Non-cooperative Game Theory Research Articles

Conflicts in Overlay Environments: Inefficient Equilibrium and Incentive Mechanism

Overlay networks have been widely deployed upon the Internet by Service Providers (SPs) to provide improved network services. However, the interaction between each overlay and traffic engineering (TE) as well as the interaction among co-existing overlays may occur. In this paper, we adopt both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory to analyze these interactions, which are collectively called hybrid interaction. Firstly, we model a situation of the hybrid interaction as an n+1-player non-cooperative game, in which overlays and TE are of equal status, and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) for this game. Secondly, we model another situation of the hybrid interaction as a 1-leader-n-follower Stackelberg-Nash game, in which TE is the leader and co-existing overlays are followers, and prove that the cost at Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium (SNE) is at least as good as that at NE for TE. Thirdly, we propose a cooperative coalition mechanism based on Shapley value to overcome the inherent inefficiency of NE and SNE, in which players can improve their performance and form stable coalitions. Finally, we apply distinct genetic algorithms (GA) to calculate the values for NE, SNE and the assigned cost for each player in each coalition, respectively. Analytical results are confirmed by the simulation on complex network topologies.

A NOVEL APPROACH OF DEMAND SIDE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR RESIDENTIAL CONSUMERS IN SMART GRID

In this paper, Demand Side Management scheme in a smart grid environment is proposed as a feature of reducing the peak demand for residential users and maximizing the profit for the utility. A smart grid scenario is considered for detailed analysis. Non-cooperative game theory approaches are generalized in this methodology for solving two dynamic conditions such as reducing peak demand and maximize the utility profit with respect to the users comfort. In this work a new strategy is developed among the various users for scheduling of appliances autonomously. Extensive simulations are carried out using actual load profiles and obtained results demonstrates reduction in Peak to average ratio. In addition the proposed system is analyzed by considering the changes in climatic conditions of summer and winter for a particular region.

Resource allocation for network security risk assessment: A non-cooperative differential game based approach

In this paper, we propose a non-cooperative differential game theory based resource allocation approach for the network security risk assessment. For the risk assessment, the resource will be used for risk assess, including response cost and response negative cost. The whole assessment process is considered as a differential game for optimal resource control. The proposed scheme can be obtained through the Nash Equilibrium. It is proved that the game theory based algorithm is applicable and the optimal resource level can be achieved based on the proposed algorithm.

Multi-party energy management for smart building cluster with PV systems using automatic demand response

In a smart grid environment, the joint operation of multiple Smart Buildings (SBs) could be more advantageous than the independent operation of each individual SB. In order to enable the joint operation, the concept of Smart Building Cluster (SBC) is introduced in this paper. An energy management framework for achieving optimal operations of SBC is proposed, and the information exchange processes between the Smart Building Cluster Operator (SBCO) and the participating SBs are described. A multi-party energy management model for SBC based on non-cooperative game theory is proposed, considering building-integrated PV systems and automatic demand response (ADR), with all participating SBs viewed as players in the game. The existence of Nash equilibrium in the game model is proved, and the process for solving the Nash equilibrium strategy is modeled as a multi-objective optimization problem (MOP). Furthermore, the solution method and procedure based on an iterative method are proposed. Finally, via a practical example, the effectiveness of the model is verified. The proposed method is able to reduce the total cost of the SBs by 4.6% and improve the load factor of the SBC from 0.68 to 0.76 when the proportion of shiftable loads is 25% in the total load profile.

Understanding Human Avoidance Behavior: Interaction-Aware Decision Making Based on Game Theory

Being aware of mutual influences between individuals is a major requirement a robot to efficiently operate in human populated environments. This is especially true for the navigation among humans with its mutual avoidance maneuvers. While humans easily manage this task, robotic systems are still facing problems. Most of the recent approaches concentrate on predicting the motions of humans individually and deciding afterwards. Thereby, interactivity is mostly neglected. In this work, we go one step back and focus on understanding the underlying principle of human decision making in the presence of multiple humans. Non-cooperative game theory is applied to formulate the problem of predicting the decisions of multiple humans that interact which each other during navigation. Therefore, we use the theory of Nash equilibria in static and dynamic games where different cost functions from literature rate the payoffs of the individual humans. The approach anticipates collisions and additionally reasons about several avoidance maneuvers of all humans. For the evaluation of the game theoretic approach we recorded trajectories of humans passing each other. The evaluation shows that game theory is able to reproduce the decision process of humans more accurately than a decision model that predicts humans individually.

