New Centers Of Power Research Articles

Re-balancing the G-20 from Efficiency to Legitimacy: The 3G Coalition and the Practice of Global Governance

This article contributes to the literature on global governance, legitimacy, and small states through a detailed analysis of the Global Governance Group. It examines in particular the operational impact and wider conceptual implications of the 3G's collective diplomatic efforts on the Group of 20. By engaging in a reconfigured form of informal multilateralism, the article finds that the 3G has been and is capable of shaping the global agenda with respect to the G-20 in a way that is both more inclusive and connected with existing institutions, especially the United Nations. Through this initiative, this group has effectively recalibrated the existing narrative about small states, the G-20, and global governance--shifting it from the paradigm of efficiency to one of legitimacy. Keywords: 3G, G-20, global governance, informal groups, small states. Informal Global Governance As new centers of power mobilize and old institutions fall behind the curve of change, the trend in world politics has been for countries to substitute, bypass, or marginalize established institutions of global governance in favor of engagement with new forms of cooperative institutional arrangements--in short, toward informality in global governance. International relations theory has traditionally been uneasy with forms of informal global governance. (1) Realists have dismissed them as irrelevant given that powerful members can go it alone, and neoliberal institutionalists are uncertain of what to make of these forums where formal institutional structures or binding agreements are not apparent. (2) Students of rational design see the advance of centralized rather than disaggregated models of international organizations. (3) Yet this trend toward informality is not only important for extending the debate about the manner by which cooperation can be secured in the global political economy after hegemony, (4) but the manner by which small states attempt to influence bigger ones. Marked by less hierarchy and greater flexibility, informal global governance of small states is an admittedly fuzzy concept, and explaining its theoretical relevance has therefore been a challenge for dominant international relations paradigms. Moreover, the relationship between conceptualization and issue-specific international practice beyond the domain of the UN Security Council in select crisis situations has not been extensively explored. Notwithstanding Jochen Prantl's call in his 2005 International Organization article for extended studies of the dynamics between internal arrangements and formal international organizations, there has been scant research that explores the use by smaller states of informal groups to increase their leverage in the global political economy and so increase our understanding of power, legitimacy and change. (5) Thus, in functional terms, there is some considerable space for specialized and more nuanced studies. Although greater attention is devoted to multilateralism light, the focus has been to some considerable extent on the mechanisms used by bigger and stronger countries, not as tools by coalitions of the weak. (6) A major strand of literature that traces forms of informal governance does so in a mode of analysis that privileges clubs of power where informality allows for easier backroom negotiations over contested issue areas as well as the implementation of tough regulations that are monitored in the privacy of informal groups, whether on a permanent or temporary ad hoc basis. (7) Well-known groupings such as the Group of 8 (G8), the World Trade Organization Green Rooms, and the Middle East Quartet on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are reflections of these informal groups, which indeed can be effective at achieving their narrow objective of furthering global cooperation. Yet although we have become accustomed to the idea that these contracting parties should have the requisite resources to back up their influence at the table, this approach should not limit our inclination or ability to perceive of alternative arrangements. …

Rise of New Centres of Power in Eurasia: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy

The emergence of new centres of power in Eurasia has entailed a re-reading of Zbigniew Brzezinski's book which drew an analogy between the Eurasian supercontinent and a grand chessboard. Following the global financial crisis of the last few years, countries like China, Russia and India have started to project greater global political and economic influence. Eventually, Eurasia has become a geopolitical symbol signifying a multipolar world order unlike fifteen years ago when Brzezinski wrote his book in a world dominated by the US superpower. The changes in the geopolitical meaning of Eurasia have also been very important for Turkey for a number of reasons. First, it is a country that is strategically located at the meeting point of Europe and Asia. Second, its economy has grown at an impressive rate throughout the 2000s turning it into a rising Eurasian power. Third, its multi-dimensional foreign policy approach in the last decade has enabled it to develop closer relations with the Eurasian states.

The BRICS countries: a new force in global health?

