Nonbelieved Memories Research Articles

Time and memory distrust shape the dynamics of recollection and belief-in-occurrence

ABSTRACT The current study examined how people’s metamemory judgments of recollection and belief-in-occurrence change over time. Furthermore, we examined to what extent these judgments are affected by memory distrust – the subjective appraisal of one’s memory functioning – as measured by the Memory Distrust Scale (MDS) and the Squire Subjective Memory Scale (SSMQ). Participants (N = 234) studied pictorial stimuli and were tested on some of these stimuli later in the same session, but were tested on other stimuli 1, 2, 4, 8, and 17 days later. Recollection and belief ratings were correlated highly and followed similar declining patterns over time. However, belief decreased relatively more slowly than recollection, such that the discrepancy between recollection and belief increased over time. Memory distrust moderated the association between recollection and belief, with this association being weaker among people who reported greater (versus lower) memory distrust. Memory distrust also interacted with retention period to predict memory judgments. Two measures of memory distrust diverged in their predictive power. In particular, only the MDS predicted the spontaneous reporting of nonbelieved memories. Our results provide support to the theoretical perspective that belief-in-occurrence is a summative judgment informed not only by recollective phenomenology but also by metamemorial beliefs.

Retracted memories in the general population: are there differences between eastern and western countries?

ABSTRACT The main purpose of the current studies was to examine retracted experiences in the general population from various cultural backgrounds. More specifically, in two studies, we examined the details of memory retraction experiences, the reasons for retraction, and the outcomes of retraction in participants from China and other countries, mainly the United States of America. It was found that memory retraction experiences appeared to be quite common. In the sample of Chinese participants (Study 1: N = 1380), 50.58% reported at least one such an experience, whereas in respondents from other countries (Study 2; N = 425), a significantly lower but still substantial prevalence rate of 35% was found. In general, the retracted memories predominantly involved positive events and some respondents experienced pressure during the withdrawal. Social feedback and event plausibility were the two main reasons for the withdrawal. Compared to recollection scores, belief scores decreased significantly after withdrawal, and some respondents even formed nonbelieved memories. After retracting the memories, most respondents felt they gained benefits (e.g., they had resolved a psychological problem that had bothered them for years). These studies give us a more general understanding of retracted memory experiences in the general population.

Unringing the bell: Successful debriefing following a rich false memory study

In rich false memory studies, familial informants often provide information to support researchers in planting vivid memories of events that never occurred. The goal of the current study was to assess how effectively we can retract these false memories via debriefing – i.e., to what extent can we put participants back the way we found them? We aimed to establish (1) what proportion of participants would retain a false memory or false belief following debriefing, and (2) whether richer, more detailed memories would be more difficult to retract. Participants (N = 123) completed a false memory implantation protocol as part of a replication of the “Lost in the Mall” study (Loftus & Pickrell, Psychiatric Annals, 25, 720-725, 1995). By the end of the protocol, 14% of participants self-reported a memory for the fabricated event, and a further 52% believed it had happened. Participants were then fully debriefed, and memory and belief for the false event were assessed again. In a follow-up assessment 3 days post-debriefing, the false memory rate had dropped to 6% and false belief rates also fell precipitously to 7%. Moreover, virtually all persistent false memories were found to be nonbelieved memories, where participants no longer accepted that the fabricated event had occurred. Richer, more detailed memories were more resistant to correction, but were still mostly retracted. This study provides evidence that participants can be “dehoaxed”, and even very convincing false memories can be retracted.

On the frequency and nature of the cues that elicit déjà vu and involuntary autobiographical memories.

Barzykowski and Moulin suggest that déjà vu and involuntary autobiographical memories recruit similar retrieval processes. Here, we invite the authors to clarify three issues: (1) What mechanism prevents déjà vu to happen more frequently? (2) What is the role of semantic cues in involuntary autobiographical retrieval? and (3) How déjà vu relates to non-believed memories?

Examining the associations between nonbelieved memories and memory distrust, self-esteem, and rumination.

Examining the associations between nonbelieved memories and memory distrust, self-esteem, and rumination.

More Lies Lead to More Memory Impairments in Daily Life.

