non-Communist Countries Research Articles

Using Hong Kong as a springboard: China’s indirect exports via Hong Kong in the 1950s

ABSTRACT Although Hong Kong’s entrepôt role in China’s foreign trade has long received scholarly attention, there is a relative paucity of studies on China’s indirect exports via Hong Kong in the Mao era (1949–1976). Using data from Chinese and Hong Kong trade statistics, this study estimates China’s indirect exports via Hong Kong in the 1950s and calculates their share in China’s export trade. The principal findings are threefold. First, their value, destination, and commodity composition changed markedly. Second, their share in China’s export trade declined during the decade, but the speed and extent of the decline varied by destination. In particular, their share in China’s exports to the non-Communist world initially increased from 1950 to 1952 and subsequently decreased. Third, their share in China’s exports to the non-Communist world was slightly higher in the 1950s than in the 1980s. These findings support recent historical studies indicating that Hong Kong played an essential role in selling Chinese goods to non-Communist countries during the early Mao era. Fundamentally, this study modifies the widely held view that Hong Kong’s entrepôt role in China’s foreign trade was much less important in the Mao era than in the post-1978 reform era.

Alexandre Kostov, ed. Contemporary Balkans. The Challenges of the 21st Century

Alexandre Kostov, ed. <i>Contemporary Balkans. The Challenges of the 21st Century</i>

Japan’s Peace Diplomacy on the Vietnam War and the 1968–1969 Shift in the United States’ Asia Policy

ABSTRACT This article investigates the impact of the changing international environment in Asia at the turn of the 1960s on Japanese diplomacy regarding the Vietnam war and Southeast Asia. In 1968–1969, the United States announced important changes in its policy on the Vietnam problem and Asia, particularly the reduction of its military involvement in the region. Taking advantage of a US policy shift, China and the Soviet Union sought to expand their influence in Southeast Asia. Drawing on declassified diplomatic documents, this article shows that the government of Japanese Prime Minister Satō Eisaku, balancing domestic pressures and the need to preserve relations with Washington, adjusted its diplomacy in response to changes in the regional environment. While continuing efforts towards peace in Vietnam, Japan began work to shape a post-Vietnam Southeast Asian order based on peaceful coexistence between communist and non-communist countries. This was Japan’s strategy for countering the expected increase in Beijing and Moscow’s regional influence. Japan gradually acted to engage North Vietnam, a key actor to realize regional peaceful coexistence and a war settlement – which would in turn facilitate the realization of the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. This approach would be formalized in the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine.

Post-communist Burden Influence on the Perception of Crea-tive Identities: Consequences for Managers and Leaders

Purpose: Communism, being one of the most repressive systems, influences the whole spec-trum of behaviors of individuals, groups, and society. Countries that changed their politi-cal system start a journey of external (economic, social) and internal (personal, interper-sonal, group) changes. The post-communist burden determines human behavior, and man-agers and leaders should pay attention to these consequences. The research deals with the perception of creative identities (a creator, artist, manager, entrepreneur, and leader) by the society of post-communist countries compared to countries without communist history. Design/methodology/approach: Quantitive research (n = 160) among people from a dozen nations; chi-square test of independence used; qualitative analysis of feature differences. Findings: There are no statistical differences in the perception of the creative identities of a creator, artist, manager, entrepreneur, and leader between citizens of post-communist and non-communist countries. Practical implications: The study in perception of the particular creative identities might have practical implications for managers and leaders of groups, and business organiza-tions dominated or not by creative individuals. These differences are shown in detail, and links between this research results and the literature are built. Originality value: The originality of the research lies in the conclusion that societies that finished their intercourse with communism more than one generation ago (ca. 30 years) should be perceived similarly to non-communist societies. Perception of the creative indi-viduals' social capital by these societies does not show essential discrepancies.

