Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Research Articles

Surgical challenges in Non-combatant Evacuation Operations

BackgroundGlobal uncertainties have prompted nations to adopt vigilant approaches to safeguard their citizens. Recent crises have compelled Western nations to undertake evacuations, ranging from peaceful scenarios to urgent military interventions. In April 2023, Sudan descended into civil war, prompting France to orchestrate a complex evacuation operation leveraging prepositioned forces in Djibouti. Materials & MethodsThis retrospective observational study aims to analyze the surgical challenges encountered during Operation SAGITTAIRE (OS), focusing on human, technical, and logistical requirements for successful military interventions in multinational civilian populations. ResultsOS successfully evacuated 1017 individuals of 84 nationalities from Khartoum using road, sea, and air routes. Special forces teams, including the Surgical Life-saving Module (SLM), were mobilized alongside conventional military elements. The Joint Medical Surgical Center (JMSC) in Djibouti served as a permanent medical facility with comprehensive facilities and staff. Air Medical evacuations were performed for vicitms and surgical interventions were conducted, including damage control surgery, orthopedic procedures, and debridements. Five surgical evaluations and four surgical procedures were performed. The operation spanned 96 hours without death. The SLM, deployed in Khartoum and within an aircraft, played a crucial role. DiscussionOS highlighted the need for a comprehensive health support system. Challenges in assessing health needs led to the establishment of a substantial and adaptable system. The report emphasizes the importance of a comprehensive approach to support Non-combatant Evacuation Operations in French Doctrine. ConclusionOS showcased the French Health Military Service's capabilities in deploying a comprehensive damage control chain in challenging environments. This fatality-free success underlines the effectiveness of coordinated resuscitation, damage control, and transportation. Evacuation operations in non-combatant settings during civil wars pose formidable challenges, requiring a modular and adaptable support concept. Coordination, communication, logistical preparation, and training are crucial elements for successful management of such operations.

China's Strategy to Maintain its Non-interference Policy: The Safety of Chinese Travellers in the Middle East

The Middle East is becoming a hotspot for thousands of Chinese businesses with hundreds of thousands of Chinese nationals working and living throughout the region, as well as several million Chinese tourists. Traditionally, China's policies towards the Middle East were based on the principle of non-interference. In face of the increasing number and frequency of acts of violence against Chinese nationals and assets in the region, this study examines whether China's strategy to maintain its non-interference policy can meet the challenge of protecting the safety and rights of Chinese tourists in the Middle East. The main argument is that China's approach to maintaining its non-interference policy is part of a carefully devised strategy that suits the country's doctrine. China's leadership favours a global proactive diplomatic approach which includes five diplomatic and military measures identified in this article: non-combatant evacuation operations and peacekeeping operations; construction of infrastructure and logistical capacities; legal framework and security cooperation; mediation and conflict management; and consular protection. This proactive diplomatic approach is also suitable to meet the challenge of the safety and rights of Chinese tourists in the region.

Modeling and transportation planning for US noncombatant evacuation operations in South Korea

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate US noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) in South Korea and devise planning and management procedures that improve the efficiency of those missions. Design/methodology/approach It formulates a time-staged network model of the South Korean noncombatant evacuation system as a mixed integer linear program to determine an optimal flow configuration that minimizes the time required to complete an evacuation. This solution considers the capacity and resource constraints of multiple transportation modes and effectively allocates the limited assets across a time-staged network to create a feasible evacuation plan. That solution is post-processed and a vehicle routing procedure then produces a high resolution schedule for each individual asset throughout the entire duration of the NEO. Findings This work makes a clear improvement in the decision-making and resource allocation methodology currently used in a NEO on the Korea peninsula. It immediately provides previously unidentifiable information regarding the scope and requirements of a particular evacuation scenario and then produces an executable schedule for assets to facilitate mission accomplishment. Originality/value The significance of this work is not relegated only to evacuation operations on the Korean peninsula; there are numerous other NEO and natural disaster related scenarios that can benefit from this approach.

