Nine-dash Line Research Articles

China's Maritime Trap

The July 12, 2016, arbitral tribunal ruling in Hague, which satisfied almost all of the Philippines demands in the South China Sea and invalidated China's nine-dash line and other maritime activiti...

Roundtable: The Trump Presidency and Southeast Asia

The accession of Donald Trump to the US presidency has triggered serious discussion within Australia's policy community over the future of Australia-US security relations and Australia's role in Southeast During his first days in office, President Trump pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal, an integral part of his predecessor's pivot strategy towards Asia and an initiative strongly supported by the Australian government. The United States' withdrawal from the TPP has led various Australian commentators to question Washington's commitment to maintain a viable economic and strategic presence in the Asia Pacific. (1) Such uncertainty is aggravated by Canberra's growing disquiet over intensified tensions between China and the United States in the South China Sea. President Trump's posture of challenging Chinese sovereign control over its man-made islands in the South China Sea has increased Australian concerns that it could soon face the nightmare of being compelled to choose between its largest trading partner--China--and its long-term security ally--the United States--if the two Great Powers were to clash militarily in Southeast Asia's critical maritime littorals. (2) ASEAN Fragility and Australia's Concerns Shortly after Trump's election victory, former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating called for Australia to cut the tag of unmitigated support for US foreign policies and recognize that our future is basically in the region around us, in Southeast Asia. (3) Since its inception in 2011, successive Australian governments had extended unqualified backing to the Barack Obama administration's pivot strategy which was largely designed to reassure members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that Washington was committed to playing a vigorous and sustained strategic and economic role in Southeast Asia in the face of China's rising power. (4) Trump's decision to withdraw America from the TPP undercut Australia's commitment to regional order-building by pursuing multilateral free trade arrangements and promoting an inclusive approach to shaping future rules for security conduct in Comments by Trump's nominee for US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, during his confirmation testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee--that the new administration would reserve the prerogative to resort to military force to oppose Chinese territorial claims and would ask US regional allies to provide backup for any such military operation--exacerbated Australian uncertainties about future US policy directions. Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop reiterated that her government's position would remain consistent: the South China Sea dispute should be settled by international law. For the Australian government to respond to such hypothetical situations prematurely, Bishop noted, would not be appropriate. (5) However, Keating and other Australian critics warned that any such US action would be tantamount to initiating a Sino--American war that would disrupt Australia's vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs), devastate its economy, and render global security null and void. Australia, he insisted, should tell the Trump administration from the get-go that it would not be a part of such adventurism. (6) ASEAN's brittleness in the absence of a regionally engaged United States ranks as perhaps Australia's most fundamental concern about Southeast As ASEAN's self-appointed locomotive, Indonesia's willingness to push back against China's maritime expansion southwards--in conjunction with China's territorial claims embodied in the so-called line--is viewed by Australian policy planners as increasingly critical. While Indonesia is not formally involved in the South China Sea dispute, and its control of the geographically critical Natuna Islands has not been formally challenged by Beijing, some Chinese maps have demarcated Indonesia's 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as being partly inside the nine-dash line. …

‘Deliberate Ambiguity’ and the Demise of China’s Claim to Historic Rights in the South China Sea

The Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Philippines v China case was a resounding victory for the Philippines as well as a bold and potentially landmark decision. The key issue for the Philippines was whether China could lawfully claim historic rights to resources within the nine-dash line on Chinese maps, if such areas are within the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf of the Philippines under unclos. In deciding this issue the Tribunal had to address the fact the exact legal basis for China’s claim to historic rights in the South China Sea, and the nature and scope of such claims, was ambiguous. The Tribunal addressed the issue of ambiguity in its award on jurisdiction, and ruled that it could draw inferences from China’s conduct in determining the nature of its claim to historic rights. In its Award on the Merits the Tribunal ruled that unclos allocated rights and jurisdiction to the natural resource in the oceans, and that under unclos, coastal States have sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural resources in their exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. Consequently, whatever historic rights China claimed to resources in the South China Sea, those rights were extinguished when UNCLOS entered into force insofar as they were a claim to resources that are now in the maritime zone of other States.

