Non-causal Explanations Research Articles

Explaining the Big Bang

Abstract The Big Bang is the cause of every event in our Universe and hence it explains all subsequent cosmic history. But can the Big Bang itself be explained? This paper explores a number of different styles of explanation that might be offered. These include causal explanations of the Big Bang either by a physical or a non-physical cause: here the paper focusses especially on Roger Penrose’s conformal cyclic cosmology. They also include non-causal explanations of the Big Bang in terms of an underlying physical or non-physical fundamental basis for the Universe or in terms of fundamental physical laws.

The Explanatory Power of Discourse Analysis

This paper discusses the explanatory power of discourse analysis, an approach to typically considered one of the main qualitative methods for data analysis. Although discourse analysis is typically not used to develop explanatory models, some have claimed that discourse models can causally explain social phenomena, such as institutional change. I analyze a case of institutional change to discuss and provide arguments for two claims. First, discourse analysis cannot generate causal explanations of social phenomena. Secondly, discourse analysis can generate non-causal explanations, specifically constitutive explanations of social phenomena. I conclude the paper by discussing possible implications for social research.

Higher incidence of paediatric inflammatory bowel disease by increasing latitude in Norway, but stable incidence by age.

To examine possible geographical and temporal differences in the incidence of childhood-onset inflammatory bowel disease (IBD) in Norway, motivated by previous research indicating relevant environmental factors explaining changing epidemiology. We analysed data from children born in Norway from 2004 to 2012 (n = 541 036) in a registry-based nationwide study. After validating registry diagnoses against medical records, we defined IBD as ≥2 entries of International Classification of Diseases, 10th revision (ICD-10) codes K50, K51 and K52.3 in the Norwegian Patient registry. We estimated hazard ratios (HR) for IBD across four geographical regions with a south-to-north gradient and the incidence by period of birth. By the end of follow-up on 31 December 2020, 799 IBD diagnoses were identified (Crohn's disease: n = 465; ulcerative colitis, n = 293, IBD: unclassified, n = 41). Compared to children in the southernmost region, there was almost a two-fold HR for IBD in children in the most Northern region (HR = 1.94, 95% Cl = 1.47-2.57; Mid region: HR = 1.68, 95% CI = 1.29-2.19, ptrend <0.001). These estimates remained largely unchanged after adjustment for potential confounding factors. The cohorts born in 2004-2006 and 2010-2012 had comparable cumulative incidences, with a slightly higher incidence for those born in 2007-2009. We observed an increase in the risk of IBD by increasing latitude which may suggest that environmental factors influence the development of IBD, although non-causal explanations cannot be ruled out.

Mind the gap: noncausal explanations of dual properties

I identify and characterize a type of noncausal explanation in physics. I first introduce a distinction, between the physical properties of a system, and the representational properties of the mathematical expressions of the system’s physical properties. Then I introduce a novel kind of property, which I shall call a dual property. This is a special kind of representational property, one for which there is an interpretation as a physical property. It is these dual properties that, I claim, are amenable to noncausal (mathematical, in fact) explanations. I discuss a typical example of such a dual property, and an example of an explanation as to why that dual property holds (the explanation of the quantization of the linear momentum).

Are Mathematical Explanations Causal Explanations in Disguise?

AbstractThere is a major debate as to whether there are non-causal mathematical explanations of physical facts that show how the facts under question arise from a degree of mathematical necessity considered stronger than that of contingent causal laws. We focus on Marc Lange’s account of distinctively mathematical explanations to argue that purported mathematical explanations are essentially causal explanations in disguise and are no different from ordinary applications of mathematics. This is because these explanations work not by appealing to what the world must be like as a matter of mathematical necessity but by appealing to various contingent causal facts.

Causal and non-causal explanations in theology: the case of Aquinas's primary–secondary causation distinction

Abstract The basic question of this article is whether Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of divine providence through his understanding of primary and secondary causation can be understood as a theological causal or non-causal explanation. To answer this question, I will consider some contemporary discussions about the nature of causal and non-causal explanations in philosophy of science and metaphysics, in order to integrate them into a theological discourse that appeals to the classical distinction between God as first cause and creatures as secondary causes to explain God's presence and providence in the created universe. My main argument will hold that, even if there are some philosophical models of explanation that seem to allow one to suggest that, at least partially, this doctrine could be seen as a non-causal theological explanation, there are other models that offer seemingly stronger reasons to see this doctrine in full as a causal theological explanation.

Causal Constraints in the Life and Social Sciences

Abstract This paper examines constraints and their role in scientific explanation. Common views in the philosophical literature suggest that constraints are non-causal and that they provide non-causal explanations. While much of this work focuses on examples from physics, this paper explores constraints from other fields, including neuroscience, physiology, and the social sciences. I argue that these cases involve constraints that are causal and that provide a unique type of causal explanation. This paper clarifies what it means for a factor to be a constraint, when such constraints are causal, and how they figure in scientific explanation.