Exploring the Influences of Job Satisfaction for Europeans Aged 50 + from Ex-communist vs. Non-communist Countries

Exploring the Influences of Job Satisfaction for Europeans Aged 50 + from Ex-communist vs. Non-communist Countries

The New Era of Sino-Burmese Relations: Changes in the Bilateral Relationship in View of China's Rise and Myanmar's Reforms

Burma was the first non-Communist country to recognize the People's Republic in 1949. Since then, the relationship between Burma and China remained nervously friendly, and finally warmed in 1988. Due to isolation and economic sanctions Burma moved closer to China, the two authoritarian states becoming close allies. Subsequent concerns over Beijing's influence directly affected the junta's decision to pursue reform and open up the country. The following rapid expansion of Myanmar's diplomatic profile has complicated its relations with China. Myanmar has sought to diversify its foreign relations, but the Rohingya crisis has hindered this effort. China with its non-interference principle and the Belt and Road Initiative has managed to win Myanmar back, at least partially. This paper examines how Myanmar's relationship with China has evolved from Myanmar being aligned with China; through Myanmar hedging on the side of the United States; to Myanmar employing a double-hedging strategy with two great powers.

China, between Bombay cinema and the world

If Hegel himself manifested as a spirit wandering world history, contemporary India–China alignments might very well spook his ghost. Take, for example, the view of the chief executive of Trinity Pictures, who excitedly pledged the fortunes of Indian–Chinese film co-productions on the appeal of ‘the massive Sino-Indian market’.1 Hegel might be baffled at such an expression of regional solidarity. While he had generalized Asia as the beginning of history, Hegel saw China and India as the embodiment of antithetical historicities. After all, China, in its ‘prosaic rationality’, produced ‘minutely cataloged’ histories of its country while the ‘unbroken superstition’ of India was incapable of historical consciousness.2 The idea of a shared culture, history and geography between India and China belies one of the comparative tenets of modern orientalism. That is not to deny that certain world-historical tensions continue, of course. Around the time that the Hindi film Dangal (Nitesh Tiwari, 2016) was breaking box-office records at Chinese theatres in mid 2017, military tensions were intensifying along the Indian–Chinese border, leading to a diplomatic crisis between the two nations. Connecting the two events – culture and conflict – begs an important question for comparative media scholarship. Should we interpret coincidence as correlation and take both events as figured in a kind of conjuncture, or are we in the realm of the disjunctural – according to which, borrowing the ‘old’ discourse of the Cold War, cinema and statecraft are somehow out of ‘alignment’? At the very least, cutting across these two events helps us to grapple with the political and cultural forces that have drawn two nations into contact since India ended formal ties with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1950, as one of the first noncommunist countries to do so.

The Catholic 1968: Poland, Social Justice, and the Global Cold War

In the 1960s, the Catholic Church underwent a revolution in the teaching and practice of its faith, known asaggiornamento. Catholics responded by pioneering new forms of agency in world affairs in the Global Sixties. This was a cross-Iron Curtain story, affecting communist and non-communist countries in Europe, as well as developing countries across the world – a story of transfers and encounters unfolding simultaneously along multiple geographical axes: “East-West,” “North-South,” and “East-South.” The narrative anchor for this story is the year 1968. This article explores the seminal role of east European Catholics in this story, focusing on Polish Catholic intellectuals as they wrote and rewrote global narratives of political economy and sexual politics. A global Catholic conversation on international development stalled as sexual politics reinforced Cold War and post-colonial divisions, with the Second and Third Worlds joining forces against First World critics of a new papal teaching on contraception,Humanae Vitae. Paradoxically, the Soviet Bloc became the prism through which the Catholic Church refracted a new vision of international development for the Third World.

India-Vietnam in the Changing Tide: Exploring the Significance of the Relations

In the changing face of political governance and security structure in the Asia-Pacific regions, India want to play an active political and security role as the region is very critical to India's strategic calculus for many reasons, including the political and economic reasons and the growing assertive role of China in Southeast Asia which controls a significant section of the Southeast Asian economy. In this context, New Delhi looks at Vietnam in sustaining its presence in the Asia-Pacific region. India and Vietnam share a long history of shared political, culture and economic interest. India supported Vietnam's independence from France, opposed American involvement in the Vietnam War, and supported unification of Vietnam. India was also one of the few noncommunist countries to assist Vietnam during the Cambodian-Vietnamese War. Furthermore, with extensive economic, defense and maritime cooperation, including oil exploration, agriculture, manufacturing, sale of military equipment, sharing of intelligence, joint naval exercises and training in counterinsurgency and jungle warfare, the relation has improved extensively. In the recent time, India's consideration in strengthening its link with Southeast Asian countries through its Act-East policy has heightened Vietnam's importance in India's strategic calculus from being a ‘strategic partner’ to ‘Comprehensive strategic partner’. Vietnam gives a strategic advantage in India's pursuance of its policy objective. First, Vietnam provides an impetus to India's Act East policy that aims to re-invigorate its historical ties with countries in Southeast and East Asia. Second, Vietnam's rich natural resources like hydrocarbon can add to India's growing energy needs. As for Vietnam, India can help in playing an alternative emerging power against the dominance of China in the Asia-Pacific region where Vietnam is in a long festering territorial dispute with Beijing in the South China Sea. Second, India can infuse much needed capital and technology into Vietnam, thereby bringing it par with its other ASEAN countries.

