Non-nuclear Weapon States Research Articles

A Brief Legal Commentary on Nuclear Weapons States’ Contemporary Policies Through Comparative International Approaches

Despite the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons remain an important issue in international relations, where efforts and cooperation worldwide have been reported toward the conceptualization of the “global nuclear order” for the purposes of mitigating nuclear dangers, inhibiting arms races, preventing the continuous spread of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear-weapons states (NNWS), as well as creating conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Hence, the objective of this research paper concerns to scrutinize the effectiveness of the global nuclear order through the legal perspective of international law. For that matter, the research methods adopted by this research paper include comparative international approaches by providing a legal commentary in regards to the nuclear policies and doctrines of the nine nuclear-weapons states (NWS) currently in possession of nuclear weapons. They are classified in three main categories: (1) recognized NWS (Russia, the U.S., the U.K., France and China), (2) states declaring possession of nuclear weapons (India, Pakistan and North Korea) and (3) states indicated to possess nuclear weapons (Israel). The results obtained from this research paper implicate the clash between contrasting nuclear-related objectives of different political backgrounds demonstrating the potential to increase the risk of nuclear escalation threatening international peace and security.

Breaking the impasse: the case for establishing a no first nuclear threat norm

ABSTRACT For more than half a century, non-nuclear weapon States have sought to outlaw nuclear threats. Across the decades, some of the nuclear armed States have issued assurances and/or signed agreements limiting their recourse to nuclear threats. Many of these assurances and agreements have, however, contained reservations that limit their scope. Further, there is debate as to whether some of the assurances given are legally binding. The piecemeal state of assurances and agreements on nuclear threats has allowed nuclear armed States to issue nuclear threats on a concerningly frequent basis. In this article, we consider the idea of developing a non-binding no first threat norm whereby nuclear armed States would commit to not being the first to make nuclear threats. We suggest that this norm should encompass both specific threats and general nuclear threats, and that it should be made to both non-nuclear weapon States and other nuclear armed States.

The Impact of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: The Crucial Role of the European NATO Allies

This article makes the argument that the role of the European NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) allies, and especially the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), may and should play a key role in the future of nuclear disarmament. Once the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is signed and ratified by more or less 100 NNWS, mostly from the Global South, it will be up to the allied NNWS to make up their mind about their role vis-à-vis nuclear disarmament. Will they continue to behave as protégés by (and in some way also protectors of) the nuclear-armed states and break the disarmament process further, or will they shake off the nuclear “protection” in the interest of making progress toward a world without nuclear weapons? This article zooms in on the European NATO allies in particular. The TPNW can and will be used to put pressure on the European NATO allies to switch sides, and it can, on its turn, be used by the European NATO allies to stigmatize the nuclear-armed states in order to make progress in the direction of nuclear elimination. The article starts by reviewing the origins and objectives of the TPNW. In the next section, its impact will be scrutinized. We then turn to the current and possible future role of the European NATO allies.

Nuclear-Powered Submarines and the Global Nuclear Order

The nuclear propulsion of submarines has never been raised as a source of controversy since the countries operating nuclear-powered submarines are only the five Nuclear-Weapon States recognized in the NPT, plus India, which is not a signatory to the NPT. However, with the advancement of the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine program and the announcement that Australia will operate and develop nuclear-powered submarines, this issue has become a hot spot on the non-proliferation agenda. In this context, two questions arise: What are the perceptions of the main actors involved with the issue of nuclear energy use for the propulsion of submarines of Non-nuclear Weapon States? What are the impacts of these perceptions on the global nuclear order? This article argues that a new normative inequality would be in the formation process, in which there would be the “have” and “have-not” users of nuclear energy for the propulsion of submarines.

Regulatory and Legal Support of International Nuclear Law

Between the first regulatory and legal development of international nuclear law in 1957 and modern achievements, three main stages of this process can be distinguished.
 The first period of development of international nuclear law corresponds to the period of development of nuclear energy and guarantees of its peaceful use by all non-nuclear weapon states. This dual purpose was legally confirmed by the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957 and the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970.
 The first stage in the development of international nuclear law was complemented by a second growth phase aimed at increasing collective resilience to the dangers of nuclear energy. The Three Mile Island accident in 1979 and especially the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 triggered intense regulatory activity aimed at preventing nuclear accidents and better managing their consequences on an international scale.
 As a result, several international conventions have been adopted in this area: The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
 Unlike the first-generation nuclear nonpro­liferation treaties, these norms do not violate the essential sovereignty of the states parties. By merging binding provisions and flexible legislation, a cooperative system was created for flexible and decentralized management of nuclear activities on an international scale.
 The third stage of the development of inter­national nuclear law, in which we are currently located, is characterized by both negative and positive elements.
 On the negative side, there are problems that affect the effectiveness of international nuclear law. The most alarming issue in this area is the independence of nuclear regulatory authorities in several countries, although it is regulated by Article 8 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and Article 20 of the Joint Convention on Nuclear Safety.

