Network Security Policy Research Articles

Securing Library Technology: A How-To-Do-It Manual

Securing Library Technology: A How-To-Do-It Manual

Application of a JXTA-overlay P2P system for end-device control and e-learning

This work is motivated by the need to develop decentralized P2P approaches for controlling end-devices in a wide-area network without changing the network security policy. Much of current research work on P2P systems is devoted to P2P networks of standard peers such as PCs. Due to improvements of connections capabilities of mobile devices and end-devices, there is an increasing interest to design, implement and deploy full featured P2P networks that integrate standard peers, mobile devices and end-devices. In this paper, we use the JXTA-Overlay for the control of end-devices and e-learning in a P2P network. We considered as end-devices the smart box (which is used for stimulating the learners in our implemented P2P e-learning system), robot, and room lightening. We also considered the control of a mobile car in order to prove the applicability of our approach in wireless environment. The proposed approach, due to the capabilities of JXTA protocols to overcome firewalls and NATs, is able to control devices without changing network security policies. We evaluate the proposed system by many experiments and have shown that the proposed system has a good performance and can be used successfully for the control of end-devices and in e-learning.

Integrated security analysis framework for an enterprise network – a formal approach

In a typical enterprise network, correct implementation of security policies is becoming increasingly difficult owing to complex security constraints and dynamic changes in network topology. Usually, the network security policy is defined as the collection of service access rules between various network zones. The specification of the security policy is often incomplete since all possible service access paths may not be explicitly covered. This policy is implemented in the network interfaces in a distributed fashion through sets of access control (ACL) rules. Formally verifying whether the distributed ACL implementation conforms to the security policy is a major requirement. The complexity of the problem is compounded as some combination of network services may lead to inconsistent hidden access paths. Further, failure of network link(s) may result in the formation of alternative routing paths and thus the existing security implementation may defy the policy. In this study, an integrated formal verification and fault analysis framework has been proposed which derives a correct ACL implementation with respect to given policy specification and also ensures that the implementation is fault tolerant to certain number of link failures. The verification incorporates boolean modelling of the security policies and ACL implementations and then formulates a satisfiability checking problem.

Enterprise Network Packet Filtering for Mobile Cryptographic Identities

Firewalls are an essential component of the Internet and enterprise network security policy enforcement today. The configurations of enterprise firewalls are typically rather static. Even if client’s IP addresses can be dynamically added to the packet filtering rules, the services allowed through the firewall are commonly still fixed. In this paper, we present a transparent firewall configuration solution based on mobile cryptographic identifiers of Host Identity Protocol (HIP). HIP allows a client to protect the data transfer with IPsec ESP, and supports dynamic address changes for mobile clients. The HIP-based firewall learns the identity of a client when it communicates with the server over HIP. The firewall configures the necessary rules based on HIP control messages passing through the firewall. The solution is secure and flexible, and introduces only minimal latency to the initial HIP connection establishment.

A Framework for Translating a High Level Security Policy into Low Level Security Mechanisms

A Framework for Translating a High Level Security Policy into Low Level Security MechanismsSecurity policies have different components; firewall, active directory, and IDS are some examples of these components. Enforcement of network security policies to low level security mechanisms faces some essential difficulties. Consistency, verification, and maintenance are the major ones of these difficulties. One approach to overcome these difficulties is to automate the process of translation of high level security policy into low level security mechanisms. This paper introduces a framework of an automation process that translates a high level security policy into low level security mechanisms. The framework is described in terms of three phases; in the first phase all network assets are categorized according to their roles in the network security and relations between them are identified to constitute the network security model. This proposed model is based on organization based access control (OrBAC). However, the proposed model extend the OrBAC model to include not only access control policy but also some other administrative security policies like auditing policy. Besides, the proposed model enables matching of each rule of the high level security policy with the corresponding ones of the low level security policy. Through the second phase of the proposed framework, the high level security policy is mapped into the network security model. The second phase could be considered as a translation of the high level security policy into an intermediate model level. Finally, the intermediate model level is translated automatically into low level security mechanism. The paper illustrates the applicability of proposed approach through an application example.

