Corruption Networks Research Articles

시진핑 시기 중국의 늙은 호랑이 사냥 ― 저우융캉 처벌 사례를 중심으로

The purpose of this study is to accurately verify how Xijin Ping effectively persecuted Zhou Yongkang with tremendous influence in judiciary and police departments by terminating unspoken political belief of “Never punish members of Politburo Standing Committee” that has deeply been rooted in Chinese politics. Although there have been several observations in which the members of Political Bureau have severely been chastised, Politburo Standing Committee members—who serve as the core actors in Chinese politics—are exempted. It is mainly because of fearing strong opposition, high political cost, and potential weakening of Communistic party if the members of Politburo Standing Committee were subjected to political investigation. However, the Xijin Ping authority—more heavily dependent on Rule by Law than Judiciary department—has greatly focused on persecuting Zhou Yongkang by mobilizing Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection. The Commission for Disciplinary Inspection has cleverly exploited the already established Zhou’s corruption network to arrest his political henchmen, and has succeeded in thoroughly collecting lawful evidence against Zhou Yongkang. Conclusively, the Xijin Ping authority has ultimately received the consensus from the senior political members to persecute Zhou Yongkang.

Corruption and its detection: a graph-theoretic approach

We consider a corruption network where agents, both internal or external to the network, use connections and bribes to obtain goods or services outside the formal procedures. We develop a graph-theoretic model for the system and present sufficient conditions for detectability of the corruption status of at least one agent. Where detectability is not possible, we determine the topology of the network and all the possible corruption statuses of the agents. Further we provide, if we have information on the corruption status of a single agent, an algorithm that identifies the corruption status of every other agent in the network. Our results provide tools for detecting corrupt agents in organizations such as revenue authorities, municipalities, police, vehicle inspection departments, financial institutions and firms, while allowing the system to operate in normal mode.

The Systemic Nature of Corruption

This paper aims to view corruption in light of the consequences that arise from it and believes that corruption should not be regarded in individual instances. Corruption is not restricted to any one type office or motive or a single type of compensation. The paper argues that by its very nature corruption is a self reproducing network that leads to a social institution that parallels the government in strength and its impact on the economy. Once corruption is institutionalized, people interacting in a corrupt network often have no choice but to engage in corrupt practices thereby ‘supporting’ and fueling the furtherance of the institution of corruption. The provision of licenses and permits is used as a standing example to measure the nature of corruption because the monopoly that the public sector has over the issue of such public goods and services is exemplified by regulations in licensing and the awarding of permits. The consequences of corruption are identified in the context of license provision. It is very common for ministries or smaller branches of the government to entrust one of their officials with the responsibility of granting a license or permit for a certain project. This is seen in heavy industries or large projects which require a sizable investment and will yield massive revenue in time. Licenses and permits are common for natural resource extraction, steel, coal and natural gas industries, infrastructure development, fisheries, construction and many other such industries. This provide public officials a perfect opportunity to extract rent from citizens who either don't know any better or simply cannot do anything about it because of the system they live in. The dynamics and problems of such a system are highlighted and a few simple solutions are suggested.

Corruption in Indonesia’s Emerging Democracy

Much has been studied by political scientists about practices of corruption and their implications for development. They have provided useful analysis on the causes and impacts of corruption. In contrast, sociologists seem to have glossed over issues of corruption. This article aims to contribute to the sociology of organization by reconstructing a theoretical framework of organizational institutionalism through understanding corruption in an emerging democracy. Using cases of corruption in Indonesia, this article intends to enrich previous perspectives on social construction and contestation of corruption occurring in democratizing polities. It explores the extent to which reform in formal governance has taken into account informal arrangements to eradicate corruption. Secondary data and focused group discussions have been used to collect data. The findings inform that informal organizational networks of corruption emerge and develop within formal organizational relationships. On the other hand, informal norms and networks also exist that potentially facilitate anticorruption initiatives. This article recommends that the Corruption Eradication Commission, as the main anticorruption body, improves its understanding of the connections among public organizations, and between public organizations and societal organizations. This will enable public leaders to adopt a combination of the principles of Western and formal governance and existing informal arrangements to combat corruption. The sociology of organization will benefit from adopting the concept of informal organizational networks of corruption to illuminate the “dark corners” of formal organizational relationships.

