Neoliberal Institutionalism Research Articles

US Hegemony in a Unipolar World: Here to Stay or Sic Transit Gloria?

World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. By Stephen G. Brooks, William C. Wohlforth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. 226 pp., $65.00 hardcover (ISBN-13: 978-0-691-12699-9). Unipolarity has preoccupied American international relations (IR) scholars, policymakers, and foreign policy analysts since the Cold War ended and the “unipolar moment” was proclaimed (Krauthammer 1990/1991). Since the Cold War's end IR scholars of various stripes—especially balance-of-power realists—have warned that unipolarity would boomerang against the United States (Layne 1993, 2006a,b; Waltz 1993). The United States’ post-9/11 policies—especially the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003—fanned these worries as scholars and policy analysts argued that “unilateralist” US policies were fueling a backlash against American hegemony (Ikenberry 2002; Nye 2002; Walt 2002, 2005; Pape 2005; Paul 2005). More recently, the financial and economic crisis that hit the US economy beginning in Fall 2007—coupled with the rise of new great powers like China and India, and the resurgence of Russia—have raised questions about the decline of America's relative power. These doubts found official expression in the National Intelligence Council's (2008) Global Trends 2025 report. World Out of Balance is a forcefully argued rebuttal to arguments that American hegemony is waning and that unipolarity provokes other states to check US power. This is an important—must read—book for scholars of IR theory, security studies, and US foreign policy. Displaying a firm mastery of the various IR theory literatures, Dartmouth professors Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth seek to refute the arguments of Waltzian realists, liberal IR theorists, neoliberal institutionalists, and constructivists that “the current unipolarity is not an unalloyed benefit for the Untied States because it comes with the prospect of counterbalancing, increased dependence on the international economy, a greater need to maintain a favorable reputation to sustain cooperation within international institutions, and greater challenges to American legitimacy” (p. 4). Brooks and Wohlforth conclude the “unprecedented …

It takes all types: social psychology, trust, and the international relations paradigm in our minds

The insights of social psychology are not thoroughly integrated into international relations theory, yet social psychology has much to offer. Social psychology provides a conceptualization of a number of varieties of trust – moralistic, strategic, and generalized – and their opposites that implicitly drive the logic of major works of international relations. It also reveals the empirical presence of a number of different types of trusters who make different assumptions about the trustworthiness of others and consequently show markedly different propensities towards cooperation. The rough correspondence between these different ‘social orientations’ and the logics of the three approaches of structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism suggest that individuals carry a crude paradigm in their minds. Metatheoretically, the implication for international relations theory is that scholars capture a part but not the totality of world politics, the behavior of those who trust (or do not trust) in a particular way that matches the logic of their paradigms. Theoretically it suggests a research agenda at multiple levels of analysis, utilizing all of the types of trust and trusters. I review the work of others that offers some preliminary evidence for its plausibility, suggest some hypotheses of my own, and address potential theoretical objections.

Violations of Sovereignty and Regime Engineering: A Critique of the State Theory of Stephen Krasner

With the publication of his 1999 book Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, and a welter of other publications on sovereignty, Krasner has represented a dominating voice in the recent resurgence of sovereignty discourse. Krasner's intricate discussions of international relations (IR) and US foreign policy have overshadowed the theoretical weaknesses of his account of sovereignty itself, leading to accusations by critics such as Amitav Acharya of ‘disorganised hypocrisy’. This paper investigates both the content of his policy prescriptions for the State Department, of which he was a part from 2005 to 2007, and the thin account of sovereignty in his works, and demonstrates a possible relationship between the two. It also seeks to situate his position, as a neorealist with some liberal institutionalist tendencies,1 within the larger debate on sovereignty in IR. It is argued that Krasner does not satisfactorily resolve the contradictions between sovereignty and extended transitional administrations or similar arrangements, especially the regime established by the US in Iraq. 1Krasner is described by Donnelly (1995, 193) as ‘the leading young neorealist’ of the 1970s in a passage that stresses the closeness of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Neorealists are supportive of the leading liberal institutions, such as the WTO and IMF. Liberal institutionalists can be very close to neorealism, and for example Joseph Nye's idea of ‘soft power’ (Nye 2004) questions the neo-conservative policy of unilateralism but does not dispute ideas of power asymmetries that make US dominance conceivable. The warm acceptance of selected global institutions (WTO, World Bank) by leading neoliberal political economists has further confused this distinction.

