Neo-Confucian Philosophy Research Articles

Neo-Confucianism and the Development of German Idealism.

This article analyzes the influence of Chinese Neo-Confucianism on the development of German idealism. Information obtained by Leibniz from Jesuit missionaries included key concepts in Neo-Confucian philosophy that not only confirmed Leibniz's belief in the universality of his organic image of the cosmos but also influenced Leibniz's later writings. Such influence is also exhibited in Kant's work, especially in his crucial noumenon-phenomenon distinction, as well as in Hegel's phenomenology and philosophy of history. Recognition of these influences, unacknowledged by either Kant or Hegel, enhances our assessment of the import of both Neo-Confucianism and German idealism in international religio-philosophical discourse.

One Hundred Years of Echoes: The Influence of the Jesuit Aleni on the Spiritual Life of the Manchu Prince Depei

This paper reveals the interweaving of three traditions—Christian, Manchu, and Han Chinese—in the work of an unduly neglected figure in early modern China, Aisin-Gioro Depei 愛新覺羅·德沛 (1688–1752), who was a Manchu prince, neo-Confucian philosopher, and likely, a hidden Christian. The analysis demonstrates that Depei developed a particular syncretic philosophy based on the rational theology that he learned from the works of a significant Jesuit missionary, Giulio Aleni (1582–1649, 艾儒略), notably Aleni’s Xingxue cushu 性學觕述 (A Brief Introduction to the Study of Human Nature). Using resources from Christian and Confucian traditions, Depei puts forward an approach, which marks the continuation of the cross-cultural interpretation movement launched by the missionaries since the late Ming.

Kang Youwei and Italy in the beginning of the 20th century: comprehension of the politics of the west by the traditional confucian thinker

The article deals with the theoretical treatises written by Kang Youwei (1858 — 1927) in exile and devoted to the understanding of Western social and political reality from the standpoint of a bearer of traditional Chinese culture and Neo-Confucian philosophy. First of all, these are “Travelogue to Italy” (Yidali youji, 1904) and “Impartial Words on Republicanism” (Gonghe pingyi, 1918). Kang Yuwei’s thinking is characterized by attention to the Confucian binary opposition si — gong (private — general), which he transferred to both civilizational development and international politics. In other words, the Western path of development, which consist national imperialist states based on economic, social and foreign policy competition and individualism (“private”), was opposed to the monolithic ancient China, whose society and politics are based on the principles of “community” and unity. Kang Youwei perceived the political reality of Western countries from the standpoint of traditional Chinese historiography, which was intended to serve as a base of positive and negative precedents for use by the ruler in the name of the common good and the harmonization of society. In Kang Youwei’s system of historical views, modern Italy and Germany were very important for illustrating the principle of consolidation of political entities and the merging of small and weak states into large empires. Methodologically, this was formalized as the assignment of Germany, Italy and China to the same ontological category (tong lei).

‘유형원의 실리론’ 분석

The Neo-Confucian writings of Bangye Yu Hyeong-won, the pioneer of Shilhak, did not remain, and he himself confessed his conversion from a ‘Qi centered view’ to 'Shilli theory', resulting in a variety of interpretations, making the whole aspect of his Neo-Confucian philosophy difficult to figure out. From that time on, as interpreted in his conversion from ‘anti Zhuzi Studies’ to ‘Zhuzi Studies’, he has been recognized as a Juri-theorist with a Li-centered thinking. Nevertheless, many scholars who paid attention to Yu's 'The Theory of Governing Society' evaluated him as a reality-oriented Qi-theorist and experientialist. In this article, through analyzing the content and character of his Shilli theory expressed by Yu himself, and exploring the content, inclination degree, motive and purpose of the conversion he confessed at the age of 37, I examine whether his confession really meant a turn to Juri. I point out that even if he recognized Li's substance and developed Shilli theory, which emphasized Li’s independence and Superintendence Character, he still did not give up 'Qiwaiwuli' and 'Qizhili' and maintained a reality-oriented perspective that focuses on things and practice. I also point out that his Shilli theory has a light inclination that just adds reinforcement of the essential nature to the existence that is already firmly established in his philosophy. The trigger or purpose of the turn to Shilli theory was to secure absolute moral standards that could not be solved by Qi-centered theory, and to lay the cornerstone of his lifelong work, Bangyesurok, on the absolute principle of Tianli. Through this, I develop the argument that his Shilli theory was not a conversion to Juri.