Corruption and the Architecture of Paramilitary Bureaucracies: Comparing the American and the Russian Police

Despite institutional change, corrupt networks have been tremendously successful enterprises at the expense of the public good; returning and evolving with new elements. For public sector corruption to prosper, bureaucracies must possess certain structural characteristics which facilitate criminal behavior. Although public organizations have been largely studied, it is less clear how their structure creates opportunities for deviance. Given the understudied field of paramilitary bureaucracies and the deleterious consequences of corruption for socioeconomic development and (inter)national security, we seek to understand: “How and why does the structure of police organizations facilitate corruption?” To address this question, we draw upon organizational, covert networks, and organized crime theories, and test them using a conditional uniform graph test on a dataset that includes the formal hierarchical structures of the modern police forces in Russia and the United States. We show that despite operating in largely different institutional regimes, the Moscow and the Los Angeles police department exhibit similar structural characteristics. Police bureaucracies’ structures are efficient in performing complex tasks, but are highly conducive to concealment, creating numerous temptations and opportunities for corruption. Lastly, we show that police organizations are scale-free networks which makes them extremely vulnerable to corruptive pressures.

Las costas de Yucatán, escenario de batallas navales durante la guerra Méjico-Tejas 1835-37

During the interval of time of Texas Independence War, the Mexican Gulf was the place of Texan attacks against the ships of the Mexican navy as well as national trade ships. The effective assaults organized during two years on the Yucatan coasts, particularly in front of the Sisal and Campeche ports, were considered as pirates by the Mexican Authorities. This investigation offers a vision of the same event viewed from both opposite sides, as given us by a documental review in Mexican and foreign archives. With this information, we can understand different aspects of the Yucatan economic as well as maritime trade, smuggling, the disastrous situation of peninsula's inhabitants and finally the network of corruption in the higher levels of the local government that weakened the defense of the Yucatan coasts against these fulminant corsairs attacks.

Виктимологический аспект коррупционной сделки

Objective: to present the author's concept of the victimological aspect of corruption crime.Methods: dialectical method of cognition, mainly the systemic approach (analysis).Results: the article discusses the concept of corruption deal as an unlawful act, statutory offence (bribery and subornation), law abuse by the authorized entity. The illegal (most common), and manipulative types of corruption deals and their mechanisms are defined, as well as the ways of their implementation, which include mutually beneficial, bilateral trade, extortion and initiative, active bribery. The diverse negative effects of corruption on the legal relationships are proved. The danger of the crime deal is shown as the factor of corrupt behavior, and active means of formation of corruption networks, which increases victimogenity of corruption acts, doing harm not only to physical but also legal entities. In accordance with this, the point of view supported and proved that it is necessary to expand the notion of victim of corruption offences to legal persons. The conclusion is made about the feasibility of a legal assessment of corruption deals as a qualifying feature of a criminal offense.Scientific novelty: the article justifies the author's position in relation to an assessment of corruption victimization of the deal; victimological characteristic of a corrupt deals victim are given; critical analysis of basic victimological concepts is made to identify the potential corrupt deals victims and ensure victim safety.Practical significance: the idea is expressed of reorienting public consciousness, views on corruption as a way of solving problems; of changing tolerance to corruption, due to which the legal subjects become victims of corrupt deals; of amending the anti-corruption policies towards more careful attention to the protection of the legal relations subjects against the corruption threat.