Liberalism, International Terrorism, and Democratic Wars

Despite its claim that the questions ‘Why do wars occur?’ and ‘How can a stable peace be achieved?’ are fundamental to its raison d’etre, IR has been relatively slow to re-evaluate its theoretical frameworks in light of the violence generated by terrorist groups and the responses to these threats by state actors. This short article argues that such a re-appraisal is of some urgency. The so-called war on terror has highlighted the fact that certain liberal democracies are highly war-prone, and their ‘enemies’ are represented as being existential threats to the Western way of life. Moreover, the institutions that are purportedly meant to constrain executive authority from engaging in wars of aggression have failed to prevent illiberal interventions. War-like behaviour towards those who fi ght without just cause and who do not distinguish between combatants and non-combatants does not in itself refute the argument that democracies have forged a ‘separate peace’; indeed, defending this zone might be regarded as a historic duty. At a theoretical level, advocates of liberalism take the challenge posed by international terrorism seriously. While their historic rivals, the realists, can invoke the domestic–international divide to argue that terrorism does not materially affect the international system, liberals see terrorism as an ideological challenge. While liberalism is about toleration, civility and progress, terrorism takes us down an altogether different path – one of violent intolerance where human life is lived in fear and dies in anger. It is commonplace to draw distinctions between the various strands of liberal thought. This made a great deal of sense during the 1980s when neo-liberal institutionalists sought to make liberalism compatible with social scientifi c methods of inquiry. In so doing, a space was opened up for normative liberals to re-assert a values-based version of liberalism which centred on the claim that liberal states were more peace-prone. I would argue that this distinction is no longer relevant. Post9/11, many former liberal regime theorists (such as Robert Keohane and Ann-Marie Slaughter) have grafted onto their once positivist approach a strong normative distinction between liberal and illiberal regimes. In place of the distinction between positivist and normative conceptions of liberalism, the main fault-line in relation to the war on terror has been between defensive and offensive variants. Pre-9/11, the dominant narrative inside liberalism was about the pacifi c character of liberal states. Post-9/11, a signifi cant number of infl uential liberals have defended the right of Western states to wage war on terrorist groups and those that allegedly harbour them. The legal basis for such action has been contested in domains as varied as the UN Security Council and parliaments where the validity of the use of force against Iraq has been vigorously debated. The tendency for legal

Trade and Conflict Reduction: Implications for Regional Strategic Stability

The relationship between growing trade interdependence and the reduction of militarised inter-state conflict is one of the central theoretical tenets in neo-liberal institutionalism. This tenet, under various theoretical guises, is evaluated critically in this article. Using two illustrative examples, it is argued here that under certain specific conditions, trade interdependence is unlikely to occur and therefore the expected palliative effect of trade on militarised inter-state conflict cannot take place.

China-India Relations: Contemporary Dynamics (review)