Diverse in profile, but unified in purpose. Andrew Harmer tells Fiona Fleck why the BRICS countries' approach to health is different. Q: The term BRIC was coined by a Goldman Sachs analyst for four big emerging economies, Brazil, the Russian Federation, India and China, in 2001. Why has the group--with South Africa added in 2010--embraced the term? A: Goldman Sachs was not the only one to realize that these four economies were way ahead of the others, but they didn't meet as a group until 2006 and only held their first formal summit in 2009 in the Russian Federation to discuss the global economy and reform of global financial institutions, their primary concerns. Academics started looking at these countries as a group from early on, so in some ways there may be a sense of self-fulfilling prophecy in their formation. They now meet regularly and, although they have never actually signed a document saying are the BRICS, they seem quite happy with the term. Q: When did the BRICS countries start discussing health? A: Health appears for the first time as a discussion point in the Sanya Declaration at the 3rd BRICS Summit in 2011 in China, with regard to HIV/ AIDS. Since then the group has held annual meetings devoted to health, with the first meeting of the BRICS health ministers hosted by the Chinese in Beijing in July that year. In 2012, the BRICS health ministers also decided to meet every year on the side-lines of the World Health Assembly. Q: How did you become interested in researching this area? A: The BRICS countries were being discussed, but there was very little published on their role in health. It was an obvious area to explore. What interested me most was the extent to which they were acting as a unified bloc: looking at what they were doing, compared with the rhetoric, was fascinating. It's fascinating to see a new centre of power emerging in global health with a new set of priorities that contrast with the dominant western health development paradigm. This is seen in their efforts to promote multilateralism in health, in contrast to the United States, for example, that is keen to pursue bilateral relations. In 2012, the BRICS countries announced they would create a new development bank with a start-up capital of US$ 50 billion, eventually increasing to US$ 100 billion, and a BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement, which would be a US$ 100 billion fund to steady currency markets. These two projects are expected to be finalized at their next summit in Brazil in July this year. Q: On which health areas do these five countries work together most? A: They have committed themselves to promoting certain health issues above others. In some ways their priorities are different to the priorities of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. At their first meeting of health ministers, they discussed four priorities: strengthening their domestic health systems, primarily by developing and ensuring access to health technologies, the double burden of infectious and noncommunicable diseases (NCDs), support for international organizations, such as WHO and UNAIDS as well as global health partnerships, and promoting technology transfer to developing countries. There is a lot of interest in intra-BRICS health cooperation. The health ministers referred to this last year at the 3rd health ministers' meeting in Cape Town. Soon, we may have a new development bank doing development differently to the World Bank. Other than that and supporting international organizations and health partnerships, there are few tangible examples of the BRICS countries working together on health. Q: How are the BRICS countries facing up to the problem of NCDs? A: With the exception of South Africa, NCDs are the biggest problem facing these countries and the incidence of NCDs is increasing, even as infectious diseases are being brought under control. …

Deals and Dealings: Inconclusive Peace and Treacherous Trade along the South Sudan-Uganda Border

Since Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, its border with Uganda has become a hub of activity. Contrasting developments on the Ugandan side of the border with those on the South Sudanese side, the paper draws on empirical fieldwork to argue that the CPA has created new centres of power in the margins of both states. However, in day-today dealings on either side of the border, South Sudanese military actors have become dominant. In the particular case of Arua and the South Sudan-Uganda border, past wartime authority structures determine access to opportunities in a tightly regulated, inconclusive peace. This means that small-scale Ugandan traders – although vital to South Sudan – have become more vulnerable to South Sudan's assertions of state authority. The experience of Ugandan traders calls into question the broad consensus that trade across the border is always beneficial for peace-building The paper concludes that trade is not unconditionally helpful to the establishment of a peaceful environment for everyone.

