Noncausal Events Research Articles

The space contraction asymmetry in Michotte's launching effect.

Previous studies have found that, compared with noncausal events, spatial contraction exists between the causal object and the effect object due to the perceived causality. The present research aims to examine whether the causal object and the effect object have the same effect on spatial contraction. A modified launching effect, in which a bar bridges the spatial gap between the final position of the launcher and the initial position of the target, was adopted. Experiment 1 validates the absolute underestimation of the bar's length between the launcher and the target. Experiment 2a finds that in the direct launching effect, the perceived position of the bar's trailing edge that was contacted by the final launcher was displaced along the objects' direction of movement. Meanwhile, the perceived position of the bar's leading edge that was contacted by the initial target was displaced in opposite direction to the moving direction. The magnitude of the former's displacement was significantly larger than that of the latter, displaying a significant contraction asymmetry. Experiment 2b demonstrates that the contraction asymmetry did not result from the launcher remaining in contact with the edge of the bar. Experiment 3 indicates that contraction asymmetry showed a type of postdictive effect; that is, to some extent, this asymmetry depends on what happens after contact. In conclusion, the space between the causal object and effect object contracts asymmetrically in the launching effect, which implies that the causal object and effect object are perceived as shifting toward each other nonequidistantly in visual space.

Causal events enter awareness faster than non-causal events.

Philosophers have long argued that causality cannot be directly observed but requires a conscious inference (Hume, 1967). Albert Michotte however developed numerous visual phenomena in which people seemed to perceive causality akin to primary visual properties like colour or motion (Michotte, 1946). Michotte claimed that the perception of causality did not require a conscious, deliberate inference but, working over 70 years ago, he did not have access to the experimental methods to test this claim. Here we employ Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS)—an interocular suppression technique to render stimuli invisible (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005)—to test whether causal events enter awareness faster than non-causal events. We presented observers with ‘causal’ and ‘non-causal’ events, and found consistent evidence that participants become aware of causal events more rapidly than non-causal events. Our results suggest that, whilst causality must be inferred from sensory evidence, this inference might be computed at low levels of perceptual processing, and does not depend on a deliberative conscious evaluation of the stimulus. This work therefore supports Michotte’s contention that, like colour or motion, causality is an immediate property of our perception of the world.

Causal events enter awareness faster than non-causal events

Philosophers have long argued that causality cannot be directly observed but requires a conscious inference (Hume, 1967). Albert Michotte however developed numerous visual phenomena in which people seemed to perceive causality akin to primary visual properties like colour or motion (Michotte, 1946). Michotte claimed that the perception of causality did not require a conscious, deliberate inference but, working over 70 years ago, he did not have access to the experimental methods to test this claim. Here we employ Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS)—an interocular suppression technique to render stimuli invisible (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005)—to test whether causal events enter awareness faster than non-causal events. We presented observers with ‘causal’ and ‘non-causal’ events, and found consistent evidence that participants become aware of causal events more rapidly than non-causal events. Our results suggest that, whilst causality must be inferred from sensory evidence, this inference might be computed at low levels of perceptual processing, and does not depend on a deliberative conscious evaluation of the stimulus. This work therefore supports Michotte’s contention that, like colour or motion, causality is an immediate property of our perception of the world.

Identification of Master Regulator Genes in Human Periodontitis

Analytic approaches confined to fold-change comparisons of gene expression patterns between states of health and disease are unable to distinguish between primary causal disease drivers and secondary noncausal events. Genome-wide reverse engineering approaches can facilitate the identification of candidate genes that may distinguish between causal and associative interactions and may account for the emergence or maintenance of pathologic phenotypes. In this work, we used the algorithm for the reconstruction of accurate cellular networks (ARACNE) to analyze a large gene expression profile data set (313 gingival tissue samples from a cross-sectional study of 120 periodontitis patients) obtained from clinically healthy (n = 70) or periodontitis-affected (n = 243) gingival sites. The generated transcriptional regulatory network of the gingival interactome was subsequently interrogated with the master regulator inference algorithm (MARINA) and gene expression signature data from healthy and periodontitis-affected gingiva. Our analyses identified 41 consensus master regulator genes (MRs), the regulons of which comprised between 25 and 833 genes. Regulons of 7 MRs (HCLS1, ZNF823, XBP1, ZNF750, RORA, TFAP2C, and ZNF57) included >500 genes each. Gene set enrichment analysis indicated differential expression of these regulons in gingival health versus disease with a type 1 error between 2% and 0.5% and with >80% of the regulon genes in the leading edge. Ingenuity pathway analysis showed significant enrichment of 36 regulons for several pathways, while 6 regulons (those of MRs HCLS1, IKZF3, ETS1, NHLH2, POU2F2, and VAV1) were enriched for >10 pathways. Pathways related to immune system signaling and development were the ones most frequently enriched across all regulons. The unbiased analysis of genome-wide regulatory networks can enhance our understanding of the pathobiology of human periodontitis and, after appropriate validation, ultimately identify target molecules of diagnostic, prognostic, or therapeutic value.