Circles of Steel, Castles of Vanity: The Geopolitics of Military Bases on the South China Sea

After four years of rising tensions over China's construction of military bases in the South China Sea, in July 2016 the Permanent Court of Arbitration issued a landmark decision layered with meaning, academic as well as diplomatic. “China's claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction,” wrote the panel of five judges, “with respect to the maritime areas … encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’ are contrary to the Convention [on the Law of the Sea] and without lawful effect.” Writing with unambiguous clarity, the court ruled that China's dredging of these artificial islands for military bases gave it no right whatsoever to the surrounding seas and rebuked Beijing for infringing on waters that the Philippines should rightly control. China's claims to most of the South China Sea within that nine-dash line, which Beijing first published on maps at the height of the Cold War in 1953 and has pursued ever since, “were extinguished,” the court said, by the UN Convention (Gao and Jia 2013, 103–4;New York Times2016; Permanent Court of Arbitration 2016, 68–77, 116–17).

(The Controversy of the Establishing Air Defense Identification Zone in the South China Sea under International Law)

Chinese Abstract: 2013年中國宣布在東海劃設防空識別區引發美國、日本及韓國等國關切及抗議後，在國際仲裁法院即將對菲律賓所提的南海爭端提出仲裁報告之際，近來又傳出中國可能另在南海劃設防空識別區 。然而，防空識別區之設立除了因欠缺國際法上依據而有適法性之問題外，因中國在防空識別區範圍內除了監控區域內航空器之活動外，更進一步禁止他國航空器於該區域內進行情報偵蒐及軍事訓練，此也引發中國是否侵犯他國航空器於聯合國海洋法公約下所享有之公海飛躍自由之問題。為了探討中國未來於南海設立防空識別區所可能涉及之國際法問題，本文之第一部分，將研析設立防空識別區在國際法上之依據及適法性問題，第二部份則藉分析中國於東海劃設防空識別區後所引發之問題，而探討中國擬劃設南海防空識別區對區域之影響及可能引發之爭議。English Abstract: Air Defense Identification Zone was created in the 1950s for states to extend its control beyond its territorial airspace to prevent long range attack from other countries. Nowadays, more than 20 countries have established ADIZs above the high sea or EEZ area. In four parts, this paper addresses the legal controversy that may arise if China establishes Air Defense Identification Zone in the South China Sea. The first part of this paper reviews the discussion about the legality of ADIZ under the international law. Second, from China’s ADIZ practices in the East China Sea, this paper observes how China’s ADIZ policies differ from the practices of other States and shall identify the unique problems that may arise from China’s establishment of ADIZ. Third, this paper observes the potential conflicts and controversies that may arise if China establishes ADIZ in the South China Sea. The discussed questions include if China’s ADIZ rules excessively obstructed the freedom of overflight and the rules under Chicago Convention, and how China’s ADIZ may correspond with its nine-dash line claims. This paper will also look into how the decision of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration between Philippine and China may affect the legitimacy of China’s ADIZ in the South China Sea. The last part concludes.

China’s nine-dash line, international law, and the Monroe Doctrine analogy

John Mearsheimer has compared China’s attitude towards the South China Sea to the Monroe Doctrine of the United States. Mearsheimer does not accord international law much weight and certainly does not regard it as determinative of political outcomes. But many observers of China’s disputes in the South China Sea look to international law for rules and processes that could facilitate peaceful resolution of the disputes. In doing so they are variously puzzled, bemused, and/or angered by China’s assertion of the nine-dash line (南海九段线). This article draws more broadly on the literature on the Monroe Doctrine, viewing the doctrine as: a unilateral pronouncement of foreign policy; representing resistance; embedded in domestic as opposed to international law; and an assertion of legitimate regional hegemony. Through applying the analogy of the Monroe Doctrine, the article seeks fresh insights into China’s legal position in relation to the South China Sea and into the significance of the nine-dash line in terms of international law.