On the Role of Erotetic Constraints in Noncausal Explanations

Abstract In noncausal explanations, some noncausal facts (such as mathematical, modal, or metaphysical) are used to explain some physical facts. However, precisely because these explanations abstract away from causal facts, they face two challenges: (1) it is not clear why one rather than the other noncausal explanantia would be relevant for the explanandum; and (2) why would standing in a particular explanatory relation (e.g., “counterfactual dependence,” “constraint,” “entailment,” “constitution,” and “grounding”), and not in some other, be explanatory. I develop an explanatory relevance account that is based on erotetic constraints and show how it addresses these two challenges.

An Epistemic Approach to Ground

AbstractRecent enthusiasm for grounding often begins by observing that inquiry in metaphysics (and other areas) features a distinctive species of noncausal explanation. Having labeled this species “grounding explanation,” it’s a short step to the conclusion that we need a philosophical theory of grounding itself: an allegedly fundamental relation of metaphysical dependency between facts, such that a “grounding explanation” of some fact succeeds by providing information about what “grounds” that fact. This short step is hasty. For another live option is to accept that grounding explanation is a legitimate form of explanation, but to give it a thoroughly epistemic treatment, one that does not see it as involving any sort of special metaphysical relationship or structure at all. This paper sketches such a treatment, drawing inspiration from reflections on explanatory structure in mathematics.

Non-causal Explanations in the Humanities: Some Examples

Abstract The humanistic disciplines aim to offer explanations of a wide variety of phenomena. Philosophical theories of explanation have focused mostly on explanations in the natural sciences; a much discussed theory of explanation is the causal theory of explanation. Recently it has come to be recognized that the sciences sometimes offer respectable explanations that are non-causal. This paper broadens the discussion by discussing explanations that are offered in the fields of history, linguistics, literary theory, and archaeology that do not seem to fit the causal theory of explanation. We conducted an exploratory survey in acclaimed humanities textbooks to find explicitly so-called explanations and analyze their nature. The survey suggests that non-causal explanations are an integral part of the humanities and that they are of distinct kinds. This paper describes three kinds that are suggested by our survey: teleological, formal, and normative explanations. We suggest that such humanistic explanations strengthen the case for explanatory pluralism.

Mathematical Explanation in Computer Science

AbstractThis note scouts a broad but underexplored class of explanations found in contemporary computer science. These explanations, which I call limitative explanations, explain why certain problems cannot be solved computationally. Limitative explanations are philosophically rich, but have not received the attention they deserve. The primary goals of this note are to isolate limitative explanations and provide a preliminary account of what makes them explanatory. On the account I favor, limitative explanations are a kind of non-causal mathematical explanation which depend on highly idealized models of computation.

Methodological deflationism and metaphysical grounding: from because via truth to ground

ABSTRACT The paper proposes a strategy for understanding metaphysical grounding in deflationary terms and, more generally, proposes a form of methodological deflationism with respect to the notions of ground. The idea is to define a deflationary is grounded in-predicate by appeal to the two-place non-causal connective ‘because’ and a deflationary truth predicate. To this end, we discuss the explanatory role of the truth-predicate in non-causal explanations and develop a theory of truth for the language of the ‘because’-connective. We argue that at least from a logical perspective our deflationary notion of ground is up to the task.

Mediterranean Diet and Cardiovascular Prevention: Why Analytical Observational Designs Do Support Causality and Not Only Associations.

Causal reductions in cardiovascular disease (CVD) with the Mediterranean diet (MedDiet) are supported by randomized trials, but the ability of nonrandomized studies to provide causal inferences in nutritional epidemiology is questioned. The “Seguimiento Universidad de Navarra” (SUN) project, conducted during 1999–2019 with 18,419 participants, was used to try to refute non-causal explanations for the inverse association found between adherence to the MedDiet and reduced CVD risk. A framework of different analytical strategies is proposed: alternative definitions of the exposure, exploration of residual confounding, resampling methods, depiction of absolute risks across the follow-up period, trial emulation, and negative controls. Additionally, we calculated the rate advancement period (RAP). We found that one standard deviation increase in the most frequently used MedDiet score was associated with a 29% relative reduction in CVD risk (95% Confidence Interval [CI] 14–41%), which is almost identical to that found in 2 randomized trials. The RAP of CVD would be postponed by an average of 7.9 years (95% CI: 1.6 to 14.2 years) by switching from low (MDS = 0 to2) to high (MDS = 7 to 9) adherence to the MedDiet in the fully adjusted model. Sensitivity analyses, graphical representations of absolute risks, trial emulation, and negative controls also supported causality. In conclusion, a framework of analytical approaches supported the causal effect of the MedDiet on CVD prevention using observational data. Similar methodology could be applied for causal inferences regarding other hypotheses.

Explanatory Asymmetry in Non-Causal Explanation

The problem of explanatory asymmetry remains a serious challenge for non-causal accounts of explanation. This paper proposes a novel solution, and it does so by appealing to the theoretical context in which an explanation is offered. The paper develops the problem of explanatory asymmetry for non-causal dependency accounts of explanation, focusing specifically on Alexander Reutlinger’s Counterfactual Theory of Explanation and recent work by Marc Lange and Lina Jansson. It defends the idea that nomological possibility with respect to a global theory is the right constraint on explanation, and it shows how this breaks the apparent symmetry in counterfactual dependence that is the source of the problem. This solution appeals to theoretical context, and the paper develops and defends the version of contextualism in explanation that is required.

