Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy Research Articles

Comparative and Historical Analysis of Early Donghak: Cross-Religious Dialogue between Confucianism and Catholicism in 19th-Century Korea

The purpose of this study was to characterize early Donghak thought as the fusion of two horizons, one Confucian and the other Catholic. In particular, the study divided the Donghak founder Su-un Choe Je-u’s view of divinity into three stages, and showed how the evolution of his thought through these stages can be explained as the product of a dialogue between the Confucian monist tradition based on qi or vital energy and the Catholic dualist tradition based on Thomistic scholasticism. The study adopted a comparative and historical methodology, whereby comparison was limited to similarities and differences between Su-un’s works and sources in the Confucian or Catholic tradition that we can reasonably assume to have been available to Su-un. It was found that Su-un’s thought in the early stage was marked by theistic features similar to the scholastic view of God, and that in the middle stage Su-un sought to accommodate this theism within a pantheistic framework based on the Confucian monist tradition. For convenience’ sake, this theism-within-pantheism can be referred to as Su-un’s “panentheism”. It is suggested that the creative tension within this panentheism motivated Su-un to introduce innovations in his thought. First, in the middle stage, Su-un rejected the monism of li or pattern that was prevalent in the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy of his day, reverting to the older tradition of qi-monism. Second, in the late stage of his thought, he appears to have rehabilitated li as intelligent pattern that is the source of all signs of intelligence in the natural and moral order. As for the value of the approach adopted in this study, it enables us to make better sense of obscure details in Su-un’s works by placing them in their proper historical context, as evinced by the reading of Su-un’s late stage work “Buryeon Giyeon” presented herein. It is hoped that this approach will be applied more rigorously in future studies to deepen our understanding of the intellectual history of Donghak and Cheondogyo, along with various other new religions that emerged in Korea’s modern history.

The Literati’s Polyphonic Answers to Social Changes in Late Imperial China

The article aims to rethink the pluralistic intellectual currents and social changes of the last centuries in China: How literati reacted to the historical changes, the economic developments, the collapse of the hierarchical order, and the social mobility from the end of the Ming to the middle of the Qing dynasty. Urbanisation, the great silver inflow, the acceleration of trade, and social mobility raised new challenges to the orthodox view of the world and to Neo-Confucian norms. These new attitudes of the Chinese literati—which can be inferred both from literary and philosophical works—uncover new attitudes in the mental structure of the intellectual strata of the time. In the history of ideas we notice a progressive detachment from the orthodox view of the conflictual relationship between principle and desires, especially in the ambit of the Taizhou school. The elaboration of a new anthropological mindset aimed at the rehabilitation of passions and desires culminated with Li Zhi. This trend went on in the Qing period, from Wang Fuzhi to Dai Zhen. In literature, a similar trend, the so-called “cult of qing ,” can be found with the moral justification of emotion-desire (establishing emotion as a genuine and active source of virtue), and with the vitalistic identification of emotions as the source of life and reproduction. Another indication of change is the challenge of common and accepted truisms through the praise of “folly” in real life situations and literary works: To be “crazy” and “foolish” became a sign of distinction among certain intellectual circles, in contrast with the pedant orthodox scholars and officials and the vulgar nouveaux riches . The unconventional character of the anti-hero Baoyu is emblematic, with his aversion for any kind of official ceremony and convention, his abnormal sensibility and impractical and naive mentality, and his consciousness of being different from others. The crisis of the established ladder of values can be seen in the exaltation of “amoral” wisdom and in the presentation of various dimensions of love, from the idealistic sentiment of “the talented student and the beautiful girl” to the metaphysical passion that overcomes death, and to the minimalist concept of “love is like food” in a carpe diem perspective. And finally another challenge is exemplified by Yuan Mei’s reflections on the concept of Heavenly Mandate, retribution, human responsibility, and historical constructions by resorting to “abnormal” phenomena to uncover the absurdity of reality and unconscious imagery. His questions testify the polyphonic debates of the late imperial China, besides established conventions and Neo-Confucian orthodoxy.