16세기 화담 서경덕의 교유 인물

Joseon scholar’s understanding of the Neo-Confucian philosophy grew deeper and deeper In the 16<SUP>th</SUP> century. One of the results of such deepened understanding was the formation of various academic schools[學派]. And amongst all the scholars who established such schools with their pupils, there was one scholar who had been teaching students with his own understanding of the philosophy from fairly early on, in the Gaeseong(開城) area which was the late Goryeo dynasty’s capital. That scholar was Hwadam(花潭) Seo Gyeong-deok(徐敬德, 1489∼1546), and the school that developed with him at the top is now called the Hwadam School. Members of this school studied mostly in Seoul, and had backgrounds in the Gyeonggi(京畿) region, so in local terms the school was also essentially a “Seoul(-based) School,” just like called the “Yeongnam(嶺南) School.” which were based in Yeongnam.<BR> The identity of Seo Gyeong-deok and the Hwadam School, however, needs to be discussed with two issues clarified beforehand. One is the notion that Hwadam was one of the pupils of Yi Yeon-gyeong(李延慶, 1484∼1548), which is also referred to as the so-called “Originating from Tansu(灘叟淵源說)” theory. The other is the notion that Hwadam was a friend with the aforementioned Jo Shik, which we now call as the “Friends with Nammyeong(南冥交遊說)” argument. The purpose of this article is to prove that these two notions are not based on facts, by rebutting the relevance of certain texts that had been considered to be supporting these notions, based on the fact that those texts are referring to a different time and place.<BR> Two groups of people Hwadam actually befriended was the members of the Gimyo Sarim(己卯士林) group and officials serving at the Gaeseong-bu(開城府) authorities. People like Kim An-guk, Jo Wuk, Shin Gwang-han, Park Wu and Shim Eui were the most noteworthy ones. Most interestingly, all these people also had close relationships with key members of the Hwadam School, like Heo Yeob, Yi Gu, Park Sun, Hong In-wu and Park Min-heon. Such relationships help us understand the initial development phase of the Hwadam School.

On Becoming a Person: Perspectives from Carl Rogers, Huineng, Wang Yangming, and Ken Wilber

Abstract On Becoming a Person: A Therapist’s View of Psychotherapy published in 1961 is believed to be the most well-known book written by Carl Rogers, the quintessential humanistic psychologist and psychotherapist. Chapter 6 seems to represent the core of this book: What It Means to Become a Person? To this seminal question, Rogers gives a four-fold answer: A person who has become himself demonstrates the following qualities: openness to experience, trust in one’s own organism, an internal locus of evaluation, and willingness to be a process. Much of Rogers’ conception of a person who has emerged from therapy and become himself sounds familiar to Chinese readers who know Huineng, the real founder of Chan Buddhism in the eighth century China and Wang Yangming, a neo-Confucian philosopher in the 15th and 16th century China. This paper will try to present a brief comparative study of the concept and performance of a highly functional person who has become himself from the standpoint of Rogers, Huineng, Wang and Wilber. We will focus the discussion on two fundamental questions: What does it mean to become oneself (Who am I)? How do we actualize ourselves? After counseling tens of thousands of clients over a couple of decades, Carl Rogers (1902–1987) summarized as a psychotherapist that the various problems of his clients boil down to one search, “‘Who am I, really? How can I get in touch with this real self, underlying all my surface behavior? How can I become myself?” (Rogers, 2020, p. 108). From this Rogers extrapolates that the purpose of education, like counseling and psychotherapy, is to provide facility to allow students to become themselves. Like the client-centered therapy, which later is renamed as person-centered therapy (Rogers, 1980), the method in education is the student-centered approach (Rogers, 1951, 1961/2020). In the following I will elucidate the views and practices of Rogers, Huineng and Wang around the two questions: Who am I? How could I become myself?