The South China Sea Arbitration Award

On January 22, 2013, the Philippines submitted to arbitration its dispute with China regarding the interpretation and application of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in the South China Sea. China declined to participate, but did communicate its position on jurisdiction and certain other matters. On July 12, 2016, the arbitral Tribunal rendered its unanimous award. It concluded that China’s claim of historic rights to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by China’s “nine-dash line” is contrary to the Convention. Without addressing the competing claims to sovereignty over the islands, the Tribunal also determined that all of the Spratly Islands features that emerge above high tide are “rocks” that do not generate entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf beyond a 12-mile territorial sea. In addition, the Tribunal found that China’s island-building activities in the Spratly’s, commenced after the dispute was submitted to arbitration, caused extensive damage to coral reefs that violated the environmental provisions of the Convention, and also aggravated and extended the dispute. The Tribunal held that failure to control fishing for internationally protected endangered species and failure to respect international collision regulations violated the Convention. The award also protected traditional artisanal fishing in the territorial sea of Scarborough Shoal. The perceptions of those that border and use the South China Sea will unquestionably be affected by the award’s authoritative contribution to the law of the sea. Among the award’s long term effects may be a tempering of disputes over small features at sea and the entitlements they generate, as well as a decline in gratuitous environmental disruption occasioned by attempts to artificially enhance such features to reinforce claims to maritime jurisdiction.

Meeting China Halfway - How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry

Meeting China Halfway--How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry. By Lyle J. Goldstein. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2015. Hardcover: 389pp. Meeting China Halfway is a must read for anyone concerned about the current trajectory of US-China relations. It has much to say about how America and China might build greater strategic trust, and thus avoid the risks of a Thucydides trap. It puts forward constructive policy proposals about how these major powers might move from an escalation spiral in their relationship to a spiral. Recognizing that Chinese and American interests coincide over many global problems, successive chapters address major global issues, such as the environment, the Middle East, Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula, and how a spiral might proceed. For each issue it identifies a mutually reciprocal progression of steps that would promote cooperation and trust. Such a spiral would start with small steps and move on to more difficult initiatives. Associate Professor Lyle Goldstein was the founding director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College, and has considerable expertise on China, with the language ability to analyse Chinese language sources, including military publications, not otherwise available to Western experts. Goldstein's basic concern in Meeting China Halfway is the increasing levels of distrust between Beijing and Washington. This is aggravated by the lack of appreciation on the American side of China's history, especially US imperialism, and the wide extent of anti-American sentiment in China. Goldstein notes that Most Chinese foreign policy and defense specialists are convinced that Washington seeks to contain and even derail China's rise (p. 355). With this background, it is not surprising that China responds robustly to US initiatives, especially those of a military nature, in the South China Sea. As Goldstein reminds us, there are hawks in both Beijing and Washington. In his view, Most troubling of all, the military establishments in both the United States and China each appears to hold that they must earnestly prepare for rivalry and even direct conflict (pp. 330-31). Given developments over the past year, with China's artificial island-building in the South China Sea and the US Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), if anything these sentiments have increased since the book was published. This review focuses primarily on the chapter which addresses US-China relations in the South China Sea. title of this chapter is The New 'Fulda Gap' using the metaphor for US-China rivalry first introduced by Robert Kaplan in a 2009 Foreign Affairs article on the Indian Ocean. Given the depth of anti-American sentiment in China, Goldstein believes that it is Washington's responsibility to initiate the first steps of each spiral. With the South China Sea, the first step would be for Washington to invite China's participation in the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) series of naval exercises. Subsequent steps by Washington might include promotion of regional coast guard cooperation, public recognition of China as a claimant in the South China Sea, and the scaling back of military activities in the region. last step involves terminating US military cooperation with Vietnam, believing that recent overtures toward military cooperation between Hanoi and Washington have violated reasonable principles of geopolitical moderation (p. 290). Similarly, Goldstein is opposed to the US encouraging India's entry into the South China Sea. reciprocal steps by Beijing might include proposals for combined counter-piracy patrols in the Malacca Straits (unlikely to be well received by the littoral states), clarification of the nine-dash line, joint resource development on the principle of equality and ending its own initiatives for regional military cooperation. …