Buddhism during the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392–1910): A Collective Trauma?

AbstractAn increasing number of recent scholars have challenged the narrative of Korean Buddhism as persecuted, isolated, and debased under the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy of the Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910). These scholars have revealed the continued support from both the state and Confucian aristocrats afforded to Buddhism; the friendship between yangbans and monastics; and the recognition of monastics’ role in Chosŏn society. While these insights provide a welcome nuance to a consideration of the period, it should be also recognized that the anti-Buddhist paradigm was a pervasive norm at the state and local levels throughout the Chosŏn era. The perception that Buddhism was heretical and that monastics were socially inferior was so deeply ingrained in the minds of aristocrats and the populace for so long that monastics developed a sense of collective trauma. This article revisits the vicissitudes of Chosŏn Buddhism by considering an incident that took place in the 1930s in colonial Korea. This case will help scholars of Korean history and Buddhism understand how colonial-period monastics acted from the trauma of the anti-Buddhist paradigm of the Chosŏn dynasty.

Wm. Theodore de Bary: August 9, 1919–July 14, 2017

Wm. Theodore de BaryAugust 9, 1919–July 14, 2017 Peter K. Bol Wm. T. de Bary passed away in 2017 in his ninety-eighth year. He was one of the several academic leaders of the post-World War II generation who worked to establish East Asian studies in the United States and in particular the East Asian humanities. Through his own scholarship, his collaboration with Wing-tsit Chan, and his advising of graduate students he largely made the field of Neo-Confucian studies. He was also a truly dedicated teacher in the "great books" tradition and continued to teach at Columbia into his final year. There is a story, which I believe, that a university sought to entice him away from Columbia with an offer it thought too good to be refused: he would not be required to teach. That was the end of it for Ted; he would not serve at such a university. I am not sure if there was an order of precedence, but these were the three things Ted as a scholar cared the most about: Chinese thought, teaching, and Columbia. Ted orchestrated the contributions that made possible the Sources series for China, Japan and India. The late Irene Bloom co-edited the greatly expanded second edition of Sources of Chinese Tradition. Sources was, I think, his effort to create an equivalent for China of "Introduction to Contemporary Civilization in the West," the survey of political, moral, religious and philosophical thought that was one of two enduring core courses at Columbia. Yet Columbia students also had to take the other one, "Literature Humanities," a survey of Western literary and aesthetic traditions. As far as I can tell, that side of China's past did not interest Ted, perhaps because it was too culturally specific. Certainly the division between the intellectual and the literary was not of his making, yet perhaps it helps explain what drew him to the study of Neo-Confucians, who were so clearly on the intellectual side of things and who saw rather little value in the literary. Anthologies that capture the tensions and interplay between the intellectual and the literary in China's past still await. Ted was not an historian, as he occasionally would remind those who were. The series of books he wrote on Neo-Confucianism, beginning with Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of the Mind-And-Heart (Columbia [End Page v] University Press, 1981), were historical in that they dealt with thinkers in the past; and yet he was right in suspecting that they would disappoint historians. I am not sure he thought all that much of historians in any case. It was not necessary to seek explanations for why Neo-Confucianism had spread, it was enough to know that it had, and that it evolved from its Song origins, gaining a degree of what he saw as individualism and humanitarianism in late Ming, as he described it in his contribution to Self and Society in Ming Thought. And yet one would not turn to his work to understand Neo-Confucianism as a philosophical system either. He was interested in the values of the elite, their articulation, and their instantiation in practice. In the Chinese case Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism demanded attention not because it was an intrinsically superior or a uniquely Chinese mode of thought, but because here was a society in which the governing elite consciously defined itself in terms of shared moral values, values which could transcend historical context. He saw Neo-Confucianism, and Confucianism in general, as a successful solution to a common human problem, one still worth reflecting on today: how to cultivate a political elite that thought itself responsible for the common good and was capable of both serving and resisting autocratic power. The Trouble with Confucianism (Harvard University Press, 1991) is a statement of his ultimate appraisal of the place of Confucianism in world history and a recognition of its problem with giving voice to the common people. His discussion of this work and the critical responses by leading scholars of the day in China Review International 1.1 (Spring 1994: 9–47) stands as an introduction to his mission...