From lords of war to leaders in society: How former Liberian warlords have used ‘old’ and ‘new’ media to self-reframe

The process of post-conflict reconstruction in Liberia involves an array of actors vying for power. Many of the key political and civic figures involved are former warlords, whose reigns of terror affected many they now work with and serve. By reframing themselves through social media these warlords have created new centers of power, embracing their new roles as public servants and renouncing past acts of terrorism. This article focuses on two of Liberia’s most notorious former warlords, Prince Johnson and Joshua Blahyi. Johnson, now Senator Johnson, was best known for swilling beer while he conducted the video-taped torture of President Doe. Joshua Blahyi, formerly General Butt Naked, who infamously drank children’s blood before running naked into battle, is now a born-again preacher with his own faith-based NGO. We argue that their use of social media has enabled them to reconstruct and reframe their ‘past lives’, ensuring these cannot become political liabilities.

The “New” Multilateralism of the Twenty-First Century

OUR UNIPOLAR WORLD IS PASSING INTO HISTORY, AS THE ECONOMIC CENTER OF gravity shifts eastward and southward and new centers of power emerge. Our international governance systems and institutions, constructed out of the ruins of World War II and the Great Depression, have been steadily lagging the steepening curve of change. Meanwhile, as the world struggles with the aftershocks of the global financial and economic crisis, terrorism, transnational crime and drug trafficking, climate change, food security and energy prices, the Arab Awakening, Japan's triple crises, failing and fragile states, the dangers of nuclear proliferation, and so forth, the virtues of multilateral cooperation are being rediscovered. Many see renewed merit in pooling national sovereignty in cooperative institutional arrangements. (1) At the same time, the preeminent power in the international system, the United States, burdened by debt, hobbled by internal divisions, newly conscious of its limits, led by a president whose formative years are more North-South than East-West, is itself putting greater stock in partnership and multilateral cooperation. (2) In response to this unprecedented pace and scope of change, old institutions are innovating and new forms and varieties of international cooperation are being called into being. Issues of legitimacy, accountability, social justice, and effectiveness are generating calls for change. Some, especially the emerging powers such as India, Brazil, and China would like to see a better representation of Southern values and interests in global summitry and in the major decisionmaking organs of the United Nations and Bretton Woods system. Western powers in the North privilege increased effectiveness. Still others, including the increasingly mobilized voices of civil society, want to see more accountability of the powerful to the less powerful, nationally and internationally, North and South. These continuing variances in what forms of cooperation are desirable pose formidable governance challenges. Such new challenges seem likely to require new forms of multilateral diplomacy--especially minilateralism--centered on institutional innovations such as the Group of 20 (G-20). Diplomacy will have to be sensitive to the needs and wishes of emerging economies and the interests of new global powers. This means less presumption on the part of the West, fewer decisions delivered from Mount Washington and additional hands on the global steering wheel and feet on the brakes and gas, as well. But as we argue, it will also require a greater sense of international civic duty on the part of the emerging powers. The response to the Libyan crisis of the claimants to permanent member status in the Security Council, who all put ideology and rhetorical posturing before protecting the innocent, is an indication of the distance still to be traveled. Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) (3) seem more disposed to accept responsibility on economic as opposed to political issues on which some seem still wedded to old patterns of behavior. In global economic summitry in the G-20, China, Brazil, India, and other emerging economies are playing an increasingly important global role. Power sharing has to mean burden sharing if the reform process is to be effective, legitimate, and ultimately accountable. But burden sharing also has to mean benefit sharing. The Changing Meaning of Multilateralism At its core, the concept of multilateralism centers on the collectively agreed norms, rules, and principles that guide and govern interstate behavior. Multilateral institutions are all based on the principles of generalized reciprocity, in which states make common undertakings and agree to act cooperatively. (4) Multilateral arrangements typically cover four institutional domains: international orders like the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century; international treaty regimes such as the Law of the Sea; international organizations, (5) notably the UN; and international negotiating processes and forums that generate institutional or outcomes such as the Ottawa landmines treaty and the International Criminal Court. …

Informational cities: Analysis and construction of cities in the knowledge society