Lessons from Lassen: Plotting a Proper Course for Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea

The USS Lassen’s October 2015 South China Sea freedom of navigation operation was exemplary in some respects and cautionary in others. This article argues the Lassen’s mission to sail within 12 nautical miles of one of China’s artificial islands was a successful albeit exploratory challenge because the operation has helped to clarify maritime claims in the region and garnered international support for continued operations. This paper examines the US Freedom of Navigation Program’s broader goals of benefiting the international community with a rules-based system. It also argues that increased transparency is essential if these goals are to be achieved. This article analyzes China’s unclarified claims in the South China Sea and explores the concept of “psycho-legal boundaries” in relation to the so-called nine-dash line. It concludes by presenting suggestions for plotting a proper path forward for FONOPs in the region with an emphasis on protecting the marine environment.

Free the Sea: The Philippines v. China

In early 2013, pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) treaty, the Philippines initiated compulsory arbitration against China in an attempt to finally settle their South China Sea disputes. Tired after years of futile negotiating and what it views as belligerent Chinese actions in the Sea, the Philippines hopes that a UN tribunal will reject China’s nine-dash line and its claims of sovereignty over much of the Sea. International legal regimes are systems of choice, and China must calculate if it is in its national interest to comply with an adverse award. As an aspiring power, the political, economic, and military costs of ignoring a UN tribunal to China are high. Yet, China’s strict adherence to a historic right to the Sea’s waters and islands may preclude it from seeing the wisdom in complying with a UN award. Thus, the solution to peace in the South China Sea may sit outside of UNCLOS and may necessitate a freeing from UNCLOS obligations.

Walking the Talk in the South China Sea

Walking the Talk in the South China Sea Thomas B. Fargo (bio) For most of the first decade of the 21st century, the South China Sea was a region of relative calm. Civilian commerce and military transits and training were conducted with only routine concern for the security environment. After the Hainan Island EP-3 collision incident in 2001, peaceful development of the region’s resources moved forward until China re-promulgated a vague historical claim to much of the South China Sea in 2009—the so-called nine-dash line—which stoked tensions with its neighbors over competing sovereignty claims. Also worrying have been Beijing’s confrontational tactics: harassment at sea, the construction and garrisoning of artificial islands, and the absolute rejection of mediation or legal adjudication. These activities have tested, and frequently overstepped, the boundaries of international law. This essay examines the core U.S. interests in the South China Sea and argues that the United States should ensure that freedom of navigation operations are one component of a consistent and comprehensive strategy of regional engagement. This strategy needs to make full use of well-honed diplomatic, military, and economic tools to impart a shared vision of a peaceful maritime arena. Core U.S. Interests and Freedom of Navigation The escalation of tensions in the South China Sea has tested the littoral states’ preferred strategic orientation: good relations with China, the United States, and their neighbors. More than ever, they fear that China’s pretensions are a preview of the day when Beijing will make all the rules and call all the shots in littoral Asia. In a number of respects, it is unfortunate that the U.S. pivot or rebalance to Asia was framed as such, implying that the United States had abandoned the region during the war on terrorism. As one of our good friends in the region once said to me, the rebalance is really a “reaffirmation” of U.S. policy and presence over the past three administrations. The facts are the United States has remained committed [End Page 59] to Southeast Asia and engaged there because the challenge to peace in the South China Sea is also a challenge to three key U.S. interests. The first and foremost reason the United States will remain invested in the peace and stability of Pacific Asia is economic. In 2014, U.S. exports to Asia had a total value of $650.5 billion, while imports from Asia were worth $1.06 trillion, accounting for a respective 27.7% and 37.2% of total U.S. exports and imports.1 Further, investment by American entrepreneurs in Asian economies gives the United States a stake in the regular and uninterrupted conduct of intrastate and intraregional trade and in predictable and inclusive growth. A second national interest is the security of allies and friends. The pursuit of peace beyond U.S. shores is, in turn, the most effective guarantee that the continental homeland will never itself become a battlefield. Third, both of these core interests—prosperity and security—are underpinned by the traditional rights of states to sail unimpeded on the high seas and, without impairing the peace or security of coastal states, travel through territorial waters without prior permission. From its earliest days, the law of the sea has protected trading nations’ access to foreign ports. In the modern global economy, all nations are traders and enjoy in common the benefits of open access. Further, maritime power, which is reliant on mobility at sea, plays a unique and irreplaceable role in U.S. power-projection strategies, being both flexible and visible. U.S. fleets make neighbors of our distant allies, assuring them of the United States’ commitment to their security.2 The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program was established in response to the gradual erosion of traditional rights at sea. Rather than an attempt by the United States to claim special privileges, it was created in reaction to new claims to territorial zones that threatened to enclose the littoral space within a jumble of overlapping jurisdictions.3 Announced in 1979 by President Jimmy Carter and endorsed by President Ronald Reagan in the 1983 U.S. Oceans Policy...

