Non-political Crimes Research Articles

The Criminal Justice System in the Lithuanian SSR: Genesis, Specifics and Relationship with Unarmed Anti-soviet Resistance

The article analyses the criminal justice system of Soviet Lithuania: the formation of the system, its norms and institutions, the aggregate of laws, and the prosecution of criminals. It also reveals how the transformation of the Soviet regime after Stalin’s death was reflected in the legal reality. The dimension of political crime, criminal prosecution for various forms of resistance against the Soviet regime, is particularly emphasised. The research revealed that although after Stalin’s death the Soviet regime in Lithuania released its grip and Soviet law acquired more liberal features, it continued to be used for reprisals against people who espoused different opinions. Several features were characteristic to the criminal prosecution of those who participated in unarmed opposition and dissidents in the Lithuanian SSR: a) the suspect was accused of a political crime under an article of the Criminal Code applicable to his activities (such cases violated international law, but were legal in the Soviet legal system), b) political crimes were criminalised by interpreting articles of the Criminal Code too liberally (even in the Soviet system such cases lacked objectivity), c) political cases were masked by criminal offenses and also contained elements of non-political crimes (cases were not objective and criminal charges were falsified). Even in the late Soviet period, the Soviet legal system collaborated hand in hand with the Lithuanian Communist Party and the KGB and was an integral part of the Soviet ruling system. The dishonesty of the Soviet legal system often served as evidence that the criticism of the regime by dissidents was justified. The fact that Soviet authorities did not always follow the legal norms that regulated their own activities showed that legal reality in the USSR was just fiction. The regime, which became softer externally, continued to observe the same totalitarian logic internally.

الاغتيال السياسي: مفهومه، تكييفه، نماذجه، وتجريمه في الفقه والقانون

Under Islamic Sharia, the crime of political assassination is, indeed, a political crime as a criminal offense and is considered a non-political crime as a penalty or punishment. It is the physical elimination of a political figure for a political purpose. With no doubt, by killing the ruler or President of a country, the regime may fall in some cases. It is a political crime in this sense, and it is a non-political crime as a punishment or penalty in accordance with Islamic Sharia, International and national law. Because the perpetrator of the crime of political assassination is punished with the most severe punishment, even death by hanging, unlike the general political crime. The crime of political assassination is as old as politics itself. Since the state existed, politics and political assassination have also been existed with state. Even during the best Islamic centuries (i.e Khilfa Al-Rashida period) the Khalifa (rulers) were assassinated by the opponents. In this article, we will endeavor to discuss the provisions of political assassination from Islamic Sharia perspective, and will make its comparison with both International and Afghan laws as well.

Financial Crimes as ‘Serious Non-Political Crimes’: Consequences for the Concepts of Seriousness and Unworthiness in Exclusion Law

Abstract Financial crimes were recently recognized by the Conseil d’État, France’s supreme administrative court, as ‘serious non-political crimes’ for the purposes of exclusion under article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention. Such an extension of the scope of article 1F(b) raises questions regarding the seriousness threshold of article 1F(b) and its link to bodily harm. A first approach would be to establish the indirect relationship between financial crimes and bodily harm. Another approach would be to discard the concept of bodily harm as being pivotal in understanding the scope of the exclusion clauses. This second solution would have crucial implications for the theoretical underpinnings of the exclusion clauses of article 1F of the Refugee Convention, namely on the concept of unworthiness. In this regard, the recognition of financial crimes as rendering an asylum seeker unworthy of protection highlights the link between exclusion and moral and societal concerns.

Afghan Refugees in Pakistan and Syrian Refugees in European Union: A Comparative Analysis