Previous studies have demonstrated that lying can undermine memory and that its memory-undermining effects could be modulated by the cognitive resources required to tell lies. We extended the investigation of the memory-undermining effect by using a daily life setting in which participants were highly involved in a mock shopping task. Participants were randomly assigned to truth-telling, denying or mixed lying conditions. After finishing the shopping task, participants were told that two people wanted to know about their shopping lists and would ask them some questions in an interview. During the interview, participants were asked whether each of ten items were on the shopping list, five of which were randomly selected from the shopping list, while the other five were not sold in the store. In answering the interview questions, the truth-telling group was asked to respond honestly, the denying group was asked to give denial responses, and the mixed lying group was asked to respond deceptively. Thus, the denying group told five lies and the mixed lying group told ten lies in the interview. The item memory test, source memory test and destination memory test were given in an orderly manner 48 h after the interview. We found that the mixed lying group, rather than the denying group, forgot the lies they told in the interview and mistakenly believed they had lied about something that they had not lied about. Moreover, the mixed lying group retained fewer memories about the person they responded to than the honest group. In addition, participants in the mixed lying group had more non-believed memories than those in the truth-telling group in both item and source memory tests. We conclude that more lies could result in more memory disruptions in daily life.

Memory distrust is related to memory errors, self‐esteem, and personality

AbstractResearch on memory distrust and nonbelieved memory (NBM) both stress the importance of belief in memory but no previous research has brought these fields together. In the present study, we examined how trait memory distrust is associated with false memory and NBM, self‐esteem as well as personality traits. Through two studies (N1 = 280, N2 = 77, we found that higher memory distrust was associated with higher false memory as well as NBM frequency, and lower self‐esteem. As for personality traits, people who were high on agreeableness, openness, or conscientiousness had lower memory distrust. Explorative mediation analyses showed significant indirect effects of self‐esteem on false memory (Study 1a and Study 2) and NBM (Study 2) through memory distrust. We conclude that memory distrust could be conducive to the formation of false memory and NBM under social conditions where one's memory is challenged.

Involvement Modulates the Effects of Deception on Memory in Daily Life.

Previous studies have demonstrated that liars who adopt a false denial strategy often forget what they lied about, which has been labeled the denial-induced forgetting (DIF) effect. However, several investigations have not found such an effect. It has been suggested that involvement might play a role in the inconsistency. The present study was designed to directly determine whether involvement modulates the effects of deception on memory. Participants were assigned randomly to either high- or low-involvement conditions and were required to complete a mock shopping task. They were then asked to participate in an interview in which they were asked to respond honestly or deceptively. Two days later, final memory tests were given, and the participants were asked to give honest responses. We found a DIF effect in the high-involvement condition but not in the low-involvement condition. Moreover, the liars in the high-involvement condition created more non-believed memories in the source memory test and the destination memory test than the honest participants. In addition, liars in both the high- and low-involvement conditions forgot who they lied to. We conclude that the effects of deception on memory could be influenced by the degree of involvement.

Creating nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions using an imagination inflation procedure

SummaryThe current experiments examined the creation of nonbelieved true and false memories after imagining bizarre and familiar actions using the imagination inflation procedure (Goff & Roediger, 1998). In both experiments, participants took part in three sessions. In Session 1, participants had to perform or imagine simple familiar actions (e.g., “stir the water with the spoon”) and bizarre actions (e.g., “balance the spoon on your nose”). A day later, participants needed to imagine simple actions of which some were new actions, and some were old actions that appeared in the first session. After a week, the participants completed a recognition task. For those actions that were correctly or incorrectly remembered as having been performed, the participant was challenged that the action was not performed in order to evoke nonbelieved true and false memories. In general, we found that the imagination inflation procedure can successfully induce participants to produce nonbelieved memories. In Study 1, we successfully induced nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions, although in general nonbelieved memory rates were low. In Study 2, more participants formed nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions than for familiar actions. Also, we found that especially belief was more susceptible to revision when memories were challenged than recollection. In two experiments, we showed that nonbelieved memories can successfully be induced for both familiar and bizarre actions.

Nonbelieved Memories in The False Memory Archive

The False Memory Archive is a unique art collection containing hundreds of false memory reports submitted by members of the general population. The current study aimed to analyze these reports. Specifically, we examined whether some of the memories reported in these submissions were better described as nonbelieved memories (NBMs). Furthermore, we investigated the reasons for why people decided that their memory was false and assessed the verification strategies that people used to validate their mental representation. Five hundred submissions were coded and more than half (53.4%) met the criteria for NBMs. Social feedback was the most frequently reported reason for reducing belief and asking family members was the most frequently mentioned memory verification strategy. Reports categorized as NBMs were more likely to include mention of memory verification strategies than were believed memories.

An anti-reminiscence bump for childhood memory: Revisiting the dating of nonbelieved memories.