Linking Language and Events: Spatiotemporal Cues Drive Children’s Expectations About the Meanings of Novel Transitive Verbs

ABSTRACTHow do children map linguistic representations onto the conceptual structures that they encode? In the present studies, we provided 3–4-year-old children with minimal-pair scene contrasts in order to determine the effect of particular event properties on novel verb learning. Specifically, we tested whether spatiotemporal cues to causation also inform children’s interpretation of transitive verbs either with or without the causal/inchoative alternation (She broke the lamp/the lamp broke). In Experiment 1, we examined spatiotemporal continuity. Children saw scenes with puppets that approached a toy in a distinctive manner, and toys that lit up or played a sound. In the causal events, the puppet contacted the object, and activation was immediate. In the noncausal events, the puppet stopped short before reaching the object, and the effect occurred after a short pause (apparently spontaneously). Children expected novel verbs used in the inchoative transitive/intransitive alternation to refer to spatiotemporally intact causal interactions rather than to “gap” control scenes. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the temporal order of sub-events, holding spatial relationships constant, and provided evidence for only one verb frame (either transitive or intransitive). Children mapped transitive verbs to scenes where the agent’s action closely preceded the activation of the toy over scenes in which the timing of the two events was switched, but did not do so when they heard an intransitive construction. These studies reveal that children’s expectations about transitive verbs are at least partly driven by their nonlinguistic understanding of causal events: children expect transitive syntax to refer to scenes where the agent’s action is a plausible cause of the outcome. These findings open a wide avenue for exploration into the relationship between children’s linguistic knowledge and their nonlinguistic understanding of events.

The cradle of causal reasoning: newborns’ preference for physical causality

Perception of mechanical (i.e. physical) causality, in terms of a cause-effect relationship between two motion events, appears to be a powerful mechanism in our daily experience. In spite of a growing interest in the earliest causal representations, the role of experience in the origin of this sensitivity is still a matter of dispute. Here, we asked the question about the innate origin of causal perception, never tested before at birth. Three experiments were carried out to investigate sensitivity at birth to some visual spatiotemporal cues present in a launching event. Newborn babies, only a few hours old, showed that they significantly preferred a physical causality event (i.e. Michotte's Launching effect) when matched to a delay event (i.e. a delayed launching; Experiment 1) or to a non-causal event completely identical to the causal one except for the order of the displacements of the two objects involved which was swapped temporally (Experiment 3). This preference for the launching event, moreover, also depended on the continuity of the trajectory between the objects involved in the event (Experiment 2). These results support the hypothesis that the human system possesses an early available, possibly innate basic mechanism to compute causality, such a mechanism being sensitive to the additive effect of certain well-defined spatiotemporal cues present in the causal event independently of any prior visual experience.

Taking Action: A Cross-Modal Investigation of Discourse-Level Representations

Segmenting stimuli into events and understanding the relations between those events is crucial for understanding the world. For example, on the linguistic level, successful language use requires the ability to recognize semantic coherence relations between events (e.g., causality, similarity). However, relatively little is known about the mental representation of discourse structure. We report two experiments that used a cross-modal priming paradigm to investigate how humans represent the relations between events. Participants repeated a motor action modeled by the experimenter (e.g., rolled a ball toward mini bowling pins to knock them over), and then completed an unrelated sentence-continuation task (e.g., provided a continuation for “Peter scratched John.…”). In two experiments, we tested whether and how the coherence relations represented by the motor actions (e.g., causal events vs. non-causal events) influence participants’ performance in the linguistic task. (A production study was also conducted to explore potential syntactic priming effects.) Our analyses focused on the coherence relations between the prompt sentences and participants’ continuations, as well as the referential shifts in the continuations. As a whole, the results suggest that the mental representations activated by motor actions overlap with the mental representations used during linguistic discourse-level processing, but nevertheless contain fine-grained information about sub-types of causality (reaction vs. consequence). In addition, the findings point to parallels between shifting one’s attention from one-event to another and shifting one’s attention from one referent to another, and indicate that the event structure of causal sequences is conceptualized more like single events than like two distinct events. As a whole, the results point toward common representations activated by motor sequences and discourse-semantic relations, and further our understanding of the mental representation of discourse structure, an area that is still not yet well-understood.

