Reviewed by: Transforming European Militaries: Coalition Operations and the Technology Gap Theo Farrell Transforming European Militaries: Coalition Operations and the Technology Gap. By Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari . New York: Routledge, 2006. ISBN 0-415-39264-0. Tables. Glossary. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xiv, 176. $120.00. The United States military is currently embarked on a hugely ambitious effort to transform itself for the twenty-first century. This self-styled military transformation has grown out of the much touted U.S.-led revolution in military affairs (RMA) of the 1990s. Hence, at the heart of it is a techno-centric vision of the future U.S. force: a move from large platform-centric formations [End Page 300] (armoured divisions, bomber fleets, and carrier battle groups) to agile, mission orientated groupings and networks of sensors, information processors, and shooters. Crucial also is the shaping influence of new doctrinal ideas about network-centric warfare. Where are the Europeans in all this? The RMA already promised to leave them trailing behind. Hence, the title of a well known U.S. National Defense University (NDU) monograph, Mind the Gap (1999), pointed to the risks for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of American military development steaming ahead of its European allies. Transforming European Militaries is also the fruit of a NDU project. In this important book, the authors take stock of where the Europeans are at in all this. The book focuses on one (albeit the central) aspect of transformation, namely, the networking of military forces. Chapters two and three of this book assess European strategies and European capabilities for network-based operations. Chapters three and four then examine the roles, respectively, of NATO and the European Union in this area of European military transformation. European collaboration on space assets and the European technology industrial base are then considered in chapters five and six. This is an admirably thorough work. The chapters on European strategies and capabilities go into very useful detail on developments in France, Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. Some readers may be struck by the paucity of references for such an empirically rich work. It so happens that this is because the authors have drawn on many confidential and classified sources that could not be cited. And as somebody who works on British and French military transformation in recent years, I can vouch for the accuracy of their accounts of these cases. The book makes a number of findings. In general, it reveals a major difference between U.S. and European approaches to networking of military forces. Thus, in contrast to the U.S. vision of network-centric warfare, the Europeans are pursuing the far more modest goal of network-enabled capability (NEC). The more limited scope of European military transformation is not due to an inferior technological industrial base. Rather it is the result of less investment combined with the absence of a long-term strategy. In this respect, it is worth noting the minor role of the EU in guiding European military transformation. The authors also draw out fascinating comparisons between the national case studies. For instance, the British NEC program is focused on improving inter-operability (between the services and with U.S. forces) whereas the French NEC effort is focused on improving self-sufficiency. Also whereas the British are European leaders in developing doctrine on NEC, the French are leaders when it comes to NEC equipment capabilities. This is a very important book. There are hardly any comparative studies of European military transformation. It is true that the subject is technical by nature. So this book often gets down into the weeds (necessarily so) and, in places, is a dry read. But the authors do pull out big points. For instance, in the United States, military transformation is all about the synergy [End Page 301] of new doctrine and new technology. In Europe, however, doctrine leaders are not the same as technology leaders. In sum, this book may not be an exciting read, but it is an essential one. Theo Farrell King’s College London London, United Kingdom Copyright © 2007 Society for Military History