Informational cities are prototypical cities of the knowledge society. If they are informational world cities, they are new centers of power. According to Manuel Castells (1989), in those cities space of flows (flows of money, power, and information) tend to override space of places. Information and communication technology infrastructures, cognitive infrastructures (as groundwork of knowledge cities and creative cities), and city-level knowledge management are of great importance. Digital libraries provide access to the global explicit knowledge. The informational city consists of creative clusters and spaces for personal contacts to stimulate sharing of implicit information. In such cities, we can observe job polarization in favor of well-trained employees. The corporate structure of informational cities is made up of financial services, knowledge-intensive high-tech industrial enterprises, companies of the information economy, and further creative and knowledge-intensive service enterprises. Weak location factors are facilities for culture, recreational activities, and consumption. Political willingness to create an informational city and e-governance activities are crucial aspects for the development of such cities. This conceptual article frames indicators which are able to mark the degree of “informativeness” of a city. Finally, based upon findings of network economy, we try to explain why certain cities master the transition to informational cities and others (lagging to relative insignificance) do not. The article connects findings of information science and of urbanistics and urban planning.

From the 'Strawberry Jam' to the 'Sushi-Bar': Romanian Migration in the Context of Asia's Increasing Economic Role

The paper analyzes the following points: 1) The increase of Asia’s economical role (consequences of moving the world economic centre from the Atlantic to Pacific; the new centres of power: China and Japan; Asia’s attraction; the new economical configuration, an important migration vector) 2) Romania and the Strawberry Jam. Comparative analysis between countries of destination for Romanian emigration; remittances versus FDI; the influence of the economic crisis on development. 3) Chinese Diaspora in Romania. Romanian migration to Japan. Specificities, trends, development of phenomena. How to create a Romanian Diaspora?

Escape from empire: the developing world's journey through heaven and hell

The American government has been both miracle worker and villain in the developing world. From the end of World War II until the 1980s poor countries, including many in Africa and the Middle East, enjoyed a modicum of economic growth. New industries mushroomed and skilled jobs multiplied, thanks in part to flexible American policies that showed an awareness of the diversity of Third World countries and an appreciation for their long-standing knowledge about how their own economies worked. Then during the Reagan era, American policy changed. The definition of laissez-faire shifted from Do it your way to an imperial Do it our Growth in the developing world slowed, income inequalities skyrocketed, and financial crises raged. Only East Asian economies resisted the strict prescriptions of Washington and continued to boom. Why? In Escape from Empire, Alice Amsden argues provocatively that the more freedom a developing country has to determine its own policies, the faster its economy will grow. America's recent inflexibility--as it has single-mindedly imposed the same rules, laws, and institutions on all developing economies under its influence--has been the backdrop to the rise of two new giants, China and India, who have built economic power in their own way. Amsden describes the two eras in America's relationship with the developing world as Heaven and Hell--a beneficent and politically savvy empire followed by a dictatorial, ideology-driven one. What will the next American empire learn from the failure of the last? Amsden argues convincingly that the world--and the United States--will be far better off if new centers of power are met with sensible policies rather than hard-knuckled ideologies. But, she asks, can it be done?

Going Beyond the Rhetoric

Health is a fundamental human right. Unfortunately the pursuit of good health remains a struggle for marginalized individuals/groups because of the rise of new centres of power. Hepworth argues that critical health psychologists can contribute to the promotion of public health by moving towards 'greater practice and action orientation'. Until we learn to become more actively involved in translating our research into practice, our efforts will only end up being done in vain. To pursue our humanitarian aims, CHP needs to move beyond the confines of its academic circle and begin to share its vision with a greater audience-society itself.