Communist legacies and opposition churches: religious behavior in post-communist Europe

The interaction between religion and the state in post-Communist countries has naturally received a great deal of scholarly attention. The situation provides an almost natural experiment to examine the influence that government policies can have on religious behavior and organization. The bulk of research has attempted to explain religious behavior in post-Communist countries using either the secularization approach or the supply-side approach. Both of these models were developed with respect to non-Communist countries and have not been able to fully explain religious behavior patterns. The current study suggests that two key factors are crucial to account for religious behavior in post-Communist countries: the strength of the Communist legacy and the role of religious organizations in opposition movements. A most similar systems design is employed by analyzing religious behavior in Estonia and Latvia. Some support is found through the analysis. Latvia, where the Lutheran Church was involved in opposition and displays a slightly weaker Communist legacy, has greater religious participation and belief than Estonia. By grounding expectations of post-Communist religious behavior in characteristics of the transition the current study makes a valuable contribution to the existing literature.

THE DOMESTIC SIGNIFICANCE OF CHINA’S POLICY TOWARD EGYPT, 1955–1957

In the wake of the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, China’s Communist government developed close relations with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. China’s conciliatory diplomacy toward Egypt and other non-communist countries in the Arab world has long intrigued historians, who have interpreted this campaign as a way to break out of diplomatic isolation and gain political influence in the Middle East. Such an interpretation neglects the relevance of Sino-Egyptian relations to Chinese domestic politics, especially the Communist Party’s interest in incorporating Muslims into its vision of the Chinese nation. By using relations with Egypt to present China as a staunch supporter of global Islam, the government encouraged all its citizens—and Muslims in particular—to reaffirm their allegiance to Chinese nationalism and the Communist government that championed it.

Income inequality, Redistribution, and Democracy

Many economists, and more generally institutions are concerned with the development of poor countries. Not only poverty, but also income inequality can have perverse consequences on the economic, political, and social stability of a country. In order to get more insight into this topic the main research question was: How is income inequality determined by regime type and is there a difference in the way democracies and dictatorships redistribute income? We can find three individual processes in democratization: democratization of the recruitment of the executive, the degree of independence of the executive authority, and the degree of political competition and opposition. The democratization of executive recruitment leads to a linear, negative effect on inequality, while the degree of political competition leads to a linear, positive effect on inequality. If a (post)communist country experiences an increase in the independence of executive authority, inequality increases to a lesser degree than for a non-communist country. Additionally, the level of inequality starts to fall sooner for a (post)communist country as compared with a non-communist country when the degree of independence increases. It is concluded that democracy not only leads to more inequality, it also leads to less redistribution.

Asymmetric adaptive legal cultures amongst minorities and Euro-migrants

In the post-communist period, there has been considerable pressure towards a more convergent pan-European legal culture. Under international pressure, formal laws can be changed, but legal cultures that include public perceptions, attitudes, habits, conventions and even behaviour may be resistant to change imposed on them from outside. Formal laws may be changed, but legal cultures still reflect the legacy of communism. This study conducted in Ukraine, Bulgaria, Poland, England and Norway confirms that public perceptions of law and public attitudes towards law, law observance and law enforcement still vary very sharply between the post-communist countries and others, with Ukraine and Norway being at the extremes. But we should not simply equate people with their countries of origin when studying legal cultures. The post-communist period coincides with a surge in personal mobility across Europe. While there is no guarantee that the large number of recent ‘Euro-migrants’ (defined as born in one European country, but now living in another) will necessarily adapt to the general legal culture of the majority in their new country of residence, their natural tendency is to do so. Over the long term, long-established Muslim minorities in Europe have adapted to the general legal culture in the country. So even though they continue to have their own particular concerns, the legal cultures of Muslim minorities tend to vary from one European country to another in much the same way as the legal cultures of the majorities in these countries do. To that extent, their legal cultures are at least as ‘country specific’ as they are ‘Muslim’. On a much shorter time scale, ‘Euro-migrants’ now moving more easily in both directions between former communist and non-communist countries tend to adapt quite quickly to the local legal culture in their new country of residence. Most importantly, however, is this adaptation both asymmetric and benign: the evidence here shows that Euro-migrants are more willing to adapt their legal culture when they move to a more law-abiding part of Europe, but they are less willing (or perhaps just less able) to adapt their legal culture when they move to a less law-abiding and more ‘informal’ society. Overall therefore, increasing migration across the old communist border is likely to exert a net positive influence on the popular legal culture across Europe taken as a whole.

