New Theory Of Reference Research Articles

The fallacies of the new theory of reference

The fallacies of the new theory of reference

Marcus, Kripke, and the origin of the new theory of reference

Marcus, Kripke, and the origin of the new theory of reference

Discussion: Why The New Theory of Reference Does Not Entail Absolute Time and Space

I explain why the New Theory of Reference of Marcus, Kripke, Kaplan, Putnam and others does not entail absolute time and space, contrary to what Quentin Smith has recently claimed.

The New Theory of Reference Entails Absolute Time and Space

The New Theory of Reference (NTR) of Marcus, Kripke, Kaplan, Putnam and others is a theory in the philosophy of language and there has been much debate about whether it entails the metaphysical theory of essentialism. But there has been no discussion about whether the NTR entails another metaphysical theory, the absolutist theory of time and space. It is argued in this paper that the NTR carries this entailment; the theory of time is the main focus of the paper and it is argued that the NTR entails the absolutist theory that times are event-independent moments.

Essentialism and The New Theory of Reference

Kripke, Putnam and others have proposed what is often called The New Theory of Reference. Professor Matthen thinks that this theory needs to be modified in various ways: (1) so as to avert misunderstandings about the New Theory's commitment to essentialism; (2) so as to clarify the semantic function of what he calls “nonconnoting terms”; (3) so as to answer Quinean doubts about the determinacy of ostension; (4) so as to correct Putnam's “simplistic” account of ostension; (5) so as to solve Kripke's puzzle about the seemingly inconsistent beliefs of the bilingual Pierre; and (6) so as to show how many ordinary names, contra Kripke and Putnam, can be treated as “equivalent” to definite descriptions. No doubt many of the other things he says in his paper are clever, and perhaps even true. But as to the six modifications I have listed, I have run into difficulties. To the extent that I am able to understand them, I have been forced to conclude that they are neither needed nor helpful.

Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds ed. by Stephen Schwartz

156 BOOK IU!:VIEWS notion that the Eucharist nourishes in via while· pointing to the messianic banquet which is the goal of. the pilgrimage itself. The Christian pilgrimage , in turn, is judged and illumined .by the pilgrim way of Christ whose Gospel journey moves purposefully to Calvary and Beyond. Images for Self Recognition enlarges on two earlier works of Harned (Grace and Common Life in 1971 and Faith and Virtue in 1973) which explore in depth some of the ideas which are taken up and advanced in this work. Together they make up a striking contribution as Professor Harned continues to show the nova et vetera of the theological enterprise. The Florida State Univerttity Tallahassee, Florida LAWRENCE s. CUNNINGHAM Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds. Edited by STEPHEN SCHWARTZ. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977. Pp. Q77; $5.95. Paperback. The traditional theory of references holds that meaning is given to terms by specifying a conjunction of properties. Any item possessing all of the specified properties is considered to be an object of that species or natural kind, and the meaning of terms is considered to be analytic to the concept of the term. When this theory is applied to proper names, it holds that each proper name refers to a set of descriptions and the item which satisfies all of the descriptions is the referent of the proper name. And this theory also holds that identities obtaining between referents such as the identity " Cicero is Tully " or " Hesperus is Phosphorus " are contingent identities. This theory has been rejected by a group of philosophers who propose a totally different account of reference. They theorize that names have no intension, that names defining naturally occurring species (natural kinds) are not determined in their meaning by intension, and that reference is determined by a causal chain rather than by description. Stephen Schwartz has collected a number of articles by these theorists which criticize various aspects of the traditional theory of reference, and has created a work that should prove to be of importance to natural law theory. This new theory is worthy of serious attention, and I would like to consider some of its points here. Keith Donnellan's article, "Reference and Definite Description," makes a major contribution to the new theory of reference by noting that reference can occur when description does not take place, or when .it is mistaken. This is so because descriptions can be either referential or attributive. Referential descriptions enable the audience to pick out whatever is being 157 spoken of and are merely a tool or instrument of· communication. Attribu~ tive descriptions assert something of whatever fits the description. Attributive description .is such that misdescription is logically impossible, while referential description must be admitted so that the. fact of misdescription can be explained. Attributive description does not assume the existence of the referent, while referential description does. Thus, if it is true that reference is possible when description is absent, then what is the means by which reference is made? Donnellan suggests that the causal theory of names will provide an answer. Saul Kripke asks in his "Identity and Necessity" how it is logically possible to have contingent identity statements. How are statements such as " Cicero is Tully " possible in contingent and non-necessary terms? Kripke asserts that such an identity is necessary if it is true because the names are what he calls "rigid designators". This means that the term refers to the same individirnl in all actual and counterfactual worlds. If "X " is identical to" X" and is also identical to "Y", then Kripke contends that it is necessary that " X" be identical to " Y ". If this were only contingently true, then it would be logically possible for " X " to be identical to " X " and not be identical to "Y " at the same time. Kripke justifies the necessary status of this relationship by distinguishing necessity from analyticity or a priority. Necessity refers to the logical or practical impossibility of a state of affairs being other than what it is. Kripke is not saying that identity statements are analytic or a priori, but only that they are necessarily as they are if they are true. That the...