An anti-reminiscence bump for childhood memory: Revisiting the dating of nonbelieved memories.

Belief in memories may be relinquished as often for adulthood as for childhood events, but for different reasons

ABSTRACTThe age distribution of nonbelieved memories (NBMs) reported by young and older adults typically reflects a large proportion of events dated to childhood. The present study aimed to further investigate the age of origin of NBMs by using instructions that include an NBM related to adulthood. Participants aged from 40 to 80 years were asked to describe an NBM, to explain why they had stopped believing their memory, and to rate its phenomenal characteristics. Participants also described and rated an age-matched believed memory (BM). The results revealed a similar proportion of nonbelieved events experienced in childhood and adulthood, thus calling into question the hypothesis that NBMs are mainly related to childhood events. We also found that NBMs might emerge for different reasons depending on the time of events. Additional analyses indicated that, overall, the influence of temporal distance on the ratings of phenomenal characteristics was similar for BMs and NBMs.

Believing does not equal remembering: The effects of social feedback and objective false evidence on belief in occurrence, belief in accuracy, and recollection

We examined the impact of social feedback and objective false evidence on belief in occurrence, belief in accuracy, and recollection of an autobiographical experience. Participants viewed six virtual scenes (e.g., park) and were tested on their belief/recollection. After 1-week, participants were randomly assigned to four groups. One group received social feedback that one scene was not experienced. A second group received objective false evidence that one of the scenes was not shown. A third group received both social feedback and objective false evidence and the control group did not receive any manipulation. Belief in occurrence dropped considerably in the social feedback group and in the combined group. Also, nonbelieved memories were most likely to occur in participants receiving both social feedback and objective false evidence. We show that social feedback and objective false evidence undermine belief in occurrence, but that they leave belief in accuracy and recollection unaffected.

Defending and reducing belief in memories: An experimental laboratory analogue.

When receiving disconfirmatory social feedback about recollected events, people sometimes defend and sometimes reduce their belief that the event genuinely occurred. To improve estimates of the rates of memory defense and reduction, and of the magnitude of the change in belief in occurrence that results, in the present studies we examined the effect of disconfirmatory social challenges made to correctly recalled memories for actions performed in the lab. Adult participants performed, imagined, or heard action statements and imagined some of the initial actions multiple times. One week later, they completed a source-monitoring test and rated the actions on belief in their occurrence, recollection, visual detail, vividness, and reexperiencing. Four of the correctly recalled performed actions were challenged either prior to making the ratings during the test (Study 1, N = 44) or after making initial ratings after completing the test, following which the ratings were taken again (Study 2, N = 85). Across both studies, challenges were associated with lower belief-in-occurrence and recollection ratings on average than for control items, and belief in occurrence was affected to a greater extent than recollective features. Challenges that occurred during the test produced more instances of defense, whereas challenges that occurred after the test produced more instances of reduction. A closer analysis showed that some participants always defended, some always reduced, and some both defended and reduced belief. Responses to the first challenge positively predicted the responses to subsequent challenges. In addition, the procedure in Study 2 produced a variety of types of nonbelieved memories.

False memories, nonbelieved memories, and the unresolved primacy of communication.

Mahr & Csibra (M&C) make a compelling case for a communicative function of episodic remembering, but a less compelling case that this is its primary function. Questions arise on whether confirming their predictions would support their account sufficiently, on the communicative function of preserving rich, nonbelieved memories, and on the epistemic benefits of developing false memories via the acceptance of misinformation.

Exploring the consequences of nonbelieved memories in the DRM paradigm

ABSTRACTIn the current experiments, we attempted to elicit nonbelieved memories (NBMs) using the Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) false memory paradigm. Furthermore, by using this approach, we explored the consequences of nonbelieved true and false memories. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants received several DRM wordlists and were presented with a recognition task. After the recognition task, participants’ statements were contradicted by giving them feedback about true and false items. In this way, we succeeded in eliciting nonbelieved true and false memories. In Experiment 2, participants were also involved in a modified perceptual closure task after receiving belief-relevant feedback. In this task, participants received degraded visual representations of words (e.g., false and true) that became clearer over time. Participants had to identify them as fast as possible. We also measured dissociation, compliance, and social desirability. We found that undermining belief had contrasting consequences for true and false memories. That is, nonbelieved true memories were identified more slowly whereas nonbelieved false memories were identified more quickly. We did not find any relation between our individual differences measures and the formation of NBMs.