Buddhism during the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392–1910): A Collective Trauma?

An increasing number of recent scholars have challenged the narrative of Korean Buddhism as persecuted, isolated, and debased under the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy of the Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910). These scholars have revealed the continued support from both the state and Confucian aristocrats afforded to Buddhism; the friendship between yangbans and monastics; and the recognition of monastics’ role in Chosŏn society. While these insights provide a welcome nuance to a consideration of the period, it should be also recognized that the anti-Buddhist paradigm was a pervasive norm at the state and local levels throughout the Chosŏn era. The perception that Buddhism was heretical and that monastics were socially inferior was so deeply ingrained in the minds of aristocrats and the populace for so long that monastics developed a sense of collective trauma . This article revisits the vicissitudes of Chosŏn Buddhism by considering an incident that took place in the 1930s in colonial Korea. This case will help scholars of Korean history and Buddhism understand how colonial-period monastics acted from the trauma of the anti-Buddhist paradigm of the Chosŏn dynasty.

Timizi nu in (The Bond of Water in Hands): An Early Modern Ryūkyūan Kumi Odori, as Staged by the National Theatre Okinawa

The early modern Ryūkyūan play Timizi nu in (The Bond of Water in Hands) is commonly attributed to Heshikiya Chōbin (1700–1734), an aristocrat whose views on love and human nature clashed with the Ryūkyūan royal state’s Neo-Confucian orthodoxy. As a proto-Romantic outlier in the otherwise ideologically narrow early modern Ryūkyūan repertory, Timizi nu in helped shape the development of modern Okinawan theatre and remains quite popular today. This article connects Timizi nu in to its intellectual historical context and sheds light on its aesthetic characteristics, paying particular attention to its use of allusion to establish links with the Ryūkyūan and mainland Japanese literary traditions.

Empire of the Dharma: Korean and Japanese Buddhism, 1877–1912 by Hwansoo Ilmee Kim (review)