Displaced persons are Refugees, cross borders under coercion by force, leave motherland and difficult to return safely to home of parents. Root word is ‘refuge’ from which ‘refugee’ is derived, it means hiding and shelter from danger. Pakistan is not signatory of Refugee Convention 1951 but member of the United Nations (UN). Afghan refugees are living in Pakistan for approximately four decades, the Government of Pakistan provides favorable treatment and atmosphere to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan. Resultantly, Pakistan has been suffering terrorism, political instability, and economic dropdown though after left of Unites States of America (USA) in 2021, many more Afghan Refugees are expected to migrate to Pakistan. International Community is required to work and ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan in order to ensure returning back of Afghan Refugees to their parent’s home safely and work for stability and peace of Afghanistan and the region so that they live there peacefully. According to Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (UDHR) article 14: everybody has freedom and right to enjoy, seek asylum from persecution in other countries. Asylum right not invoked if (i) genuinely arising prosecutions from non-political crimes, or (ii) acts repugnant to principles and purposes of United Nations, and Convention Relating to Status of Refugee signed in 1951 under United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). There are 145 signatories currently to Refugee Convention 1951 but Pakistan has not yet acceded to Refugee Convention 1951. According to Refugee Convention 1951 preamble: freedom under fundamental rights enjoyed by human beings under Charter of the UN and UDHR without discrimination. The UN has assured efforts to expand freedom under fundamental rights to refugees. Communitarian Critique research methodology is deployed to help understand issues of refugees. Qualitative methodology is used while conducting this research, an analytical and comparative methods to analyze and compare Government of Pakistan’s treatment of Afghan refugees in Pakistan approximately for 4 decades as compare to Syrian Refugees’ treatment by European Union (EU). The largest populated migrants refugee country of the world for 4 decades is Pakistan, approximately 5 million Afghan nationals migrated to Pakistan during Cold War and approximately around 1.3 million still living in Pakistan and they are not willing to go back to Afghanistan specially after withdrawal of USA in 2021. The International Community is required, requested, and suggested to wish, help, and endeavor to build up economies of Afghanistan and Pakistan and try to strengthen stability and peace so that remaining Afghan nationals who are living as refugees in Pakistan can go back to their motherland safely, happily, and live there peacefully.

Disguised Repression: Targeting Opponents with Non-Political Crimes to Undermine Dissent

Disguised Repression: Targeting Opponents with Non-Political Crimes to Undermine Dissent

Proportionality in Refugee Exclusion

Abstract In the increased discussions about international security and terrorism, the application of the exclusion clauses in Article 1 F of the 1951 Refugee Convention has become a topical and controversial issue. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) advises states to apply a proportionality test to weigh the gravity of the crime against the consequences of exclusion for cases concerning serious non-political crimes and war crimes. However, there is no uniform approach in state practice. Also, the concept of ‘gravity of the crime’ is not clarified in any guidance document of the UNHCR. Relying on the different applications of Article 1 F of the 1951 Convention, this article questions whether the proportionality analysis is actually necessary for determining the exclusion, and how should the gravity of the crime be interpreted in such cases. First, the present article argues that the proportionality analysis is compatible with the overriding humanitarian aims of the 1951 Convention and that this analysis should be applicable to all the crimes listed in Article 1 F. Secondly, it demonstrates that the concept of ‘gravity of the crime’ should be interpreted by referring to the relevant concepts developed in international criminal law, and by considering the extent of the person’s individual criminal responsibility. This article asserts that exclusion from refugee status causes serious consequences, which sometimes might be heavier than criminal punishment. Therefore, Article 1 F should be applied with the utmost attention and sensitivity.

Swiss‐Army Knife of Social Control: Administrative Exile in Late Imperial Russia

Punitive exile was imposed more extensively in late imperial Russia than in any other major contemporaneous country. Roughly one‐half of exiles were convicted by courts for heinous nonpolitical crimes, for which the penalty would be death in European countries. The other half of exiles were sent largely by peasant communities wishing to dispose of unproductive and otherwise unwanted members. Most exiles were transported to Siberia, but significant proportions ended up in remote areas of European Russia. Although both penal and administrative exile were often more humane than imprisonment, which imposed greater restrictions on prisoners, the practice met with staunch criticism, both in public and within the corridors of officialdom. Its use, consequently, was in decline before the revolution of 1905. Suppressing social and political unrest involved an intensive application of exile, both penal and administrative. The fact that its use ebbed again in the years before World War I confirms senior officials' ongoing commitment to the rule of law. That the Russian government continued to rely on exile, however, can best be explained by the inadequacy of personnel, training, professional discipline, and investigative practices of most Russia policemen and the authoritarian and paternalistic attitudes and fear of disorder among officials.

Crime and Punishment in Russia: A Comparative History from Peter the Great to Vladimir Putin by Jonathan Daly