Developing Algorithms to Discover Novel Cancer Genes: A look at the challenges and approaches

A sampling of the challenges and approaches involved with discovering cancer genes is presented. The following are also highlighted: detecting somantic genomic events; identifying driver genomic events; assessing functional impact; assessing statistical significance; and strategies for gaining confidence in algorithms for detecting cancer. In conclusion, one cannot readily determine the genetic events responsible for an individual's cancer simply by using massively parallel sequencing to sequence their tumor's genome, because the half dozen or so causal driver events are mixed with thousands of noncausal passenger events, millions of germline events, and tens of millions of instrumentation errors. Instead, many current approaches first identify the somatic events and then identify the subset of these that are driver events.

Comprehension of Argument Structure and Semantic Roles: Evidence from English-Learning Children and the Forced-Choice Pointing Paradigm

Research using the intermodal preferential looking paradigm (IPLP) has consistently shown that English-learning children aged 2 can associate transitive argument structure with causal events. However, studies using the same methodology investigating 2-year-old children's knowledge of the conjoined agent intransitive and semantic role assignment have reported inconsistent findings. The aim of the present study was to establish at what age English-learning children have verb-general knowledge of both transitive and intransitive argument structure using a new method: the forced-choice pointing paradigm. The results suggest that young 2-year-olds can associate transitive structures with causal (or externally caused) events and can use transitive structure to assign agent and patient roles correctly. However, the children were unable to associate the conjoined agent intransitive with noncausal events until aged 3;4. The results confirm the pattern from previous IPLP studies and indicate that children may develop the ability to comprehend different aspects of argument structure at different ages. The implications for theories of language acquisition and the nature of the language acquisition mechanism are discussed.

Causes of causes

When is a cause of a cause of an effect also a cause of that effect? The right answer is either “Sometimes” or “Always”. In favour of “Always”, transitivity is considered by some to be necessary for distinguishing causes from redundant non-causal events. Moreover transitivity may be motivated by an interest in an unselective notion of causation, untroubled by principles of invidious discrimination. And causal relations appear to “add up” like transitive relations, so that the obtaining of the overarching relation is not independent of the obtaining of the intermediaries. On the other hand, in favour of “Sometimes”, often we seem not to treat events that are very spatiotemporally remote from an effect as its causes, even when connected to the effect in question by a chain of counterfactual or chance-raising dependence. Moreover cases of double prevention provide counterexamples to causal transitivity even over short chains. According to the argument of this paper, causation is non-transitive. Transitizing causation provides no viable account of causal redundancy. An unselective approach to causation may motivate resisting the “distance” counterexamples to transitivity, but it does not help with double prevention, and even makes it more intractable. The strongest point in favour of transitivity is the adding up of causal relations, and this is the point that extant non-transitizing analyses have not adequately addressed. I propose a necessary condition on causation that explains the adding up phenomenon. In doing so it also provides a unifying explanation of distance and double prevention counterexamples to transitivity.

The spatiotemporal distinctiveness of direct causation

The launching effect, in which people judge one object to have caused another to immediately move after contact, is often described as the prototype of direct causation. The special status of this interaction may be due to its psychophysical distinctiveness, and this property may be the origin of the formation of causality as a conceptual category. This hypothesis was tested by having participants judge the relative similarity of pairs of events that either had no spatial gap or delay (direct launching) or had small gaps and/or short delays. Direct launching was much easier to discriminate from launches involving small gaps or delays. In a follow-up experiment, participants made similar judgments for a noncausal event.

VII. SIMULATION 5: A MODEL OF RAKISON, 2006: ANIMACY RELATIONS IN NONCAUSAL EVENTS

Monographs of the Society for Research in Child DevelopmentVolume 73, Issue 1 p. 80-84 VII. SIMULATION 5: A MODEL OF RAKISON, 2006: ANIMACY RELATIONS IN NONCAUSAL EVENTS First published: 16 March 2008 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5834.2008.00461.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume73, Issue1April 2008Pages 80-84 RelatedInformation

The psychophysical law of speed estimation in Michotte’s causal events

Observers saw an event in which a computer-animated square moved up to and made contact with another, which after a short delay moved off, its motion appearing to be caused by launch by the first square. Observers chose whether the second (launched) square was faster in this causal event than when presented following a long delay (non-causal event). The speed of the second object in causal events was overestimated for a wide range of speeds of the first object (launcher), but accurately assessed in non-causal events. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that overestimation occurred also in other causal displays in which the trajectories were overlapping, successive, spatially separated or inverted but did not occurred with consecutive speeds that did not produce causal percepts. We also found that if the first object in a causal event was faster, then Weber’s law holds and overestimation of the launched object speed was proportional to the speed of the launcher. In contrast, if the second object was faster, overestimation was constant, i.e. independent of the launcher. We propose that the particular speed integration of causal display results in overestimation and that the way overestimation depends on V1 phenomenally affects the attribution of the source of V2 motion: either in V1 (in launching) or in V2 (in triggering).

Make the first move: How infants learn about self-propelled objects.