Securing the Maritime Silk Road in South Asia and the Indian Ocean

Securing the Maritime Silk Road in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Nilanthi Samaranayake (bio) For roughly fifteen years, China's commercial and military activities in South Asia and the wider Indian Ocean have caused increasing concern about its intentions in the region. China specialists have examined the country's energy interests and naval planning along its sea lines of communication.1 The proliferation of commercial infrastructure projects now branded under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has heightened these concerns about China's presence in the Indian Ocean region. Prominent infrastructure efforts include port development in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, while lower-profile efforts include tunnel and bridge construction in Bangladesh and Maldives. These developments have raised questions about how China is attempting to secure the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR)—the waterway "road" component of BRI—in South Asia and across the Indian Ocean region more broadly. Because Pakistan will be examined by another essay in this roundtable and the China-Pakistan relationship is long-standing and predates BRI activities, this essay focuses on what China's activities look like elsewhere in maritime South Asia and out to critical Indian Ocean chokepoints. Despite notable changes in the country's presence in the Indian Ocean over the last decade, to what extent is China securing its commercial interests using naval and maritime forces? If it indeed aims to do this in a comprehensive way, then the results are modest at present. The first section of this essay examines the evidence that China is working to secure its interests in the region. The next section describes challenges to China's efforts to do so and the galvanizing effects of its activities thus far. The essay will conclude by emphasizing the importance of monitoring potential indicators of a substantive shift in the Indian Ocean and South Asian order, [End Page 21] despite the limited scope of China's activities to secure the MSR to date, and by considering the implications for U.S. interests in the region. Is China Securing the MSR? The clearest examples of China acting to secure the MSR are the counterpiracy and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) conducted by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and the establishment of a base in the far fringes of the Indian Ocean at the chokepoint in Djibouti. Since 2008, Beijing has sent a PLA Navy task force to the Gulf of Aden. Originating out of UN resolutions to combat piracy,2 China's military vessels have transited the Indian Ocean for the past decade, providing escort activity that aims to secure the safe passage of shipping, including for Chinese commercial vessels. China has used this mission to justify the deployment of submarines. These were clearly not in support of counterpiracy but instead appeared to be aimed at gaining operational experience far from home for this platform.3 As Admiral (ret.) Michael McDevitt observes, at any given time the PLA Navy has four to five surface ships and two support ships transiting the Indian Ocean, plus occasionally a submarine.4 India's chief of naval staff Admiral Sunil Lanba estimates a similar number (six to eight ships).5 Second, China conducted NEOs in response to domestic instability in Libya in 2011 and Yemen in 2015. In total, roughly 35,000 Chinese nationals were evacuated from Libya using Chinese civilian and military aircraft and ships,6 and nearly 1,000 Chinese and foreign nationals were evacuated from Yemen.7 Through such operations, China secured an important MSR asset—its citizens working in these countries. [End Page 22] Third, China established a military base in Djibouti in 2017. Although China had stated for decades that it had no intention of developing overseas bases, its counterpiracy operations as well as NEOs pointed to the potential benefits of having logistical support in place.8 The base leverages Djibouti's location at the Bab el-Mandeb Strait chokepoint, where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden. China's presence at this far corner of the Indian Ocean shows the expanse of its operational reach across the region. Challenges to China Securing the MSR Through conducting counterpiracy operations and NEOs and establishing a base...

Policy Research on Japanese Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) in a Korean Peninsula Crisis

Policy Research on Japanese Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) in a Korean Peninsula Crisis

The forcible protection of nationals and non-combatant evacuation operations

ABSTRACTIndia possesses the world’s largest overseas population (31.2 million). This geographically dispersed overseas population contributes more to India financially every year than Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Aid put together. India has come a long way from the Nehruvian era policy of active disassociation between the Indian State and overseas Indians. The need to protect or rescue Indians residing abroad may arise due to any number of scenarios ranging from natural disasters to civil disorder to terrorist action to full scale combat. This article examines whether it is possible for India to engage in the forcible protection/rescue of its nationals. It also examines the issue of whether India must limit itself to only protecting/rescuing its citizens or whether it can also protect/rescue its nationals.

UK–China Cooperation on Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations

Edward Schwarck discusses the diplomatic and operational rationale for why and how London and Beijing might cooperate on non-combatant evacuation operations, and the attendant benefits and drawbacks. He concludes with a list of policy recommendations for both Britain and China as they plan for the future.

How Should the State Manage the Contemporary Expectation of Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations?

Globalisation is challenging the conventional, state-centric concept of security while politicians perpetuate the myth that the state can, and will, offer absolute security to its citizens overseas. David Bond explores how the scale of the challenge of a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) could already be beyond the capacity of many states in the current era of increasingly diverse security threats, reduced capital military assets and diminishing defence resources.

