Non-aggression Pact Research Articles

Iconographic Aspects of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact: A Comparative Analysis of Documentary Photographs

Based on the surviving 1939 photographs and their comparative analysis, the article reveals the main visual differences that emerged when photographing two different German-USSR bilateral treaty signing ceremonies. This is important and relevant because in scientific literature, history textbooks and other educational materials, as well as in exhibitions and media articles devoted to history, photographsfrom the signing of the German–Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty on 28 September 1939 are often mistakenly used to illustrate the signing of the non-aggression pact concluded between Germany and the USSR in Moscow on 23 August 1939, five weeks earlier. Since these two treaties were signed by the same two people – Vyacheslav Molotov and Joachim von Ribbentrop – at the same desk in the same office of the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR in the Moscow Kremlin, it is not that easy to distinguish at first glance which treaty is being signed in one photograph or another. The photographs are often confused, arbitrarily choosing the ones that look more expressive for the sake of illustration. The article presents visual material, its analysis, insights and generalisations that will help to avoid the photograph attribution errors that are so common in using old photographs to illustrate the signing of the 23 August 1939 Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Victims of the NKVD Katyn Operation from among Lithuanians and Residents of the Former Wilna Province of the Second Polish Republic

The German Treaty of Non-Aggression of 23 August 1939, signed in Moscow by Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov, defined the spheres of influence of the contracting parties and effectively signalled the beginning of World War II. At the same time, the Pact initiated the tragedy of millions of Central and Eastern Europeans, including the people of Lithuania and Poland. The Soviet government wanted to eradicate those who did not fit the Soviet model, so they were deported en masse and exterminated in Soviet-occupied Poland and Lithuania. One of the greatest symbols of such crimes is Katyn massacre. The fate of these people was determined by the Soviet military imperialist doctrine.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Beginning of World War II as Perceived by Soviet Citizens: New Sources and Interpretations

Abstract After the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed, a new historical phase began for the whole of Europe, marked by a sharp escalation of international conflict and the imminent outbreak of World War II. For Soviet citizens, these events were particularly traumatic because they also meant a sudden turn toward peace with Germany. The news of the signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression pact was received by Soviet citizens with mixed feelings. Many of them did not understand why yesterday’s Enemy No. 1 was suddenly turned into Ally No. 1, and what to expect from this partnership. In searching for the rationale for this agreement, the Soviet people were inclined to take a positive view of the pact, and then a negative one. A detailed analysis of the transformation of the public mood makes it possible to identify the internal problems of Soviet society, which manifested themselves expressively in the first weeks of World War II. This study also draws attention to the problem of Soviet people’s trust in official sources of information; to the impact of war scares of the interwar period on Soviet society; and to the influence of the ideas of the world proletarian revolution on the perception of the events of late August and early September 1939. The study is based on the accounts of the predominantly Russian population of the Soviet Union and presents the perspective of this ethnic group.

Survival Strategies and Non-Aggression Pacts Between the Guardia Civil and the Republican Guerrilla in Spain's Irregular War, 1936–1952

Existing literature on the anti-Francoist guerrilla has focused on the origins, development and decline of guerrilla parties. However, many aspects of the irregular war of 1936–1952 that pitted rebel forces, and later the Francoist dictatorship, against Republican resistance fighters remain unexplored. Historians have often cited civil guards as sources on killings and torture that took place in spaces of anti-guerrilla warfare, and the violence employed by the guerrilla has also been the subject of a significant amount of research. In contrast, this article looks at how civil guards deployed in the irregular war and guerrilla fighters not only interacted peacefully, but in fact came to establish non-aggression pacts as a survival strategy. The existence of such agreements was known not only to the men on both sides, but also to the civilian population and the dictatorship itself.

Market Structure and Extortion: Evidence from 50,000 Extortion Payments

Abstract How does gang competition affect extortion? Using detailed data on individual extortion payments to gangs and sales from a leading wholesale distributor of consumer goods and pharmaceuticals in El Salvador, we document evidence on the determinants of extortion payments and the effects of extortion on firms and consumers. We exploit a 2016 nonaggression pact between gangs to examine how collusion affects extortion in areas where gangs previously competed. While the pact led to a large reduction in competition and violence, we find that it increased the amount paid in extortion by approximately 20%. Much of this increase was passed through to retailers and consumers: retailers experienced an increase in delivery fees, leading to an increase in consumer prices. In particular, we find an increase in prices for pharmaceutical drugs and a corresponding increase in hospital visits for chronic illnesses. The results point to an unintended consequence of policies that reduce competition between criminal organizations.