Using Non-cooperative Game Theory for Taxi-Sharing Recommendation Systems

This paper presents a recommendation mechanism for taxi-sharing. The first aim of our model is to respectively recommend taxis and passengers for picking up passengers quickly and finding taxis eas...

Anticommons, the Coase Theorem and the problem of bundling inefficiency

The Coase theorem is most often formulated in terms of bi-lateral monopoly, for instance between a polluting factory and an affected neighbour. Instead, we introduce multiple affected neighbours and the concept of anticommons, in which autonomous actors with separate yet necessarily complementary inputs each has the right to deny but not to permit use. Once we posit multiple owners possessing complementary rights, strategically maximizing against each other as well as against the actor who wishes to purchase a portion of that right, the outcome is neither efficient nor invariant. Our finding, based on non-cooperative game theory, is sustained even under the restrictive Coase assumptions regarding complete information, perfect rationality, and zero transaction costs. The implication is that suboptimal bundling agreements in cases of multiple stakeholders is not the mere product of market imperfection, but instead is a systematic result.

Analysis of Maintenance Service Contracts for Dump Trucks Used in Mining Industry with Simulation Approach

A mining company needs high availability of dump trucks used to haul mining materials. As a result, an effective maintenance action is required to keep the dump trucks in a good condition and hence reducing failure and downtime of the dump trucks. To carry out maintenance in-house requires a high intensive maintenance facility and high skilled maintenance specialists. Often, outsourcing maintenance is an economic option for the company. An external agent takes a proactive action with offering some maintenance contract options to the owner. The decision problem for the owner is to decide the best option and for the agent is to determine the optimal price for each option offered. A non-cooperative game-theory is used to formulate the decision problems for the owner and the agent. We consider that failure pattern of each truck follows a non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) and a queueing theory with multiple servers is used to estimate the downtime. As it involves high complexity to model downtime using a queueing theory, then in this paper we use a simulation method. Furthermore, we conduct experiment to seek for the best number of maintenance facilities (servers) which minimises maintenance and penalty costs incurred to the agent.

Multi-agent based distributed control architecture for microgrid energy management and optimization

Most energy management systems are based on a centralized controller that is difficult to satisfy criteria such as fault tolerance and adaptability. Therefore, a new multi-agent based distributed energy management system architecture is proposed in this paper. The distributed generation system is composed of several distributed energy resources and a group of loads. A multi-agent system based decentralized control architecture was developed in order to provide control for the complex energy management of the distributed generation system. Then, non-cooperative game theory was used for the multi-agent coordination in the system. The distributed generation system was assessed by simulation under renewable resource fluctuations, seasonal load demand and grid disturbances. The simulation results show that the implementation of the new energy management system proved to provide more robust and high performance controls than conventional centralized energy management systems.

Powers Without Power: Game Theory and the Nondelegation Principle

The nondelegation principle prohibits Congress from delegating its leg-islative powers to other entities. The doctrinal test of this constitutional prohibition is to ask whether a statute provide an “intelligible principle” to guide and constrain delegated lawmaking authority. But the Court has never adequately explained the basis of the nondelegation principle, nor how it justifies an intelligible-principle test that today seems nearly impossible to fail. And while many theories of nondelegation have been put forth in the academic literature, few explain the prevalence of legislative delegation today, and none explain the intelligible principle test. This paper takes a novel approach to nondelegation: looking for the principle under the lens of non-cooperative game theory. The result is an intuitive theory of the nondelegation principle with attractive properties. This theory generalizes important aspects of many existing theories of nondelegation. It also provides a dynamic explanation, and partial justification, of the much maligned intelligible principle test.

Game theoretic simulation on the mimicry honeypot

A mimicry honeypot framework based on game theory is presented in our work, which can calculate the equilibrium strategy of the deceptive game using non-cooperative incomplete dynamic game theory, and make decisions for the mimicry framework to deploy the simple service, the honeypot and the fake honeypot. A mimicry prototype is implemented using NS2 platform, and simulation experiments are launched to validate the decision-making result and the deceptive performance of the mimicry honeypot. The empirical study shows that the mimicry honeypot framework based on game theory can be able to influence the equilibrium strategy results by dynamically changing the deployment vector of the mimicry system. It validates that the mimicry honeypot framework has better flexibility, activeness and fraudulence than the traditional honeypot.

