weapons to take similar steps. Because they possess the vast majority of nuclear weapons and fissile material in the world, the United States and Russia should lead the way by creating a model for declarations, including non-deployed and nonstrategic weapons. Declarations of nuclear weapons and fissile materials could be verified bilaterally, through new multilateral agreements and a multilateral inspections agency or by expanding the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Some transparency actions can be taken immediately, either unilaterally or reciprocally. Increased transparency can provide short-term benefits for some states and establish a foundation for additional bilateral and multilateral nuclear arms reductions. Transparency can be embraced by non-nuclear weapons states and states with nuclear weapons outside of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty without undertaking new treaty obligations.

Modernization of nuclear weapons: Aspiring to “indefinite retention”?

Currently, all nations with nuclear weapons are modernizing their arsenals, delivery systems, and related infrastructure. These programs have serious implications for nuclear disarmament. By investing in the extension, upgrading, and reinforcement of their arsenals and capacities, the author writes, these governments are investing in the future of nuclear weapons, not in the future of disarmament. Other non-nuclear states have expressed concern with these programs and are using international venues, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conferences, to call on the nuclear-armed states to cease these programs, which undermine the objectives of the treaty in terms of both non-proliferation and disarmament. Ending upgrades and investment in nuclear weapons would help establish the necessary conditions for disarmament. The author writes that non-nuclear weapon states should further advance the conditions for disarmament by negotiating a treaty banning nuclear weapons, highlighting that the world’s governments, themselves, do not need to possess nuclear weapons in order to prohibit them.

Конвенциональное высокоточное оружие в современном стратегическом контексте

The paper covers the role and mission of high-precision non-nuclear weapons on short-/medium- and long-range delivery systems. The author makes an attempt to forecast the precision guided munitions prospects in terms of operational deployment and conceptualization, compares military and political potential of conventional and nuclear weapons. The paper also outlines key problem areas of political and technical nature impeding the further development of high-precision weapons programs.

Policy or Posturing

On 6 April 2010 the long-awaited nuclear posture review report was released, fulfilling a promise from as the White House blog proclaimed.1 A year earlier, in Prague, President Barack Obama had pledged that the United States would take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. On the 40th anniversary of the entry into force of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in March 2010, Obama pledged that the forthcoming review would move beyond outdated Cold War thinking and reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in US strategy.2 The administration clearly saw the review as a key element of the positive narrative regarding US nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament policy that it wanted to convey prior to the Washington nuclear security summit in April and the nonproliferation treaty review conference in New York in May. Now that these major multilateral events have successfully been held and the anniversary of the review's release has passed, it is worth considering its real impact on the international strategic environment. Did the review represent a genuine reform of US nuclear policy or was it more of a public relations exercise designed to position the US favourably in the context of a major meeting of the nonproliferation treaty parties? This article will consider the review from an international perspective, and in particular how its content responds to the obligations of states party to the treaty and the decisions of its quinquennial review conferences. The review, as an authoritative policy statement of the world's leading nuclear power, was addressed to a foreign as much as a domestic audience. The nature and timing of the review was intended to influence states active in international nuclear affairs in a manner coincident with US policy objectives. Issued a month before the opening of the May 2010 review conference of the nonproliferation treaty, and after a decade of difficulties for this core international security treaty, the nuclear posture review was undoubtedly going to have an impact on the perceptions of participating states as well as on the atmosphere of the conference itself.Despite the timing of its release and its deployment as a public diplomacy vehicle in the lead-up to the US -hosted nuclear security summit and treaty review conference, the nuclear review was nevertheless very much a home-grown product. It had domestic roots as a congressionally mandated review of all aspects of US nuclear weapons policy and posture, as well as the related infrastructure of the nuclear weapons complex. An early decision was taken to issue the review solely in an unclassified form, thus ensuring full transparency of the results to the public, both domestic and foreign. The Obama administration was not going to repeat the mistake of the previous administration, which conducted a classified nuclear posture review in 2001 and saw excerpts of it leaked, including controversial text on nuclear deterrence and preemption that provoked international consternation. The 2010 review was designed to be viewed as a progressive statement on US nuclear weapons policy that would complement the administration's foreign policy aims of strengthening the treaty and enlisting international support in shoring up the global nonproliferation regime. At the same time, it was also meant to send a reassuring message to US allies and partners who rely on extended deterrence that American commitments are as solid as ever. Finally, it was intended to placate various domestic constituencies with vested interests in the continuation of nuclear forces and the associated nuclear weapons complex. Given the inherent tensions, if not downright incompatibility, among these various aims, it is not surprising that in the end the review delivered a rather mixed message to the international audience.The salient issues of the review from an international perspective were the definition of the role for nuclear weapons in US strategy; the nature of the security assurances the US was prepared to give to non-nuclear weapons states; what action the US would take on outstanding nuclear disarmament commitments; what would be done to strengthen nonproliferation and nuclear security; and how the US would approach relations with other nuclear weapons-possessing states. …