Soviet Politics and Diplomacy in the Far East: Strategies and Alliances on the Eve of and During World War II

This article offers an in-depth analysis of Soviet policy and diplomacy in the Far East during the tumultuous period spanning from the 1920s to the 1940s. These policies were profoundly shaped by two key factors: firstly, the ideological considerations rooted in the political framework established in the USSR following the 1917 revolution, and secondly, the geopolitical dynamics reflecting the evolving global and regional political landscape in the Far East. The ruling Bolshevik Party and the Soviet government faced formidable challenges as they sought to safeguard the nascent Soviet Republic amid mounting international tensions, both on a global scale and within the Asia-Pacific region.This study aspires to present a comprehensive and integrated examination of Soviet policy and diplomacy during this era. It delineates four distinct chronological segments, each characterized by its unique features, priorities, and challenges. At the same time, these segments are united by the overarching goal of consolidating the Soviet Union's position in the Far Eastern region and the broader Pacific theater. The four discernible stages in Soviet policy and diplomacy in the Far East encompass:1. The period spanning from 1927 to 1932, marked by an initial deterioration in relations between the Soviet government and the Kuomintang administration following the 1927 split between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China (CPC). This phase also witnessed the 1929 conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway and culminated in the reestablishment of Sino-Soviet relations, all set against the backdrop of escalating Japanese aggression in Northeastern China (Manchuria). This phase demanded adroit diplomacy balancing strength and strategic statecraft.2. The 1930s, especially in the aftermath of Japan's aggressive incursions into China, saw limited interaction and collaboration between the USSR and the Republic of China. This period featured cautious Soviet-Japanese relations and included significant events such as armed clashes at Lake Khasan and the Khalkhin-Gol River, as well as the signing of the USSR-Japan Neutrality Pact.3. The era of the Great Patriotic War from 1941 to 1945, during which the Soviet Union's foremost objective was the defeat of the German Nazi aggressor. During this period, Soviet diplomacy was primarily preoccupied with relations with Anglo-American allies, with particular emphasis on the contentious issue of opening a second front. Consequently, Far Eastern and Pacific policy concerns assumed a somewhat marginalized role within the realm of Soviet diplomacy.4. Finally, the period spanning from the winter to the summer of 1945 emerged as a pivotal juncture. During this time, the Soviet Union intensified its political, diplomatic, and military involvement in the Far East, all against the backdrop of preparations for the impending entry into the war against Japan. Diplomatic endeavors reached their zenith during this critical phase.

Ewolucja stosunków rosyjsko(radziecko)-japońskich w latach 1699–1941

Russian(Soviet)-Japanese contacts have a tradition of over 300 years. The author focuses in the article on a brief exemplification and analysis of unofficial Russian-Japanese contacts since the 18th century and their official relations until the signing of the Treaty of Neutrality between the Soviet Union and Japan in April 1941. In total, four parts of the article are devoted to the analysis, apart from the introduction and conclusion. The first part of the article covers the period of unofficial relations between the two countries, which was characterized by two contradictory tendencies. Russia is pursuing territorial expansion towards the Pacific Ocean, while Japan maintains a policy of voluntary closure to the outside world. The second part deals with the official relationship between them from the Treaty of Shimoda to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. During this period, both countries are guided by a policy of territorial expansion, which led to a war between them. The third part is related to the period from the signing of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty in 1905 to the fall of the Romanov dynasty in 1917. This was the only period of mutual friendship between Russia and Japan. The last part was the years from the February and October Revolutions in Russia to the conclusion of the neutrality pact in April 1941. At that time, one of the external interventions against Soviet Russia was Japan. However, after the Japanese troops were driven out of Soviet territory in the Far East, the two countries establish official diplomatic relations. In the 1930s, mutual relations deteriorated, and in the complicated international situation that existed at the time, Moscow and Tokyo signed the Neutrality Pact in April 1941. At the end of the article, several conclusions were formulated.

WAR AND RUMORS IN THE TURKISH PRESS: THE BEGINNING OF OPERATION BARBAROSSA

peration Barbarossa, the most important turning point of the Second World War, was also of great importance for Türkiye, which was in danger of going to war at any moment. The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact signed on 23 August 1939 did not last long. As a matter of fact, Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, and this started a new era for the Second World War. This situation, which further increased Türkiye’s uneasiness about the war, was followed closely by the Turkish press, and the war discourses expressed just before the attack were constantly brought to the agenda. Docu-ment analysis, one of the qualitative research methods, was used in the study. In this study, the views of the Turkish public on this great front that shook the whole world were followed through Akşam, Cum-huriyet, Tan and Ulus newspapers. News and columns about the subject in newspapers were included in the study. Thus, it was aimed to develop a perspective that has never been put forward by the press on the subject before. As a result, it has been determined that the Turkish press, which does not want Türkiye to actually take part in this war, uses cautious, peaceful but realistic discourses.

