Non-cooperative Context Research Articles

A Blind Modulation Type Detector for DPRS Standard

In this paper, some methods allowing automatic discrimination between the types of modulations proposed by the DPRS communication standard are presented. In a non-cooperative context, the receiver must first be able to detect the presence of a modulated signal before eventually carrying out its demodulation (i.e. having access to the information). For this purpose a receiver capable of identifying digital modulations of type M-QAM, 8-PSK and GMSK, proposed by the ETSI---DPRS standard, has been studied. Three detection algorithms have been investigated. The first is based on the observation of the amplitude histograms, the second on the continuous wavelet transform and the third on the maximum likelihood for the joint probability densities of phases and amplitudes. Their performance has been evaluated against signal to noise ratio.

Performance analysis of a spreading sequence estimator for spread spectrum transmissions

Direct sequence spread spectrum transmissions (DS-SS) are now widely used for secure communications, as well as for multiple access. They have many interesting properties, including low probability of interception. Indeed, DS-SS transmitters use a periodical pseudo-random sequence to modulate the baseband signal before transmission. A receiver which does not know the sequence cannot demodulate the signal. In this paper, we propose a new method which can estimate the spreading sequence in a noncooperative context. The method is based on eigenanalysis techniques. The received signal is divided into windows, from which a covariance matrix is computed. We show that the sequence can be reconstructed from the two first eigenvectors of this matrix, and that useful information, such as desynchronisation time, can be extracted from the eigenvalues. The main achievement of the present paper is a performance analysis of the proposed spreading sequence estimation procedure. An analytical approach is first considered owing to matrix perturbation theory and Wishart matrix properties. Then, complementary Monte Carlo simulations are performed to show the effectiveness of the proposed method.

Effects of gain—loss frames on satisfaction with self–other outcome‐differences

AbstractThis research concerned satisfaction with outcome‐differences (advantageous inequity, equity, or disadvantageous inequity) as a function of the individual's gain or loss frame, other's gain or loss frame, the cooperative or noncooperative nature of the relationship, and their interactions. After reading a scenario, subjects rated on a satisfaction‐dissatisfaction scale a series of outcome‐pairs providing themselves and another party with outcomes. Consistent with Equity Theory, results showed that gain framed individuals found equity more pleasing than advantageous inequity, which in turn was preferred over disadvantageous inequity, but only when the decision making context was coopera‐ tive rather than noncooperative. In a noncooperative context, gain framed individuals were as pleased with equity as with advantageous inequity. Contrary to Equity Theory, but consistent with Prospect Theory, loss framed individuals were relatively insensitive to outcome‐differences and the nature of the relationship. Results finally suggested that advantageous inequity was preferred less when the other party had a loss rather than gain frame, albeit only under cooperative circumstances.

Trade Wars, Trade Negotiations and Applied Game Theory

What is the value of trade negotiations? Quantitative measures of the value of trade liberalisation generally ignore the strategic aspects of protection policy. The traditional approach is to compare welfare levels under the existing structure of protection with welfare levels under some alternative structure of protection, such as unilateral or multilateral free trade. We add two additional questions. First, in a non-cooperative context, are either of these points of comparison consistent with countries adopting 'best response' policies given the policies of other countries? Second, in the context of a cooperative negotiation, are either of these points of comparison consistent with the outcome that meets certain plausible criteria for a bargaining process? If the answer to either of these questions is 'no' then the traditional approach provides at best an incomplete answer to the original question, and could provide a misleading answer. A simple example illustrates our basic point. Consider the game in Table i. This is a non-cooperative game between the United States and EC, in which each agent has just two pure strategies: to do nothing and Keep (K) the existing structure of protection in place, or to Abolish (A) trade barriers (on imports from the other agent only). The payoffs shown are the annual welfare impact relative to the status quo, as measured by the Equivalent Variation (EV) in income in billions of I973 U.S. dollars. The values shown are taken from the simulation results of Brown and Whalley (I980; Table I 4, p. 864). What is the best response of the United States in this context? If the EC decides to Keep its protection structure the United States does better by also Keeping its protection structure intact. In other words, given that the EC plays K, it is a best response for the United States to also play K. Thus the traditional approach would imply that the United States gains from protection in this case. However, what is the best response of the United States if the EC decides to Abolish its protection structure? In this instance the United States does best by also Abolishing its protection structure. The point here is simply that the welfare cost of protection to the United States depends on what the EC does. Without saying something about what the EC will do, one cannot answer our question vis-'a-vis the United States. As it happens, in this particular game we

The strategic inconsistency of Paretian liberalism

In this paper, the problem of the Paretian liberal is cast as a preference revelation game whose outcome function satisfies Gibbard's libertarian condition and strong Pareto optimality. Strategic consistency requires that the equilibrium of the game agree with the sincere outcome. It is shown that, whether viewed in a cooperative or non-cooperative context, the liberal social choice function is strategically inconsistent. This result suggests that, from a strategic standpoint, a different resolution of the liberal paradox is desirable.