In defense of really statistical explanations

According to Lange (2013, 2017), ?Really Statistical (RS) explanations? constitute an important kind of non-causalscientific explanation. However, Roski (2021) has argued that all alleged RS explanations are either causalexplanations or not explanations at all. In so arguing, Roski has invoked Kahneman?s (2011) interpretation of onealleged RS explanation. I employ Roski?s arguments as an opportunity to elaborate and defend RS explanations. Iargue that ?RS explanations? genuinely explain rather than deny the presuppositions of why-questions. I argue thatthe RS model is not excessively permissive in allowing some explanations to work purely statistically rather than bydescribing causal relations. I argue that Roski?s view that some ?RS explanations? operate by describing causalrelations fails to capture the kind of explanatory insight that RS explanations provide. I elaborate the notion of a?characteristically statistical phenomenon? that figures in the RS model and thereby explain how an RS explanationreveals that its explanandum is independent of any causal facts or specific chances, but rather depends only on ageneric sort of arrangement of chances. Finally, I argue that Roski misinterprets Kahneman, who actually holds thatthe explanation he discusses is a non-causal explanation that nicely fits the RS model. RS explanations constitutean important kind of non-causal scientific explanation.

Grounding Functionalism and Explanatory Unificationism

AbstractIn this essay, I propose a functionalist theory of grounding (functionalist-grounding). Specifically, I argue that grounding is a second-order phenomenon that is realized by relations that play the noncausal explanatoriness role. I also show that functionalist-grounding can deal with a powerful challenge. Appeals to explanatory unificationism have been made to argue that the success of noncausal explanations does not depend on the existence of grounding relations. Against this, I argue that a systematization involving functionalist-grounding is superior to its anti-relational counterpart.

Can Non-Causal Explanations Answer the Leibniz Question?

Abstract Leibniz is often cited as an authority when it comes to the formulation and answer strategy of the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” Yet much current research assumes that Leibniz advocates an unambiguous question and strategy for the answer. In this respect, one repeatedly finds the argument in the literature that alternative explanatory approaches to this question violate Leibniz’s intention, since he derives the question from the principle of sufficient reason and also demands a causal explanation to the question. In particular, the new research on non-causal explanatory strategies to the Leibniz question seems to concern this counter-argument. In this paper, however, I will argue that while Leibniz raises the question by means of the principle of sufficient reason, he even favours a non-causal explanatory strategy to the question. Thus, a more accurate Leibniz interpretation seems not only to legitimise but also to support non-causal explanations to the Leibniz question.

The Role of Philosophy of Science in Quantitative Linguistics

Abstract The paper aims to evaluate the role of the philosophy of science in contemporary quanti-tative linguistics. The primary goal is the reflection of the scientific methods and models of scientific explanations (Köhler 1986, 2012) used in quantitative linguistics. The paper shows that the current philosophy of science has adopted some new approaches to ex-planation that are conducive to quantitative linguistics (Craver, Darden 2013, Eck, Mennes 2016). Above all, the philosophy of science offers new models of non-causal explanations (Reutlinger, Saatsi 2018; Lange 2017). The paper’s primary goal is to propose a new topo-logical model of explanation in system-theoretical linguistics, following Kostić’s (2019a) and Huneman’s (2018) approaches. This model of explanation overcomes various difficul-ties of functional explanation, such as the nature of the structural axiom and the func-tional equivalents. Simultaneously, it establishes a non-causal form of linguistic explana-tion which builds on the previous analysis of quantitative linguists (Andres 2009; Ferrer-i-Cancho, Solé 2003; Hřebíček 2002).

Not so distinctively mathematical explanations: topology and dynamical systems

So-called ‘distinctively mathematical explanations’ (DMEs) are said to explain physical phenomena, not in terms of contingent causal laws, but rather in terms of mathematical necessities that constrain the physical system in question. Lange argues that the existence of four or more equilibrium positions of any double pendulum has a DME. Here we refute both Lange’s claim itself and a strengthened and extended version of the claim that would pertain to any n-tuple pendulum system on the ground that such explanations are actually causal explanations in disguise and their associated modal conditionals are not general enough to explain the said features of such dynamical systems. We argue and show that if circumscribing the antecedent for a necessarily true conditional in such explanations involves making a causal analysis of the problem, then the resulting explanation is not distinctively mathematical or non-causal. Our argument generalises to other dynamical systems that may have purported DMEs analogous to the one proposed by Lange, and even to some other counterfactual accounts of non-causal explanation given by Reutlinger and Rice.

Hamilton's rule: A non-causal explanation?

The explanatory power of Hamilton's rule, the main explanatory principle of social evolution theory, is an ongoing subject of controversy. In this paper, we reinforce the case for the considerable value of the regression-based version of the rule in explaining the evolution of social traits. Although we agree that the rule can have an organizing role in social evolution research, we maintain that it does not explain in virtue of citing causes or providing an organizing framework. Instead, we argue it either provides an explanation by constraint or a non-causal counterfactual explanation.