Reviewed by: China-India Relations: Contemporary Dynamics Alka Acharya (bio) Athwal Amardeep. China-India Relations: Contemporary Dynamics. Routledge Contemporary South Asian Series. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2008. xvi, 159 pp. Hardcover $160.00, isbn 978-0-415-43735-6. Over the past few years, proponents of the realist and neorealist schools in international relations have come up against a paradox or contradiction, if you will, that characterizes the India and China relationship in the present. There is the problem of an unsettled boundary between these two neighbors over which they went to war in 1962; there is considerable mistrust in India with respect to the Sino-Pakistan military (particularly nuclear) cooperation, and, in China, about Indian intentions with regard to the Tibetan question; and in overall terms, the relationship appears to be suspicion-ridden. Yet, bilateral trade levels have surged, and the engagement has become far more varied and multilevel. The two countries have entered into a strategic partnership. Clearly, realist/neorealist approaches are unable to address this paradox satisfactorily. The book under review appears to be a very welcome addition to the emerging category of those works departing from the neorealist frameworks and the conflictional paradigm for examining and analyzing India-China relations, which are the staple in the Western discourse. Works of this kind are refreshing for the new approaches that are consciously sought and the new perspectives that they introduce. Athwal begins by delineating the neorealist perspective on Sino-Indian relations and questioning the accuracy of the neorealist approaches in making an adequate case for exploring newer frameworks. However, as he says in his introduction, "rather than rejecting neorealist explanations all together because of their inconsistency … this book points towards theoretical pluralism (an appeal to 'soft' realism and theories of neoliberalism and peaceful change)" (p. 17). In the use of "soft realism," Athwal is moving closer to the "more subtler" (p. 14) works of the early realists—Carr, Morgenthau, Neibhur, and Frederick Dunn—emphasizing roles of institutions and norms, creative use of diplomacy and mutual understanding, developing mutual trust, and resolving conflict through negotiation and bargaining. The author grounds such theoretical pluralism—or "theoretical synthesis" (p. 7)—in the writings of international relations (IR) theorists such as Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Alker and Biersteker, Adler and [End Page 553] Barnett, and even Alexander Wendt. There is a neat survey of the critical writings on neorealism, and also the critiques of a range of the new IR approaches—neoliberalism, neoliberal institutionalism, and neofunctionalism—from which Athwal then distills his framework and usage. Athwal adopts Keohane and Nye's model, bringing together political realism and complex interdependence to examine the trade potential in transforming India-China relations. This is combined with neoliberal institutional arguments (related to sociological theories of communication) to posit the hypothesis, suggested in the works by Deutsch and Adler and Barnett, that states can possibly overcome the security dilemma through "mechanisms of communication." (p. 13). This then is the theoretical setting for the volume. The first chapter traces the interaction between India and China after their respective independence and liberation. As the author himself puts it, this chapter is "crucial especially to those unfamiliar with the history of Sino-Indian relations because it puts the entire book and the chapters … in their appropriate context." Essentially, Athwal looks at this history in two broad swathes—the beginnings of the discord in the 1950s and the conflict of 1962 spanning up to the 1980s, when the realist/neorealist applications gain ascendance, and the period since the 1980s and 1990s, when interdependence and peaceful change theories became relevant. It, therefore, serves the author's purpose to an extent, but errs on the side of oversimplification. The difficulty with this neat division is that it cannot be sustained under closer scrutiny. The brief chill that followed the conflict of 1962 did not reduce the Sino-Indian relationship to merely that between two enemy states on different sides of the Cold War divide. Undeniably, the relations were adversarial. The tremendous upheavals in the 1960s and 1970s in the non-Western world generally, especially the Afro-Asian resurgence and the important role that both India and China were playing, the complex...

Constant Tension: Regulating International Shipping

line, but ease that tension to prevent the very dangerous possibility of the line parting and to enable the controlled movement of the ship. Elizabeth DeSombre's Ragging Standards looks at similar situation. It analyzes contemporary efforts to establish and maintain rigorous standards for the international shipping industry (tension on the line) without creating so much regulation, with its negative economic impact, that the system cannot operate (and the line parts from the stress). The book is strong and insightful study of the world's second oldest profession, and in it DeSombre makes relatively rare and quite valuable contribution both to the specialized literature on international shipping safety and to the broader literature on the formation and effectiveness of international regimes in an era of globalization. Both the most optimistic neoliberal institutionalists and those critics of international regimes who are least sanguine about the prospects for international cooperation will be equally disappointed in DeSombre's conclusion. In essence, she argues that--with respect to environmental, safety, and labor regulations in the shipping industry--the race is not to the top, or to the bottom, but to the middle. After exploring the roles of states, international organizations, industry groups, and international civil society actors, DeSombre unfolds what is, in her words, a regulatory middle ground, where profit is still possible and moderate level of protection achievable (p. 229). As contribution to the theoretical literatures on both international regimes and globalization, Flagging Standards usefully explores the efficacy of host of interrelated efforts that are designed to improve the governance of international shipping. Given that international shipping is critical global business in terms of the volume of goods involved, greater understanding of efforts to make it cleaner and safer industry is quite valuable. Her pursuit of that understanding leads DeSombre to the consideration of the roles played by states and numerous nonstate actors. Although states remain the dominant actors in the international shipping regime, efforts to raise environmental, safety, and labor standards have emerged from the interrelated efforts of several important Each of these clubs, because of the exclusivity of their membership requirements, can compel actors who perform poorly to either come up to club standards, leave the market, or operate, often illegally, at the lowest end of the industry. In shipping terms, the last option involves moving the least profitable cargoes between ports that have the lowest standards because one's ship is effectively locked out of other opportunities. DeSombre very effectively develops the concept of exclusion as an incentive in an early chapter. Thereafter, she devotes individual chapters to the formation and performance of the state and nonstate clubs. Readers