Reviewed by: Crime and Punishment in Russia: A Comparative History from Peter the Great to Vladimir Putin by Jonathan Daly Curtis Richardson (bio) Jonathan Daly, Crime and Punishment in Russia: A Comparative History from Peter the Great to Vladimir Putin (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018). 236 pp., ills. Works Cited. Index. ISBN: 978-1-4742-2435-2. Jonathan Daly's Crime and Punishment in Russia is a welcome addition to the literature on the history of criminal justice in Russia. The monograph is part of The Bloomsbury History of Modern Russia Series, which promotes short, accessible studies on major themes of Russian history, for an audience including not only scholars and experts but also students. This book thus represents a synthesis of much of the author's earlier work and the broader literature in the field. The book is organized chronologically into seven chapters with an introduction and conclusion; a useful nine-page chronology of important events connected to Russian history and criminal justice precedes the introduction. The introduction is a brief survey of the pre-Petrine seventeenth century with a discussion of the legal code or Ulozhenie of 1649, the prominence of inquisitorial procedure and of customary law. Chapter 1 covers the eighteenth century and the role of Westernization introduced by Peter the Great and most of his successors, with the copying of Western institutions in criminal justice. Yet the continued significance of administrative measures and personal authority limited their effectiveness, and Elizabeth's and Catherine's reforms limited applications of corporal and capital punishment. In chapter 2, Daly notes the expansion of limitations on capital punishment and the significance of the codification of Russia's laws, in addition to some application of fairness to the criminal justice system under Nicholas I. Chapter 3 is dominated by the Great Reforms and the first part of the revolutionary era. Daly cites a genuine effort toward establishing the rule of law with the Judicial Reform, but this was partially undermined by terrorist attacks that led to a major reaction. The 1905 Revolution led to expanded rights, and the March Revolution saw the end of most of the repressive apparatus. Chapter 4 focuses on the era of Lenin, during which the Bolsheviks renounced the rule of law and used "revolutionary consciousness as the foundation of the criminal justice system under a political dictatorship. Yet the Bolsheviks had a dualism found in new laws endorsing social liberalization, for example, concerning marriage and nonpolitical crimes. In chapter 5, Daly asserts that "Stalin … engineered a radical break toward almost complete lawlessness" (P. 7). [End Page 336] The criminal justice system became a tool for regime rule and the leader's power. In chapter 6, the author highlights a more rational and predictable criminal justice system during the last four decades of the Soviet era. The state even offered a modicum of due process. In chapter 7, Daly analyzes the post-Soviet era with its major liberalization of the system, but a growing crime wave and the rise of Vladimir Putin led to a criminal justice system that was less arbitrary and strict but also less fair. In the very first sentence Daly asserts that, contrary to a common view that the various Russian governments failed to modernize and the country was simply backward, Russia "developed as one of the most successful states in human history" (P. x). He does note, however, the many contradictions over the past three centuries of efforts to build a law-based society and the adoption of numerous practices for humaneness, but with a ubiquity of despotism, arbitrariness, corruption, and the lack of such a law-based society. To analyze these contradictions and to seek to discern the continuities in these problems in contemporary Russia, Daly poses a series of questions in the preface, two of the most critical of which are: "How can one explain historically both the striking harshness and humanity of Russia's criminal justice system over the past three centuries? In general, does one find clues in specific historical developments in the evolution of criminal justice in Russia to understanding the domestic and geopolitical successes of the Stalin and Putin regimes?" (P. x). To answer...

Migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean

In 2015, deadly incidents of migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean were daily covered by everyday newspapers. Empirical research has shown that migrants themselves may be involved in these smuggling operations. If they apply for refugee protection, they may be excluded from refugee status under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention. Article 1F(b) excludes asylum seekers from international protection if serious reasons exist to consider that they have committed serious non-political crimes. This contribution discusses whether migrant smuggling can be considered as such and whether various forms of participation in smuggling operations give rise to individual responsibility and trigger application of article 1F(b).

POLITICIZATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE CONTEMPORARY PERIOD IN UKRAINE

The article examines the phenomenon of politicization of constitutional relations. In particular, three of its aspects are identified and investigated: the impact of social revolutions on the rule of law; the problem of lustration of state employees; and the deepening of the politicization of the judiciary. Social revolutions, including the Ukrainian 2013–2014 social revolution, are viewed as a concept that can have a decisive influence on the reform of the state mechanism and, in many ways, determine its future destiny. The lustration procedure, which is considered in the context of transitional justice – a scientific discipline that studies the functioning of justice in transitional democracies, undergoes special research herein. The classification of lustration according to various criteria is given. The article also shows the practice of a number of states whose judicial systems fall under the concept of political justice. A shocking conclusion is drawn that the percentage of acquittals in Nazi Germanyfor non-political crimes was higher than in modern Russia or Ukraine.