Safeguards and the Nuclear-Powered Submarines of the NNWS: there is no gap; there is a first time | Submarinos de Propulsão Nuclear dos NNWS e as Salvaguardas da AIEA: Não Há Lacuna; Há Uma Primeira Vez

Is there a gap in the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Regime related to nuclear material for the propulsion of submarines by Non-nuclear Weapons States? This question arises with the steady advancement of the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine program and within the AUKUS strategic partnership. This article argues that there is no such gap since the IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) addresses this issue. What happens is that no Special Procedures models for this kind of nuclear material have yet been elaborated. The article proceeds in three steps. Firstly, it focuses on the discussion regarding the existence of such a gap. Then, it addresses the CSA signed by Australia and Brazil. The final remarks present the inferences regarding this kind of gap. Received on: 30 Apr. 2023 | Accepted on: 18 Nov. 2023

Five Decades of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Time to Pass the Baton to the UN Security Council?

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) came into force in 1970. After renouncing its nuclear weapons programme, South Africa became a party to the NPT in 1991. The NPT is the principal international instrument aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT has generated various other treaties with similar aims, which, together with the NPT, constitute the ‘nuclear non-proliferation regime’. The NPT has, for various reasons, not been a success. Whether the NPT has achieved nuclear non-proliferation is a moot point–a concept which implies nuclear disarmament. For example, there is evidence of a network of covert operations marketing nuclear technology; some non-NPT states have clandestinely embarked on nuclear weapons programmes, and some NPT states have threatened to adopt a policy of actual or pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear weapons states for its deterrent value. Alarm bells are ringing regarding the interpretation of ‘peaceful’ and ‘non-peaceful’ uses of nuclear energy. Despite the NPT, nothing prohibits the testing and refinement of existing nuclear weapons technology. Certain questions need to be answered. Has the NPT not become an instrument of rhetorical posturing by the five major nuclear weapon states–the ‘Club of Five’? Why has none of the Club of Five given their nuclear weapons up? Where do the Club of Five get the moral authority to declare that introducing new members on the Club is unacceptable? Instead of concentrating on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as the NPT does, should there not rather be an emphasis on the total prohibition of all nuclear weapons? It is submitted that a more active role for the UN in nuclear non-proliferation issues be considered. All UN Secretaries-General have made nuclear non-proliferation one of their top priorities. Kofi Annan concluded that the NPT was the victim of insufficient progress in not only nuclear non-proliferation but also nuclear disarmament and that the world was sleepwalking towards a nuclear disaster. The basis for greater involvement of the UN Security Council in nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is to be found in the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Statute of the NPT, the UN Charter and in Security Council Relations 1540 of 2004 and 1929 of 2010. The argument is put forward that as the Security Council has the legal authority to determine threats to the peace or acts of aggression and make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken regarding it, utilising that body may be a more meaningful route to follow than the NPT which appears to have reached its sell-by date.

Military Regimes and Resistance to Nuclear Weapons Development

Few military regimes have seriously pursued a nuclear weapons capability, and only Pakistan has succeeded. I argue that military regimes governing nonnuclear weapons states are likely to prefer to invest in conventional rather than nuclear forces, even in the presence of external security threats. I identify two domestic sources of nuclear proliferation behavior in military regimes: the resource distribution preferences of the military organization and the need to manage the domestic conflicts that threaten the regime’s political survival. I test this theory using case evidence from Egypt, Brazil, and Pakistan. This study suggests that while external conditions are certainly important, domestic factors also have a significant impact on state security behavior.

The AUKUS Alliance and its Implications on the Non-Proliferation Treaty

A new three-pronged security pact was signed in September 2021 between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, allowing Australia to acquire nuclear-propelled submarines and advance technological sharing on a variety of fronts, including the most recent sharing of hypersonic technology. The AUKUS agreement appears to violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as the US decades-long commitments to reduce highly enriched uranium stockpiles in non-nuclear weapon states. The United States has abandoned its commitment to non-proliferation in favour of a deal that is more strategic in nature and driven by national interests. The AUKUS agreement carries significant security risks and will add fuel to the Asia-Pacific nuclear non-proliferation debate and arms race. In this context, this study seeks to investigate the effects of AUKUS on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This study contends that the NPT's future is bleak and remains in the shadow of major powers' interests; smaller states are unlikely to comply with existing nuclear treaties due to the dichotomous nature that major powers hold against them. It also sheds light on the future of non-nuclear armed states in relation to existing treaties such as the NPT.