A neoclassical realist model of overconfidence and the Japan–Soviet Neutrality Pact in 1941

Why did Japan conclude the Japan–Soviet Neutrality Pact in 1941, even though it knew the German-Soviet relations were deteriorating and heading towards a disastrous war? Under the Tripartite Pact, it would be irrational for Japan to approach the USSR, which Germany had decided to invade. This article examines this long-standing puzzle in Japanese diplomatic history (also an anomaly of neorealism) by developing a new neoclassical realist model termed ‘neoclassical realist model of overconfidence’ based on self-deception in evolutionary psychology using scientific realism in the philosophy of science as a metatheoretical foundation. Drawing on neoclassical realism, I argue that Japan’s balancing strategy during 1940–41, which initially reflected the tripolar structure of the international system (independent variable), ultimately resulted in the suboptimal balancing of the Japan–Soviet Neutrality Pact (dependent variable) due to Yosuke Matsuoka’s (Japanese foreign minister) self-deception, including the positive illusion and cognitive dissonance effect (intervening variable).

Alliance Complements or Substitutes? Explaining Bilateral Intergovernmental Strategic Partnership Ties

Since the end of the Cold War, informal security cooperation has been on the rise. Besides formal alliances, states are increasingly establishing so-called “strategic partnerships”. This new form of security cooperation is currently under-researched, although governments consider it an important foreign policy tool. We do not yet know whether security interests are the basis of these arrangements or whether strategic partnerships function as substitutes for or complements to formal alliances. This article addresses both issues by analyzing a new dataset on strategic partnerships with the involvement of G20 countries. I find that two or more states are most likely to be tied by partnerships when the presence of a common threat coincides with the absence of their joint membership in a formal alliance. However, states parties to a formal alliance with a lower commitment, such as a consultation, neutrality, or non-aggression pact, are also likely to be tied to each other by partnerships when they face a common threat.

The Soviet East European Policy in the Arabic Press on the Eve of the World War II (August — December 1939)

This paper analyzes Arabic newspaper and magazine publications devoted to the assessment of the USSR foreign policy towards the East European countries after the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty of August 23, 1939. The article presents the opinions of Arab journalists and writers about the prerequisites and consequences of the signing of the so-called «Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact», the peculiarities of relations between Moscow and Berlin in the end of 1939, the reasons for the invasion of the Red Army in Poland, as well as the motives that prompted the Soviet leadership to strengthen its presence in the Baltic region. It is concluded that many authoritative Arabic newspapers and magazines, despite a dependence on the Western European information agenda, sought to independently comprehend the actions of the Soviet government in different parts of Europe, sometimes even emphasizing the forced nature of an aggressive and ultimatum policy. At the same time, it is impossible to talk about the existence of a dominant position on this problem. Arab authors frequently criticized the military and political actions of the Soviet government in the autumn-winter of 1939. It should be added that the volume and number of articles published in the press testify to the true interest of the Middle Eastern publics in the state of affairs in the distant Soviet Union.

Polska dyplomacja wobec Związku Radzieckiego po przewrocie majowym

The May Coup did not initially bring about any major changes in Polish foreign policy, although the post-May governmental circles put a stronger emphasis on the Promethean idea and the concept of the Intermarium. In mutual relations between Warsaw and Moscow, a dialogue on the Polish-Soviet non-aggression treaty continued, as before 1926. The main point of contention was Warsaw's position on the necessity of concluding a Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact simultaneously with Moscow's analogous agreements with: Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Romania. The article presents the path to the agreement from the perspective of Warsaw, taking into account the changing international situation, including the rise of fascist tendencies in Europe, the threat of war and changes in the USSR's domestic policy. The agreement of 25 January 1932 and the non-agreement pact of 25 July that year between Poland and the USSR were the high points of mutually correct relations. Later years, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and 17 September showed that Sanation diplomacy was unable to prevent Poland from losing its independence. Whether this catastrophe could have been prevented remains a matter of dispute.