Failed states or a failed paradigm? State capacity and the limits of institutionalism

In the post-Cold War era, a voluminous literature has developed to define failed states, identify the causes and parameters of failure, and devise ways for dealing with the problems associated with state fragility and failure. While there is some theoretical diversity within this literature — notably between neoliberal institutionalists and neo-Weberian institutionalists — state failure is commonly defined in terms of state capacity. Since capacity is conceived in technical and ‘objective’ terms, the political nature of projects of state construction (and reconstruction) is masked. Whereas the existence of social and political struggles of various types is often recognized by the failed states literature, these conflicts are abstracted from political and social institutions. Such an analysis then extends into programmes that attempt to build state capacity as part of projects that seek to manage social and political conflict. Ascertaining which interests are involved and which interests are left out in such processes is essential for any understanding of the prospects or otherwise of conflict resolution.

Toward an Identity Theory of International Organizations

Despite the contemporary prominence of international organizations (IOs), their ontological status largely remains nebulous. Traditional international relations (IR) theories tend to regard an IO mainly as an instrument created to serve powerful states’ interests (neorealism) or to facilitate interstate cooperation on certain regulatory areas (neoliberal institutionalism). Therefore, those theories hardly offer a satisfactory explanation of a distinctive mode of IOs’ identity-forming process, in which a particular IO, as a separate and autonomous organic entity, grows, evolves and eventually makes sense of its own existence. This Article offers a novel perspective that attempts to overcome the aforementioned theoretical deficiency. Drawing on the identity theory in psychology, this new perspective captures an IO’s internal normative development in which one can witness a dynamic process of identity formation. The Article argues that based on its autonomy qua organization, and not merely as an instrument of states, an IO forms its unique legal identity as it experiences a normative crisis in a similar way in which a human individual does. An IO discovers its genuine identity only after it achieves a necessary level of institutional maturity as a result of incessant legal interactions and communications with its environment. The Article tests this new framework by applying it to the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Neorealism and neoliberalism in the contemporary international relations theory

The author explores some fundamental aspects of international cooperation its functional incentives and structural limitations, by describing the discussion between two most influential approaches in international relations theory: neorealism and neoliberalism, or to be more precise between defensive neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. During the discussion on possibilities and limitations of international co-operation neorealism and neoliberalism showed their differences, but also similarities of views that resulted in their approach, which is called the neo-neo synthesis in international relations theory. The discussion, that has been going on for three decades in USA also reflects on the practical foreign policy decision making in this country. The discussion contains the ideas that can serve as means to explain some foreign policy approaches in our country as well.