A countervailing force

PHILOSOPHY OF TRADE UNIONRIGHTS□ EGALITARIANISM A countervailing force Thereis an important correlation internationally between countries withstronger tradeunion movements and greater equality RICHARD WILKINSON, Emeritus Professor of Social Epidemiology and author of The Spirit Level with Kate Pickett Income widened Robert Wade differences rapidly gave over an in illustration the many last countries few ofhow decades. large have Income widened rapidlyover the last few decades. Robert Wadegavean illustration ofhowlarge the changesin the distribution of incomehad beenintheUSA.Interviewed inthedocumentary TheFlaw, he said thatthe fallin the shareof incomegoingto the bottom90 percentof the populationrepresented an annual transfer of roughly one and a halftrillion dollarsto thetop one percent. He pointsout thatthistookplace "ina stabledemocracy withthegovernments that werepromoting thisupwardredistribution being re-elected timeand timeagain."How has this happenedand how can itbe putright? Changes in income distribution duringthe twentieth century have a similar pattern across manycountries. Incomedifferences werehighin the1920sbut,during the1930s,theydiminished dramatically. Inequalitythen remainedlow or continuedto diminish untilincomedifferences started to widenagainfrom sometime after the endofthe1970s.TheNobelPrizewinning economistPaul Krugman attributes thesechangesto 'polities'. He givesprideofplace forthenarrowingofincomedifferences in theUSAduring the 1930sto Roosevelt's NewDeal. Buteventhough FDR was the conduitforthesechangesin the USA,there weresimilar declinesin inequality in othercountries. The scale ofincomedifferences looks broadlyU-shaped duringthe twentieth centuryin many countries- the decline in inequality duringthe 1930s,followedby low inequality whichlastedthrough untilthe 1970s, onlyto be followedby risinginequality again from the1980sand/or 1990s. These changeswereofcoursepartofa much widerpattern ofprogressive socialand economicpolicy whichincluded thedevelopment ofwelfaresystems and of protective legislation coveringemployment , housingand consumerrights. Perhapsthemostimportant driver forthislong U-shapedpattern of inequality was thewaxing andthenthewaningofthefearand influence of socialism and communism. The greatdepression ofthe1930s(triggered bythefinancial collapse of 1929) was seen by manyas the collapse of capitalism whichMarxism had longpredicted. The growing influence of Communism, aided by the SovietUnion,the strength of the trade unionmovement and ofsocialist parties inmany Europeancountries, influenced social attitudes andpolicyon inequality from the1920sonwards. Withtheend ofWWIIcame a rapidincreasein thenumber of communist countries. Fromthen untilthe later1960s,estimates suggestedthat, regardless oftheother failings ofthesesocieties, their economiesweregrowing as fast, or faster, thantheeconomiesof themarket democracies. Norcouldthegrowing technical prowessofthe Soviet Union,demonstrated by the successful launchofSputnik in 1957,be ignored. The fear was of a system whichinitially seemedas ifit might be moreefficient. Onlyinthe1970sdidthe reputation foreconomicefficiency ofthecentrally planned economies become seriouslytarnished ,and notuntilthe1980swerethesesocietieswidelyseen as failing. Comparisons ofthehealth differences between Easternand WesternEurope seem to indicate some of theunderlying trends. Untilaboutthe end of the 1960s,lifeexpectancy improved at least as fastin Easternas in Western Europe. Several Eastern European countries hadbetter life expectancy thanWestern Europe.EastGermany, thoughpoorer,had better lifeexpectancy than WestGermany. But fromabout 1970 onwards, healthceased to improvethroughout Eastern Europe and the SovietUnion.It continuedto improve intheWest, andbytheendofthe1980s all WesternEuropeancountries had betterlife expectancythan all EasternEuropean ones. During the1980scommunism ceasedtobe a real threat totheWestandtheregimes inthesecountries finally collapsedin 1989-90. Asthethreat of communism diminished, incomedifferences in theWeststarted towidenagainandtowards the end of thetwentieth century inequality had, in manycases,returned tolevelsnotseensincethe 1920s. Ofcoursemanyanalyseshavetried to identify thecausesofchangesininequality - particularly thecausesofthewidening ofincomedifferences whichhas takenplace overthelast30 yearsor so. Mostoftheseanalyses haveconcerned themselveswithstatistical analyses restricted tofactors whichcan be measuredquantitatively and are therefore blindto the ideologicaland political factorswhich explain why so manydifferent components - changesintaxrates, weakening of tradeunionpower,thewaningof welfaresystems ,denationalisation, financial deregulation oftenmovedtogether , and whytherewere no effective countervailing redistributive policies. The evidencethatfearofcommunism exerted an important influence on incomedistribution in non-communist countries can also be foundin otherpartsof the world.A 1993 WorldBank reportentitledTheEast Asian Miracle , argued thatsimilar forceswere at workin whatwere thencalled'theAsianTigereconomies'- Japan, Republicof Korea, Taiwan, Singapore,Hong Kong,Thailand, Malaysiaand Indonesia.Under policieswhichcametobe called"shared growth" theyall reducedtheirincomeinequality during thedecadesfrom I960 to 1980.TheWorldBank authorssuggestthatthismove towardsgreater equalitywas drivenby governments in each country trying to gainpopularsupportto ward INTERNATIONAL union rights Page 24Volume 18Issue 4201 2 PHILOSOPHY OF TRADE UNIONRIGHTS□ EGALITARIANISM offthethreat from communism which,in many countries was onlytoo apparent. In terms ofinequality, itlooksas ifthefearof socialism andcommunism helpedmakecapitalist societiesverymuch more humane than they might otherwise havebeen.Butthat hasnotbeen theonlymotivation forredistributive policies.In bothworldwars,Britainbecame much more equal. In his essay War and Social Policy , Titmuss saysthatthegovernment believedthat "togainthecooperation of themasses"in the war effort "thesocial pyramid had to be flattened " so that peoplefelt that theburdenofwar was equallyshared.Notonlywere taxesmade muchmoreprogressive and incomedifferences narrowed, buttheBeveridge report, whichlaid out plansfora welfarestateto put an end to want,disease,ignorance, squalorand idleness, was publishedin one ofthedarkest periodsof thewarwhenyoumight otherwise haveexpected suchexpensesto be furthest from theminds ofpoliticians. Examplessuchas thesesuggest thatthemost powerful...