Chastity as a Virtue

This paper analyzes two philosophers’ views on chastity as a virtue, comparing Song Siyeol, a Korean neo-Confucian philosopher of the east, and David Hume, a Scottish philosopher. Despite the importance in and impact on women’s lives, chastity has been understated in religio-philosophical fields. The two philosophers’ understandings and arguments differ in significant ways and yet share important common aspects. Analyzing the views of Song and Hume helps us better understand and approach the issue of women’s chastity, not only as a historical phenomenon but also in the contemporary world, more fully and deeply. The analysis will provide an alternative way to re-appropriate the concept of chastity as a virtue.

The Primacy of Li (Principle) in the NeoConfucian Philosophy of Zhu Xi: Significance for Contemporary Korean Society

The Primacy of Li (Principle) in the NeoConfucian Philosophy of Zhu Xi: Significance for Contemporary Korean Society

Wang Yangming’s Reductionist Account of Practical Necessity: General and Particular

In this article, I argue that we can have a plausible account of the experience of practical necessity, namely, the experience that some action is necessitated for someone, by referring to the philosophy of Wang Yangming (1472–1529), a Neo-Confucian philosopher in Ming Dynasty China. The experience of practical necessity, according to Wang, can be of two kinds: general (to be a human) and particular (to be a particular person), both having their bases on human nature and related to the fulfillment of the self. I argue that this account fares better than the non-reductionist account and other reductionist accounts, including Christine Korsgaard’s, which explains the experience in terms of the constitution of the self.

Beyond Murderous Dialectics

This essay has been inspired by the writings of the contemporary Neo-Confucian philosopher Mou Zongsan and the German sinologist Wolfgang Bauer. It assumes that the power of Mao Zedong’s thought sprung from its ability to systematically subordinate the transformative philosophy of the classical Book of Changes to the Marxist model of revolutionary class struggle. If dialectical thinking requires thought to think against itself and thereby be able to continuously change itself from the inside, Mao seems to have been a master of dialectical thinking. One of the intellectual impulses for the Great Cultural Revolution was the radically unsentimental judgement that, in order for the socialist revolution to succeed, it was necessary to erase the ancient Chinese legacy of paradoxical thinking, and that this was a precondition of the possibility of Mao’s Sino-Marxist discourse. But the enormous power that Mao’s thought derived from the tension between revolutionary heroism and transformative flexibility revealed itself as self-destructive. Mao tried to fight against the failure of his revolutionary vision and the possibility that the wisdom of paradoxical thinking and the classical heritage of China could, finally, gain the upper hand in the ongoing struggle for modernization. From this perspective, this essay touches upon a contradiction, which can be understood as the principle contradiction of contemporary Chinese philosophy: the contradiction between the defence of Sino-Marxism as the ideological foundation of a “socialism with Chinese characteristics” on the one hand, and the renaissance of traditional culture and classical learning on the other, which entails a powerful challenge to this very foundation.

The Mind&amp;#x92;s Dynamism in Chinese Catholic Theology: A Comparative Study of Metaphysics and Knowledge in the Thought of Wang Yangming and Joseph Maréchal

ABSTRACT As a particular case study of &amp;#x93;world Christianity,&amp;#x94; this article seeks to develop a Chinese Catholic epistemological foundation for the Church&amp;#x92;s theological quest to know God. It is a comparative study of the thought of Neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yangming (1472&amp;#x96;1529) and the Belgian Jesuit Joseph Maréchal. I demonstrate how both thinkers affirm the subjective contribution of the human mind in any act of knowing while still maintaining that any accurate or moral knowledge participates in a higher order of ontological being. The agreements between Wang&amp;#x92;s Neo-Confucian and Maréchal&amp;#x92;s Transcendental Thomist theories of mind make for a fruitful convergence of the Chinese and Catholic intellectual traditions, from which Chinese theology can contribute to the worldwide Church&amp;#x92;s understanding of God.