Resisting Criminal Organizations: Reconceptualizing the “Political” in International Refugee Law

This article examines and reconstructs the term “political” in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Individuals may be eligible for refugee status if they can prove that they have a well-founded fear of persecution for, amongst other reasons, their political opinion. At the same time, individuals are excluded from obtaining refugee status where there are serious reasons for considering that they have committed a serious non-political crime. For those resisting persons or entities wielding oppressive power, the meaning of the term “political” in these provisions has particular importance. Where the targets of resistance are criminal organizations, however, courts and tribunals have been, for the most part, reluctant to recognize such resistance as manifesting a political opinion. Given the demonstrated power of criminal organizations, this article contends that opposition to these entities should be viewed as being “political”. Through an examination of the text, context, and purpose of the Refugee Convention, it argues that a broader understanding of the term “political” is reasonable if not compelling. The article examines the conflicting jurisprudence and discourse surrounding “political opinion” and “political crimes”. Despite some strong voices in support of a more traditional state-centric interpretation, others have advanced more robust articulations that account for the dynamic nature and diversity of power transactions between citizens and powerful non-state actors. Finally, the article examines the substantial power of drug cartels and youth gangs in particular Central American states to illustrate that they exercise de facto control in substantial geographic spaces. As such, resistance to such entities should properly be viewed as “political” within the meaning of the Refugee Convention.

Alleged Terrorists and Other Perpetrators of Serious Non-Political Crimes: The Application of Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention in the Netherlands

Alleged perpetrators of serious non-political crimes are excluded from refugee protection on the basis of Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention. This study offers a first complete and systematic empirical analysis of the application of Article 1F(b) in a given country, in this case the Netherlands. The analysis shows that most of the cases in which 1F(b) is applied are crimes motivated not by personal reasons or gain, but rather by political, ideological, ethnic and/or religious beliefs. The study furthermore suggests that, in determining what constitutes ‘serious’ non-political crimes, factors extraneous to the commission of the crime itself, such as post-crime rehabilitation, are deemed irrelevant. Finally, the study shows that the post-exclusion phase of 1F(b) cases is full of hurdles: domestic prosecution and extradition are often not possible, while voluntary or forced return may be barred because of non-refoulement obligations. Consequently, possibly dangerous, unwanted but unreturnable individuals disappear from the radar and travel around in Europe.

FTZK v. Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

441Aliens — Refugees — United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951 — Exclusion from definition of refugee — Article 1F(b) — Interpretation — Whether there were serious reasons for considering that the appellant committed a serious non-political crime — Whether there was a rational foundation for the inference that the appellant committed a serious non-political crime — Whether evidence was logically probative of serious reasons for considering that the appellant committed a serious non-political crime — The law of Australia

Vincent Chetail and Caroline Laly-Chevalier (eds), Asile et extradition: Theorie et pratique de l'exclusion du statut de refugie [Asylum and Extradition: Theory and Practice of Exclusion from Refugee Status

Concern for the plight of refugees is a prominent topic in current international affairs. Armed conflicts, persecution, civil wars and generalized violence have caused millions of refugees to spill over borders into neighboring countries.1 The global sentiment is that many of these individuals are innocent victims of conflicts beyond their control and should be protected. Yet, some individuals who seek refugee status may have engaged in past criminal behaviour. The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) explicitly excludes from its protection those individuals who have committed a crime against the peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity; a serious non-political crime; or are guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.2 Furthermore, extradition law may place burdens on a state that has already accepted a wanted individual as a refugee. As a result, states can face competing international obligations between the protection of refugees and upholding their extradition obligations to other states.

Exclusion under Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention: The Uncertain Concept of Internationally Serious Common Crimes

Strong conceptual and doctrinal connections exist between the interpretation of Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention and the international criminal law principles developed in relation to the international crimes with which that sub-clause is concerned. Article 1F(c) also imports a strong international aspect, concerning itself with acts that compromise international peace and security. Far less clear are the connections between international criminal law or transnational law and exclusion from refugee status under Article 1F(b) for the commission of a ‘serious non-political crime’. Although the articles of the Convention are said to speak with an autonomous international voice, whether this is a refugee law voice or an international criminal law voice is uncertain. In the absence of a ready link to the direct concerns of international criminal law or transnational law, determining if common criminality is internationally serious is more an interpretive than prescriptive exercise. Refugee law decision-makers need to examine international and transnational legal instruments more broadly, engage in a comparative law analysis of national legal systems, and pay special attention to the specific facts of the individual case. In cases involving acts of terrorism, developments in counter-terrorism law may be particularly impactful on the exclusion question, although determining individual responsibility for an excludable crime remains crucial. Despite the growing connection between international/transnational law developments and exclusion from refugee status, no international legal definition of serious common crimes has been formulated. Determinations under Article 1F(b) will therefore continue to demand a contextual approach that sits on the contested borders of international law.