The Significance of the ADMM-Plus: A Perspective from India

India sees a role for itself in shaping Asia's emerging security and economic architecture. The Indian view, stated clearly Shri Anil Wadhwa, then secretary (east) in Ministry of External Affairs, is that the regional security architecture should be open, transparent, inclusive and evolutionary; should respect diversity of region; as well as be coterminous with boundaries of EAS [East Asia Summit].1 This essay will first look at security challenges India perceives in Asia-Pacific before examining cooperation with ASEAN and involvement in ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). The third section will then discuss involvement in other regional forums and make some comparisons with ADMM-Plus.India's Perception of Its Present Security ChallengesFrom perspective, security is a prerequisite for internal cohesion, economic development, and consolidation. According to Secretary Wadhwa, India's primary interest is to create an enabling external environment for economic progress of country. 2 Unless there is regional security, economic development cannot be envisaged.At 2016 Shangri-La Dialogue, Manohar Parrikar identified three key challenges to security: territorial disputes that could degenerate into military conflict, terrorism, and protection of maritime domain. Emphasizing third challenge, he went on to state that by virtue of geographical location, Indo-Pacific is crossroads of [the] world's maritime traffic. Over half of world's commercial shipping passes through these waterways.3 Any adventurism would disrupt process of economic growth and development not only for India but for broader region. Earlier, addressing third ADMM-Plus in Kuala Lumpur, Parrikar referred to seas and oceans as critical enablers of our prosperity. 4The maritime challenge affects India directly, as bulk of its trade is via maritime routes and thus requires freedom of navigation and security of sea lines of communication. Even though India is not a party to any of disputes in South China Sea, it has a significant stake in stability of region because any conflict would disrupt flow of trade and supplies. India is therefore carefully watching to see how parties will react to decision of Permanent Court of Arbitration in Philippines' arbitration case against China's nine-dash line claim, which is still pending at time of writing. To resolve a maritime dispute between India and Bangladesh, in July 2014 court awarded Bangladesh 19,467 square kilometers of sea area in Bay of Bengal, and New Delhi readily accepted decision. A verdict that re-establishes trust in international law and norms on maritime issues is best outcome that India can hope to see in case involving China and Philippines.To address challenges in maritime domain, Indian Navy has stepped up its activities in regional waters. The Indian Navy released its maritime security strategy Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy at Naval Commanders' Conference in October 2015, which replaced and updated 2007 strategy. India was a founding member of Indian Ocean Rim Association. It also founded Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in 2009, which provides a forum to discuss issues that have a bearing on maritime security in Indian Ocean region. The symposium includes 35 countries as members and has become a dialogue partner of Indian Ocean Rim Association. Moreover, Indian Navy has adopted a proactive approach to maritime security organizing 2016 International Fleet Review (its second ever) and Milan (confluence) exercises in Bay of Bengal.India's Cooperation with ASEAN and Participation in ADMM-PlusIn conjunction with greater U.S.-India cooperation and U.S. rebalance to Asia, New Delhi's cooperative approach has served to reduce distance between India and ASEAN and fostered commitment to playing a role in emerging security architecture in Asia-Pacific. …

Chinese Discourse on the “Nine-Dashed Line”

This article surveys the discussion and debate in China over the nine-dashed line in recent years, with special focus on the efforts of scholars and think-tank experts to legitimize the nine-dashed line and their interactions with the Chinese public and policymakers through public media.