Reviewed by: Empire of the Dharma: Korean and Japanese Buddhism, 1877–1912 by Hwansoo Ilmee Kim Trent Maxey (bio) Empire of the Dharma: Korean and Japanese Buddhism, 1877–1912. By Hwansoo Ilmee Kim. Harvard University Asia Center, Cambridge, Mass., 2012. xxvi, 415 pages. $49.95. Hwansoo Ilmee Kim’s lengthy study examines interactions between Korean and Japanese Buddhism during the decades leading up to the annexation of Korea in 1910. Kim uses the fluidity and uncertainty of that period to challenge the prevailing narrative animated by imperialists and collaborators. His narrative is more nuanced, foregrounding the complex motives under lying the collaborative relationships sought by Korean and Japanese Buddhist clergy. Those collaborations, in turn, created the institutional and discursive foundation for modern Korean Buddhism. The book thus addresses both the history of Korean Buddhism and the politically charged task of interpreting the personal and institutional ties accompanying Japan’s encroachment into and eventual annexation of Korea. Organized into seven chapters, in addition to an introduction, conclusion, and postscript, the book also supplies the reader with extensive supplementary materials, including maps of relevant Buddhist temples in Seoul; a chronology; a key to significant individuals, movements, and organizations; and a glossary. These materials greatly aid readers unfamiliar with either Korean or Japanese Buddhist history and suggest the book is meant to address a wide audience. At the same time, given the overlap of the material covered in some chapters, one feels the book could be significantly shorter without sacrificing the focus and strength of its argument. [End Page 422] Kim draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s theoretical apparatus of habitus, capital, and field to shed light on the relative autonomy with which Korean and Japanese Buddhists entered into a game of exchange. This attempt to “bring to light the agency and voices of Buddhists” from Japan and Korea guides Kim’s historiographic intervention and explains the chronological focus of the volume (p. 2). Kim argues that the uncertain future of Korean and Japanese relations in the decades between 1877 and formal annexation in 1910 created a context that “abounded with converging and diverting visions, interests, and strategies among Korean Buddhists, Japanese Buddhists, and the state” (pp. 2–3). Within this context, a dichotomizing master narrative of imperialistic aggression and passive victimization gives way to a more complicated form of encounter guided by differentials in social and political capital. Despite this search for nuance, Kim ends his introduction with a stark and provocative question: who benefited most from this exchange between Korean and Japanese Buddhism? His conclusion at the end of the book that Korean monastics by far benefited more than their Japanese counter parts indicates the boldness with which this book intervenes in both the history of Korean Buddhism and the precolonial encounter between Japan and Korea. The argument in support of this bold claim unfolds unevenly over the course of seven chapters, which draw from a wide range of Korean and Japanese sources. Particularly notable is the way in which Kim draws on the histories of the five most active Japanese Buddhist sects in Korea as well as the private letters of Korean and Japanese clergy. The focus of analysis shifts frequently across and within the chapters, between intimate biographical accounts of key clerics and broader, institutional and political histories. Chapter 1, for instance, lays out the history of Korean Buddhism through the five centuries of Chosŏn Korea, counterposing it with the modern re-configuration of Buddhism in post-Meiji Japan. Korean monastics were systematically marginalized by the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy of the Chosŏn court, proscribed from entering the four gates of Seoul, and given a modicum of official recognition only as soldier-monks. Their position at the margins of the Korean sociopolitical order cast the seemingly elevated status of Japanese Buddhist clergy in attractive light. In an efficient summary of developments in post-Restoration Japan, Kim underscores how the demands of a modernizing state forced painful institutional reforms upon Buddhist sects there. Japanese Buddhists arrived in Korea as modernizers possessing considerable social and political capital, having reformed their sects into highly centralized and largely autonomous organizations and begun to counter Christian missions by defining Buddhism as a Pan-Asian...

Tobacco, God, and Books: The Perils of Barbarism in Eighteenth-Century Korea

Late eighteenth-century East Asia witnessed similar events with the Qianlong emperor's (r. 1736–96) literary inquisition in China, King Chŏngjo's (r. 1776–1800) fight against heterodoxy in Korea, and Matsudaira Sadanobu's (1759–1829) Ban on Heterodoxy (Igaku no kin, 1790) in Japan. As is well known, Qianlong sought to destroy anti-Manchu writings, whereas Matsudaira sought to impose order by mandating the neo-Confucian orthodoxy of Zhu Xi (1130–1200) in elite education. Chŏngjo's activities are less understood, but equally significant. His own literary inquisition developed around threats Catholicism posed to the centrality of neo-Confucian orthodoxy, but it encompassed wider concerns over heterodox books imported from Qing China (1644–1911). What Matsudaira desired, Chŏngjo took for granted as defining Chosŏn (1392–1910) Korea's historic claim to guard civilization, and his fears over the threats of barbarism intensified as Catholicism and other forms of heterodoxy arrived via Qing China. This study examines Chŏngjo's response to those threats.

Filial Piety with a Zen Twist: Universalism and Particularism Surrounding the Sutra on the Difficulty of Reciprocating the Kindness of Parents

Abstract This article examines the Sutra on the Difficulty of Reciprocating the Kindness of Parents and its reinterpretation by the Japanese Rinzai Zen monk Tōrei Enji 東嶺圓慈 (1721-1792). In the context of the Tokugawa period (1600-1867) where filial piety was upheld as one of the pillars of morality and Neo-confucian orthodoxy, Tōrei’s commentary of this sutra skillfully combined the particularist understanding of filiality as limited to one’s relatives with its broader construal as a universal attitude of reverence directed toward all sentient beings. The father is envisioned as the wisdom and the excellence of the Buddha, the mother as the compassionate vows of the Bodhisattva, and the children as those who emit the thought of awakening. Tōrei further pushed this interpretation by adding the distinct Zen idea that the initial insight into one’s true nature needs to be surpassed and refined by perfecting the going beyond (kōjō 向上) phase of training, where the child/disciple’s legacy and his indebtedness towards his spiritual mentors is recast in terms of overcoming one’s attainments and attachment to them.