Structural Sources of China's Territorial Compromises

More than a decade ago, in a review of Jack Snyder's Myths of Empire, Fareed Zakaria noted: After over a decade of vigorous debates about realism, structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and hegemonic stability theory, political scientists are shifting their attention to the internal sources of foreign policy. Some even contend that realism's dictum about the 'primacy of foreign policy' is wrong, and that the domestic politics of states are key to understanding world events. Innenpolitik is in.' evidenced by Taylor Fravel's Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes, Innenpolitik is still in.2 In Fravel's words, Regime insecurity best explains China's pattern of cooperation and delay in its territorial disputes between 1949 and 2004 (p. 81). According to the regime insecurity hypothesis, Internal conflict often creates conditions for cooperation, producing a 'diversionary peace' instead of war (p. 49). Given the domestic vulnerability of the Chinese Communist regime during periods such as the revolt in Tibet and the upheaval that followed the Tiananmen crisis, Chinese leaders reached territorial compromises to extend their tenure in office (p. 51). Although intuitively plausible, Fravel's regime vulnerability argument is flawed, for two reasons. First, his confidence in the empirical accuracy of the domestic insecuritydiversionary peace theory rests on a realist straw man, arguing that China's behavior is inconsistent with the predictions of realist theories because China has not used its power advantages to bargain hard over contested land, especially with its weaker neighbors (p. 46). When properly construed and understood, realist theories can explain territorial compromises as well as conflict. Realist theories suggest that strong states exploit the weak, but only under certain conditions because powerful states often face powerful incentives not to exploit their weaker neighbors: As Stuart Kaufman suggests, the logic of self-help under anarchy 'encourages strong powers to absorb

Regions Make the World Go Around

A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium. By Peter J. Katzenstein Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005. 320 pp., $49.94 cloth (ISBN: 0-8014-4359-8), $22.95 paper (ISBN: 0-8014-7275-X). With such a distinguished track record of producing important books, few readers will be surprised to hear that Peter Katzenstein has published another one. Even when compared with such classics as Between Power and Plenty (Katzenstein 1978), Small States in World Markets (Katzenstein 1985), or The Culture of National Security (Katzenstein 1996), many scholars will regard A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium as his magnum opus. This book assembles the pieces of the large puzzle that Katzenstein has been developing in more than a dozen books, articles, and book chapters over the last decade. Empirically rich, analytically sharp, and theoretically sophisticated, nearly every page sparkles with insight. Yet, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Perhaps most impressive is that this “big think” book, unlike most canonical works in international relations, is accomplished without a wisp of intellectual imperialism. It is instead the showcase of an approach that Katzenstein describes as “analytical eclecticism” (p. 41). As a theoretical statement, it is on par with the work of other masters of hybridity in international relations, such as Hedley Bull. It is no coincidence that Katzenstein invokes Bull's (1977) classic in both his introduction (p. 1) and conclusion (p. 245). Like Bull, whose wide appeal comes from a chameleon-like ability to fit into multiple theoretical camps (realists and neoliberal institutionalists recognize Bull as one of their own, and constructivists see him as an early prototype), Katzenstein articulates a hybrid theoretical model. He draws on materialist, ideational, and behavioral approaches (such as Karl Deutsch's “transaction” model). Theoretical pluralism affords nuance and depth in untangling complex causal stories, and A World of Regions addresses several such stories: how identity shapes understandings of geography, the connections between powerful regional core states and emergent forms of institutionalization, and …

The Evolution of China's Engagement with International Governmental Organizations: Toward a Liberal Foreign Policy?

This article highlights China's interactions within intergovernmental organizations, a dynamic that has evolved in a liberal direction. The assertion is made that China's foreign policy behavior is no longer adequately explained solely by realist models and that, instead, we must look to neo-liberal institutionalism in order to describe and predict China's behavior.

From Santiago to Lima: The organization of American States and political integration in the Americas after the cold war

This article looks at the pattern of political integration that has been taking place in the Americas since the 1990s. It is argued that the ideological convergence in the hemisphere has contributed to the emergence of a distinct regional normative structure to support democracy. The article begins with a brief summary of my theoretical baselines, constructivism and neoliberal institutionalism, and subsequently discusses the adoption of the 1991 Santiago Commitment to Democracy and Resolution 1080, briefly reviewing the four instances in which the new instrument was applied. I then consider the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter, and look at the Venezuelan situation since the 2002 unsuccessful coup. I conclude by evaluating this 12-year-long process from my two theoretical baselines.