Public Support for Nuclear Proliferation: Experimental Evidence from Brazil

Abstract How do mass publics in nonnuclear weapon states form their preferences over the acquisition of nuclear weapons? We field a survey experiment in Brazil, a possessor of uranium-enrichment capabilities with a long history of nuclear ambitions. Three sets of results support the view that members of the public approach nuclear proliferation strategically, that is, by taking into account how their home state interacts with enemies and allies alike. First, the external security environment is a major driver for individual-level preferences: when security is plentiful, only a small minority of the public in Brazil supports proliferation, but a deterioration of external conditions engenders a high minority in support for nuclear-weapon acquisition. Second, the mere extension by the United States of conventional security assurances suffices to dampen public support for an indigenous nuclear deterrent, restoring a majority view opposing proliferation. Third, conventional security assurances shape public sentiment on nuclear acquisition irrespective of whether they are credible or not. These results contribute to the effort currently unfolding in the scholarly community to make sense of how citizens outside the United States think about international security in a nuclear world.

IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN A STATE WITH AN IMPORTED FAST REACTOR AND A CLOSED NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

The implementation of the IAEA safeguards in the non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) that has imported the fast-neutron reactor with nuclear fuel cycle facilities is considered. The features of fast reactors that should be taken into account when preparing them for export together with CNFC technologies considering the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the importing state, are noted. These include high mass fraction of plutonium in fresh fuel loads and handling of a large amounts of fissile materials in the technological cycles of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. It is concluded that it is possible to implement the effective IAEA safeguards in the state importing such reactor and nuclear fuel cycle facilities considering their physical and design features and innovative technologies, including those used in the IAEA safeguards implementation.

THE NUCLEAR ORDER UNDER STRESS


 
 
 
 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been labelled the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. However, through its reaffirmation of the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the treaty encompasses the main elements of the nuclear phenomenon, the most pressing ones being the need to rid humanity of nuclear weapons while preventing the emergence of new nuclear-armed states. As such, the NPT constitutes a beacon for the advancement of international peace and security understood not just as the mere absence of war and conflict, but an underlying global condition enabling cooperation for the economic, social and cultural development of humankind. Disturbingly, the deterioration of the international political environment due to great -and regional- power competition and the increased pugnacity displayed by some states to pursue their national interests have raised the risk of nuclear confrontation and increased the danger of further nuclear and conventional proliferation, putting the nuclear order at risk. We posit that such risk and dangers require diplomatic action from non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) concerting efforts in every multilateral fora but, particularly, the United Nations.
 
 
 

The Bush and Clinton Administrations and Ukraine’s Nuclear Dismantlement, 1991–1994

ABSTRACT The collapse of the Soviet Union posed the greatest non-proliferation problem since the beginning of the atomic age. Would Ukraine be willing to abandon the nuclear weapons on their territory and join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state? Based on recently declassified archival sources, this article investigates how the Geoge H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations pursued Ukraine’s nuclear dismantlement through a mix of three types of policy action including trilateral diplomacy with Ukraine and Russia, United States financial and technical assistance in the denuclearisation process and a policy to address Ukraine’s broader security dilemma.

Non-Proliferation and State Succession

Abstract One of the lingering legacies of the Cold War was the enormous nuclear arsenals amassed by the two superpowers. When one of them, the Soviet Union, disintegrated in 1991, its nearly 30,000 nuclear weapons were located on the territory of not one but four newly sovereign states: Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. Although command-and-control of Soviet strategic missiles was centralized in Moscow, the specter of the single largest wave of horizontal nuclear proliferation loomed after 1991. By 1994, however, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine had decided to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states and to give up the missiles on their soil. Drawing on previously untapped archival records, this article reconstructs the divergent paths of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine toward relinquishing their armaments. A combination of domestic and international political factors contributed to the resolution of the problem. Among the various contributing factors, the NPT stands out as a salient force that provided normative framing and guided deliberations on post-Soviet nuclear disarmament.

Remarks and Questions by Thilo Marauhn

It is my pleasure to be with you on this occasion, if only virtually. This year's annual meeting has as an overall theme: “Personalizing International Law.” For this year's closing plenary, we thought of a truly important topic: “International Law Needs People: Humanitarian Arms Control and the Peace Movement.” Nuclear war, whether big or small, would have disastrous consequences for humankind. Nuclear arms control is crucial—not least in light of the humanitarian consequences. Following the failure of nuclear weapon states to implement Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), NGOs and governments of non-nuclear weapon states pushed for the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Given the role of civil society, of individuals, in this process, and given current circumstances, we want to discuss whether there is both a need and an opportunity to enhance international law and increase lawmaking and implementation by leveraging these actors. We will do so against the background of two distinct developments which I will highlight in opening the panel:

China and the international debate on no first use of nuclear weapons

ABSTRACT China is the only nuclear-armed country in the world that has an unconditional No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons policy. China’s practice of this policy and its impact on international security have important implications for the international debate around NFU and inform other countries’ potential consideration of NFU. Whether NFU policy could deliver the expected benefits of reducing the role of nuclear weapons, containing nuclear arms competition, and mitigating the risk of nuclear proliferation depends on the perceived credibility by other countries of such policy. This paper examines a number of internal challenges that may affect the perceived credibility of China’s NFU policy. One of them is Chinese military strategists’ expressed interest in threatening nuclear use in a conventional conflict under certain conditions through the so-called “lower the nuclear coercion threshold” operation. The others include the lack of institutional constraint in the Chinese system to ensure implementation of NFU and the growing ambiguities about the NFU policy’s applicability in specific scenarios as a result of new technological development. The paper offers recommendations on how China can address these challenges and work with other countries to create the conditions for the international adoption of NFU, including how to address the concerns of nonnuclear weapons states about the conventional-level security consequences. It concludes by discussing how China and the other nuclear-armed states can better fulfill their disarmament obligations by strengthening the existing NFU policy and promoting credible NFU policy more broadly.

When is it legitimate to abandon the NPT? Withdrawal as a political tool to move nuclear disarmament forward

ABSTRACT Treaties can be denounced and withdrawn from unilaterally and collectively. We ask when it would be legitimate to abandon the NPT, a treaty that 50 years ago committed states to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, but still has not delivered on the latter. The end of the NPT is a taboo subject in the arms control community that sees it as the cornerstone of the nuclear order. We draw on literature on the legitimacy of and exit from international institutions. We especially explore the political substance of the discontent that the non-nuclear weapons states have expressed in and outside the NPT forum. Exiting the NPT can legitimately be used as a political tool to challenge the current status quo where five states claim a right to possess nuclear weapons based on the NPT, and to achieve a nuclear order where nuclear weapons are illegal for all.

Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation. Alexander Lanoszka, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018. 216 pp. $49.95.

<i>Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation</i>. Alexander Lanoszka, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018. 216 pp. $49.95.

Is the NPT unraveling? Evidence from text analysis of review conference statements

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a landmark international treaty that is widely regarded as a cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, pessimists point to a growing divergence of preferences between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states as a precursor to the impending ‘unraveling of this vital piece of international law’. In this article, we test for evidence of preference divergence using statements from NPT review conferences, which are manifestos presenting each country’s position on the NPT. We measure preferences on the NPT using Wordfish, a method that is frequently used to estimate ideological preferences from election manifestos. Our measure estimates the latent positions of state actors along a ‘non-proliferation vs. disarmament’ dimension, and shows little evidence of growing preference divergence between the nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. Thus, a significant premise underlying more pessimistic assessments of the NPT appears to be in doubt.

THE DANGEROUS OUTSIDER: HISTORICIZING AND INTERROGATING THE NON-NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

The Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which is one of the world’s most widely adopted security conventions, which also proved to be one of the most controversial treaty. Its provisions define the core bargain between those few Nuclear weapon states and numerous Non-Nuclear weapon states. The paper examines the NPT and undertakes an excursus on the dangers posed to the international nuclear control effort by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Using secondary sources of information, the paper examines the NPT by tracing its historical basis. This enabled the study to interrogate the NPT, in spite of its major achievements, questions and criticisms are being raised about the implementation of the NPT and its overall strength. The past years have seen a series of efforts by multilateral institutions to enforce the treaty by combining restrictive measures and proposals for long-term arrangements. These efforts have not yielded results so far. The existing Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) are not required by the treaty to give up nuclear weapons but rather to negotiate in good faith. This has questioned the credibility of the nuclear states to press others to drop their nuclear ambitions. More ominous still, is the risk of the qualitative escalation of proliferation of nations following North Korea’s withdrawal and series of test. The findings of the study reveal that the potential danger posed by North Korea are in threefold; firstly, if there is war in the Korean peninsula it could use nuclear weapons against its neighbors. Secondly, North Korea could help other states build a nuclear reactor that could produce materials for nuclear weapon. And lastly, North Korea’s nuclear programme could breakdown the international regime intended to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The paper concludes that the case of North Korea has proved that arms control by example is an important adjunct to specific nonproliferation treaties and cooperative measures. Although it cannot by itself stop states or leaders determined to violate an international agreement or tacit understanding, it can enhance the moral authority of the major powers to press others to drop their nuclear ambitions. &#x0D; Efanodor-Obeten, O. H. | Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Edo University Iyamho, Edo State, Nigeria