A Game Theoretic Method for Resource Allocation in Scientific Cloud

Due to the widespread use of cloud services, the need for proper and dynamic distribution will redouble the resources. One of the most complex problems in cloud environments is resource allocation such that on one hand the resource provider should obtain maximum utilization and on the other hand users want to lease best resources based on his time and budget constraints. Many studies which presented new methods for solving this NP-complete problem have used heuristic algorithm. Based on economic aspects of cloud environments, using market oriented model for solving allocation problem can decrease the complexity and converge it to the best solution in minimum time. In this paper a method has been proposed based on auction theory that it has used a non-cooperative game theory mechanism in an incomplete information environment. This game try to select best bidder for selling resource to it. At the end of the paper, the proposed algorithm was experienced in cloudsim and the simulated results showed that the authors' suggested model converge to the best response at Nash equilibrium point.

Bilateral negotiation model for intelligent decision-making under uncertainty

The relevance of bargaining in construction material procurement can easily be ascertained, yet the study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining process - asymmetries and uncertainties in particular - by using a non-cooperative game theory approach. We develop a computational model which simulates the process of negotiation between supplier and contractor, who bargain over the material price. Through numerically simulating negotiation games between two players, we identify the main features of players' optimal strategies and equilibrium agreements. Our results confirm that uncertainty affects players' behaviour and modifies the likelihood of a self-enforcing agreement to emerge. The model proposed here can have several applications, in particular in the field of computer-aided decision and automation in construction procurement, where conflicts over how to optimise negotiation price.

A game theoretic analysis in capacity-constrained supplier-selection and cooperation by considering the total supply chain inventory costs

The first models of supplier selection were based on maximizing buyer׳s interests. Recently, with the growing attention towards supply chain competition and vertical coordination, some researchers propose models that select suppliers based on total supply chain cost. These models usually consider a centralized system to tackle the problem of proper incentives for members in cooperation. Our purpose in this paper is to analyze the selected suppliers and prices that are agreed on in decentralized supply chains. Also we aim to study the conditions in which the selected suppliers are in the benefit of total supply chain. We use the inventory related costs to calculate payoff function of buyer and suppliers.At the beginning of this paper, a centralized model is developed as a benchmark. Then, we investigate the problem in a decentralized supply chain with the suppliers having capacity constraints. In this regard, we use cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to analyze the selected suppliers and total supply chain costs in two scenarios. In the first scenario, suppliers act independently while in the second scenario the suppliers cooperate with each other making coalitions. It is shown that the cooperative model could result in a stable solution with same total supply chain cost as the centralized model and also, when suppliers have equal opportunity costs for each single production capacity, selected suppliers are determined independent from the opportunity cost. But when the suppliers act independently or have different opportunity costs, the selected suppliers are influenced by the opportunity cost that they have. A numerical example clarifies the findings.

The Strategic and Effective Dimensions of the Border Tax Adjustment

Between 2001 and 2011, the Kyoto Protocol has experienced defections of two countries that took part in its negotiation and accounted for around 44% of all parties' emissions. The border tax adjustment, a tax levied on imports to reproduce domestic taxation on similar goods, is advocated to prevent such compliance failures as well as to support unilateral pollution regulations by mitigating firms' competitiveness losses and carbon leakages. The paper investigates whether this trade instrument can constitute a decentralized solution to achieve the first-best in a noncooperative framework. It develops a two-country two-firm reciprocal-market model of trade with global pollution and country heterogeneity. Countries' interactions are studied following a noncooperative game theory approach, for two scenarios defined by the possibility to implement a border tax adjustment to sanction unilateral deviation from the cooperative situation. The paper predicts first that this opportunity modifies the countries' choices of strategies toward more compliance; second that among the strategic and effective dimensions of the border tax adjustment, only the former allows to achieve the first-best; finally that the border tax adjustment fosters countries' participation in the cooperative international environmental agreement.