What Is the Correct Answer about The Dress' Colors? Investigating the Relation between Optimism, Previous Experience, and Answerability.

The Dress photograph, first displayed on the internet in 2015, revealed stunning individual differences in color perception. The aim of this study was to investigate if lay-persons believed that the question about The Dress colors was answerable. Past research has found that optimism is related to judgments of how answerable knowledge questions with controversial answers are (Karlsson et al., 2016). Furthermore, familiarity with a question can create a feeling of knowing the answer (Reder and Ritter, 1992). Building on these findings, 186 participants saw the photo of The Dress and were asked about the correct answer to the question about The Dress’ colors (“blue and black,” “white and gold,” “other, namely…,” or “there is no correct answer”). Choice of the alternative “there is no correct answer” was interpreted as believing the question was not answerable. This answer was chosen more often by optimists and by people who reported they had not seen The Dress before. We also found that among participants who had seen The Dress photo before, 19%, perceived The Dress as “white and gold” but believed that the correct answer was “blue and black.” This, in analogy to previous findings about non-believed memories (Scoboria and Pascal, 2016), shows that people sometimes do not believe the colors they have perceived are correct. Our results suggest that individual differences related to optimism and previous experience may contribute to if the judgment of the individual perception of a photograph is enough to serve as a decision basis for valid conclusions about colors. Further research about color judgments under ambiguous circumstances could benefit from separating individual perceptual experience from beliefs about the correct answer to the color question. Including the option “there is no correct answer” may also be beneficial.

Undermining belief in false memories leads to less efficient problem-solving behaviour

ABSTRACTMemories of events for which the belief in the occurrence of those events is undermined, but recollection is retained, are called nonbelieved memories (NBMs). The present experiments examined the effects of NBMs on subsequent problem-solving behaviour. In Experiment 1, we challenged participants’ beliefs in their memories and examined whether NBMs affected subsequent solution rates on insight-based problems. True and false memories were elicited using the Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Then participants’ belief in true and false memories was challenged by telling them the item had not been presented. We found that when the challenge led to undermining belief in false memories, fewer problems were solved than when belief was not challenged. In Experiment 2, a similar procedure was used except that some participants solved the problems one week rather than immediately after the feedback. Again, our results showed that undermining belief in false memories resulted in lower problem solution rates. These findings suggest that for false memories, belief is an important agent in whether memories serve as effective primes for immediate and delayed problem-solving.

Recollection, belief and metacognition: a reality check

ABSTRACTNon-believed autobiographical memories [e.g. Mazzoni, G., Scoboria, A., & Harvey, L. (2010). Nonbelieved memories. Psychological Science, 21, 1334–1340] are striking examples of divergences between recollective experiences and beliefs in their correspondence to real events. After reviewing a broader range of similar phenomena, I argue that recollection–belief divergences can arise from normal, “healthy” metacognitive monitoring and control processes that balance memory recollections and reality constraints. Such validating “reality checks” draw on general world knowledge and external/social information. Importantly, changes in (perceived) reality constraints can lead to changes in memory beliefs. More generally, both recollection and (external) reality are keys to the past. In many cases, more or less automatic (System 1-type) reliance on recollection is sufficient (or memory would be useless as a system), but sometimes more elaborate (System 2-type) reality checks are needed. I conclude with some ideas about memory-driven and reality-driven recollection–belief divergences.

Sub-types of nonbelieved memories reveal differential outcomes of challenges to memories

ABSTRACTNonbelieved memories (NBMs) highlight the independence between distinct metamemorial judgements that contribute to the experience of remembering. Initial definitions of NBMs portrayed them as involving the withdrawal of belief in occurrence despite sustained recollection. While people rate belief for their NBMs as weaker than recollection, the average difference is too small to support the idea that autobiographical belief is completely withdrawn in all cases. Furthermore, autobiographical belief and recollection ratings vary considerably across NBMs. In two studies, we reanalysed data from prior studies to examine whether NBM reports reflect a single category or multiple sub-categories using cluster analytic methods. In Study 1, we identified three sub-types of NBMs. In Study 2 we incorporated the concept of belief in accuracy, and found that two of the clusters from Study 1 split into two clusters apiece. All clusters were characterised by higher recollection than belief in occurrence ratings, and clusters were differentiated by the degree of difference between these variables. In both studies the clusters were discriminated by a number of memory characteristic ratings and by reasons reported as leading to the alteration of belief. Implications for understanding the remembering of past events and predicting the creation of NBMs are discussed.