Searching for the Way: Theory of Knowledge in Pre-modern and Modern China (review)

Reviewed by: Searching for the Way: Theory of Knowledge in Pre-modern and Modern China Bart Dessein Searching for the Way: Theory of Knowledge in Pre-modern and Modern China. By Jana S. Rosker. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2008. Pp. xvi + 356. U.S. $52.00. In Searching for the Way: Theory of Knowledge in Pre-modern and Modern China, Jana S. Rosker investigates the development of ontological and epistemological theories in China, from the early philosophical fundaments of the period of the Warring States to the contemporary period. Rosker deals with the development of Chinese theories of how knowledge is gained and transmitted in order to attain ultimate wisdom, where wisdom is understood to pertain to the domain of morality in the Chinese holistic view of man and the cosmos. Given the discrepancy between the object of knowledge and the subject of comprehension, this investigation more particularly deals with such problems as the possibility or impossibility of attaining correct knowledge of a given object—and thus the possibility or impossibility of attaining a complete understanding of the way (dao); the relationship between this knowledge and wisdom on the one hand and morality on the other; the possibility or impossibility of language to function as a conveyer of knowledge; and the relationship between knowledge (zhi) and action (xing). In this investigation the author engages in a discussion of the criteria that define a logical tradition, that is, a tradition of rational inquiry, and the number of such logical traditions that can be discerned. This discussion is also part of the Chinese philosophical debate, as the modern Chinese Marxist philosopher Feng Qi (1915–1995) claimed that, with the exception of the Mohist classic Mo jing, which includes some well-developed formal logical treatises, “it is generally acknowledged that Chinese philosophy was primarily focused on ethics.”1 With this claim, Feng agrees with the common Western opinion that this characteristic of Chinese philosophy places the Chinese tradition in contrast to the European and Indian traditions, which are characterized by the accentuation of formal logic.2 Indeed, this fundamental difference between the Chinese tradition on the one hand and the European and Indian traditions on the other made some scholars claim that only two traditions of rational inquiry can be differentiated: the Western and the Indian.3 The difference between the Chinese and Western approaches to these problems can be summarized in the following: whereas in Western discourse, the external world (or objective reality) was conceived to a great extent as independent of the subject of comprehension, the Chinese theories of knowledge can generally be called ‘relational epistemologies,’ that is, epistemologies in which there is a holistic relation between the object of knowledge and the subject of comprehension. In the first chapter, “Chinese Philosophy and Chinese Epistemology—Uncovering a Hidden Relationship” (pp. 1–37), Rosker argues that four basic epistemological trends can be differentiated in the philosophy of the Warring States period. A first trend is the one represented by Confucius and Mozi. For them, language is normative and reality is subject to language. Therefore, language can express reality and is a normative instrument for gaining knowledge. A second trend is represented by [End Page 130] Laozi and Xunzi. For them, language cannot express reality. Hence, it cannot be used as a conveyor of knowledge. Mengzi also formulated a critique of the Confucian interpretation of language: “Mengzi argued that language did not represent an innate system which contained the essence of proper social norms that enabled people to live in a harmonic society” (p. 15). As this is the case for Laozi, his moral epistemology was based solely on introspection. While the Nomenalists (xingming jia) based their theories on isomorphic assumptions, the Neo-Mohists based them on linguistic relativism. They constitute a third trend. Zhuangzi’s philosophy, finally, can be named ‘radical relativism.’ It has been argued that “Rationality and argumentation arise when a thinker seriously contemplates the pervasiveness of the possibility that he may be wrong, that he needs reasons and arguments to support the validity of his views.”4 In other words, the peculiar Chinese connection between Confucian and Neo-Confucian orthodoxy on the one hand and the political milieu...