Three paradigms for the analysis of corruption

In the last decades a growing awareness emerged of the relevance of corruption as an hidden factor which may negatively affect political and economic decision-making processes. In spite of a lively scientific debate there is no general consensus on a commonly accepted definition of what corruption is. The A. distinguishes three main paradigms, focusing on different (though not irreconcilable) variables. The first is the economic paradigm, which usually takes the principal-agent model of corruption as its founding pillar. In this paradigm corruption is considered the outcome of rational individual choices, and its spread within a certain organization is influenced by the factors defining the structure of expected costs and rewards. A second approach – the cultural paradigm – looks at the differences in cultural traditions, social norms and interiorized values which shape individuals’ moral preferences and consideration of his social and institutional role. These are a leading forces that can push a corrupt public or private agent (not) to violate legal norms. A third neo-institutional approach considers also mechanisms which allow the internal regulation of social interactions within corrupt networks, and their effects on individuals’ beliefs and preferences. Though the corrupt agreements cannot be enforced with legal sanctions, several informal, non-written rules, contractual provisos and conventions may regulate the corrupt exchange between agent and corruptor. The A. underlines that corruption is the outcome of a multitude of individual and collective choices which change public opinion towards corruption and its diffusion throughout the state, markets and civil society. There is no univocal recipe to deal with anti-bribery measures, since corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. Reforms aimed at dismantling systemic corruption have to be finely tuned against its hidden governance structures, i.e. its internal regulation of exchanges and relationships. Otherwise, a vicious circle may emerge: the more an anti-corruption policy is needed, because corruption is systemic and enforced by effective third-parties, the less probable its formulation and implementation. Only when official rules are complemented by coherent informal institutions, bottom-up initiatives, they tend to produce the expected outcomes and make anticorruption regulation more effective.

The Paradox of Corrupt Networks: An Analysis of Organizational Crime at Enron

Despite the prevalence of organizational crime and renewed academic interest in corruption, the coordination of corrupt activities remains undertheorized. This study uses longitudinal data based on the email communication from Enron Corporation prior to its demise and couples qualitative coding techniques with social network analysis to understand the effects of corruption on communication behavior. By contrasting the evolution of corrupt and noncorrupt projects at Enron, I examine how corruption influences the way individuals attempt to remain undetected while sharing information. Although transitive communications were not different at the projects’ onsets, the members of corrupt projects communicate less and have fewer reciprocal relations than the noncorrupt project members. But as the corrupt project members’ tenure on a project increases, their behavior tends to become more similar to the behavior of the noncorrupt project members. Potential mechanisms are explored to explain this finding. This study provides insight into how corruption is coordinated within firms over time and highlights the role of information in understanding the emergent properties of social networks.

Performance contracting and social capital (re)formation: A case study of Nairobi City Council in Kenya

This paper reports on a qualitative case study of Nairobi City Council (NCC) to, firstly, illuminate how social capital is constructed in discourses surrounding the introduction of performance contracting into the Kenyan public sector and secondly, examine how the introduction of performance contracting into the Kenyan public sector may have affected social capital formation within this authority. The data were collected via an extensive review of official government documents as well as qualitative interviews over a six-month period. The analysis reveals that there is perceived notable change in the social structure and working norms and values among employees following the implementation of performance contracting. This perceived change is however being frustrated by inadequate resources and entrenched attitudes and networks of patronage and corruption, especially at the top levels of government. The study illuminates how regulatory discourse, structural changes and incentive and coercive mechanisms combine in an effort to change social capital at the micro level of government agencies but how these efforts are thwarted by strongly embedded institutions. We conclude that performance contracts, on their own, are unlikely to transform the Kenyan public sector in the manner envisaged without political will and significant change in the wider socio-political environment.

The Nagygate Affair, Corruption and Organized Crime: Corruption Networks and their Potential Impact on the Quality of Democracy in the Czech Republic

AbstractThis paper addresses the influence of organized crime on the performance of democracy in the Czech Republic and seeks to determine which dimensions of its political system (if any) are most endangered. We construe organized crime in terms of corruption networks, questioning in effect the predominant understanding of these two concepts as distinct or even exclusive phenomena. The paper thus construes corruption and organized crime as concepts referring to transgressive acts (i.e., behavior that involves a violation of moral or social boundaries that need not be legally codified), rather than in terms of legal norms. The influence of corruption networks is demonstrated using the “Nagygate” affair, which is analyzed using Maltz’s framework of potential harm. We argue that the debate on organized crime in the Czech Republic is, in fact, inherently tied to the study of corruption, since corruption constitutes an integral part of organized crime activity. Our findings are that transgressive behavior has a mostly negative impact, including loss of trust, the widespread belief that injustice goes unpunished, a weakening of the political system, and degeneration of the democratic regime. Moreover, the Nagygate scandal provides evidence that democratic institutions are not solely victims of organized crime but also a potential source of transgressive acts.