Security of internet-connected computer networks

The security of computer networks connected to the internet is an important, vital and hotly contested real-world issue. Once the computer networks get connected to the internet, the number of attacks, their strength and intensity grow exponentially. All the attacks then exploit breaches in the network security. In this paper some of the passive and active attacks against the computer networks are presented. The anatomy of the attack is presented showing the phases and the techniques for penetrating into the computer networks – with the purpose to stress and highlight the several dangers faced by the network manager and the utmost necessity of setting a proper corporate network security policy in place. The detection of an attack is a difficult task because the detection technology is still in its infancy and has yet to mature, also once the attack is detected, the attacker in most cases still remains unknown. After the detection of the attack, the analyst needs some time to establish the actual nature of the attack.

Formalizing the design, evaluation, and analysis of quality of protection in wireless networks

A diversity of wireless networks, with rapidly evolving wireless technology, are currently in service. Due to their innate physical layer vulnerability, wireless networks require enhanced security components. WLAN, WiBro, and UMTS have defined proper security components that meet standard security requirements. Extensive research has been conducted to enhance the security of individual wireless platforms, and we now have meaningful results at hand. However, with the advent of ubiquitous service, new horizontal platform service models with vertical cross-layer security are expected to be proposed. Research on synchronized security service and interoperability in a heterogeneous environment must be conducted. In heterogeneous environments, to design the balanced security components, quantitative evaluation model of security policy in wireless networks is required. To design appropriate evaluation method of security policies in heterogeneous wireless networks, we formalize the security properties in wireless networks. As the benefit of security protocols is indicated by the quality of protection (QoP), we improve the QoP model and evaluate hybrid security policy in heterogeneous wireless networks by applying to the QoP model. Deriving relative indicators from the positive impact of security points, and using these indicators to quantify a total reward function, this paper will help to assure the appropriate benchmark for combined security components in wireless networks.

Structure preserving anonymization of router configuration data

A repository of router configuration files from production networks would provide the research community with a treasure trove of data about network topologies, routing designs, and security policies. However, configuration files have been largely unobtainable precisely because they provide detailed information that could be exploited by competitors and attackers. This paper describes a method for anonymizing router configuration files by removing all information that connects the data to the identity of the underlying network, while still preserving the structure of information that makes the data valuable to networking researchers. Anonymizing configuration files has unusual requirements, including preserving relationships between elements of data, anonymizing regular expressions, and robustly coping with more than 200 versions of the configuration language. Conventional tools and techniques are poorly suited to the problem. Our anonymization method has been validated with a major carrier, earning unprivileged researchers access to the configuration files of thousands of routers in hundreds of networks. Through example analysis, we demonstrate that the anonymized data retains the key properties of the network design. The paper sets out techniques that could be used in an attempt to break the anonymization, and it concludes our anonymization techniques are most applicable to enterprise networks, because the large number of enterprises and the difficulty of probing them from the outside make it hard to recognize an anonymized network based solely on publicly-available information about its topology or configuration. When applied to backbone networks, which are few in number and many of whose properties can be publicly measured, the anonymization might be broken by fingerprinting techniques described in this paper.

Abstraction-based analysis of known and unknown vulnerabilities of critical information infrastructures

The systematic protection of critical information infrastructures requires an analytical process to identify the critical components and their interplay, to determine the threats and vulnerabilities, to assess the risks and to prioritise countermeasures where risk is unacceptable. The abstraction-based approach presented here builds on a model-based construction of an attack graph with constraints given by the network security policy. A unique feature of the presented approach is, that abstract representations of these graphs can be computed that allow comparison of focused views on the behaviour of the system. In order to analyse resilience of critical information infrastructures against exploits of unknown vulnerabilities, generic vulnerabilities for each installed product and affected service are added to the model. The reachability analysis now considers every possible choice of product, and so all alternatives are evaluated in the attack graph. The impact of changes to security policies or network structure can be visualised by differences in the attack graphs. Results of this analysis support the process of dependable configuration of critical information infrastructures.

Lightweight Vulnerability Management System

To secure a network, ideally, all software in the computers should be updated. However, especially in a server farm, we have to cope with unresolved vulnerabilities due to software dependencies. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the vulnerabilities inside the network. Existing methods require IP reachability and dedicated software to be installed in the managed computers. In addition, existing approaches cannot detect vulnerabilities of underlying libraries and uniformly control the communication between computers based only on the vulnerability score. We propose a lightweight vulnerability management system (LWVMS) based on a self-enumeration approach. This LWVMS allows administrators to configure their own network security policy flexibly. It complies with existing standards, such as IEEE802.1X and EAP-TLS, and can operate in existing corporate networks. Since LWVMS does not require IP reachability between the managed server and management servers, it can reduce the risk of invasion and infection in the quarantine phase. In addition, LWVMS can control the connectivity based on both the vulnerabilities of respective components and the network security policy. Since this system can be implemented by a slight modification of open-source software, the developers can implement this system to fit their network more easily.