The Four–Seven Debate of Korean Neo-Confucianism and the Moral Psychological and Theistic Turn in Korean Philosophy

This paper discusses how Korean Neo-Confucian philosophers in the Joseon dynasty (1392–1910) explained the moral nature of the mind and its emotions. Among the philosophical debates of Korean Neo-Confucianism, the author of the paper focuses on the Four–Seven Debate (a philosophical debate about the moral psychological nature of the four moral emotions and the seven morally indiscrete emotions) to analyze its li–qi metaphysics (a philosophical explanation of the universe through the intricate and interactive relation between the two cosmic processes, li and qi) and its conflicting viewpoints on the moral psychological nature of emotion. Because of the ambiguities and inconsistencies in the Neo-Confucian explanation, specifically those of the Cheng–Zhu schools of Neo-Confucianism on the nature and functions of the mind, Korean Neo-Confucians struggled to bring Neo-Confucian li–qi metaphysics to the moral and practical issues of the human mind and moral cultivation. Later in the Joseon dynasty, some Korean Neo-Confucians discussed the fundamental limitations of li–qi metaphysics and developed their explanations for the goodness of the moral mind and the world from an alternative (i.e., theistic) viewpoint.

Neo-Confucianism, experimental philosophy and the trouble with intuitive methods

ABSTRACTThe proper role of intuitions in philosophy has been debated throughout its history, and especially since the turn of the twenty-first century. The context of this recent debate within analytic philosophy has been the heightened interest in (and use of) intuitions as data points that need to be accommodated or explained away by philosophical theories. This, in turn, has given rise to a sceptical movement called experimental philosophy, whose advocates seek to understand the nature and reliability of such intuitions (along with related judgements and behaviour). Yet such scepticism of intuition or introspective methods can be found in earlier periods and across philosophical traditions. Indeed, the Neo-Confucian philosophers of the Song and Ming dynasties (ca. tenth to seventeenth centuries CE) seem to exemplify this very tension, as they can be divided into an intuitionistic school on the one hand and an investigative school on the other. In this paper, I argue that, notwithstanding some obvious differences, there are broad similarities between the dynamics at play across these philosophical traditions. Moreover, by comparing and juxtaposing them, we will come to appreciate the distinctiveness of each, as their attendant aims, weaknesses and strengths become more salient thereby.

CORPO EM FLAMAS: SILÊNCIO, RUPTURA E VIOLÊNCIA DA PALAVRA EM &lt;em&gt;A VEGETARIANA&lt;/em&gt; (채식주의자/&lt;em&gt;CHAESIKJUIJA&lt;/em&gt;) DE HAN KANG

O presente artigo tem como objetivo explorar as relações entre corpo, silêncio, ruptura e violência da palavra no romance A Vegetariana (Chaesik-juija/ 채식주의자) (2007) da escritora sul-coreana Han Kang. A análise tem como ponto de partida a discussão da ruptura e da violência da palavra a partir de entrevistas da escritora Han Kang e da obra teórica de Jacques Derrida. Para a discussão do corpo feminino, serão utilizadas a teoria do gênero de Judith Butler e crítica à filosofia Neo-Confucionista na Coreia do Sul (de Sohee Kim).

Xiong Shili on Why Reality Cannot be Sought Independent of Phenomena

In China, Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885–1968) is typically regarded as one of the most important Chinese philosophers of the twentieth century. The focus of this paper is Xiong’s monistic ontology and draws its findings principally from the 1932 literary edition of his New Treatise on Nothing but Consciousness (Xin weishi lun新唯識論). Xiong’s New Treatise is the first substantive attempt to respond to the modernist challenge of providing Chinese philosophy with ‘system,’ and he did this in the form of an ontology. The New Treatise consists of an interpretive summary and discussion of key Yogācāra teachings that feature in Cheng weishi lun; a sustained critique of views Xiong attributes to the sixth-century Yogācāra master Dharmapāla; and a synthesis of Yogācāra thought with ideas derived from Madhyamaka Buddhism, various Sinitic traditions of Buddhism, the Book of Change, Laozi and Zhuangzi, and from Chinese Neo-Confucian thinkers associated with the Lu-Wang wing of Neo-Confucian philosophy, as well as Zhu Xi. Xiong was very much a syncretist. I seek to explain why Xiong insisted that reality (shiti 實體; [*tattva]) cannot be sought independent of phenomena despite his also claiming that phenomena are not real. The first and major part of the paper introduces Xiong’s critique of Yogācāra accounts of consciousness. The second part introduces his understanding of the doctrine of emptiness. I also trace the connection between Xiong’s understanding and how the concept of emptiness was understood in Tathāgatagarbha school of Sinitic Buddhism. I do not address the Confucian elements in his thought—the Buddhist elements are complex enough.