Accounting and Networks of Corruption

This paper examines the process of corruption within a Canadian federal government sponsorship programme in the mid- to late-1990s and, more specifically, the role of accounting in making this corr...

Blurring the line between licit and illicit: transnational corruption networks in Central Asia and beyond

The anti-corruption norm in both scholarship and the policy world has too narrowly focused on the domestic and institutional context of bribe-taking and public corruption. Instead, we argue that corruption in the contemporary global economy requires a multiple set of connected transactions, processes, and relationships that take place within informal transnational networks that blur the line between illegal and legal activities. These networks include multinational companies, elites in host countries, offshore financial vehicles and conduits, middlemen and brokers, and destination financial institutions. We examine how these actors operate in Central Asia, a region that is widely identified as corrupt, yet is rarely understood as embedded in the types of global processes, offshore connections and transnational links specified in our analysis. Examples of offshore centers in tax planning from Central Asia, and partial results from a field experiment based on impersonating high corruption risks from four Central Asian states, provide evidence for how the various actors in transnational financial networks structure their dealings. We then present two brief illustrative cases of how these transnational networks have operated in energy explorations services in Kazakhstan and telecommunications contracts in Uzbekistan. Our findings have theoretical, practical, and normative implications for scholars and practitioners of Central Asian international political economy and other ‘high risk' regions.

Aféra Nagygate mezi korupcí a organizovaným zločinem: korupční sítě a jejich možný vliv na kvalitu demokracie v České republice

The paper addresses the question of what sort of influence organized crime may have on democratic performance in the Czech Republic and which dimensions of its political system (if any) are endangered most. We define organized crime narrowly in terms of corruption networks, questioning in effect the predominant understanding of these two concepts as distinct or even exclusive phenomena. The paper thus construes corruption and organized crime as concepts referring to transgressive acts (i.e. behaviour that involves a violation of moral or social boundaries that do not have to be legally codified), rather than in terms of legal norms. The influence of corruption networks is demonstrated on the case of the "Nagygate" scandal, which is analysed by utilising the framework of possible harms, as developed by Michael Maltz. We argue that the debate on organized crime in the Czech Republic is, in fact, inherently tied to the study of corruption, since corruption constitutes an integral part of organized criminal activities. Our findings show that transgressive behaviour has mostly negative impacts that include the loss of trust, widespread beliefs that injustice goes unpunished, a weakening of the political system, and the overall degeneration of the democratic regime. Moreover, the Nagygate scandal provides evidence that democratic institutions are not solely the victim of organized crime but also a possible source of transgressive activities.

Extra-legal Protection in China

This paper incorporates the concept of guanxi—a Chinese version of personal connections, networks or social capital—into the discussion of police corruption and the rise of extra-legal protectors. Using published materials and fieldwork data collected from two Chinese cities ふChoミgケiミg aミd Qufuぶ, it deマoミstヴates ho┘ guaミ┝i distoヴts Chiミa’s legal s┞steマ H┞ facilitating the buying and selling of public offices and promoting the formation of corrupt networks between locally-Hased Iヴiマiミals aミd go┗eヴミマeミt offiIials. Chiミa’s ┘eak legal framework encourages individuals and entrepreneurs to employ guanxi networks to obtain private protection from alternative suppliers (e.g. corrupt government officials and street gangsters) in order to protect property rights, facilitate transactions, and fend off government extortion.