New Additions to the Sorai Library

Reviewed by: New Additions to the Sorai Library W. J. Boot (bio) Ogyū Sorai's Philosophical Masterworks: The Bendō and Benmei. By John A. Tucker. University of Hawai'i Press, 2006. xiv + 478 pages. Hardcover $56.00. John Tucker's complete translation of Bendō and Benmei is a tour de force—a masterwork, to borrow the word that he uses himself in reference to these two writings by Ogyū Sorai (1666-1728). It is both voluminous and a solid piece of work. The two translations as such, covering two hundred pages (pp. 137-337), are accompanied with copious notes (pp. 339-447) and a lengthy introduction (pp. 3-134). As Tucker specifies in the preface, he has translated the Chinese text of Bendō and Benmei that was published in 1740, not the kakikudashi version in volume 36 of Nihon shisō taikei, or the translations into modern Japanese made by Maeno Naoaki and Kanaya Osamu .1 This is as it should be: Sorai wrote in Chinese, not in Japanese. Translations, including Tucker's own into English, are useful, as they give an informed scholar's considered interpretation of a text, but they are no substitute for the real thing. I am glad to say that Tucker's translation is on the whole reliable. There are, of course, a number of things—choice of words, stresses, division of sentences and paragraphs—one could quarrel about, but errors are few. To amplify this statement a little, let us take a look at how Tucker has dealt with some of the issues implicit in chapter 7 of Benmei, yi (Jp. gi), which title Tucker has translated as "Ritual Principles" (pp. 210-21). This translation immediately raises two questions: First, is it correct to translate yi as "ritual principles," and, second, is it wise to do so, defying the standard translation of this term as "righteousness"? I think that everyone will in principle agree that it would be preferable not to use several different English words to translate the same Chinese term. Doing so complicates intratextual comparisons and, within a single text, it [End Page 559] obscures the texture of the argument. On the other hand, the differences between the two languages being what they are, sometimes it cannot be helped. As Tucker used "righteousness" in his 1998 translation of Itō Jinsai's Go-Mō jigi,2 we may conclude that the reason for his shift to the new translation "ritual principles" must lie in the argument Sorai makes in Benmei . The first few sentences of the chapter on yi show this supposition to be correct: "Ritual principles" is also a name referring to the way that the early kings founded. Now the early kings founded the rites to make their teachings as universal as possible.3 Still, while rites have a definite form, circumstances below heaven are infinite. Therefore, the early kings also founded ritual principles in relation to them. (p. 210) The position Sorai takes here is that "rites" (li, Jp. rei) and yi are complementary; in those cases in which the rites are inapplicable because they are too formalized, yi steps in. Because Sorai wants to clarify the ontological status of yi, he states that yi is a part of the Way to govern the realm, thereby already implying (he works this out later in more detail) that yi is not a virtue (de, Jp. toku) and, contrary to Neo-Confucian orthodoxy, not an innate capability of the human heart. Sorai also wants to quash the suggestion that one can decide by oneself how to behave when confronted with circumstances for which the formalized rites do not provide guidance. Hence, he says that the rites are part of the Way, which was instituted by the ancient kings. As the ancient kings established the rites, they also established yi, and they are the only ones who can do so. In view of Sorai's argument, Tucker needs to convey the idea that yi is something formulated by "someone." If he had translated yi as "righteousness," this implication would have been absent. "Righteousness" is too vast and amorphous a concept; one is inclined to assume that "it just is there," and it does not...

THE YONGLE REIGN AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF DAOXUE

In the late Ming period, nostalgia for the early years of the dynasty seemed to be a common convention. In his 1541 treatise, the Hanlin ji (Record of the Hanlin Academy), the erudite scholar Huang Zuo, (1490–1566) praised the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy of the early Ming court. He then recounted a story which, on its surface, illustrated his point. At the same time, however, the story raises certain problems with his view.

Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of the Mind-and-Heart

Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of the Mind-and-Heart

Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of the Mind-and-Heart. By Wm. Theodore De Bary. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. xviii, 267 pp. Notes, Glossaries (of Chinese graphs in text and notes), Index. $28.50.

Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of the Mind-and-Heart. By Wm. Theodore De Bary. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. xviii, 267 pp. Notes, Glossaries (of Chinese graphs in text and notes), Index. $28.50.

Chŏng Tasan's Philosophy of Man: A Radical Critique of the Neo-Confucian World View

Articles Chöng Tasan's Philosophy of Man: A Radical Critique ofthe Neo-Confucian World View MICHAEL C. KALTON Cihöng Yag-yong (1762-1836), better known by his pen name, Tasan, is recognized as the one who brought Sirhak, the School of Practical Learning, to its highest peak. The long years of his exile (1801-18) were years of vast scholarly accomplishment. In volume alone his work is overwhelming; his collected works, set in modern Chinese type, occupy well over thirteen thousand pages. But it is not the volume alone that is impressive, for his work is marked by a consistently high level of comprehensive and careful scholarship, sophisticated and critical methodology, and an originality that is the product of deep reflection and independence ofjudgment. Tasan is best known as the foremost representative of Sirhak, an intellectual movement characterized by practical concerns such as institutional and economic reform, along with a critical cast of mind that emphasized the need for concrete evidence rather than speculative theorizing. Materials of this sort abound in Tasan's work, and it is being mined anew by contemporary Korean scholars for an audience that discovers in Tasan a precursor of the modern era. This does not begin to exhaust the full dimensions of Tasan's work, however. Approximately one-half of his extant written works are devoted to studies and commentaries on the Confucian classics, and of all his scholarly accomplishments, the two that he himself esteemed most highly are his commentary on the Book of Changes and his elucidation of mourning ritual. Tasan's aim in his classical studies is to recover the pristine Confucian vision; the Han (206 B.c.-A.D. 220) and Sung (960-1126) dynasties in particular were periods of new developments in the Confucian tradition. Tasan, attempting to shake free of the effects of these two 4 Journal ofKorean Studies periods that deeply colored the interpretation of the classics, terms his own study Susa hak after the names of the two rivers where Confucius is said to have established his school. In his commentaries on the classics, he critically reviews for each passage the principal commentaries of the Han and Sung Confucians, along with a selection from T'ang, Ming, and Ch'ing commentators, and then offers his own interpretation with supporting historical and philological evidence. His work is at once both original and deeply faithful to the texts that stand at the foundation of the Confucian tradition. In a certain sense, Tasan's accomplishment in these Confucian studies is more remarkable than the Sirhak studies for which he is most noted. In the latter, he adheres to avalué orientation shared by others; in the former he is walking a more independent and lonely path, breaking decisively not only with the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy of Chu Hsi's school of thought, which had thoroughly dominated the intellectual world of Yi-dynasty Korea, but also with the whole body of underlying assumptions about the universe and man's place in it that had been generally accepted in the Confucian tradition for some two thousand years. It would be difficult to find ¿mother thinker in either China or Korea who not only put off the Neo-Confucian vision, but also developed an alternative that rivaled it in comprehensiveness, balance, and depth. In this paper I will attempt to delineate the major features of Tasan's view of man and the universe in contrast to the prevalent NeoConfucian vision. To understand the full dimensions of his undertaking , Neo-Confucianism must be understood not merely as a speculative philosophical system, but as a total vision and way of life. Thus we will begin with an overview of this vision, with special attention to the articulation between its metaphysics, its view of human nature and psychology, and the way it approaches the basic Confucian task of cultivating one's full human potential. THE NEO-CONFUCIAN VISION There are historical periods during which the intellectual life of the times calls for the descriptive prefix "neo," when men return to the thought, art, or culture of an earlier age but change what they recover because they themselves have become different. The Sung dynasty in China...