In 3 experiments, the author investigated 16- to 20-month-old infants' attention to dynamic and static parts in learning about self-propelled objects. In Experiment 1, infants were habituated to simple noncausal events in which a geometric figure with a single moving part started to move without physical contact from an identical geometric figure that possessed a single static part. Infants were then tested with an event in which the parts of the objects were switched. In Experiments 2 and 3, infants were habituated and tested with identical events except that the part possessed by each object during habitation was switched relative to the first experiment. Results of the experiments revealed that 16-month-olds failed to encode the relation between an object's part and its onset of motion, 18-month-olds were unconstrained in the relations involving self-propulsion that they would encode, and 20-month-olds were constrained in the relations they would encode. The results are discussed with regard to the developmental trajectory of learning about motion properties and the mechanism involved in early concept acquisition.

Brain mechanisms underlying perceptual causality

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used to examine the neural correlates of perceptual causality. Participants were imaged while viewing alternating blocks of causal events in which a ball collides with, and causes movement of another ball, versus non-causal events in which a spatial or a temporal gap precedes the movement of a second ball. There were significantly higher levels of relative activation in the right middle frontal gyrus and the right inferior parietal lobule for causal relative to non-causal events. Furthermore, when the differential effects of spatial and temporal incontiguities were subtracted from the contiguous stimuli, we observed both common (right prefrontal) and unique (right parietal and right temporal) regions of activation as a function of spatial and temporal processing of contiguity, respectively. Taken together, these data provide a means to help determine how the visual system extracts causality from dynamic visual information in the environment using spatial and temporal cues.

Perception and judgement of physical causality involve different brain structures

One basic type of ‘mechanical’ causality is that which occurs between physical objects. Subjects were presented with mechanically causal events (ball collides with and causes movement of another ball) or two non-causal events (a ball either passes underneath another ball, or rolls across the screen and changes colour). We investigated which brain regions exhibit increased activity during the judgement of causality (‘judged causality’) as compared with judgement of movement direction (‘perceived causality’). We show an increase of medial frontal cortex activity when subjects were explicitly instructed to search for causality. Moreover, this increase was specifically associated with the search for causality and not with the perception of causality because the signal increase occurs whatever the nature of the stimulus (causal or non causal). Our study provides evidence for brain regions involved in a conscious level of inference about the presence of causality.

How the brain perceives causality: an event-related fMRI study.

Detection of the causal relationships between events is fundamental for understanding the world around us. We report an event-related fMRI study designed to investigate how the human brain processes the perception of mechanical causality. Subjects were presented with mechanically causal events (in which a ball collides with and causes movement of another ball) and non-causal events (in which no contact is made between the balls). There was a significantly higher level of activation of V5/MT/MST bilaterally, the superior temporal sulcus bilaterally and the left intraparietal sulcus to causal relative to non-causal events. Directing attention to the causal nature of the stimuli had no significant effect on the neural processing of the causal events. These results support theories of causality suggesting that the perception of elementary mechanical causality events is automatically processed by the visual system.

Can 6‐month‐old infants process causality in different types of causal events?

Two experiments investigated 6‐month‐old infants’ processing of causal and noncausal events with the habituation/dishabituation technique. Experiment 1 was carried out with the usual launching events. Results showed that 6‐month‐old infants can recognize the presence of causality embedded in a direct launching event. Experiment 2 was carried out with a previously univestigated type of causal event: the entraining event. Results showed that 6‐month‐old infants could not process causality through a direct entraining event. Findings are discussed in terms of compatibility with a modular or an information‐processing framework.

Infants' Processing of Causal and Noncausal Events at 3.5 Months of Age

Infants' processing of causal (direct launching) and noncausal (delayed reaction, launching without collision) events was investigated with 30 infants who were 3.5 months old. The habituation-dishabituation technique was used. Results showed that the infants did not process direct launching as causal. However, their pattern of responding revealed a tendency to key on the spatial and temporal properties of the events. Those findings are discussed in terms of their compatibility with a modular, an information-processing, and a Piagetian framework.

Precursors to infants' perception of the causality of a simple event

Three habituation experiments examined the perception of causal and non-causal events by infants at 6 1/4, 5 1/2, and 4 months of age. Experiment 1 replicated previous studies showing that by 6 1/4 months, infants begin to respond to the interaction of simple objects in Michottian type launching events on the basis of causality. In Experiments 2 and 3, however, younger infants exposed to the identical event sequences responded on the basis of simpler perceptual features of the launching events, and not on the basis of causality. 4-month-old infants responded to continuous versus non-continuous movement. 5 1/2-month-old infants also responded somewhat on the basis of continuous movement. However, in addition they responded on the basis of the spatial and temporal perceptual features of the events. This change in the pattern of results over age suggests a multi-step developmental progression.