Social Networks of Corruption in the Vietnamese and Lao Cross-Border Timber Trade

Although corruption is a core issue in discourses on Southeast Asian states and the region's illegal timber trade, its specific meanings, characteristics, and role are poorly understood. Our ethnographic study of corruption and timber trade in the lower Mekong uncovers the relationships, dealings, and networks that enable illegal timber flows. We follow the disputed case of a shipment of high-value timber that originated in Laos and was seized by Vietnamese seaport customs officials in 2011. By examining the actors involved and their efforts to obtain the release of the timber, we reveal the complex and networked nature of relationships from local to national levels that enable illicit rosewood trade from Laos to Vietnam and onward from Vietnamese ports. At the same time, interactions between timber traders and state officials highlight the recursive relationship between ‘private’ and ‘state’ actors, and the scope for mobility between these categories. Our analysis challenges the current international and national emphasis on law enforcement as a means to tackle illegal logging. Instead, policy would be better founded on a more holistic and nuanced understanding of the socio-political relationships that characterise and perpetuate corruption across these multiple scales.

Mubarak's Egypt — Nexus of Criminality

Employing a Marxist framework, this article examines how neo-liberal agendas for development pursued by successive regimes in Egypt have been associated with violence, fraud and corruption. Encouraged by international financial institutions and Western governments, the Egyptian state became a means of channelling public resources into private hands, using complex relations of privilege among officials and oligarchs. The article examines a growing conviction among Egypt's people that the presidency and the ruling party represented a criminal enterprise. Addressing notions of “crony capitalism”, and the idea that the revolution of 2011 punished an aberrant political leader, it argues that bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have been party to consolidation of corrupt networks and development of an authoritarian state acting with impunity vis-à-vis the mass of Egypt's people. The article raises pressing questions about global responsibilities for state crime manifested at the local level.

A Note on Public Sector's Corruption Equilibrium and Network Economy

Most of the studies on Public Sector's corruption focused on the micro economic aspects of the criminal behavior and only limited research has conducted on the macro level in general and market equilibrium in particular. In an attempt to better understand the phenomenon of corruption this paper uniquely analyzes corruption in view of the 'network economy' theory and suggests a theoretical framework for understanding corruption equilibrium. I claim that corruption reaches equilibrium under two extremes which make it difficult for countries to move from one to the other. Unfortunately, it is thus almost impossible for a country to make a significant transition on its own and the chances of gradual reforms are generally not very good.

Clientelist corruption networks: conceptual and empirical approaches

Corruption is widespread all over the world. It is seen as a serious problem for wealth, equality, democracy and development. In many countries, corruption is not a deviant behaviour but the norm, generally practised by actors; hence corruption is an informal institution. Despite this, a consensual definition of corruption is nowhere in sight. One way of approaching corruption might be to study forms of corruption. A form or variant often mentioned is corruption networks, or clientelism. In this paper, clientelism is analysed in order to proceed further towards an understanding of corruption. With this perspective, corruption is not seen as a deviant behaviour but the social embeddedness of corruption is better understood. First, concepts and definitions of corruption and clientelism are discussed, highlighting core characteristics and analysing the relationship. Second, different approaches of studying and measuring clientelism are introduced’interpretative, ethnographic field studies, the use of proxies, surveys and expert surveys.

Cyber Rebellion: Bradley Manning, WikiLeaks, and the Struggle to Break the Power of Secrecy in the Global War on Terror

AbstractFollowing the release of thousands of diplomatic cables which revealed the human rights abuses and networks of corruption that sustain the US-sponsored global war on terror, the US Justice Department has invoked the 1917 Espionage Act to indict both Bradley Manning, the US soldier who released the classified documents to WikiLeaks, and Julian Assange, the editor and publisher of WikiLeaks. While censorship serves as an economic signal, as Assange asserts, how does the torture and prosecution of Pvt. Bradley Manning serve as a cultural signal which reveals the ­lessons of a patriotism that promotes a dystopic democracy? This article examines the spatio-temporal predicament of secrecy, surveillance, and censorship in the face of cyber rebellion.