ACHIEVING THE VISION OF THE NPT

This article assesses the prospects for a strategy of incrementalism to lead to achievement of the core bargain of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: non-nuclear weapon states' nuclear nonproliferation in exchange for nuclear weapon states' nuclear disarmament to the point of “global zero.” Game theory, prospect theory, and liberal international theory are used to evaluate the potential of a strategy of incrementalism. While separately each has insights to offer, it is when all three theoretical approaches are used in tandem that meaningful explanatory gains emerge. The article concludes that incrementalism probably cannot lead to complete nonproliferation and global nuclear zero. Instead, signal events (as described by prospect theory) are needed to “punctuate” incremental processes in negotiations (best explained by liberal international theory) in order to move past hindrances such as international structural constraints (exemplified by game theory) and the conservative risk-taking propensities of state elites (described by prospect theory).

CONCLUSION

The case studies in this special issue demonstrate that the Obama administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and related nuclear policy initiatives encouraged a number of other nuclear weapon states to likewise reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security doctrines and helped pave the way with non-nuclear weapon states for a successful 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This article reviews the contributing authors’ case study findings regarding key foreign governments that applauded the 2010 NPR and were receptive to President Barack Obama's vision of a world free of nuclear weapons as well as governments that remained skeptical about US disarmament and arms control initiatives. We conclude with an analysis of the lessons that should be learned from the 2010 NPR process: the need for consistent implementation of changes in nuclear weapons doctrine, improved coordination and consultation with allies and other states, and further global education about the likelihood and consequences of nuclear terrorism.

THE POSITION OF AN EMERGING GLOBAL POWER

After Barack Obama's April 2009 Prague speech raised expectations, Brazilian experts and government officials received the release of the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) with positive but rather skeptical feelings. The differences between the 2010 and 2001 NPRs were assessed in Brazil as constructive, and the new negative security assurances were lauded as being less threatening to non-nuclear weapon states, as was the US commitment to seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Although the Brazilian government insists that it will not sign the Additional Protocol (AP) until the nuclear weapon states take much deeper, though unspecified, steps toward complete nuclear disarmament, it did not block the final statement at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons “encouraging” all states to conclude and bring into force APs and to support multinational management of the fuel cycle. Brazilian officials, however, remain doubtful about the long-term US commitment to nuclear disarmament and notice that the lack of significant progress from nuclear weapon states toward eliminating their arsenals makes it onerous for other states to enact measures to stabilize the nonproliferation regime.

EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND DISARMAMENT

Members of the Japanese government and the Japanese security elite welcomed the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report, praising its emphasis on the twin goals of pursuing disarmament and protecting international peace and stability. Unlike many non-nuclear weapon states, Japan does not condition its support for nonproliferation upon nuclear weapon states’ progress on denuclearization. Despite general enthusiasm for the review in Japan, concerns remain. The NPR emphasizes the threat posed by nuclear weapons in the hands of non-state actors; from Japan's vantage point, state actors—North Korea, China, and Russia—are just as worrisome. While disarmament advocates in Japan had hoped the NPR would endorse a no-first-use doctrine or “sole purpose” declaration, defense officials and strategists were relieved it did not go that far, fearing that to do so would undermine US extended deterrence and leave Japan vulnerable to attack by North Korean biological or chemical weapons. US policy toward China shadows many Japanese concerns about security policy in general and nuclear policy in particular. In the absence of more clarity on the Sino-US relationship, Japanese concerns can be expected to increase. Nonetheless, the Japanese government has responded positively to the release of the NPR, in large part due to unprecedented levels of coordination and consultation between Tokyo and Washington during the drafting process. Tokyo now seeks continued close consultation on nuclear strategy and policy to develop a better understanding of the concept of extended deterrence and what Tokyo can do to support this shared goal.