Security Functional Components for Building a Secure Network Computing Environment

ABSTRACT It is difficult to define reliable security policy components that should be applied to validate a secure computing environment. The job gets further complicated when one has to deal with multiple policies in single computing environment. This paper demonstrates how we can overcome the difficulties of defining reliable security components by using evaluation criteria. In this paper we use common criteria to derive the security functional components for a multipolicy-based network computing environment. In the verification process, the derived policy components are related to the specific security objectives of the network communication environment. The evidence listed in the case study supports the claims that the proposed network security policy interpretation framework is a complete and cohesive set of requirements.

Complete analysis of configuration rules to guarantee reliable network security policies

The use of different network security components, such as firewalls and network intrusion detection systems (NIDSs), is the dominant method to monitor and guarantee the security policy in current corporate networks. To properly configure these components, it is necessary to use several sets of security rules. Nevertheless, the existence of anomalies between those rules, particularly in distributed multi-component scenarios, is very likely to degrade the network security policy. The discovery and removal of these anomalies is a serious and complex problem to solve. In this paper, we present a complete set of mechanisms for such a management.

Taxonomy of conflicts in network security policies

Network security polices are essential elements in Internet security devices that provide traffic filtering, integrity, confidentiality, and authentication. Network security perimeter devices such as firewalls, IPSec, and IDS/IPS devices operate based on locally configured policies. However, configuring network security policies remains a complex and error-prone task due to rule dependency semantics and the interaction between policies in the network. This complexity is likely to increase as the network size increases. A successful deployment of a network security system requires global analysis of policy configurations of all network security devices in order to avoid policy conflicts and inconsistency. Policy conflicts may cause serious security breaches and network vulnerability such as blocking legitimate traffic, permitting unwanted traffic, and insecure data transmission. This article presents a comprehensive classification of security policy conflicts that might potentially exist in a single security device (intrapolicy conflicts) or between different network devices (interpolicy conflicts) in enterprise networks. We also show the high probability of creating such conflicts even by expert system administrators and network practitioners.

Network Security Basics

Writing a basic article on network security is something like writing a brief introduction to flying a commercial airliner. Much must be omitted, and an optimistic goal is to enable the reader to appreciate the skills required. The first question to address is what we mean by "network security." Several possible fields of endeavor come to mind within this broad topic, and each is worthy of a lengthy article. To begin, virtually all the security policy issues apply to network as well as general computer security considerations. In fact, viewed from this perspective, network security is a subset of computer security. The art and science of cryptography and its role in providing confidentiality, integrity, and authentication represents another distinct focus even though it's an integral feature of network security policy. The topic also includes design and configuration issues for both network-perimeter and computer system security. The practical networking aspects of security include computer intrusion detection, traffic analysis, and network monitoring. This article focuses on these aspects because they principally entail a networking perspective.

다중 VPN 환경에서의 분산 Perimeter defence 모델에 관한 연구

본 논문에서는 다중 VPN을 수용하는 대규모 네트워크에서 인터넷 액세스를 지원할 때, 보안 정책에 따라 신뢰구역(Trust zone)의 불확실한 경계설정으로 발생할 수 있는 보안 문제를 해결하기 위한 적응방안을 제시하였다. 관련연구로 기존 적용모델과 다중 VPN 네트워크에서의 보안 위협을 분석하고, 외부 네트워크로부터의 보호를 위해 신뢰구역 분리와 분산 정책 적용을 고려한 시뮬레이션을 수행하였다. 시뮬레이션을 통해 다중 VPN 수용과 인터넷 액세스에 의한 신뢰구간의 불확실한 경계는 신뢰되지 않은 경계로부터의 분산 계층적인 Perimeter defence 정책 적용을 통해서 개별 VPN간의 신뢰구간을 축소할 수 있었고, 하위 개별 사이트로부터의 적용보다 정책 적용횟수가 줄어 전송 지연에 영향을 줄일 수 있었다. This paper analyzed the proper methods to solve the security problems of establishing trust zone which is changed by security policy in large scale networks containing multiple VPNs. Therefore, we surveyed the vulnerability of VPN technologies, it analyzed various models suitable for trust zone. By simulations of various models, we Propose the cascade perimeter defence policy model having the neit as such an efficient transit cost and the strictly isolation for trust tone. This model can protect the trust zone from the public network by dividing the trust Tone according to each VPN group and it shows the better transit performance by cascading the position of perimeter defence policy.

