Neural Reuse Research Articles

Massive redeployment or distributed modularity?

AbstractIn distinguishing itself from other distributed approaches to cognition, Anderson's theory of neural reuse is susceptible to some of the same criticisms that have been leveled at modular approaches. Specifically, neural reuse theories state that: (1) the “working” of a given brain circuit is fixed, rather than shaped by its input, and (2) that high-level cognitive behaviors can be cleanly mapped onto a specific set of brain circuits in a non-contextualized manner.

Reuse (neural, bodily, and environmental) as a fundamental organizational principle of human cognition

AbstractWe taxonomize the varieties of representational reuse and point out that all the sorts of reuse that the brain engages in (1) involve something like a model (or schema or simulator), and (2) are effected in bodily and external media, as well as neural media. This suggests that the real fundamental organizational principle is not neural reuse, but model reuse.

Neural reuse: A polysemous and redundant biological system subserving niche-construction

AbstractNovel functions, which emerge by reusing existing resources formerly adapted to other original usages, cannot be anticipated before the need eventually arises. Simple reuse must be accidental. However, to survive the evolutionary race, one cannot merely keep hoping for a string of good fortune. So, successful species might be gifted with “rational” and “purposeful” biological mechanisms to prepare for future reuse. Neural reuse must be extrapolated from such mechanisms.

Optical holography as an analogue for a neural reuse mechanism

AbstractWe propose an analogy between optical holography and neural behavior as a hypothesis about the physical mechanisms of neural reuse. Specifically, parameters in optical holography (frequency, amplitude, and phase of the reference beam) may provide useful analogues for understanding the role of different parameters in determining the behavior of neurons (e.g., frequency, amplitude, and phase of spiking behavior).

No bootstrapping without semantic inheritance

AbstractAnderson's massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH) takes the grounding of meaning in sensorimotor behaviour to be a side effect of neural reuse. I suggest this grounding may play a much more fundamental role in accounting for the bootstrapping of higher-level cognition from sensorimotor behaviour. Thus, the question of when neural reuse delivers semantic inheritance is a pressing one for MRH.

Neural reuse as a source of developmental homology

AbstractNeural reuse theories should interest developmental psychologists because these theories can potentially illuminate the developmental relations among psychological characteristics observed across the lifespan. Characteristics that develop by exploiting pre-existing neural circuits can be thought of as developmental homologues. And, understood in this way, the homology concept that has proven valuable for evolutionary biologists can be used productively to study psychological/behavioral development.

How and over what timescales does neural reuse actually occur?

AbstractWe isolate some critical aspects of the reuse notion in Anderson's massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH). We notice that the actual rearranging of local neural circuits at a timescale comparable with the reactivity timescale of the organism is left open. We propose the concept of programmable neural network as a solution.

Neural reuse and human individual differences

AbstractWe find the theory of neural reuse to be highly plausible, and suggest that human individual differences provide an additional line of argument in its favor, focusing on the well-replicated finding of “positive manifold,” in which individual differences are highly correlated across domains. We also suggest that the theory of neural reuse may be an important contributor to the phenomenon of positive manifold itself.

Massive modularity is consistent with most forms of neural reuse

AbstractAnderson claims that the hypothesis of massive neural reuse is inconsistent with massive mental modularity. But much depends upon how each thesis is understood. We suggest that the thesis of massive modularity presented in Carruthers (2006) is consistent with the forms of neural reuse that are actually supported by the data cited, while being inconsistent with a stronger version of reuse that Anderson seems to support.

The importance of ontogenetic change in typical and atypical development

AbstractThe compelling case that Anderson makes for neural reuse and against modularity as organizing principle of the brain is further supported by evidence from developmental disorders. However, to provide a full evolutionary-developmental theory of neural reuse that encompasses both typical and atypical development, Anderson's “massive redeployment hypothesis” (MRH) could be further constrained by considering brain development across ontogeny.

Neural reuse implies distributed coding

AbstractBoth distributed coding, with its implication of neural reuse, and more specialized function have been recognized since the beginning of brain science. A controversy over imageless thought threw introspection into disrepute as a scientific method, making more objective methods dominate. It is known in information science that one element, such as a bit in a computer, can participate in coding many independent states; in this commentary, an example is given.

Comparative studies provide evidence for neural reuse

AbstractComparative studies demonstrate that homologous neural structures differ in function and that neural mechanisms underlying behavior evolved independently. A neural structure does not serve a particular function so much as it executes an algorithm on its inputs though its dynamics. Neural dynamics are altered by a neuromodulation, and species-differences in neuromodulation can account for behavioral differences.

Reuse in the brain and elsewhere

AbstractChemistry, genetics, physics, and linguistics all present instances of reuse. I use the example of how behavioral constraints may have contributed to the emergence of phonemic reuse. Arising from specific facts about speech production, perception, and learning, such constraints suggest that combinatorial reuse is domain-specific. This implies that it would be more prudent to view instances of neural reuse not as reflecting a “fundamental organizational principle,” but as a fortuitous set of converging phenomena.

Implications of neural reuse for brain injury therapy: Historical note on the work of Kurt Goldstein

AbstractThis commentary suggests how the target article raises new implications for brain injury therapies, which may have been anticipated by the neurologist Kurt Goldstein, though he worked in and earlier era of fervent localization of brain function.

From the physical to the psychological: Mundane experiences influence social judgment and interpersonal behavior

AbstractMere physical experiences of warmth, distance, hardness, and roughness are found to activate the more abstract psychological concepts that are analogically related to them, such as interpersonal warmth and emotional distance, thereby influencing social judgments and interpersonal behavior without the individual's awareness. These findings further support the principle of neural reuse in the development and operation of higher mental processes.