Inequality and Human Rights: Who Controls What, When, and How

This article tests the empirical relationship between inequality and the protection of personal integrity rights using a cross-national time-series data set for 162 countries for the years 1980–2004. The data comprise measures of land inequality, income inequality, and a combined factor score for personal integrity rights protection, while the analysis controls for additional sets of explanatory variables related to development, political regimes, ethnic composition, and domestic conflict. The analysis shows robust support for the empirical relationship between income inequality and personal integrity rights abuse across the whole sample of countries as well as for distinct subsets, including non-communist countries and non-OECD countries. The hypothesized effect of land inequality is also born out by the data, although its effects are less substantial and less robust across different methods of estimation. Additional variables with explanatory weight include the level of income, democracy, ethnic fragmentation, domestic conflict, and population size. Sensitivity analysis suggests that the results are not due to reverse causation, misspecification or omitted variable bias. The analysis is discussed in the context of inequality and rights abuse in specific country cases and the policy implications of the results are considered in the conclusion.

India–Vietnam Relations: Need for Enhanced Cooperation

Improved India–Vietnam relations are guided both by their common historical experiences and their mutual concerns in the post-cold war context. Both have suffered aggression from China in the past and had good relations with the former Soviet Union. In fact, India was the only non-communist country to recognize the unified Vietnam and, ever since, they have had a friendly relationship, one that has stood the test of time. However, in the post-cold war context the shadow of China looms large over this relationship. As India's ‘Look East’ policy matures, New Delhi is now seeking to engage countries in the Chinese periphery. The changing geostrategic dynamics have also forced Vietnam to forge greater strategic cooperation with India. This paper argues that India has to identify potential additional areas of cooperation and proactively engage Vietnam to further strengthen this relationship.