Exclusion from Refugee Status: The Purposes and Principles of the United Nations and Article 1F(c) of the Refugee Convention

Article 1F(c) of the Refugee Convention provides that an individual is to be excluded from the benefits afforded by refugee status if ‘there are serious reasons for considering that ... he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’. This phrase has proven difficult to interpret, not least because of the differing views on its meaning at the time of drafting, and the lack of another body of law to which article 1F(c) can attach. Accordingly, different states have found that different acts fall within the provision. This assessment is largely carried out on a case-by-case basis and in an unstructured manner. This article explores the acts that have been held to fall within article 1F(c) - primarily human rights violations, terrorism, and attacks on UN personnel - and critiques some of the thorny legal issues to which these acts have given rise. It then offers a framework for assessing whether a particular act falls within article 1F(c). 1. In TR odu CTI on The need to protect individuals fleeing from persecution and grant them the protec tions afforded by refugee status has to be balanced against excluding those who are ‘undeserving’ of that protection. This is done most authoritatively in article 1 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Article 1A sets out the notion of a refugee while article 1F provides that refugee status and the benefits that follow from it shall not apply to certain individuals. An individual is excluded if ‘there are serious reasons for considering that’ (a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity; (b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to admission as a refugee; or (c) ‘he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’.

Terrorists, Freedom Fighters and Refugees: Non-Political Crimes in Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention

Terrorists, Freedom Fighters and Refugees: Non-Political Crimes in Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention

Article 14(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Exclusion from International Refugee Protection

Article 14(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that the right to seek and to enjoy asylum, as guaranteed in article 14(1), “may not be invoked in the case of prosecution genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations”. As an expression of the concept that certain persons who flee persecution are nevertheless denied international protection as refugees because of their involvement in certain serious crimes, article 14(2) of the Universal Declaration represents an “exclusion” provision. The notion that such persons are unworthy of international protection and assistance as refugees emerged during the Second World War and, from the outset, formed part of the definition of the term “refugee” in the international refugee protection regime developed from early 1946 to July 1951. Like its forerunners in a General Assembly resolution and the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization of 1946 and subsequent provisions in the 1950 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, article 14(2) of the Universal Declaration reflects the concern that those involved in war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace, or more generally acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations should not be able to enjoy such protection, and that common law criminals should be surrendered under applicable extradition agreements. A review of the drafting history of these provisions also reveals how the concept of exclusion from international refugee protection was shaped by the understanding of the concept of asylum, which was viewed at the time as the right of States not to extradite certain persons. The adoption of the Refugee Convention resulted in a significantly different legal framework for determining whether or not an individual should be granted, or excluded from, international protection against persecution, which entailed, among other things, a separation of the criteria governing exclusion from those applicable to extradition. Subsequent developments in international human rights law and other pertinent areas of international law also had an impact on the interpretation and application of exclusion provisions. Accordingly, in today's context, the scope and content of the limitations to the right of asylum provided for in article 14(2) of the Universal Declaration must be read in light of article 1F of the Refugee Convention as well as other relevant standards under international law.

Asylum Claims and Drug Offences: the Seriousness Threshold of Article 1F(b) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the UN Drug Conventions

Asylum claims lodged by individuals who were involved in drug activities prior to their entry into the country of asylum raise complex questions as to whether they have committed a serious non-political crime under Article 1F(b) of the 1951 Convention and thus shall be excluded from refugee protection. The 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Trafficking Convention) - which is the relevant international framework for drugs in the field of international criminal law - indiscriminately considers all forms of supply related drug offences as 'serious criminal offences', irrespective of individual criminal responsibility. This conflicts with the complex nature of the drug industry particularly in countries affected by armed conflict and proportionality considerations inherent to Article 1F(b). Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provide a possibility to reconcile the ambiguous wording of the Trafficking convention with Article 1F(b) by means of interpretation. Offences for personal consumption as the least serious drug offences do not reach the seriousness threshold of Article 1F(b). Trafficking offences in turn attain the seriousness threshold only if aggravating circumstances prevail over mitigating circumstances, and if there are no grounds for rejecting individual responsibility or defenses to criminal liability. International, large-scale activities carried out by transnational organized criminal groups are factors that make drug offences most serious.

Article 1F(b): Freeom Fighters, Terrorists, and the Notion of Serious Non-Political Crimes

Article 1F(b): Freeom Fighters, Terrorists, and the Notion of Serious Non-Political Crimes