A Global People’s Liberation Army: Possibilities, Challenges, and Opportunities

For more than a decade, China has been developing the necessary expeditionary military capabilities to protect its interests beyond the East Asia region.1 As China assumes a larger role in world affairs, these interests have expanded substantially and increasingly require the capacity to secure investments and business ventures around the globe, including the millions of People's Republic of China (PRC) citizens living abroad, access to energy and other natural resources, and continued access to critical shipping lanes. To this end, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has begun to engage in missions far beyond its borders, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), noncombatant evacuation operations, counterpiracy operations, and the protection of sea lines of communication (SLOC).While hardly surprising given China's global interests, the development of military expeditionary capabilities has raised concerns both in the United States and abroad about what role the PLA will play in global affairs and how that role may affect or constrain other countries. Examples include wariness about China's intentions following the announcement of a PLA logistics base in Djibouti, anxiety in New Delhi after PLA Navy (PLAN) submarines unexpectedly surfaced in the Indian Ocean, and challenges from the United States and others to Chinese naval patrols, conducted with some of the PLAN's most advanced combatants and submarines, in the farthest reaches of the South China Sea and associated disputed waters.2 Increasingly, China is able to shape the international security environment overseas with its military capabilities, posing both opportunities and challenges for U.S. leaders.Under what conditions will China decide to employ military capabilities abroad, and will this development be positive or negative for the United States and the international order?3 Current research fails to answer this question adequately because of a narrow focus on related but fundamentally different classes of behavior. For example, there is a strong scholarly tradition that evaluates Chinese thinking on the use of force but focuses exclusively on regional and border-related disputes and mainly nontraditional operations overseas.4 Another research agenda focuses on China's evolving participation in UN peacekeeping operations, but these are cases in which Chinese national interests are not directly at stake and therefore may not be a valid comparison.5 Last, scholars and practitioners often focus on how China employs its military in specific territorial disputes, such as the South China Sea-but again, how and when China utilizes its military to promote claims close to its shores provides little insight into the leadership's willingness and ability to use these military tools far from China's shores in sovereignty issues.6The topic may be understudied because Chinese involvement abroad outside the confines of UN peacekeeping operations is a nascent phenomenon and presents methodological challenges. There are few cases of Chinese expeditionary operations from which to derive causal and descriptive inferences, with the Gulf of Aden deployments and select noncombatant evacuation operations being the exceptions. A recent volume brainstormed what operational capabilities China is likely to develop for its expeditionary force by 2025 but stopped short of determining the factors that would shape its deployment.7This article seeks to better understand China's preferences, its strategies to achieve preferred outcomes, and the strategic setting in which Chinese leaders will be making real-time decisions. To do this, the article evaluates five main drivers of Chinese security behavior: (1) the leadership's agenda, (2) domestic expectations for intervention, (3) the power-projection model China adopts, (4) the nature of the situation and impact on the country's security interests, and (5) global and U.S. receptivity to a larger Chinese role. …

Operation Deference

Non-combatant evacuation operations are an often unacknowledged yet important activity performed by the military, in often difficult circumstances that require effective multinational co-operation. Michael Codner highlights the general features that characterise this type of operation, while Craig Sutherland provides a detailed account of the 2011 evacuation of noncombatants from Libya.

Introduction

Non-combatant evacuation operations are an often unacknowledged yet important activity performed by the military, in often difficult circumstances that require effective multinational co-operation. Michael Codner highlights the general features that characterise this type of operation, while Craig Sutherland provides a detailed account of the 2011 evacuation of noncombatants from Libya.

A liberal vision for the US-Japanese alliance

To ensure its longevity and usefulness, the US-Japanese alliance must become as close and as balanced, and principle-based, as the US-UK special relationship. This requires the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to expand their military missions beyond national defence and deterrence to operations inspired by liberal principles. These missions include the maintenance of navigational freedom, humanitarian relief, hostage rescue, non-combatant evacuation operations, peacekeeping, counter-piracy and counter-terrorism efforts, and the prevention of humanitarian tragedies. In turn, the US should welcome greater cooperation with Japan in crisis decision-making. Tokyo and Washington should also work, as a long-term goal, towards a multilateral collective-security arrangement for the Asia-Pacific region that includes China.

A liberal vision for the US-Japanese alliance

To ensure its longevity and usefulness, the US-Japanese alliance must become as close and as balanced, and principle-based, as the US-UK special relationship. This requires the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to expand their military missions beyond national defence and deterrence to operations inspired by liberal principles. These missions include the maintenance of navigational freedom, humanitarian relief, hostage rescue, non-combatant evacuation operations, peacekeeping, counter-piracy and counter-terrorism efforts, and the prevention of humanitarian tragedies. In turn, the US should welcome greater cooperation with Japan in crisis decision-making. Tokyo and Washington should also work, as a long-term goal, towards a multilateral collective-security arrangement for the Asia-Pacific region that includes China.