Apart from a few notable exceptions, philosophers, and just about anyone else who reflects on the matter, rightly agree that perceptual experiences can and do provide justification for many of our beliefs about the physical world. Perceiving that things are a certain way typically provides one with an excellent reason for believing that they are that way. There is, however, very little consensus concerning how or why experiences are capable of doing that. Many epistemologists maintain that reasongiving or warrant-conferring relations can hold only among mental states whose intentional contents are conceptual or propositional, since only contents of that sort can bear logical relations to one another. If these epistemologists are right, then the contents of perceptual states must be conceptual. There are, however, several good reasons for thinking that perceptual experiences have a fundamentally different sort of content from beliefs—nonconceptual content. If that is right, then reason-giving relations do not hold solely among mental states with conceptual content. The challenge for any such view is to provide an account of how perceptual states can stand in reason-giving relations with beliefs. Meeting that challenge is the ultimate aim of Perception and Knowledge (henceforth PK). On the view I defend, the relation between perceptual states and beliefs is, to borrow Husserl’s terminology, one of fulfillment. An act of fulfillment occurs when the very same object or state of affairs is both intuited or perceived and ‘‘meant’’ or conceptualized; it is an experience in which we perceptually find the world to be as we think it to be. Furthermore, although the objects of perception and belief are often, and in the case of fulfillment must be, identical, they have fundamentally different sorts of contents. Accordingly, the relation between perceptual experiences and beliefs is fundamentally different from the relation between beliefs and other beliefs. Fulfillment, in particular, is nothing like