The first wave of the Soviet oil offensive: The Anglo-American Alliance and the flow of ‘Red Oil’ to Finland during the 1950s

During the 1950s, many observers regarded the expansion of Soviet oil exports as a serious threat to Western political and economic interests. Finland was the first non-communist European country that started to buy Soviet oil on a large scale. This made the country vulnerable to Soviet political pressure. An examination of the Finnish case indicates that Anglo-American governments adopted a much more complex attitude towards the emergence of the Soviet Union as an exporter of oil than the Cold War rhetoric would suggest. The US and British governments were not automatically willing to support their oil companies or to try to block Soviet oil exports. Instead of seeing Soviet oil exports to Finland simply as a threat to Western interests, the Foreign Office and the State Department considered the precise implications that Finnish purchases of Soviet oil would have on Western strategic interests on a case-by-case basis. Many other government departments were more interested in promoting their own departmental interests.

TRANSPORTATION REGIONS AND THE EASTWARD INTEGRATION OF EUROPE

ABSTRACTTransportation facilities and performance indicate the prospects for East‐West integration in Europe. The purpose of this study is to identify and delineate regions that present particular challenges for the optimistic enlargement policy of the European Union (EU). A sequence of statistical methods – correlation, regression, and cluster analysis – reveal that the East‐West dichotomy between former communist and non‐communist countries was still the strongest cleavage in Europe as recently as 1997. Secondary cleavages include western subgroups – more or less road oriented – and three eastern subgroups – a Central and Eastern European (CEE) core, southeastern countries, and particularly underdeveloped countries that also have southeasterly location. Results of four cluster methods persistently reveal differences between the established EU members (15 as of 2003) and the eight former communist countries included in the 2004 accession. They also indicate that the eight are, indeed, the best candidates from the former Soviet bloc.

Political Structure and India's Economic Reforms of the 1990s

HE ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS launched 1991 constitute a watershed India's economic history. Until then, despite the liberalization pushed forward during the 1980s under Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, remained a comprehensively and stringently controlled economy, both internally and externally. Indeed,Joshi and Little maintain that in June 1991 was the most autarkic non-communist country the world, while the IMF notes that was one of the most heavily regulated economies the world. I thus represented a strong case of economic nationalism, combining high levels of external protection and internal regulation, as illustrated by Box Al figure 1, which conceptualizes different possible balances between economic globalization and economic nationalism.2 It is into this scene that reforms were dramatically introduced 1991. There was, no doubt, continuity with the reforms of the 1980s, but there was also a marked acceleration, indeed a clear break with the pattern of what had been done until then. With little evident embarrassment, the top leadership now made a shift what critics called a U-turn from the state to the market, openly and enthusiastically embracing globalization and integration of the Indian economy into the world economy and initiating the dismantlement of physical controls along a broad front of the Indian economy. Although not all that was intended was achieved, a substantial movement took place the direction of globalization and liberalization. As Raja Chelliah noted, These reforms taken together constitute a comprehensive and thoroughgoing overhaul of the economic policy regime. Similarly, the World Bank declared that India has fundamentally altered its development paradigm and that the reforms ended four decades of planning and have initiated a quiet economic revolution.3

The Evolution of Soviet Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia: Implications for Russian Foreign Policy

acterized by periods of activism in certain states and bouts of benign neglect in others. The lack of a sustained Soviet commitment to Southeast Asia is directly related to turbulent political events in the twentieth-century international system. The bipolar character of the international system of the twentieth-century shaped and defined the role of the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia, in some ways serving as a constraint to Soviet behavior and in other ways providing the Soviet leadership with opportunities. Initially, the Soviet Union sought to gain influence through the support of communist revolutionary movements that existed, with varying degrees of influence, in virtually every state in the region. Later, the Soviet Union developed close relations with the countries of Indochina, particularly Vietnam, and sought to expand those relationships through political alliances and massive amounts of aid. In the latter part of the 1980s, Soviet foreign policy in Southeast Asia had begun to change in tone and content. The changes were the result of Soviet domestic reform imperatives; the Soviets recognized the value of expanding relations with noncommunist countries and extending policy options to include bilateral trade, and they reassessed relations with allies in Indochina. The collapse of the Soviet state following the 1991 August coup attempt and the end of the Cold War accelerated these trends in Southeast Asian foreign policy. The rationale directing foreign policy shifted from a military to a developmental imperative. International factors have made it possible for Russia to