The Formation of Zhou Dunyi’s Role in the Daoxue: A Critical Analysis of Biographical Sources

Abstract This study presents a critical investigation on the biographical sources of the Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073), recognized as a pioneer of the tradition of Learning of the Way (Daoxue), also translated as Neo-Confucianism. Through a relevant translation and analysis of two textual typologies, namely the biographical chronology (nianpu) and the official biography (liezhuan) of Zhou Dunyi, according to their different uses of historiographical materials and epistemological assumptions, we aim to provide a portray of Zhou Dunyi in relation to the context of Daoxue. Zhou Dunyi’s individuality is established by an integration of two conceptual frameworks: one focuses on the historical representation, the other stresses the value of his Neo-Confucian personality. In both cases, there is a dynamics of legitimization of Zhou Dunyi’s role in order to create a Neo-Confucian philosophical and moral paradigm: this paper is an attempt to explain this process of formation and legitimization.

Zhu Xi’s completion of Confucius’ humanistic ethics

The archetypal Neo-Confucian philosopher, Zhu Xi (1130–1200), worked out a compelling summation of Confucius’ humanistic ethics, centered on Ren (humaneness, humane) practice and cultivation. Faced with competing philosophies and religions, Zhu Xi strove to deepen and broaden Confucius’ ethics and core teaching of Ren. He drew on Zhou Dunyi’s “Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity” to lay a naturalistic foundation for Confucius’ ethics, and on Zhang Zai’s “Western Inscription” to affirm the consanguinity between cosmos and humanity. He opened his “Treatise on Humanity” by linking Ren with the pervasive cosmic impulse to create, thus showing that the Way of Ren is not limited to the proper conduct of human affairs but springs from a pervasive beneficent creative impulse in the world. Zhu Xi also worked out a justification for Confucius’ Humanistic ethics centered on Ren cultivation and practice. This justification supports a sort of relational Humanistic ethics, the East Asian counterpart to Kant’s justification of an individual centered Humanistic ethics. Taken together, Zhu Xi’s mature comments and reflections on the formation of a moral exemplar (junzi) show that he, like Kant, set forth several conditions for the moral worth of ethical agency, decision, and action. For Kant, the moral agent must will to act from duty out of respect for reason (the Moral Law) which underlies the Golden Rule as the Categorical Imperative. Zhu Xi’s account is more practical and less theoretical than Kant’s. Zhu Xi’s aspiring moral exemplar undertakes his learning, cultivation, and practice in the spirit of reverence. Such reverence not only assures the concentration and seriousness of his dedication but purifies his mind-heart (xin) such that he becomes increasingly discerning of Heavenly pattern (tianli), which in turn sharpens his sense of appropriateness (yi). This deeper discernment also catalyzes his moral determination of will (zhuzai) to form within and to anchor his motivation to live by Ren, humanity. As Kant’s model incorporates the role of love and the Golden Rule, Zhu Xi’s centers on the cultivation of Ren and Confucius’ formulation of the Silver Rule, which are grounded in love and empathy. These teachings express a deeply emotional, relational, yet still rational form of Humanism that shows promise for a more salient Humanism by underscoring the unity of cosmos, nature, and humanity in a moral-ethical perspective.