Reconnecting Canada to the World (via Europe)

In his foreword to the 2005 international policy statement, Prime Minister Paul Martin states unequivocally, [mjake no mistake: we are in the midst of a major rebalancing of global power. New nations are rising as military and economic forces. Many established powers are striving to maintain their influence through regional integration and new alliances. In a world of traditional and emerging giants, independent countries like Canada-countries with small populations-risk being swept aside, their influence diminished, their ability to compete hampered.' There is undoubtedly a sobering logic in the prime minister's statement. Canada does need partners and political frameworks within which to multiply its influence in the world. And yet, for at least a decade, Canada has been to all intents and purposes focused on itself and its own internal political and economic balance. During that time, it seems to have resigned itself to a minor sub-American role. Canada's many other relationships are either taken for granted or seem to be considered to be of mere historical interest Consequently, for a country with such a rich internationalist tradition, Canada has become strangely isolated. When it comes to international engagement, Canada talks the talk but does not really walk the walk.As a European, it is strange to see how little a role Europe, particularly the Union, plays in Canadian thinking. This article seeks not so much to analyze the reasons for this but to offer Canadians a blunt warning: in your scramble to position yourselves in the future, do not forget the continuing power of those who made your past. The focus of this piece, therefore, whilst unashamedly on security and Canada's role therein, has implications for all of Canada's external engagements.The effective absence of Europe from Canada's international policy statement is particularly strange when one considers that the EU contains four of the world's leading G8 economies. Moreover, in Britain and France, Europe possesses the world's second and third most effective military powers and remains the centre of gravity in NATO affairs. Indeed, the US is a member of NATO but not really part of it. The role that Canada has played in the defence of Europe and the role Europe has played in shaping Canada is clear, as is the very European nature of Canada's security presence and, of course, the fact that Canada shares its head of state with Europe's most dynamic power, Great Britain. Canada may indeed look south for much of its prosperity and security. It may also increasingly look west for its new prosperity. However, much of Canada's prosperity, security, and identity remains tied to Europe.One thing that has been striking about Canada's security and defence policy over the past 10 to 15 years is how, as allies and partners have strived to first create new centres of power and then considered sources of legitimacy, Canada has chosen the obverse route. It has debated sources of legitimacy, primarily the United Nations, before considering the scope and nature of Canadian power required to render credibility unto legitimacy.THE CANADIANIZATION OF EUROPE?Superficially, it is easy for Canadians to dismiss Europe and much if its doings. The scramble over the EU constitution, the lack of economic reform in France and Germany, the splits that seem to emerge all too easily whenever a major foreign policy issue confronts Europe, can lead North American commentators in particular to write the old continent off as locked in an eternal squabble. Squabbling, in the eyes of North Americans, would seem to have replaced eternal warfare as the main pastime. Indeed, much of the North American media seem almost to revel in treating Europe's travails as petty and parochial. Equally, with state conflict moving inexorably towards east Asia, it would also be easy to dismiss Europe as a strategic backwater. As Europe increasingly looks like a region of the world where stability, prosperity, and security seem assured, one might be tempted to forecast the steady Canadianization of the Old Continent, a world in which Europe's existence is undisturbed by events beyond its fluid borders. …

Soviet Policy Perspectives on Western Europe

1. Introduction 2. Internalization and Regional Integration 3. Western Europe: A New Centre of Power 4. Western Europe in East-West Relations 5. Gorbachev's European Policy 6. Prospects for a 'Common European Home'.

Centripetal Politics: Government and the New Centres of Power

VRÜ Verfassung und Recht in Übersee , Seite 576 - 578

The Chinese Communist Party in the 1960s: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution

The recent events in China are surely drama of the highest order, but at times it has seemed that the actors themselves were not entirely sure who was writing the lines. In fact what we seem to be witnessing is a form of commedia dell'arte: improvisation within a certain tacitly understood framework. The cultural revolution appears to have taken new turns and to have broken into new channels precisely because the actors have been faced with new and unforeseen circumstances as it has run its course. No faction in the struggle has been able to impose its will on the Party or the country by fiat; new devices and stratagems have been brought into play in what has looked like desperate attempts to gain the upper hand. It has clearly been a battle of the utmost seriousness, but there appear to have been limitations on the resultant chaos. Economic disorganisation does not seem to have occurred on the scale of the later stages of the Great Leap Forward. Nor, despite the clashes, confusion and bitter infighting, have new centres of power, totally divorced from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself, arisen. The cultural revolution has been pre-eminently a struggle within the Party.