Currently, the study of religious knowledge is carried out mainly within the framework of religious epistemology, which does not exclude its consideration from the standpoint of a non-cognitive approach, for example, fideism. However, the greatest interest is in cognitivism, whose proponents explore the problems of religious knowledge using a number of standards of classical epistemology, yet at the same time modify them, creating standards of religious epistemology proper. One of the authors who develop this direction is J. Greco, who continues the tradition of studying evidence ("testimonial evidence") and its role in the formation and functioning of religious consciousness. In an effort to organize witness knowledge, he tries to typologize it, distinguishing, on the one hand, knowledge presented as a set of witness data, and, on the other hand, as knowledge transmitted and assimilated in the processes of communication that take place, for example, within a religious community. J. Greco criticizes the arguments of skeptics who claim that it is impossible that the evidence can serve as a sufficient basis for religious belief. The article emphasizes the simplicity of such an approach, since J. Greco does not distinguish the types of knowledge that are formed as a result of evidence (in particular, reflexive and value-based knowledge, which are formed and assimilated in different ways), which are different in their epistemological characteristics. At the same time, he focuses on a problem that is significant not only for religious, but also for classical epistemology, namely, the influence of the moral authority of a particular form of comprehension of being (science, religion, etc.) and its specific representatives who develop the relevant knowledge on the assimilation of certain epistemic truths by both specialized communities (for example, the scientific community) and society as a whole. The philosophical arguments of J. Greco shows that the theme of religious evidence within the framework of classical epistemology is not reduced to banal statements that they do not meet the criteria generated by scientific knowledge. These reflections touch upon a number of topics relevant to this epistemology. At the same time, these arguments point to the need to develop a religious epistemology based on the specifics of religious knowledge with its own verification criteria and methodology for obtaining it.