Development of security policies for private networks

AbstractWith the current worldwide emphasis on e‐business, the development of sound network security policies for private networks connected to the Internet is becoming of increasing importance. This paper identifies a general network security profile upon which current and planned network security states can be mapped. The paper also provides a process for the development of current security states into target states, using the network security profile. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &Sons, Ltd.

An XML-based architecture to perform data integration and data unification in vulnerability assessments

One of the problems facing penetration testers is that a test can generate vast quantities of information that need to be stored, analysed and cross-referenced for later use. Consequently, this paper will present an architecture based on the encoding of information within an XML document. We will also demonstrate how, through application of the architecture, large quantities of security-related information can be captured within a single database schema. This database can then be used to ensure that systems are conforming to an organisation's network security policy.

네트워크 보안 정책 정보 모델에 기반한 정책 관리 도구의 구현

본 논문은 정책 서버를 이용한 네트워크 보안 시스템에서 정책 정보 모델에 기반하여 구현한 정책 관리 도구를 소개한다. 본 논문이 기술하는 네트워크 보안 시스템은 특정 도메인을 보호하기 위해 정책을 관리하고 정책을 내리는 정책 서버와 정책 서버로부터 받은 정책들을 기반으로 침입을 탐지하고 대응하는 정책 클라이언트로 구성된다. 정책 서버와 정책 클라이언트간에 송수신되는 정책은 NSPIM(Network Security Policy Information Model)을 기반으로 구축된 정책 관리 도구를 이용하여 LDAP을 통해 디렉토리 형태로 데이터베이스에 저장된다. NSPIM은 본 네트워크 보안 시스템에서 사용하는 정책에 맞게 IETF의 PCIM과 PCIMe를 확장하여 구축한 정책 정보 모델이다. NSPIM 기반의 정책 관리 도구는 정책 생성, 수정, 삭제 등의 기능을 제공하여 정책을 관리할 뿐 아니라 재사용 객체 개념을 이용한 편집 기능, 객체 이름의 자동 생성 기능, 차단 정책의 자동 생성 기능 등을 통해 사용자에게 편리성을 제공한다. This paper introduces Policy Management Tool which was implemented based on Policy Information Model in network suity system. Network security system consists of policy terror managing and sending policies to keep a specific domain from attackers and policy clients detecting and responding intrusion by using policies that policy server sends. Policies exchanged between policy server and policy client are saved in database in the form of directory through LDAP by using Policy Management Tool based on network security policy information model. NSPIM is an extended policy information model of IETF's PCIM and PCIMe, which enables network administrator to describe network security policies. Policy Management Tool based on NSPIM provides not only policy management function but also editing function using reusable object, automatic generation function of object name and blocking policy, and other convenient functions to user.

OBIGrid: A New Computing Platform for Bioinformatics

Recently, bioinformatics requires high performance computing facilities for homology search, molecular simulation, cell simulation etal. Grid computing [1] has a potential for expansion in computing performance by connecting a large number of computers or PC clusters with high performance networks. Along with this line, we have designed and developed the Open Bioinformatics Grid (OBIGrid [2] http://www.obigrid.org/ ) in corporation with Japan Committee on High-Performance Computing for Bioinformatics and Initiative for Parallel Bioinformatics Processing (IPAB). On designing OBIGrid, we emphasize the importance of network transparency and security policy issues rather than the performance at the early development stage. Therefore, we adopt a virtual private network (VPN) to protect a Grid system from/to the outer world. As for bioinformatics environment, we set the following design goals to provide:

Security issues in networks with Internet access

This paper describes the basic principles of designing and administering a relatively secure network. The principles are illustrated by describing the security issues a hypothetical company faces as the networks that support its operations evolve from strictly private, through a mix of Internet and private nets, to a final state in which the Internet is finally integrated into its operations and the company participates in international electronic commerce. At each stage, the vulnerabilities and threats that the company faces, the countermeasures that it considers, and the residual risk the company accepts are noted. Network security policy and services are discussed, and a description of Internet architecture and vulnerabilities provides additional technical detail underlying the scenario. Lastly, a number of building blocks for secure networks are presented that can mitigate some of the vulnerabilities.