China and the law of the sea: implications for Arctic governance

Guided by insights from international relations theory, this article investigates China’s adherence to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), asking how Beijing’s attitude towards UNCLOS affects China’s role in Arctic governance and beyond. Examining contested Law of the Sea matters – the dispute over the “nine-dash line” in the South China Sea, the right of innocent passage of warships and the role of international arbitration – it argues that China’s compliance with UNCLOS does matter for understanding how China is perceived as a member of the international community. Further, China’s growing interests and enhanced engagement in the Arctic depend on a strong international legal framework; Arctic governance encapsulates the norms of multilateralism and rule of law. The article concludes by asking whether Chinese experiences from observing and participating in the multilateral governance of the Arctic can serve as an example of successful multilateral cooperation and peaceful conflict solution, of relevance to China also in its nearby maritime regions.

Asia's Differentness, Diversity, and Flux

Asia's Differentness, Diversity, and Flux

The Sino-Philippine Arbitration of the South China Sea Nine-Dash Line Dispute: Applying the Rule on Default of Appearance

The Sino-Philippine Arbitration of the South China Sea Nine-Dash Line Dispute: Applying the Rule on Default of Appearance

The South China Sea and U.S. Policy Options

ABSTRACT Since the summer of 2010, the Obama administration has clearly signaled through a combination of diplomacy and greater military presence that creating rules-based stability in the South China Sea (SCS) is an important U.S. national objective. Washington has become much more involved in the day-to-day security dynamic between China and SCS littoral states—and, while remaining neutral about the merits of respective sovereignty claims, it is not neutral about assertive behavior. This stance has brought the United States to a strategic cul-de-sac when it comes to the complex SCS issues because Washington has little-to-no direct leverage on the most important issues: sovereignty, China's nine-dashed line, and fishing disputes. The article does allow that the administration does have some policy options that might play an important role in achieving its objective of a rules-based regime in the SCS that would eliminate tension and preserve long-term regional stability.

The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications

The South China Sea has generally been a calm area of sea since ancient times. Until the late twentieth century, it had provided a fertile fishing ground for local fishermen from China and other littoral states, and a smooth route of navigation for the nations of the region and the rest of the international community. This tranquility has been disturbed, however, by two recent developments. The first was the physical occupation of the Nansha, or Spratly, Islands by some of the coastal states in the 1970s. This process continued through the rest of the century. Now, nearly all the islands and insular features within the Spratly Islands have been subjected to physical control by one littoral state or another.

A legal assessment of China’s historic claims in the South China Sea

This article aims to understand China’s historic claim, the purpose and status of the nine-dashed line map and analyses the legal implications of China’s historic claim over the islands and maritime areas of the South China Sea. From the various, albeit ambiguous, claims that refer to the element of ‘history’ as the basis for supporting China’s claims, it can be surmised that China’s historic claims comprise two broad aspects: a ‘historic basis of sovereignty’ claim over islands in the South China Sea, and a ‘historic claim over maritime areas/activities’ in South China Sea. The article concludes that in order to assess China’s claims in the South China Sea, these claims will have to be examined independently of the nine-dashed line map as the map has little or no legal value for China to establish its various claims. Further, China’s historic claim over maritime areas (water column, seabed and subsoil, low tide elevations and submerged features) cannot supersede other coastal states’ well established rights over their exclusive economic zones and continental shelf.

China's passport move stokes South China Sea dispute

A new row over the South China Sea has erupted following Beijing's issue of biometric passports containing a map showing the so-called ‘nine-dashed line’ that China has used to assert its sovereignty over disputed islands. By printing the passports, and inviting other states to stamp their visas in them, Beijing is attempting to gain recognition for its claims to sovereignty.