Joint spectrum load balancing and handoff management in cognitive radio networks: a non-cooperative game approach

We propose a non-cooperative game theory based algorithm for spectrum management problem in cognitive radio networks taking into account the spectrum handoff effects. The objective is to minimize the spectrum access time of Secondary Users (SUs) which are competing for spectrum opportunities in heterogeneous environment. In this paper, the preemptive resume priority (PRP) M/G/1 queuing model is used to characterize the multiple handoff and data delivery time of SUs. Also an explicit solution for channels selection probabilities of each SU is extracted for PRP M/M/1 model specifically. The effect of handoffs is considered as the interrupted packets which return to the SUs' low priority queue when the high priority Primary User's packets are arrived to take service. The queuing delay of SUs' and the effect of these returned packets are considered in order to balance the load of SUs on channels so that the minimum spectrum access time is sensed by each SU. The non-cooperative spectrum load balancing with handoff management game is proposed to find a distributed solution for each SU. It is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium point which can be achieved by SUs as decision makers. At this equilibrium, each SU incurs the minimum delay on all channels while the free spectrum holes of channels are utilized efficiently. Simulation results are provided to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of spectrum access delay, fairness, and channels spectrum holes utilization.

Characterization and Detection of ϵ-Berge-Zhukovskii Equilibria.

The Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium is an alternate solution concept in non-cooperative game theory that formalizes cooperation in a noncooperative setting. In this paper, the ϵ-Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium is introduced and characterized by using a generative relation. The generative relation also provides a solution to the problem of computing the ϵ-Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium for large games, by using evolutionary algorithms. Numerical examples illustrate the approach and provide a possible application for this equilibrium concept.

Game theory and fish wars: The case of the Northeast Atlantic mackerel fishery

Simple non-cooperative and cooperative game theory is used to explore the crisis involving the European Union (EU), Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands regarding the size and relative allocation of total allowable catches (TACs) in the mackerel fishery in the Northeast Atlantic. The analysis of the mackerel crisis is based on a statistical estimation of relevant functional relations, and the behavior of the players is explained using a fully specified empirical model. Simple, non-cooperative game theory shows that all players have an incentive to act non-cooperatively, a result that is robust to changes in basic assumptions regarding demand and cost functions. Thus, using the estimated parameters and functions, simple, non-cooperative game theory cannot explain the cooperative behavior of EU and Norway during the mackerel crisis. Simple cooperative game theory shows that no player has an incentive to enter a bargaining agreement by forming coalitions, a prediction that is consistent with the actual behavior of the EU, Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands between 2010 and 2014 when no bargaining solution was reached. Therefore, the fact that the EU and Norway entered a bilateral agreement in 2010 and that the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands reached a bargaining solution in 2014 cannot be explained by simple cooperative game theory. However, actual behavior during the mackerel crisis can be explained by opportunity costs, including alternative fishing possibilities and regulations, rather than actual harvest costs, but we do not have information about the opportunity costs of harvesting mackerel.

English

In this paper, we consider a wide range of widelystudied models strategic form behavioural game theory. It is standard multi agent settings to assume that agents will adopt Nash equilibrium strategies. This paper gives a brief overview of game theory. Therefore in the first section we want to outline what game theory generally is and where it is applied. In the next section, we introduce some of the most important terms of Non-cooperative game theory such as strategic form (or) normal form games, extensive form and Nash equilibrium.

Non-cooperative game theory in biology and cooperative reasoning in humans.

The readiness for spontaneous cooperation together with the assumptions that others share this cooperativity has been identified as a fundamental feature that distinguishes humans from other animals, including the great apes. At the same time, cooperativity presents an evolutionary puzzle because non-cooperators do better in a group of cooperators. We develop here an analysis of the process leading to cooperation in terms of rationality concepts, game theory and epistemic logic. We are, however, not attempting to reconstruct the actual evolutionary process. We rather want to provide the logical structure underlying cooperation in order to understand why cooperation is possible and what kind of reasoning and beliefs would lead to cooperative decision-making. Game theory depends on an underlying common belief in non-cooperative rationality of the players, and cooperativity similarly can utilize a common belief in cooperative rationality as its basis. We suggest a weaker concept of rational decision-making in games that encompasses both types of decision-making. We build this up in stages, starting from simple optimization, then using anticipation of the reaction of others, to finally arrive at reflexive and cooperative reasoning. While each stage is more difficult than the preceding, importantly, we also identify a reduction of complexity achieved by the consistent application of higher stage reasoning.