Japan in <I>Murzilka</I> Magazine (1924–2021)

The article attempts to generalize and analyze the materials dedicated to Japan, its folklore, culture, and literature in the children’s literary and art magazine Murzilka since its founding up to the present time. It traces the evolution of the image of Japan in the pages of the magazine for almost a hundred years, taking into consideration the historical circumstances, the SovietJapanese relations, the change in the approach to showing the peculiarities of daily life of other peoples in children’s literature. One can single out five periods of interest towards Japan in the magazine. In the second half of the 1920s, there is no unity in the image of Japan. Individual publications present it either as a capitalist country, where even small children must work, or as a collection of clichés (geishas, national clothing, Boys’ Day). The topic of Japanese aggression in China appears. During the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, the clashes at Lake Hassan and Khalkhin Gol, as well as during the first year after the war with Japan, the abstract “Japanese” are presented as aggressors, enslavers of the Chinese people, fascists encroaching on Soviet borders. The class nature of the Japan-China conflict and the liberating nature of the war against Japan are emphasized. While the Neutrality Pact between the USSR and Japan was in effect, the “Japanese” material was absent from the magazine. In the period of the Thaw, Japan turns out to be a country with an interesting and peculiar culture. In 1955–1966, the magazine publishes poems and songs by Japanese poets, fairy tales, descriptions of folk festivals and daily life, the kamishibai “paper theater”. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Japan fascinates the readers of Murzilka with its unity of material and spiritual culture, presented in ikebana, origami, and tea ceremony. In the publications of 1991–2001, this is a country existing outside of time, and the life of the Japanese is based on ancient traditions and exquisite festivals. In 2016–2021, Japan is presented, first and foremost, by daily life culture. Besides, for the first time during the existence of the magazine, the topic of technical progress appears.

Soviet Historical Science and Foreign Policy Dynamics in the Late 1930s and 1940s: The Mishulin Line

Historical scholarship in the USSR in the 1930s and 1940s developed along with the dynamics of foreign policy. The main issue that shaped the development of historical scholarship was Soviet-German relations. The Soviet alignment with Great Britain and France determined the dominance of the “anti-German” line even in those areas of historical research which, at first glance, were unrelated to modern history in general and German history in particular. Thus, this line is clearly evident in the discussion of the causes of the decline of the Harappan civilisation, which allegedly came about under pressure from the Indo-Aryan tribes, with whom Germany was implicitly identified in relevant studies in the second half of the 1930s. The initiator of the “anti-German” line in ancient history was Alexander Mishulin. After the conclusion of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty on 23 August 1939, the tone of the works on ancient history changed abruptly to “Germanophile” at the initiative of the same scholar. At the same time, the first – “anti-German” – line still persisted and developed in parallel with the second. Soviet-German academic cooperation was also progressing, as can be observed in the documents of the archives of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The “pro-German line” disappeared with the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, while the “anti-German” (“anti-Indo-Aryan”) one disappeared with the independence of India in 1947 and the gradual forging of friendly relations between the USSR and India.

Early Deportations of Jews in Occupied Poland (October 1939–June 1940): The German and the Soviet Cases

Abstract After the division of Poland in September 1939 following the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, deportations of Polish citizens were part of the Nazis’ plan to “Germanize” western and northern Poland, though the Jewish dimension of these events has hardly been investigated. Beyond the organized deportations by the German Security Police, there were local initiatives to expel Jews to the Soviet Zone of partitioned Poland. In the Soviet-occupied Polish territories, many Jews were deported in 1940 to remote areas of the USSR either as “unreliable” or “class alien elements,” or because of their refusal to accept Soviet citizenship. While the brutal Soviet policies unintendedly saved the majority of deported Jews from German extermination, the German deportations were the precursors to total mass murder. This article describes and compares the deportations on both sides, reconstructs the German transports, and concludes that the USSR’s deportations were part of its ongoing war against political opponents and “alien elements,” whereas the Germans’ were stepping stones on Karl A. Schleunes’s “twisted road to Auschwitz.”

Sovetskaya pomoshch' Kommunisticheskoj partii Kitaya v 1937—1945 gg.

The publication deals with issues related to the support of the leadership of the Soviet Union and the Comintern to the Communist Party of China in the period from autumn 1937 to autumn 1945 in violation of confidential agreements accompanying the NonAggression Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China dated August 21, 1937.

