Joe Gerlach and Thomas Jellis (2015) Guattari: Impractical philosophy, Dialogues in Human Geography, 5(2), 131-148 (Original doi: 10.1177/2043820615587787). The above article that appeared in issue 5:2 of Dialogues in Human Geography (DHG) erroneously acronymized the terms ‘non-representational theory/theories’ into ‘NRTs’, thereby negating one of the text’s key arguments. This has been corrected in the following pages: On p. 133, under section heading ‘I: Rush’, 8th line. This is perhaps most evident in cultural geography which, as Cresswell (2012: 98) notes, can be rather insistent on examining ‘an endless series of citations’. Indeed, it is the emergence and proliferation of non-representational theories that have done much to promote but also develop the spatial dimensions of this kind of philosophy (see Anderson and Harrison, 2010; see also Doel, 1999). On p. 134, first column, 4th line, should read as This quickening is not exclusive to Guattari’s assemblage of thinking, and indeed the rush to theoretical applicability finds echoes in contemporary human geography elsewhere, particularly in cultural geography and specifically in the conceptual tumult of non-representational theory (Thrift, 2008), wherein despite the manifest appeals made by its exponents to hold on to a radical conceptual indeterminacy is still liable to an awkward ‘sedimentation’ or fixation – of ideas, practices and philosophical traditions – particularly by those scholars searching for the misplaced security offered by a seemingly stable ‘theoretical framework’. On p. 139, First column, 9th line: This is in keeping with the ethos of many non-representational theories (see Thrift, 2004) that understand the world as incomplete and inconsistent, necessitating an approach that is animated by a spirit of affirmative experimentation.