International Relations Theory and the India–Pakistan Conflict

International Relations Theory and the India–Pakistan Conflict

Theoretical Review: Neo-Liberal Institutionalism and the Co-Operative Security Regime in Northeast Asia

This article examines several theoretical ideas on security regime applicable to Northeast Asia. Different from realists or idealists, two schools of international relations theory, neo-liberal institutionalists have seen that anarchy and mixed interests occasionally cause states to suffer the opportunity costs of not achieving an outcome that is more mutually beneficial. In this context, the concept of co-operative security regime has important connotations for the concept of neo-liberal institutionalism. Based on the research outcome, the co-operative security concept appears to be the most applicable to Northeast Asia in that the idea is among the more widely used terms, complementing more traditional views, acknowledges a more inclusive definition of security, and challenges to security, encompassing, but moving beyond, the traditional notion of military threat and response. Beside of this reason, there are four more logics validating the application of the co-operative security regime notion to Northeast Asia.

Signals of Reconciliation: Institution-Building and the Resolution of Civil Wars

Recent studies of civil war have tended to apply concepts associated with neorealist analyses of international conflict to understand the dynamics of disputes among collectivities within a state. The intention of the present essay is to demonstrate that this reliance on neorealist theory has resulted in the neglect of viable solutions to these conflicts that are inconsistent with the dominant paradigm. We suggest that an alternative international relations perspective, neoliberal institutionalism, can also serve as a prescription for post-civil war stability. Consistent with this perspective, we identify a process in which negotiating and establishing power-sharing institutions serves two important functions in the resolution of civil wars. First, the institutions created through this process serve as the basis for establishing a new political order. Second, the act of developing postwar institutions provides a means by which former adversaries can generate the often costly signals of conciliatory intent necessary for fostering new norms of peaceful cooperation. We demonstrate the value of this framework through a case study of conflict resolution in the Philippines.

THEORIZING INTERNATIONAL FAIRNESS

Abstract: Institutionalized practices of collective justification are central for theorizing international fairness. Institutions matter because they play a significant part in the construal of fairness claims through the provision of internal standards for moral assessment. Conceptions of international fairness must spell out how collective justification works by addressing the jurisprudential and institutional issues at stake in the specification of the moral grounds for compliance with international institutions on the one hand and international civil disobedience on the other. Theoretical models of institutions that do not pay attention to collective justification are inadequate on fairness grounds. More specifically, mainstream neoliberal institutionalist accounts of international regimes are deeply problematic when used in the normative evaluation of international institutions, as they offer the wrong benchmark for moral assessment, given their roots in a brand of exchange theory that is blind to the distribution of burdens and benefits from cooperation.

From international to world society?: English school theory and the social structure of globalisation

In this 2004 book, Barry Buzan offers an extensive critique and reappraisal of the English school approach to International Relations. Starting on the neglected concept of world society and bringing together the international society tradition and the Wendtian mode of constructivism, Buzan offers a new theoretical framework that can be used to address globalisation as a complex political interplay among state and non-state actors. This approach forces English school theory to confront neglected questions about both its basic concepts and assumptions, and about the constitution of society in terms of what values are shared, how and why they are shared, and by whom. Buzan highlights the idea of primary institutions as the central contribution of English school theory and shows how this both differentiates English school theory from realism and neoliberal institutionalism, and how it can be used to generate distinctive comparative and historical accounts of international society.

Beached Whales: Examining Japan's Rejection of an International Norm

Much of the analysis of international norms has focused on norm diffusion at the systemic level.This study argues that such analyses based on neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism, and constructivism have two major shortcomings. One is that they pay much attention to successful cases of norm diffusion, but neglect failed ones.The other is that they fail to examine the linkage between international norms and domestic structures in the processes of norm diffusion. By neglecting this linkage, systemic-level studies cannot clarify specific mechanisms and process through which international norms reach the domestic arena.This study stresses that domestic structures, in particular cultural and political structures, are the key factors allowing international norm diffusion at the domestic level. Analyzing Japan’s refusal to accept an anti-whaling norm, this paper argues that these domestic structures have served as filters to block the emergence and acceptance of this norm in Japan.