The Russian Question at the Entente Conference in Cannes

This article aims to explore the significance of the “Russian question” at the Entente conference in Cannes, putting it into the European political context of October 1921 – January 1922. The author pays special attention to the two important rounds of the international negotiations, i. e., to the Anglo-French discussions in London in December 1921 and to the meeting of the Entente Supreme Council in Cannes itself (6–13 January 1922). The “Russian question” was one of the three key topics of these conferences; however, to the other matters (German reparations and Anglo-French security pact), it is under-researched. Besides the published diplomatic documents, the author refers to new evidence drawn from the national archives of France, Great Britain, and Belgium. The article concludes that the negotiations in London and Cannes mirrored the “Russian question”, as it stood in European politics at the end of 1921 and the beginning of 1922. D. Lloyd George, UK prime minister and initiator of the Genoa conference, was eager to use the “Russian question” as a means to further British interests, transform the Soviet regime, and reconstruct and appease Europe. It involved reducing tensions as a result of a non-aggression pact that did not impose any obligations on the UK in Eastern Europe. From the trade and economic points of view, the emphasis was put on the international consortium aimed at consolidating Western business in Russia, giving German industry leadership in the field. Nevertheless, an important part of eventual German profits in Russia would go to France and the UK as reparations. The development of the Cannes conference, which resulted in the resignation of the French cabinet led by A. Briand, showed that the “Russian question” was not only a topic of high politics, but also directly concerned the wider public and elites. Accelerating Briand’s dismissal, Lloyd George found a more stubborn opponent in his successor, R. Poincaré. As the prologue to Genoa, the Cannes meeting outlined some of its future problems as well.

Who Was J. Piłsudski Going to Balance Between and Did He Balance in Fact in 1926–1935

The monograph “Piłsudski between Stalin and Hitler” by the Polish researcher K. Rak published in 2021 cannot but interest specialists in the history of international relations in the interwar period, not least because of its analysis of tripartite rather than bilateral relations, its chronological scope (1924–1935), the wealth of source material from German, Polish and Russian archives, and the extensive bibliography, including works in Russian. Our critical analysis does not purport to show the diversity of the issues raised or addressed in the book. Our task is a different one: to provide an insight into the state of Polish historiography, first and foremost, of such landmark events in international relations of the interwar period as the 1925 Locarno Treaties, the 1932 Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact, the 1934 Polish-German declaration of non-aggression, and the Polish policy of balancing. Yet Rak's book is not a historiographical one, but is purely research-oriented, containing many new and intriguing facts, observations, assertions and hypotheses, which can be debated, but cannot be dismissed. While demonstrating an innovative approach to the analysis of a number of issues, Ruck is not always free of stereotypes, especially when it comes to matters such as the threat to Poland posed by the 1922 Soviet-German Treaty of Rapallo, the explanation of Polish longstanding reluctance to respond to the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression treaty, the substitution of scholarly evidence for these stereotypes, yet his conclusions are well grounded, though not always incontrovertible.

О нормативных основаниях конструирования государственно-политической карты мира накануне Второй мировой войны (к 80-летию начала Великой Отечественной войны)

The political conditions, reasons, assessments and significance of the decision of the Soviet leadership to make the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in 1939, the features of the Czechoslovak crisis, the Munich Agreement are considered; the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is evaluated as a normative basis for constructing the state-political map of the world on the eve of the Second World War; fundamental issues requiring ideological, political and historical understanding are considered; attention is paid to the activation of falsification of the history of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War; the article shows that in the West, the falsification of history occupies a special place among the tools of manipulating the consciousness of modern society, there is a total distortion of history, which is becoming more and more intense in connection with the anniversaries of the be-ginning of the Great Patriotic War and the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War; history is increasingly rewritten, historical truth is sacrificed to the current political situation; political strategists of the West, argue that the Pact is the main cause of the Second World War; the blame for the unleashing of world bloodshed is laid on the USSR and Russia as its legal successor; attempts are made to devalue the sacrifices of the Soviet people made in the name of Victory in the liberation of Europe. It is necessary to counteract the falsification of history, there-fore the article pays special attention to the struggle for the truth of history, to the restoration of historical truth in respect of the past of Russia and international rela-tions. The authors document that the conclusions of the West about the role and significance of the USSR in the defeat of fascism, about the goals and results of the Second World War do not correspond to historical facts. It is necessary to continue comprehensive consideration of the military, political, ideological and legal situa-tion concerning the signing of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939 and the Munich Agreement that preceded it.

The Communist Walküre: Eisenstein’s Vision for Marrying German Wagnerism with Soviet Communism

ABSTRACT Soviet filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein was commissioned to produce Wagner’s Die Walküre in 1940, after the signing of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, to demonstrate Soviet loyalty to Germany during a time of hostile relations. This would be the last Ring performance in the Soviet Union before it was banished for thirty bitter years, but the politico-ideological underpinnings of this fascinating historic production have been largely overlooked. This article provides a close reading of Eisenstein’s political intentions for this production and posits that he promoted Wagner as the representative ideology of Germany, pairing it with Soviet communism in order to depict a Soviet-German union without endorsing German politics.