Nerve/Nurses of the Cosmic Doctor: Wang Yang-ming on Self-Awareness as World-Awareness

ABSTRACTIn Philip J. Ivanhoe’s introduction to his Readings from the Lu-Wang School of Neo-Confucianism, he argues convincingly that the Ming-era Neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yang-ming (1472–1529) was much more influenced by Buddhism (especially Zen’s Platform Sutra) than has generally been recognized. In light of this influence, and the centrality of questions of selfhood in Buddhism, in this article I will explore the theme of selfhood in Wang’s Neo-Confucianism. Put as a mantra, for Wang “self-awareness is world-awareness.” My central image for this mantra is the entire cosmos anthropomorphized as a doctor engaged in constant self-diagnosis, in which effort s/he is assisted by an entire staff of the nerves/nurses—individual humans enlightened as Wangian sages. In short, I will argue that the world for Wang could be meaningfully understood as a mindful, self-healing body within which humans are the sensitive nerves, using our mindful awareness to direct attention to the affected areas when injury or disease occurs. We are, and must thus recognize that we are, the bold but sensitive nervous system of the cosmos, sharing (like neurons) our loving excitement, carrying out (like a medical nurse) the doctor’s orders for the self-care of our cosmic body/medical corps.

“The Source of Learning is Thought” Reading the Chin-ssu lu (近思錄) with a “Western Eye”

The contribution focuses on Neo-Confucian texts as collected by Zhu Xi (朱熹 1130–1200) and Lü Zuqian (1137–1181) and is a look from the ‘outside’, from the perspective of German theories of Bildung (‘self-cultivation’). It aims at demonstrating that among other insights that today’s readers may gather from Neo-Confucian literature, one aspect protrudes from others: that learning can be considered as a virtue—even a meta-virtue—a form of life and mode of self-formation of the person. It does not seem exaggerated, from this perspective, to state that Neo-Confucian philosophy is—to a large extent—a philosophy of learning and self-transformation which offers fruitful irritants for questioning the widespread habits of thinking about skills and their development in today’s strong and problematic discourses and corresponding educational policies.

Picturing Technology in China: From Earliest Times to the Nineteenth Century by Peter J. Golas

Golas, Peter J. Picturing Technology in China: From Earliest Times to the Nineteenth Century. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015. Readers with an interest in the history of Chinese science and technology will find Peter J. Golas' Picturing Technology in China: From Earliest Times to the Nineteenth Century a must read. Golas, a world-renowned expert on the history of the Song Dynasty, is a Professor of History at the University of Denver. Given his extensive knowledge of China's technological development, he is arguably the most knowledgeable author to write on the history of Chinese technological illustration. While many studies have dealt with European technical illustration, this is the first major systematic treatment for the case of China and is a welcome addition to the body of knowledge. For lack of evidence, Golas only briefly considers technological illustration during the pre-Song period in the first two chapters. More printed material gradually appeared with the appearance of wood block printing in the 7th century, thus allowing the author to devote greater attention to the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing Dynasties in subsequent chapters. According to Golas, the Song period is widely considered China's Golden Age in the visual portrayal of technology. In contrast, during subsequent dynasties, technological illustrations and innovations to improve their precision witnessed a decline. A major question addressed by this book is why illustrations of technology displayed so little further development in the post-Song period (p. xxiv). Golas suggests some plausible explanations for this decline. The Song Dynasty was also China's Golden Age in terms of technological innovation and China was the world's technological leader at that time. The Ming-Qing period witnessed very little new technological innovation. Golas notes that the decline of technological innovation likely played a role in the lack of improvement in technological illustration. He emphasizes that Neo-Confucian philosophy, which was officially adopted by the government as state ideology during the Ming Dynasty and continued throughout the Qing Dynasty, suppressed innovation. In China, the government played a large role in the illustration of technology. Chinese government officials, who were trained to draw or paint, created the illustrations of technology. By contrast, in Europe, practitioners were the ones who created such illustrations. The Chinese government artists generally were lacking in the Western practitioners' attention to detail and standards. Golas compares incentives between China and Europe for illustrators to depict technology in more detail and by fixed standards. …