Abstract
Abstract In noncausal explanations, some noncausal facts (such as mathematical, modal, or metaphysical) are used to explain some physical facts. However, precisely because these explanations abstract away from causal facts, they face two challenges: (1) it is not clear why one rather than the other noncausal explanantia would be relevant for the explanandum; and (2) why would standing in a particular explanatory relation (e.g., “counterfactual dependence,” “constraint,” “entailment,” “constitution,” and “grounding”), and not in some other, be explanatory. I develop an explanatory relevance account that is based on erotetic constraints and show how it addresses these two challenges.
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