The article analyzes the institution of an independent member (independent non-executive director) of the supervisory board (board of directors) of a joint-stock company in the USA, Great Britain and China. It is concluded that UK corporate law does not contain clear criteria for differentiating nonexecutive from executive directors. Therefore, independent non-executive directors have the same duties and are legally liable as executive board members. They are subject to the duties of directors contained in the Companies Act. British law emphasizes the non-executive director’s independence from the company and its management, rather than the non-executive director’s dependence on the shareholders. The article systematizes a set of legal acts that are the sources of legal regulation of the US independent directors, namely: 1) listing standards of stock exchanges (New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq); 2) regulatory acts of the Securities and Exchange Commission; 3) laws of the state where stock corporation is registered. Attention is paid to legal regulation in China. The author notes that the existing system of regulating the legal status of an independent director actually does not fulfill the functions assigned to an independent director. Chinese corporate governance system should be aimed at limiting the power of management and better protecting the interests of minority shareholders. However, its role is not adequately fulfilled because Chinese listed companies are usually controlled by a single majority shareholder. The author concludes that two types of independent directors have spread in world practice: the American one, in accordance with which the position of an independent director is established in a mandatory manner in corporate law; English, according to which the norms regarding the independent director are of a recommendatory nature, taking into account the principle «comply or explain». It is concluded that there are no single criteria for the concept of independence in the law of the studied countries, as well as a list of requirements for independent executive directors. Thus, the independence of an independent director remains a subjective category, and the evaluation criteria are formed based on the socio-economic conditions of the country.
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